

















HANDBOOK  
FOR THE  
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY  
OF  
EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA  
1870-1914

By

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

and

AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA

With the Assistance of 50 Contributors

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Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service



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WASHINGTON  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
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## P R E F A C E .

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Responding to a request for urgent public service, the National Board for Historical Service undertook in February, 1918, to provide for the preparation of this survey of recent diplomatic history, with the understanding that the work should be so planned as to be ready for use within a very limited time. The immediate execution of this task was intrusted by the board to Profs. F. M. Anderson, of Dartmouth College, and A. S. Hershey, of Indiana University. They were fortunate in securing the cooperation of several other competent scholars, but within the limit of time originally agreed upon adequate treatment of the material was obviously impossible. During the present summer the material has been revised by Prof. F. M. Anderson, though still under such limitations as to time and available material as to preclude exhaustive research in many cases. It is believed, nevertheless, that this manual will prove of substantial service to workers in this field. Hearty thanks are due to both authors, and especially to Prof. Anderson, for the generous public spirit with which they have given many hours of gratuitous service, as well as for the energy and intelligence which they have applied to their difficult task.

NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1918.



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FRANK MALOY ANDERSON.

AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY.



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# DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1871-1914.

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## INTRODUCTION.

The diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914 falls naturally into four rather sharply defined periods:

(1) 1870-1878. From the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Congress of Berlin.

(2) 1878-1890. From the Congress of Berlin to the retirement of Bismarck.

(3) 1890-1904. From the retirement of Bismarck to the opening of the Russo-Japanese War.

(4) 1904-1914. From the opening of the Russo-Japanese War to the beginning of the World War.

A section of this volume is devoted to each of these periods. Articles which overlap any of the periods are placed in the section devoted to the period with which they seem most naturally connected.

### SECTION I.—1870-1878.

During the earlier part of this period nearly everything of much importance in the diplomatic history of Europe was connected with the Franco-Prussian War. In view of the importance of the transaction at the time and of the significance attaching to some of them in connection with the World War quite a number of articles bearing on the diplomatic history of the Franco-Prussian War are included. There are articles on the effort to prevent the outbreak of the war (1), the protection of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg (2 and 3), German seizure of neutral property during the war (4), and on the sale of munitions of war to belligerents (5). The collapse of the Second Empire on September 4, 1870, raised a problem, which is dealt with in the article on the recognition of the Government of National Defence (6). An article (8) is devoted to the adjustment of the Black Sea question which arose out of the action of Russia in declaring in October, 1870, that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856) relative to the Black Sea. There are also articles dealing with the diplomatic aspects of the taking of Rome by the Italian Government in September, 1870 (7), on the preliminaries of peace (9), and



on the Treaty of Frankfort (10). An article on the German arguments for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine states the reason put forward by Germany in attempted justification of the annexation of that region and points out the real reasons for that action (11). The series dealing with the Franco-Prussian War ends with an article describing the manner in which the evacuation of France by the German armies was brought about in the years 1871-1873 (12).

After the Franco-Prussian War and until his retirement in 1890, Bismarck dominated the international affairs of Europe to a degree seldom paralleled by any other individual. Since the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 the only person who exercised an influence at all comparable with that of Bismarck in the years indicated was Metternich in the period 1815-1848. From 1871 on Bismarck's chief and almost exclusive aim in foreign policy was to preserve for Germany the gains she had made by the Franco-Prussian War.

As the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine made the restoration of a really friendly feeling between France and Germany impossible, Bismarck was haunted with the fear lest France should find allies and thereby a coalition hostile to Germany would develop. Bismarck, therefore, bent his efforts toward securing the complete isolation of France. His success was remarkably speedy and complete. It was secured and maintained throughout the period by the arrangement commonly called the League of the Three Emperors, on which an article has been included (13). The article on the Franco-German war scare of 1875 (14) has a close connection with this topic, since it shows the kind of danger to which France was constantly exposed owing to the isolation forced upon her by Bismarck.

In this period European diplomacy was concerned almost wholly with European affairs. The problems of Asia and Africa did not engage the attention of diplomatists in any very large measure until the following period. There are, however, in this section two articles dealing with the Far East. One relates to the Kuldja affair (16), the other describes Chino-Japanese relations, 1872-1876 (15).

During the latter years of the period the most important features of European diplomacy arose out of the Eastern Question, as the problem of the existing status and future disposition of the Ottoman Empire was then called. Turkish misrule, especially in the Balkan Peninsula in the years 1875-1877, was the occasion for a series of negotiations involving all the states which had signed the Treaty of Paris (1856) and the Balkan principalities. These difficulties, which in their diplomatic aspects are treated in the article entitled the Eastern question, 1875-1877 (17), finally resulted in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Nearly all of the remaining articles in-

cluded in this section relate to that war and the settlement which grew out of it. As the settlement was the cause of great dissatisfaction in many different quarters and created conditions which had a large influence in bringing about the World War, several articles dealing with various aspects of the matter have been included. There are articles on the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 (18), on the understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary shortly before the Russo-Turkish War began (19), on the alliance between Russia and Roumania during the war (20), on the Treaty of San Stefano arranged by Russia and Turkey at the close of the war (21), on the Congress of Berlin (22), which revised this treaty and arranged the final settlement. In view of the importance of the settlement, a series of five articles (23-27) deals separately with the case of each State, except Turkey, which had a direct territorial interest at stake in the settlement arranged for the Balkan Peninsula. A number of articles dealing with problems which arose out of stipulations included in the Treaty of Berlin will be found in the sections to which they seem most appropriately attached. The series dealing with the Eastern question closes with an article on the English protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914 (28), that island having been acquired from Turkey by Great Britain on the eve of the assembling of the Congress of Berlin.

Soon after the adjournment of the Congress of Berlin Bismarck obtained from Austria-Hungary a small installment of recompense for the assistance he had there rendered to the Dual Monarchy. This took the form of a release for Germany from the obligation which Prussia had contracted in 1866 by article 5 of the Treaty of Prague whereby Prussia was bound to permit the people of North Schleswig, an overwhelmingly Danish district, to determine by free vote whether they should be returned to Denmark. The final article of the section (29) deals with this matter.

## SECTION II.—1878-1890.

At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck professed to play the rôle of "honest broker," i. e., to seek no personal or German interest, but to act as the impartial friend of all parties and to facilitate the arrangement of a satisfactory adjustment. Whether or not he actually did seek to play that rôle is a matter about which there is, perhaps, room for a difference of opinion. Russia, at any rate, was aggrieved at the settlement reached, and held that Bismarck had sacrificed the interest of Russia to promote the advantage of Austria-Hungary. The arrangement known as the League of the Three Emperors therefore no longer met the requirements of the situation from the standpoint of Bismarck. He could no longer count upon the friendship of Russia to such a degree as to assure the complete isolation of



France. Some other device must be substituted. Bismarck speedily found the necessary arrangement in the form of a close alliance with Austria-Hungary. This was the (Austro-German) Dual Alliance, to the formation of which an article is devoted (33). Three years after the formation of this alliance the arrangement, from the Bismarckian point of view, was improved by the entrance of Italy into the combination. This is dealt with in the article on the formation of the Triple Alliance (34). It is followed by articles on the renewals of the Triple Alliance (35) and on Roumania and its relation to that alliance (36). Bismarck was able to assure the continued complete isolation of France by entering into his well-known reinsurance treaty with Russia. An article deals with that subject (37).

The affairs of southeastern Europe occupied the attention of diplomatists much less in this period than in the preceding one. A series of three articles deals with more important problems of that character: the Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 (38); the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885-86 (39); and the pacific blockade of Greece, 1886 (40).

The readiness of Bismarck, several times displayed between 1871 and 1890, to threaten France with war lends interest to the article on the Schnaebeli incident (41), which was a good example of that form of Bismarckian method.

Throughout the entire period, but especially during the later years, questions arising out of the colonial enterprises of Europe, especially in Africa, occupied much attention. As late as 1878 only a small portion of Africa, consisting chiefly of the Mediterranean coast, the southern end of the continent, and scattered regions along the west coast, was under the control of European States. Within the next dozen years nearly all of the hitherto unclaimed portion of the continent passed under European control. Rivalry for possession and the adjustment of boundaries gave rise to a series of diplomatic problems. A large number of such questions were settled by agreements between the powers directly interested. There were also some important general settlements of difficult African problems. Problems of this sort were so numerous and involved that detailed treatment here is out of question. But a number of articles have been included which deal with some of the most significant features of the general problem. Among these are the articles upon the partition of Africa, 1878-1885 (43); the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunis, 1881 (44); the Dual Control over Egyptian finances, 1876-1883 (45); the British occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914 (46); the Soudan question, 1881-1899 (47); the acquisition of Madagascar by France, 1882-1897 (48); Anglo-German rivalry in Southwest Africa, 1883-1886 (49); Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa, 1885-1890 (50); the question of West Africa, 1880-1898

(51); the formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885 (52); the Berlin Conference, 1884-1885 (53); the delimitation of European colonies in Central Africa, 1885-1899 (54); the international status of the Transvaal or South African Republic, 1877-1884 (55); British relations to the Boer Republics, 1884-1899 (56); and the question of the Portuguese colonies (57).

In this period Asiatic problems had not become as numerous or as important as they were to prove in the following period. But there were a number of such problems. The section, therefore, closes with a series of six articles dealing with Asiatic matters: The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, 1878-1887 (58); the British acquisition of Upper Burma, 1885-86 (59); Franco-Siamese relations, 1893-1904 (60); European encroachments in the Far East, 1882-1887 (61); the Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885 (62); the journeys of William II to the Near East, the first of which took place shortly before the end of the period (63).

### SECTION III.—1890-1904.

In the period 1890-1904 the problems of diplomacy in large measure arose out of or were greatly influenced by four new factors affecting the international situation:

(1) The collapse or abandonment near the beginning of the period of Bismarck's system for securing the isolation of France through the Triple Alliance in combination with his reinsurance treaty with Russia.

(2) The development of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance.

(3) The adoption by Germany about 1890 of the policy of *Weltpolitik*.

(4) The Chino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and the changed situation in the Far East, due in large measure to the war.

Nearly all of the articles in the section deal with problems which were caused or were much affected by one or more of these influences. A few, however, deal with other matters.

The section opens with an article on the dismissal of Bismarck, considered in relation to the foreign policy of Germany (64). It is naturally followed by an article on the development of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance (66). After articles on the Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty of 1890 (67) and on the Dreyfus affair (68), there follows a series of articles dealing with matters arising out of the affairs of southeastern Europe and the Near East. The first of the series aims to set forth the history of railway concessions in Turkey other than the Bagdad Railway (69). Others in the series deal with Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (70), the closely connected Cretan question (1868-1898) (71), and the Armenian question from 1878 to 1897 (72). The series ends with an article which



describes the action of the leading States in regard to the Serbian Revolution of 1903 (73), and aims to point out the significance of that occurrence for the course of later events in southeastern Europe.

In this period, as in the preceding ones, African problems frequently occupied the attention of diplomatists. A series of articles is, therefore, devoted to that general topic. The clash between Italy and Abyssinia, growing out of the colonial enterprises of Italy in the Red Sea region, is dealt with in the first article of the series, entitled *Relations between Italy and Abyssinia, 1893-1900* (75). The narrative is carried down to the time when Italy desisted from all effort to assert any claim of control over Abyssinia and acknowledged its entire independence. The article on the Fashoda affair 1898-1899 (76) explains the settlement of conflicting territorial claims in the upper Nile region and makes plain the importance of that settlement in clearing the way for the development of the *Entente Cordiale*. From 1882 until after the Fashoda affair French resentment against Great Britain was constantly increasing, largely on account of colonial rivalry. Shortly before this hostile feeling reached its climax in the dispute over Fashoda an attempt was made to utilize the possible opportunity thereby presented to bring about closer and more amicable relations between France and Germany. The idea of this project and the reasons for its failure are explained in the article on the attempted Franco-German accord of 1898 (77). Events connected with the Boer War are handled in the articles on the Kruger telegram (78), the seizure of German ships during the war (79), and the Treaty of Vereeniging (80). The beginning of the Morocco question is considered in an article on *France and Morocco, 1894-1904* (81). The Congo question, after the establishment of the Congo Free State, is treated in its diplomatic aspect in the article on the annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium, 1889-1908 (82).

A group of 15 articles, the largest in the section, bears witness to the important rôle which after 1895 the Far East played in diplomatic history. The first of these articles deals with Chino-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894 (83), thereby throwing light on the outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War. The peace at the close of the war is treated in articles on the Treaty of Shimonoseki (84) and on the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan (85). An article on the "Open-door policy" in China, 1895-1904 (86), deals with a most significant phase of the general Chinese problem, while the encroachments of European states upon portions of Chinese territory, seeming to foreshadow dismemberment, are handled in articles on the leasing of Kiaou-Chau by Germany (87), the Cassini convention (88), the leasing of Port Arthur by Russia (89), the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain (90). The

Boxer Uprising, due in large measure to these encroachments, is treated in its diplomatic bearing (91). Matters connected directly with events and circumstances which led to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War are treated in articles on the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 (92), Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904 (93), the Russian advance into Manchuria, 1895-1903 (94), the convention for the evacuation of Manchuria, 1902 (95), and the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (96). The series closes with an article on the abrogation of the Japanese extra-territoriality treaties of Japan (97).

The section concludes with articles on the First Hague Conference (98) and on the Anglo-French arbitration treaty of 1903 (99), the latter of which did much to pave the way for the Entente Cordiale.

#### SECTION IV.—1904-1914.

From the standpoint of diplomatic history during 1904-1914 the events of most far-reaching influence were:

(1) The negotiation of the convention of April 8, 1904, between France and England.

(2) The signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.

(3) The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908.

It would not be difficult to point out for nearly every matter dealt with in the articles under this period that there is a close and easily discoverable connection with some one of the three events.

The section, therefore, appropriately opens with articles on the formation of the Entente Cordiale (100), and on the secret negotiations between the Kaiser and the Czar in 1905 and 1906 in consequence of the new international situation (101).

For the Russo-Japanese War there is an article on the Dogger Bank incident (103), another on the seizure of neutral ships by Russia during the war (102), while the negotiation and terms of peace at the close of the war are described in the article on the Treaty of Portsmouth (104). As that treaty contributed largely to the creation of a new situation in the Far East, the series of articles which follows seeks to state the essential facts in regard to the most important of the diplomatic transactions arising out of that situation. Since Japanese influence was paramount in the Far East, and that, in turn, depended in considerable measure upon the relations between Japan and England, there is an article on the renewals of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905 and 1911 (105). Important phases of the general Chinese problem are dealt with in articles on the open-door policy in China, 1904-1914 (106); spheres of influence in China, 1897-1904 (107); railway concessions in China (108); and on Chino-Japanese relations, 1905-1914 (109). There are also articles dealing



with Japan's relations with Korea, 1904-1910 (110), and with China and the Six Power Loan Syndicate, 1908-1913 (111). The problem of the outlying and loosely connected portions of the Chinese Empire is considered in its diplomatic aspects in the articles on the question of South Manchuria, 1905-1918 (112); the Thibet question, 1880-1914 (113); the Mongolian question, 1881-1915 (114).

The theatrical journey of the Kaiser to Tangier and his speech there (March, 1905) precipitated the first of the European crises over Morocco. This action by Germany was obviously influenced by the supposedly weakened condition of France, due to the fact that her Russian ally was still engaged in war with Japan and was already threatened with revolution. It was also the German counter-stroke to the formation of the Entente Cordiale. There can be little doubt that Germany hoped and expected that the new arrangement between France and England would thereby be destroyed or so seriously weakened that it would no longer have any real value for France. The episode as a whole, including the Algeciras Conference which terminated it, is treated in the article entitled, The Morocco crisis of 1905-6 (115). Other important matters closely connected with this crisis are treated in the articles on the resignation of Delcassé, 1905 (116), Italy and Morocco (117), and Spain and Morocco (118). Another somewhat related topic is treated in the article on the Red Sea convention, December 13, 1906 (119).

At intervals for many years the long continuing internal weakness of Persia made that country occasionally the subject of diplomatic discussion. After the Persian Revolution of 1906 such questions came up frequently. Russia and England, with territorial possessions bordering on Persia and with claims to important interests in the country, were the States most directly concerned. But Germany, on account of the Bagdad Railway and its ambitions in the Near East, was also interested. An article on the Persian question, 1906-1914 (120), deals with the matter. A separate article on the Potsdam accord, 1910, to be found further along (138), has also a bearing on the subject.

The continued solidity of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance, the attempt of Germany to destroy the Entente Cordiale in the first Morocco crisis, the growing Anglo-German antagonism, and the desire of Russia for speedy recovery from the disaster of the Russo-Japanese War and the revolutionary movement which followed it, led in 1907 to the drawing together of Russia, France, and England. This important development is treated in the article on the formation of the Triple Entente, 1907 (121).

After nearly a century, marked by frequent dissension, the personal union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved in 1905-1907. The diplomatic side of this adjustment is treated in an article

on the separation of Norway from Sweden (122). A separate article deals with the closely related topic, the Baltic and North Sea conventions of 1908 (123). This is followed by an article on the Second Hague Conference, 1907 (124).

At the Reval interview, June, 1908, to which an article is devoted (125), Edward VII and Nicholas II were reported to have come to an agreement upon the reforms they were prepared to demand of the Turkish Government in regard to Macedonia. A desire to anticipate the presentation of these demands is believed to have precipitated the revolution in Turkey long in process of preparation by the Young Turks. This revolution, to which an article is given (126), was the starting point and in large measure the cause for a chain of important events leading directly to the World War. Those of the events which occurred in 1908-9 and a number of other matters closely connected with them are handled in a series of articles, the first of which deals with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (127). It is followed by an article on the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Novi-Bazar (128), and that by another on the Bulgarian declaration of independence (129), which came immediately after and as a direct consequence of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The action of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was deeply resented by Serbia, precipitated a crisis, which nearly led to a general European war. The matter is dealt with in the article entitled the Bosnian crisis, 1908-9 (130).

At the moment of the occurrence of the Turkish Revolution and for some weeks afterwards there seemed to be good reason for the belief that the Young Turks could and would attempt to carry out the attractive program of reforms included in their profession of principles. Whatever possibility there may have been for the realization of that expectation was destroyed by the action of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. The developments of the next three years showed the Young Turks accentuating instead of removing the evils which afflicted the Christian subjects of the Sultan. This feature of the situation brought to the front important questions which in one form or another had frequently been the subject of diplomatic consideration. Macedonia and Crete were especially under discussion at that time. The Macedonian question from 1878 to 1912 is dealt with in two articles (131 and 132), the Cretan question from 1897 to 1912 also in two articles (133 and 134).

The settlement of the Morocco question, arranged by the Algeiras Conference in 1906, served to prevent the tension over the subjects between France and Germany from again becoming acute until in 1911. But there were meanwhile difficulties springing out of the matter. One of them is dealt with in the article on the Casablanca



affair (135). Other difficulties were adjusted for a time by the Morocco convention of 1909, to which an article is given (136). The most dangerous stage in the entire Morocco controversy, including the settlement finally reached in the convention of November 4, is treated in the article entitled, *The Morocco crisis of 1911* (137).

From about 1901 to 1908 Tripoli, nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, passed more and more under the control of Italy, though at least a semblance of Turkish authority was constantly maintained. The Turkish Revolution somewhat arrested this tendency, because the Young Turks set out to check it. Disputes over that situation finally resulted in 1911 in the outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey. The article on the Tripoli question, 1902-1911 (141) deals with this problem. In the article on the Treaty of Lausanne the negotiation and terms of the peace at the close of the war are described (142).

A series of articles is allotted to the diplomatic history of the Balkan wars (1912-13). The first of the series, the formation of the Balkan Alliance, aims to set forth what is known of the genesis of that league (143). It is followed by an article dealing with the unsuccessful effort of diplomacy to avert the outbreak of war between the Balkan Alliance and Turkey (144). For the negotiations and terms of the important treaty which brought peace at the close of that war between the Balkan allies and Turkey there is an article entitled *The Treaty of London, 1913* (145). As the problem of adjusting numerous conflicting claims in regard to Albania was an important factor in the negotiation of that treaty and as the Albanian question played a very important part in the whole Balkan situation in 1912 and 1913, two articles have been allotted to the matter. One deals with the Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913 (146), the other with the establishment of the Principality of Albania, 1912-13 (147).

The diplomatic history of the Second Balkan War is treated in three articles, one dealing with the effort of diplomacy to adjust the dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia and Greece which preceded the outbreak of the war (148); the second with the Treaty of Bucharest (149); and the third with the Greco-Serbian alliance of 1913 (150). While Bulgaria was engaged in the Second Balkan War Turkey took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to reconquer part of the territory recently lost to Bulgaria. The peace at the close of this Turco-Bulgar War is dealt with in the article on the *Treaty of Constantinople, 1913* (151).

A group of six articles deals with matters which belong to the closing years of the period and have a close connection with the World War. One aims to set forth what is known about the projected Austro-Hungarian intervention in Serbia in 1913 (152).

another deals with the Anglo-French military and naval conversations, 1905-1912 (153), and a third with the military conversations between England and Belgium, 1906-1912 (154). The other three deal with various phases of the effort of diplomacy to make less acute the antagonism between Germany and England. One of these relates particularly to the attempt to arrange some agreement between the two countries as to naval programs (155). Another deals with the projected agreement of 1914, which is reported to have reached the stage for the signatures when the World War broke out (156). The third treats of the London naval conference of 1909 (157).

The section concludes with a group of three articles dealing with matters of importance for the entire period 1870 to 1914; the Roman question, 1871-1914 (158); Franco-German relations, 1871-1914 (159); the growth of European armaments in relation to European diplomacy, 1871-1914 (160).





## SECTION I.—1870-1878.

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### 1. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, JULY 3 TO 19, 1870.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The victory of Prussia in the War of 1866 led immediately to the creation of the North German Confederation and to the conclusion of military treaties between Prussia and the South German States not yet members of the Confederation. A new situation was thereby created in Europe. Its most marked feature was mutual suspicion and distrust in Germany and France. A belief that war would soon break out became widely prevalent in both countries. Tension between France and Prussia rapidly increased. In France the chauvinist spirit was promoted by the ultra-Imperialists, who felt that unless the prestige of France was restored the Empire would be overthrown. In Germany the enmity toward France was nursed by Bismarck, who thought that the South German States, if they came to fear French aggression, would join the North German Confederation.

#### 2. THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY FOR THE SPANISH THRONE.

Meantime the Spanish throne, vacant by revolution (1868), had been offered to several princes, among them Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Leopold at first declined, but in 1870, after the return from Madrid of Bismarck's secret agent, Von Versen, the offer was renewed and accepted. The acceptance, announced by the Havas Agency July 3 and published in the Paris papers July 4, 5, created the greatest excitement and indignation in France (Fester, I, 122, 124, 129-133). The Emperor Napoleon and the ministry (Émile Ollivier, prime minister, and the Duc de Gramont, minister of foreign affairs) regarded the affair as a Prussian intrigue designed to humiliate France and to weaken her in a military way, in case of a war between France and Prussia; and the Government at once took the ground that France could never permit a Hohenzollern to ascend the Spanish throne. The official declaration to the chambers, July 6, affirmed the belief that "the good sense of the German people"



and the "friendship of the Spanish people" would effect the withdrawal of Prince Leopold, otherwise "We shall know how to fulfill our duty without hesitation and without feebleness." (Angeberg, I, 20; Fester, I, 134.)

### 3. WITHDRAWAL OF THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY.

To a request for explanations, the Prussian Government replied that it was not officially aware of the affair, which was a purely Hohenzollern family matter (Lesourd to Gramont, July 4; King William to Queen Augusta, July 5; Angeberg, I, 16; Fester, I, 123, 125). The French Government made it known that if Leopold became King of Spain France would regard it as a sufficient cause for war, and the courts of Europe were requested to use their influence with Prussia and Spain. Marshall Prim, the actual head of the Spanish Government, declared himself willing to "facilitate" Leopold's retreat, and July 10 he sent an agent to Berlin to urge the withdrawal of the acceptance (Mercier to Gramont, July 7, 9, 10; Angeberg, I, 32, 56, 73; Fester, II, 12, 37, 62). The English Government, most active of all the powers in endeavoring to prevent war, represented to France that Prince Leopold on the throne of Spain could not be a serious danger to a great country like France and **regretted the aggressive language of the French Government** (Letters of Granville and Lyons, July 5-8; Fester, I, 128, II, 4, 12, 15, 27; Angeberg, I, 18, 23, 24, 40, 41, 45, 48, 51); represented at Berlin that Leopold's candidacy was of no importance to Prussia, that Leopold would find the position a difficult one, and urged the Prussian Government to "discourage" the project (Granville to Loftus, July 6; Fester, I, 144; Angeberg, I, 24); and very strongly urged upon the Spanish Government not to give effect to the candidacy (Granville to Layard, July 7; Fester, II, 8; Angeberg, I, 36, 37).

The Austrian Government held the same language at Madrid (Beust to Metternich, July 11; Angeberg, I, 87; Fester, II, 80), and at Berlin, while deprecating the attitude of France, expressed the conviction that "the wisdom of the King and his influence as head of the Hohenzollern house will be utilized to prevent so unfortunate a development." (Beust to Münch, July 6; Fester, I, 141; Angeberg, I, 21.) The Russian Government, after some delay (Fleury to Gramont, July 7, 9; Buchanan to Granville, July 9; Fester, II, 9, 45, 54), made similar representations at Berlin (Fleury to Gramont, July 12; Fester, II, 95). The Italian Government strongly urged the Spanish Government to "come to some arrangement." (Layard to Granville, July 11; Fester, II, 83). Meanwhile the French Government, through Benedetti at Ems, repeatedly urged upon King William to refuse his consent to Leopold's becoming King of Spain. The king failed to comply with the request,

but said that if Leopold should withdraw he would approve the withdrawal. (Benedetti to Gramont, July 9; King William to Queen Augusta, July 10; Fester, II, 45, 47, 63; Angeberg, I, 55, 56.) July 12. Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern, moved by the evident though not expressed desire of King William (King William to Prince Anthony, July 10; King William to Queen Augusta, July 11; Fester, II, 64, 75), by the desire that a family matter should not be responsible for a European war (Prince Anthony to King William, July 11; Fester, II, 74), and perhaps by representations of the French Government conveyed through the Roumanian agent Strat (Ollivier, *Hidden Causes of the Franco-Prussian War*, 169-175), withdrew on behalf of his son, Prince Leopold, the acceptance of the Spanish Crown (Prince Anthony to Prim, July 12; Fester, II, 93; Angeberg, I, 106).

#### 4. THE DEMAND FOR "FUTURE GUARANTEES."

To the great surprise of every one concerned this did not satisfy the Emperor Napoleon or the Duc de Gramont, although a majority of the ministry would have been content with it. In opposition to very strong remonstrances by the English ambassador (Lyons to Granville, July 12; Fester, II, 109) and without consulting the ministry collectively the Emperor authorized Gramont to demand of King William that he should give "the assurance that he would not again authorize that candidacy." (Gramont to Benedetti, July 12; Fester, II, 109; Angeberg, I, 95.)

#### 5. THE EMS DISPATCH.

The King refused, and upon a repetition of the demand he refused again (Benedetti to Gramont, July 13; Fester, II, 116, 117; Angeberg, I, 107-109), and on July 13 sent through Abeken to Bismarck the famous Ems dispatch, relating the new demands of Benedetti and leaving Bismarck to decide "whether the new demand of Benedetti should not be communicated to our representatives abroad and to the press." (Fester, II, 123; Ollivier, *Hidden Causes*, 484.) While the withdrawal of Prince Leopold "lifted a stone from the heart" of King William, Bismarck so much desired the war that he thought of resigning. The King's telegram furnished him with an unexpected opportunity. He at once "edited" the telegram in such a way that it would have "the effect over yonder of a red flag on the Gallic bull," and in this form gave it to the newspapers (Bismarck, *the Man and the Statesman*, II, 96-102; Ollivier, *Hidden Causes*, 281 ff.). The next day, July 14, the telegram appeared in the Paris papers, and had exactly the effect Bismarck desired (Fester, II, 143; Ollivier, 308).



## 6. OUTBREAK OF WAR.

Austria and Russia felt that the demand for "future guarantees" placed France entirely in the wrong, and that nothing further could be done (Bloomfield to Granville, July 13; Fleury to Gramont, July 15; Fester, II, 141, 153). England thought the demands wholly unjustified, but still worked to effect a settlement (Letters of Lyons and Granville, July 14-19; Fester, II, 147-149, 165, 178). July 15 the French Government adopted measures equivalent to a declaration of war, and July 19 the Prussian Government was officially informed that a state of war existed (Ollivier, 335-365).

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## 2. THE PROTECTION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

### 1. DANGER TO BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War brought danger to Belgian neutrality. Appropriate action to meet the situation was promptly taken by the Belgian Government. On July 15, the day the decision for war was made at Paris, the French ambassador at Brussels was informed that Belgium was firmly determined to maintain its neutrality and would be gratified to obtain from France an assurance that its neutrality would be respected. France gave the desired assurance on the following day. A similar proceeding brought forth a like declaration from Berlin on July 22.



Despite these assurances on the part of the belligerents there was a good deal of fear in England that Belgian neutrality would not be respected.

The chief and immediate cause of alarm was the publication of a draft treaty between France and Prussia drawn up in August, 1866, and allowing, under certain conditions, the annexation of Belgium by France. Publication took place in the *London Times*, July 25, 1870.

## 2. ENGLISH TREATIES WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

On July 30 Granville sent identical notes to both France and Germany proposing a tripartite treaty, providing that if either party violated Belgian neutrality, England would cooperate with the other for its defense, but England's operations would be confined to Belgium. At the same time Russia and Austria, the other two signers of the 1839 treaty, were informed of this step. Both agreed to maintain Belgian neutrality, but declined to enter into any new agreement, Russia making such entrance conditional to a much wider guarantee treaty. Bismarck at once accepted the English project. France raised certain verbal objections, but finally agreed to accept. (Statement of Gladstone, Aug. 8, *Hansard*, vol. 203, p. 1699, and of Granville, *ibid.*, vol. 203, p. 1754.)

## 3. DISCUSSIONS IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

Meanwhile a debate took place in Parliament during the period July 30–August 10. Almost all participants, with the exception of certain pacifists (*Hansard*, vol. 203, p. 1738ff), defended the policy of maintaining Belgian neutrality, if necessary, by force of arms. But the treaty was criticised (1) as weakening the position of the 1839 treaty, and (2) as likely to involve England, not only in Belgium but in other phases of the war as well. (See especially speech of Lord Cairns, *Hansard*, vol. 203, p. 1746.) Granville defended the treaty against the first charge by reference to the double agreement to maintain the Ottoman Empire, signed in 1856, the first by all the powers, the second by England, Austria, and France alone; and against the second charge by reciting the text of the treaty limiting British action to certain specified fields. (See his speech, *Hansard*, vol. 203, p. 1754.)

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### 3. THE PROTECTION OF LUXEMBURG NEUTRALITY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

An affair of some importance, particularly in the light of the events of 1914, is the German allegation made during the Franco-Prussian War that the French were violating the neutrality of Luxemburg. England evinced an interest in this charge and the matter, although finally explained satisfactorily, brought up a point in regard to the position of neutral States in war time which shows Bismarck's policy in this respect and which furnishes an interesting comparison to the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914.

#### 2. THE GERMAN ALLEGATION.

On December 3, 1870, Bismarck declared that the Prussian Government could no longer consider itself bound to respect Luxemburg's neutrality in the military operations of the German Army since there was no longer any doubt of a "flagrant violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the transit [of French soldiers] through it for the purpose of entering the active French forces, in the official furtherance thereof by a functionary of the French Government, and in the toleration of such conduct by the Grand Ducal Government." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, Circular Note, Dec. 3, 1870, *British Parliamentary Papers*. *Luxemburg*. No. 1 (1871), pp. 1-2).

Luxemburg thereupon produced a menacing letter in which the Prussian Government had threatened occupation of Luxemburg as early as November 27, 1870. The Grand Duchy further declared that the French Vice Consul had been called and had given a full explanation of his proceedings with reference to the complaint made by Prussia.

#### 3. THE ENGLISH PARTICIPATION.

England, upon being informed of the note of December 3, reserved judgment for awhile; then on December 15 asked the Prus-



sian Government whether it had any present intention of acting on its charges. (Granville to Russell, Dec. 15, 1870, *Ibid*, p. 4.) It further, though still refraining from passing judgment until the facts were authenticated, protested to the Prussian Government against its summary action in declaring the treaty of 1867 violated before proof had been given to the other signers of a direct violation. (Granville to Loftus, Dec. 17, 1870, *Ibid*, pp. 6-7.) The question was thus raised as to whether a power is bound, before declaring the guaranteed neutrality of a State to have been violated, to notify and consult with the other guarantors. Bismarck declared that no State was so bound. He replied on December 24 that "the question is as to the military defence against military injuries which may be done to one of the belligerent Powers from the violation of the neutrality by the other; that every Power engaged in warfare is entitled to such a defence has hitherto been uncontested by international law, and that the defence, if it is to be effectual, must take place at the proper time, lies in the nature of war." He goes further and, although he notes that Germany did for the time confine itself to a communication of the state of affairs, adds: "But if Lord Granville expresses the opinion that even in such a case the course to be taken was that the Royal Government should bring its complaint of the violation of the neutrality before the other signatories of the Treaty, with the request that the operation of such a state of things should be taken into consideration, then I can not admit the justice of the demand so made upon us." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, Dec. 24, 1870, *Ibid*, pp. 31-32.)

Bismarck said, however, that England could rest assured that no denunciation of the treaty of 1867 was intended, that no designs were cherished against Luxemburg, and that only such measures were being taken by Prussia as were necessary for her military security. England accepted this statement and, noting Luxemburg's explanation, expressed the hope that the misunderstanding was settled and withdrew from the discussion. (Granville to Loftus, Jan. 7, 1871, *Ibid*, pp. 34-35.)

#### 4. THE LUXEMBURG EXPLANATION.

In the meantime Luxemburg had explained the offences to Bismarck on December 14 as purely commercial and personal matters in which it had had as a Government no part. It further declared that if any violation of neutrality had been committed, Germany had been much more a guilty party than France. (Servais to Bismarck, Dec. 14, 1870, *Ibid*, pp. 10-25.) Three days later Luxemburg appealed to England for protection if her neutrality should need arise, pointing out "that the neutrality conferred on certain States in Europe would no longer have any real existence if the existence of a

state constituted as neutral in virtue of a treaty could depend on the will of a single one of the contracting powers." (Servais to Harris, Dec. 17, 1870, *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.)

Bismarck replied to Luxemburg that Prussia was not wholly satisfied with the explanations and, asking for an investigation of a specific instance, suggested a commissioner from Prussia to discuss affairs with Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy in turn welcomed the proposition, and after a satisfactory explanation of the specific case had been made to him, Bismarck declared that further action would depend only on the state of affairs in the future and the matter was dropped.

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### 4. GERMAN SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL PROPERTY DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871.

#### 1. THE DUCLAIR INCIDENT.

In the latter part of the year 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, an incident occurred (spoken of as the "Duclair incident") which throws some light upon German conceptions of the rights of neutral property in warfare, more especially where the so-called *droit d'angarie* (right of angary) might seem to be involved. The incident caused considerable irritation in England.

In the course of their military operations the necessity arose for the Germans of barring the course of the River Seine at Duclair. Enemy vessels being unavailable for the purpose, the Germans seized six British vessels and sank them in the river, the crews of the vessels being treated, it is said, with great brutality.

In a communication to Lord Odo Russell, British agent at Versailles, dated December 26, 1870, Bismarck argued that the question at issue lay wholly outside the rules of international law, inasmuch as the problem was one which had never been discussed by international jurists. He suggested, however, that the captains of the vessels, by refusing to enter into a "legal" contract which stipulated terms of payment for the use of the vessels, had themselves been guilty of an infraction of neutrality.

But in a later communication, dated January 8, 1871, and in an interview with Lord Odo Russell, Bismarck expressed sincere regrets that the German troops had been obliged to take such action. He admitted the right of the British owners of the sunken vessels to an indemnity, and agreed that they should be fully compensated for their losses. He claimed, however, that the sinking of the ships was



justified by international law. Still later, on January 25, Bismarck asserted that the action taken was a "right in time of war [which] has become a peculiar institute of international law, the *jus angariae*, which so high an authority as Sir Robert Phillimore defines thus: That a belligerent power demands and makes use of foreign ships, even such as are not in inland waters, but in ports and roadsteads within its jurisdiction, and even compels the crews to transport troops, ammunition, or implements of warfare." (*Staatsarchiv*, vol. 21, p. 96.)

## 2. THE SEIZURE OF SWISS RAILWAY PROPERTY IN ALSACE.

During the same war the German authorities in Alsace also seized for military use between six and seven hundred railway carriages belonging to the Central Swiss Railway, together with a considerable quantity of Austrian rolling stock, and kept this material in their possession for some time.

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## 5. THE SALE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR TO BELLIGERENTS DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

### 1. AMERICAN SALES TO FRANCE.

During the Franco-Prussian War France was compelled to buy vast amounts of munitions of war from neutral nations. The War Department of the United States had been authorized by Congress in 1868 to sell surplus ordnance stores and continued these sales throughout the period of the war (3 Wharton's Digest of International Law, p. 542). Indirectly the French Government purchased the bulk of the \$10,000,000 sales of the year 1870-71. In October, 1870, a New York firm, purchasers of one-half of the munitions, came under suspicion as being agents of the French Government, and all further sales to this company were at once forbidden, although the United States executed its previous contracts (Congressional Globe, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1018). Congressional committees ap-

pointed to investigate charges of breach of neutrality reported that the sales of munitions were not made under such circumstances as to violate the obligations of the Government as a neutral power, since it could not be proved that sales were made to known agents of the French Government (S. Rept. 183, H. Rept. 46, 42d Cong., 2d sess.). The Senate committee erred against international law and the accepted policy of the United States Government in stating that "if, instead of sending agents, Louis Napoleon or Frederick William had personally appeared at the War Department to purchase arms it would have been lawful for us to sell to either of them, in pursuance of a national policy adopted by us prior to the commencement of hostilities" (S. Rept. 183, 42d Cong., 2d sess.). This extreme view is not upheld by such eminent publicists as Hall (*International Law*, p. 597) and Oppenheim (*International Law*, II, p. 377).

## 2. ENGLISH SALES TO FRANCE.

Munitions to a smaller amount were purchased by France from private individuals in England. These sales were the cause for a formal protest on the part of Prussia, to which the British Government replied that England was not by international law under obligation to prevent her subjects from committing such acts (Oppenheim, *International Law*, II, p. 347; Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 205, p. 784).

## 3. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS.

By proclamation as well as by actual practice England and the United States recognized the right of the citizens of the respective countries to trade with the belligerents in contraband of war, subject to seizure in transit (Moore's *Digest of International Law*, VII, p. 973). Neutrality, therefore, enjoins upon a nation abstinence from taking part in any operation of war, but does not force upon the neutral the necessity of making a prohibition on the commercial enterprise of its citizens (Westlake, *International Law*, Part II, p. 161).

This view has been consistently entertained for the past century by the United States and by nearly every European country. From the beginning of its national existence the executive department of the United States has upheld the doctrine of the legality of the sale of contraband (Washington, *Neutrality Proclamation* in *American State Papers*, *Foreign Relations*, I, p. 140; 3 *Jefferson's Works*, p. 558; *Pierce on the Crimean War*, *Richardson's Messages and Papers*, V, p. 327; Moore's *Digest of International Law*, VII, pp. 955-973). The doctrine has, however, been most clearly enunciated by the judicial department in the decision of Justice Story in the case of the "*Santissima Trinidad*." "There is nothing in our laws, or in the



law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending munitions of war to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation" (7 Wheaton, p. 340).

The English view as to the sale of munitions in time of war is in exact harmony with the American view, and in the parliamentary debates during the Franco-Prussian War the House of Commons refused to legislate to prevent the sale of munitions by municipal law, declaring that British law was in accordance with international law and with the municipal law of other nations (Hansard's Debates, vol. 205, p. 783). In the case of *La Riviere v. Morgan*, over the legality of sales made directly to agents of the French Government by English citizens, the British court decided that such operations were entirely legal (Law Reporter, 7 Chancery, 550). The English judicial as well as the executive department concurred in the American view of the practice of a neutral State.

#### 4. GERMAN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE.

Although Germany protested at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, she has in practice subscribed to the English and American positions, as is shown by her sale of munitions during the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War (Gregory in *American Journal of International Law*, Oct., 1905, p. 930; Hershey, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*). A few countries have refused to subscribe to the doctrine as laid down by international law. Switzerland and Belgium prevented the sale of munitions during the Franco-Prussian War; but because of political prudence rather than because of the obligations of neutrality (Oppenheim, *International Law*, II, p. 377).

#### 5. THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS.

The Hague Conference of 1907 laid down as a principle to be followed for war on land and sea that "a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or the other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet" (Hague Convention, V, art. 7, 1907). From the evidence it may be concluded that the neutrality laws were not in the past and are not now designed to interfere with commerce even in contraband of war.

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## 6. THE RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, 1870-1871.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

September 3, 1870, word came to Paris that Napoleon III had been made prisoner at Sedan. At several meetings of the Corps Législatif the overthrow of the Imperial Government and the substitution of some other form of authority was discussed. While the deputies debated, the people of Paris acted. On the morning of September 4 the Imperial Government was overthrown, and word was sent through France that a new authority, a Government of National Defence, had been created by acclamation of the people. (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40, 472-508.) September 6 Jules Favre sent abroad to the diplomatic agents of France a circular communication, bidding them explain the situation (Ibid., pp. 511-13) to the governments to which they were accredited.

### 2. RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES.

That very day the American Government instructed Minister Washburne at Paris not to hesitate to recognize the new government



if it possessed effective power and was accepted by the people of France. Other communications followed, and that same day recognition was given together with the congratulations of the President and people of the United States upon the happy establishment of a republican government. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870, p. 67.)

### 3. OTHER PROMPT RECOGNITIONS.

Two days later the American example was followed by Spain, by Italy, and by Switzerland, and also by Portugal shortly after (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40, pp. 524-528, 545).

### 4. THE DELAYED RECOGNITIONS.

Thiers proposed that England give immediate recognition, but Lord Granville demurred, saying that the Republic had no legal sanction yet, since no constituent assembly had decided the future government of the country (Lord Newton. Lord Lyons, I, 316-17). A similar request was made at Vienna, for the French leaders desired the greater moral authority which recognition would give them, but Count Beust replied that the friendship of the Dual Monarchy was not dependent upon the form of the French Government, and that it would be contrary to international practice to give recognition before the French people had pronounced their decision (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40, p. 703). It was in vain that Count Chaudory instructed the French envoys to press the matter, declaring that more than nine-tenths of the people of Paris had voted in favor of the Government of National Defence (Ibid., vol. 41, 934-5, vol. 42, 1348). Earl Granville submitted the matter to a meeting of the cabinet, which again refused, saying that there was wanting that kind of stability which could be given only by a constituent assembly (Ibid., IV, 1374-5). The truth is that contemporaries might well doubt whether the new government possessed either legal sanction or actual power (Annual Register, 1870, p. 182). In after days Hanotaux pronounced it to have been merely a grand local council (Contemporary France, I, 15), and on several occasions during the siege of Paris the Red Republicans attempted to overthrow it (Lord Lyons, I, 375). February 4, 1871, when hope was gone of deliverance from the Germans, the Government of National Defence called for elections of representatives of the people, and a little later formally yielded up its powers to them (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 42, 1466-71, 1487-9). England now decided, February 16, 1871, to give recognition at once (Lord Lyons, I, 367), and Austria-Hungary, desiring to act with England, gave her recognition also (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 42, 1497, 1511).

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## 7. THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1870-1871.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

The French troops guarding papal sovereignty in Rome were withdrawn July 29 to August 19, 1870, as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War. Thereupon the Italian people and the Italian Parliament called upon the King to occupy the papal territories. Visconti-Venosta, minister of foreign affairs, despatched a memorandum to the powers August 29, announcing that the Government had decided on immediate occupation. One week later the French Empire fell, whereupon the September Convention ceased to be an effective guarantee for the safety of the Pope and of the Patrimonium Petri against the aspirations of the Kingdom of Italy for possession of the city of Rome.

On August 29 the Italian Government, in a circular transmitted to the other Governments of Europe, intimated its intention of occupying Rome. Settlement of the relations to be established between the Italian Government and the Papacy on the lines subsequently followed in the Law of Guarantees was foreshadowed. No strong protest or indication of hostile action came from any of the powers.

## 2. TAKING OF ROME.

Victor Emmanuel, in a letter dated September 8, called upon the Pope to accept the love and protection of the people of Italy in lieu of a sovereignty which could be maintained only through the support of foreigners. Pius IX replied, September 11, that such a letter was not worthy of an affectionate son. To the bearer of the royal appeal he intimated, September 10, that he might yield to force.



Gen. Cadorna, at the head of his army, entered papal territory September 11, and after having effected a breach in the walls of Rome, occupied the right bank of the Tiber September 20. Three urgent requests from the Pope induced him to occupy the Leonine City on the right bank September 21. A plebiscite October 2 annexed these papal territories to the Kingdom of Italy by a vote of 133,681 to 1,507. Though it is probable that many of the papalists refrained from going to the polls, the figures indicated that public sentiment in the papal state was strongly in favor of annexation.

### 3. LAW OF GUARANTEES.

Italy effected its settlement of the papal question by the Law of Guarantees, May 13, 1871. The vote of the chamber of deputies stood 185 to 106. The provisions of the law are as follows:

#### PART I, PREROGATIVES OF THE HOLY SEE.

Article 1. Pope's person declared sacred and inviolable.

Article 2. Free discussion of religious questions allowed, but insults and outrages against the Pope to be punished as injury and insult to the King's person.

Article 3. Pope granted royal honors and his customary guard.

Article 4. Annuity of 3,225,000 lire allotted for the maintenance of the Sacred College, the sacred palaces, the congregations, the Vatican Chancery, and the diplomatic service.

Article 5. Exemption from taxation granted the sacred palaces, museums, and libraries and perpetual enjoyment of the Vatican and Lateran buildings and gardens and of the villa at Castel Gandolfo assured the Pope.

Articles 6 and 7. Access of any Italian official or agent to the palaces or to any conclave or ecumenical council forbidden without special authorization from the Pope, council, or conclave.

Article 8. Seizure or examination of ecclesiastical papers, documents, books, or registers of purely spiritual character forbidden.

Article 9. Full freedom for the exercise of the spiritual ministry guaranteed the Pope and provision made for the publication of his announcements on the doors of the Roman Church and basilicas.

Article 10. Immunity extended to ecclesiastics employed by the Holy See and personal rights of Italian citizens bestowed on foreign ecclesiastics in Rome.

Article 11. Diplomats accredited to the Holy See and papal diplomats while in Italy placed on same footing as diplomats accredited to the Quirinal.

Article 12. All papal telegrams and correspondence with bishops and with foreign governments to be transmitted free of cost in Italy and a papal telegraph office served by papal officials in communication with the Italian postal and telegraph system established.

Article 13. All ecclesiastical seminaries, academies, colleges, and schools for the education of priests in the city of Rome exempted from all interference on the part of the Government.

#### PART II, CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALY.

Article 14. Clergy allowed freedom of assembly.

Article 15. Government relinquished its right of apostolic legation in Sicily and the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices of the Kingdom;

bishops dispensed from swearing fealty to the King, though except in Rome and its suburbs, choice of bishops limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality.

Article 16. Need for royal exequatur and placet abolished for all ecclesiastical publications, but the enjoyment of temporalities by bishops and priests made subordinate to the concession of a state exequatur and placet.

Article 17. Independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction for spiritual and disciplinary matters maintained, but civil courts granted competence to pass judgment on the juridical effect of ecclesiastical sentences. Provision to be made by future law for the reorganization, conservation, and administration of all the church property in the Kingdom.

Articles 268, 269, and 270 of the penal code were modified July 12 to make ecclesiastics liable to fine and imprisonment for spoken or written attacks on the laws of the State or for fomenting disorder.

Victor Emmanuel made his official entry into the new capital July 12, and the first Italian Parliament at Rome opened November 21.

#### 4. TEMPORARY FINANCIAL MEASURES.

At first the secretary general of the Italian foreign office had been received almost daily by Cardinal Antonelli, papal secretary of state. The royal commissioner of finance, as a precautionary measure, had seized the pontifical treasury, but, upon being informed that it contained the fund of Peter's Pence, the council of state authorized the restoration of that amount. The Holy See was indemnified for moneys expended for the October service of the coupon of the pontifical debt as the Italian State had taken over that debt. Cardinal Antonelli apprised the Government September 29 that he was unable to issue drafts for the monthly payment of the pontifical budget for the maintenance of the Pope, the Sacred College, the apostolic palaces, and the papal guards. The Government honored the drafts and thus contributed an installment of the annuity afterwards placed at the disposal of the Holy See by the Law of Guarantees.

#### 5. PAPAL PROTESTS.

Pius IX protested against both the principle and plan of the Law of Guarantees in a series of declarations of which the following were the more important: Protest of Cardinal Antonelli to the powers, September 20, 1870; papal letter to the cardinals, September 29, 1870; papal encyclical of November 1, 1870; dispatch of Cardinal Antonelli to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1870; papal encyclical of May 15, 1871. (French texts of these protests are in *Archives diplomatiques*, first series, vol. 48, pp. 86-88, 111-113, 167-176, 179-184; 228-234.) In the encyclical of May 15, 1871, the pope declared: "We will not admit and we will not accept, because it is absolutely impossible for us, the immunities or guaranties devised by the Piedmontese Government, whatsoever may be their tenor, nor any other of that



kind, with whatsoever sanction it may be clothed." "We never will accept any immunity or guaranty whatsoever, which, under pretext of protecting our sacred power and our liberty, would be offered in exchange for and to take the place of that temporal sovereignty with which Divine Providence has willed that the Apostolic Holy See should be provided and fortified and which is assured to us by legitimate and unattackable titles and a possession of more than 11 centuries." (Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 231.)

The essence of the papal position as to the Law of Guarantees is perhaps best expressed in a paragraph in the dispatch of Cardinal Antonelli to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1871: "An authority which lives and is exercised by virtue of a concession, and which, consequently, depends upon the good will or caprice of the one who concedes that authority, has not a life of its own and can not extend its influence beyond the limits which are imposed upon it and agreed to by its intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Now, everybody knows that the head of the church has need of an unquestionable authority of his own, in order that the exercise of his spiritual authority may not be restricted by any cause nor interrupted at any time. It follows that, whatever the guaranty it may be proposed to give him, that authority will always be illusory if it remain subject to a sovereign or a lay power." (Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 183.)

#### 6. THE POWERS AND THE ROMAN QUESTION.

France recalled Senard, French minister at Florence, who had written congratulations to Victor Emmanuel on the capture of Rome. The next minister, the Comte de Choiseul, was instructed to absent himself from Italy at the moment of the King's official entry into the new capital. Thiers hastened to appoint a French ambassador to the Holy See. But the powers as a whole, although fully notified of Italy's actions, took no steps to get the papal status embodied in an international agreement, and their general acquiescence made the Law of Guarantees an accepted fact.

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## 8. THE BLACK SEA QUESTION, 1870-1871.

### 1. THE BLACK SEA AND THE TREATY OF PARIS (1856).

The Treaty of Paris (1856) aimed to establish a balance of power in the Near East by (1) protecting Turkey against Russian naval power in the Black Sea, and (2) safeguarding Russia against attack in that quarter by a third power. It neutralized the Black Sea, declared it open to merchantmen of all nations, forbade the establishment or maintenance of military-maritime arsenals on its coast, and interdicted it to men-of-war of the littoral and other States, admitting only a few Turkish and Russian vessels for coast service. An added convention bound the Porte, while at peace, to admit no foreign ships of war into the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

### 2. RUSSIAN CIRCULAR OF OCTOBER 31, 1870 (APPENDIX I, 2).

At a critical stage of the Franco-Prussian War, October 31, 1870, Russia issued a circular note to the signatory powers denouncing the stipulations of the general treaty and the separate convention



with Turkey of the same date relative to the limit of her naval forces in the Black Sea. Russia declared it could not admit *de jure* that treaties violated in several of their general and essential clauses should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of Russia. The reunion of Moldavia and Wallachia, effected by a series of revolutions at variance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Paris, illustrated the "modifications to which most European transactions have been exposed, and in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written law, founded upon the respect for treaties as the basis of public right and regulating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at other times." "Repeatedly and under various pretexts foreign men-of-war have been suffered to enter the straits and whole squadrons, whose presence was an infraction of the character of absolute neutrality attributed to those waters, admitted to the Black Sea."

### 3. RECEPTION OF RUSSIAN CIRCULAR.

Serious statesmen were not surprised by Russia's action. Granville wrote to Gladstone that, excepting England and Turkey, all the cosignatories of the Treaty of Paris had favored modification of the Black Sea neutralization, previous to Russia's declaration. While not dissenting from the substance of Russia's claim, Gladstone was outraged by its formal basis. His memorandum to Granville contributed the pith of the latter's reply to Gortchakoff's note. "The question therefore arises, not whether any desire expressed by Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the cosignatory Powers, but whether they are to accept from her an announcement that, by her own act, without any consent from them, she has released herself from a solemn covenant." (Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, III, 1899-1900.)

### 4. CALLING OF LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871.

Granville regarded war as a possible risk after the reply to Russia; but the best English opinion was averse to war for the neutrality of the Black Sea. And with France unable to move, and Prussia backing Russia, England stood without allies. Yet, by a threat of war, Granville induced Bismarck to invite the states which had signed the Treaty of Paris (1856) to a conference at London to discuss the questions raised by the Russian circular. (Morley, *Gladstone*, II, 353-355; Marriott, *England since Waterloo*, 427.) Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Turkey were represented. France, on account of the war, was represented only at the last session.

## 5. LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871.

The first protocol of the London Conference, January 17, 1871, recognized "that it is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement." (Hertslet, III, 1904.) This vindication of the sanctity of treaties was somewhat impaired by the fact that Russia, as a reward of submission to international law, was given what she had affected to take. (Hall, *op cit.*, 347-348; Lawrence, *Principles of International Law*, 6 ed., 328.) Articles II and III of the treaty, which was signed at the close of the conference, March 13, 1871 (See Appendix 1), maintained the principle of the closing of the straits to foreign men-of-war, as long as the Porte is at peace, and the free navigation of the Black Sea by merchantmen of all nations; Article I abolished the neutralization of the Black Sea, the exclusion of warships of the littoral powers, and the prohibition of military-maritime arsenals on its coast. (Hertslet, III, 1919-1923.) The Danube Commission, created by the Treaty of Paris (1856), was continued until 1883 and provision was made to protect and continue its work. (See article. *The Danube Question*, 1871-1904.)

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## 9. PEACE PRELIMINARIES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871.

### 1. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

With the capitulation of Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870), the Second Empire collapsed. September 4 the Republic was proclaimed at Paris and the Government of National Defence organized, with Favre as minister of foreign affairs. Paris having been invested September 19, Gambetta became (Oct. 9) the head of a "delegation" from the Paris Government, first at Tours and later at Bordeaux. The new Republic was recognized by the United States September 6, and subsequently by the other powers. (See article, *The Recognition of the Government of National Defence, 1870-1871*.) Meantime Empress Eugenie in England claimed authority as "Regent," and the allegiance of the French Army in Metz to the Government of National Defence was uncertain. Bismarck, with the invading army, at first dealt with representatives of the various French factions, and showed a disposition to play one off against the other, declaring on one occasion that the Paris government did not represent "the will of France," and suggesting either the calling of the old Napoleonic assembly, or a general election. (Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, I, II *passim*, especially I, 219, 266; II, 302-303, 342; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870*, 67-68; *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst*, II, 52-54.)

Early in September the Government of National Defence was making overtures through the British foreign office to Bismarck, who insisted upon securities (the delivery of forts). September 9, Thiers was sent by Favre on a mission to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence in an effort to secure from the powers offers of intervention, mediation, or good offices, but without substantial result, except that Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Turkey proposed an armistice. (Favre, *Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale*, I, 126-283, 420-432; II, 25-56; *British Parliamentary Papers, Franco-German War*, No. 1 (1871), pp. 60, 94, 99, 146, and *passim*; Busch, *Bismarck*, I, 144, 167-168; Rothan, *Souvenirs Diplomatiques*, 383-385.)

## 2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE SEPTEMBER, 1870-JANUARY, 1871.

Through Lord Lyons, British ambassador in Paris, a conference was arranged at Ferrières (Sept. 19), but Bismarck refused Favre's request for an armistice, demanding that France should accept the principle of territorial cessions and securities. (Favre, *Gouvernement*, I. 420-432; Busch, *Bismarck*, 167-168.) Further abortive negotiations took place at Versailles and elsewhere (Oct. 1 to Nov. 7) on the subject of an armistice and a general election. Action by the papacy was suggested (Jan. 6, 13, 1871), and Favre made an attempt to attend the London Conference on the Black Sea question (Jan. 14, 15. See article, *The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871*), in the hope of securing a discussion of "all the questions which divide Europe," but was prevented by Bismarck. Finally, direct negotiations for an armistice were held at Versailles between Bismarck and Favre (Jan. 23-28), and on January 28 they agreed upon the capitulation of Paris and an armistice (exception made of the region about Belfort) for 21 days to permit the election of a National Assembly. All of France, including Alsace-Lorraine and the occupied districts, took part in this election.

## 3. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES.

The elections held under the armistice resulted in a victory for the peace party, and the National Assembly, which met at Bordeaux, February 12, chose Thiers as Chief of the Executive Power. Negotiations for peace were then held at Versailles (Feb. 21-26). The Prussian military party stood out for Belfort and a large part of French Lorraine including Nancy, as well as Metz, but Bismarck doubted the wisdom of annexing so much French population, and was probably influenced by the opinion of the neutral States. France was accordingly allowed to keep Belfort and Nancy. England protested against the indemnity as excessive and may have helped to secure its reduction from six to five milliards. The preliminaries of peace were signed February 26, 1871, subject to ratifications by the National Assembly. (See article, *The Treaty of Frankfurt*.)

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## 10. THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT, 1871.

### 1. PRELIMINARIES.

The preliminary Treaty of Versailles, signed February 26, 1871, by Thiers and Favre for France and Bismarck for Germany, and ratified by the National Assembly March 1, included these general provisions:

(a) Cession of Alsace and Lorraine, including Metz, to Germany; France to keep Belfort.

(b) Payment of 5 milliards of francs (\$1,000,000,000).

(c) Gradual evacuation by German troops.

It also provided that negotiations for the definitive treaty of peace should be opened at Brussels immediately after the ratification of the preliminary treaty by the French National Assembly and the German Emperor. (See article, The Peace Preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War.)

### 2. NEGOTIATIONS AT BRUSSELS.

The negotiations at Brussels lasted from March 24 to May 4, 1871. Germany was represented by Count von Arnim and Baron von Bode, France by Baron Baude and M. Goulard. The French representatives were not provided with official instructions. "It is, however, probable that M. Thiers maintained personal communications with them and that he traced the line of conduct for them to follow." (Hanotaux, I, 282.)

At the opening of the negotiations the Germans presented five demands:

(a) That the war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs be paid in coin.

(b) That the railroads in Alsace-Lorraine be turned over to Germany without any other condition than an indemnity for the holders of the bonds.

(c) That all treaties between France and Germany which had been abrogated by the war be restored, including the commercial treaty of 1862.

(d) That an indemnity be allotted to Germans expelled from France during the war.

(e) That a clause relative to private property at sea be introduced into the treaty.

The French representatives resisted the German demands and sought to obtain stipulations that 1,000,000,000 francs of the indemnity be paid in coin, the remainder in 5 per cent bonds; that the evacuation of France by the German armies take place by July 1, 1871; and that in annexing Alsace-Lorraine Germany should take over a proportionate share of the French public debt.



No protocols of the conferences at Brussels were kept. The negotiations can not, therefore, be followed in detail. During the first month many points were discussed but no agreements were reached, while the difficult question of the definitive frontier remained in abeyance. On April 3 that question was brought forward and held a leading place in the discussions until May 4, when the negotiations were transferred to Frankfort. The uncertainty of the situation in France, owing to the conflict between the Government of the National Assembly and the Paris Commune, appears to have been the chief cause for delay. The German Government apparently desired to wait until the outcome of the struggle should be clearly indicated.

### 3. NEGOTIATIONS AT FRANKFORT.

The negotiations at Brussels terminated on May 4 and were resumed at Frankfort on May 6. Jules Favre, minister of foreign affairs, and Pouyer-Quertier, minister of finance, represented France, while Bismarck appeared in person for Germany. In sharp contrast with the proceedings at Brussels the negotiation went forward rapidly. Bismarck presented an ultimatum, but not until after previous discussion had developed the fact that agreement was almost certain, and with the explanation that his instructions required its presentation. The treaty was signed on May 10. Ratifications were exchanged on May 21.

### 4. TERMS.

The Treaty of Frankfort converted the preliminary treaty of Versailles of February 26 (See article, The Peace Preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War) into a definitive treaty modified in certain particulars. The two treaties, therefore, make up a single instrument containing the terms of peace at close of the Franco-Prussian War. The most important features were as follows:

1. *Alsace-Lorraine*.—France surrendered to Germany, Alsace, except Belfort, and a part of Lorraine. Being permitted to choose between a larger and smaller radius about Belfort or the retention of the Thionville region, France, in the interest of greater security, choose the larger radius around Belfort.

2. *Indemnity*.—France was required to pay an indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs. A period of less than three years was allowed for payment. Interest was to be paid at the rate of 5 per cent from March 1, 1871. Payment could be made only in coin, Prussian, Dutch, or Belgian bank notes and "first-class negotiable bills to order or letters of exchange, payable at sight."

3. *Occupation and evacuation of French territory*.—A large part of the territory of France was to be occupied by German troops

until the last installment of the indemnity had been paid. Evacuation was to proceed *pari passu* with the payment of the indemnity.

(See articles, The Peace Preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War and The Evacuation of France by the German Armies, 1871-1873.) The expense of maintenance of the army of occupation was to fall upon France.

4. *Choice of nationality for the people of Alsace-Lorraine*—Frenchmen born in Alsace-Lorraine and actually domiciled there were permitted to remain and retain their French nationality until October 1, 1872. No obstacle was to be put in the way of their removal before that date.

5. *Trade*.—The two Governments agreed to “adopt as the basis of their commercial relations the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most-favored nation.”

#### 5. APPRAISEMENT.

It is not too much to say that the Treaty of Frankfort exerted a more decisive and far-reaching influence than any other treaty or international agreement belonging to the period of 1871 to 1914. The reason for its great significance lay in the fact that it created the Alsace-Lorraine question. The injury done to France and the people of Alsace-Lorraine made a reconciliation between France and Germany after the Franco-Prussian War impossible.

To meet that condition of affairs Bismarck labored, and with great success as long as he remained German Chancellor, to bring about the isolation of France. In pursuance of that aim he created the Triple Alliance. The existence of the Triple Alliance (See article, The Formation of the Triple Alliance) naturally and almost necessarily led in time to the formation of the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance (See article, that title). As the development of German aims for world domination became more apparent the Dual Alliance came to be supplemented by the Triple Entente (See article, The Formation of the Triple Entente). Europe thus became divided between two hostile and mutually distrustful coalitions. Peace rested upon so uncertain a foundation that it was likely to be destroyed by even a small incident. It escaped destruction by narrow margins on not less than four occasions in the series of crises which marked the years of 1905 to 1913. It succumbed in 1914. A chain of causation runs directly from the Treaty of Frankfort to the World War.

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## 11. GERMAN ARGUMENTS FOR THE ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE, 1870-1871.

### 1. GERMAN PROPAGANDA FOR ANNEXATION, 1815-1870.

German absorption of Alsace-Lorraine began at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, but at that time only a small segment of the territory was taken. Public opinion, however, was henceforth systematically taught to regard these provinces as German and necessary for the safety of the German people. Politicians, the army, the schools, and the press, liberals and conservatives alike, declared for the "restoration" of the "enslaved" brothers. The Rhine was acclaimed a German river from whose borders the French must be expelled.

The fact that the inhabitants of these provinces regarded themselves as French and declared their determination to remain so did not dampen the ardor of the early "Pan Germans." Their writings and speeches often expressed bitterness at the unfilial attitude of these "degermanized" people, but their purpose remained the same.

### 2. GERMAN ARGUMENTS FOR ANNEXATION.

(a) *Nationality*.—Much emphasis was laid upon the claim that the people of Alsace-Lorraine were in fact Germans. German ethnologists described skulls found in gravel pits as of German type. A more appealing argument was that of language. Many natives of these provinces speak a Germanic tongue; therefore, it was argued, they must be Germans. This, in spite of the fact that the sympathies, the interests, and the culture of the people were avowedly French.

(b) *Historic rights*.—Much emphasis was laid upon the argument for "historic rights." The new German Empire was the heir of the Holy Roman Empire, which at one time included within its borders both Alsace and Lorraine. It was, therefore, the duty of the empire to "resume" what had been German. The fact that this doctrine, if accepted, would justify the Germans in "resuming" still other lands that had not yet fallen before their sword was disregarded.

(c) *Natural frontiers*.—The French argument for the Rhine as the "natural frontier" of France was met by the assertion that the Vosges Mountains were the "natural frontier" of Germany. The Rhine was not a frontier, but a German river.

(d) *Military necessity*.—The arguments advanced by Germans before 1871 could not justify the cession of all these territories. The country around Metz was admittedly French and was beyond the "natural frontiers." For the incorporation of this region the law



of military necessity was urged. It was the gateway into France which Von Moltke declared was worth 100,000 men. To the minds of some this French region must suffer the first shocks of the "next war" and thus protect Germans from suffering. It was felt also that the loss of Metz would greatly cripple the military strength of France.

(e) *Punishment*.—German preachers had long urged that France was decadent and immoral and should be punished by God through the German people. Those Frenchmen who were to be made Germans had the way opened to salvation, and their sons would honor the Germans as deliverers.

(f) *Political reasons*.—Bismarck and others felt that the acquisition of common property would prove useful in holding together the new German empire. The German States would now have a material interest in the maintenance of the new empire, and to further this policy the annexed provinces were organized as imperial territory (Reichsland).

(g) *Economic reasons*.—The northwestern part of this acquisition was rich in iron, additional supplies of which were vitally important to the development of German industry. To what extent this was a national motive is not clear, but there were in 1870 Germans who understood its importance.

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## 12. THE EVACUATION OF FRANCE BY THE GERMAN ARMIES, 1871–1873.

### 1. THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT (SEE THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT, 1871).

According to the Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), 19 departments of France, including the northern forts of Paris, were to remain under the occupation of a German Army of 500,000 men and 150,000 horses, for the maintenance of which the French Government was to pay 1.75 francs a man and 2.25 francs a horse per diem. (See Appendix I, 4.) This occupied territory formed a wide area across

France from the Vosges Mountains to the English Channel. Many other departments were occupied by the Germans during the war, but these were evacuated on or before the ratification of this treaty. If the stipulated payments were not made promptly, the Germans were permitted to levy taxes in the occupied departments or those near by. This territory was to be evacuated gradually, beginning near the channel, and the army of occupation reduced as the five billion francs of war indemnity were paid.

## 2. BEGINNING OF THE EVACUATION.

Accordingly three departments were evacuated July 22, 1871, on payment of the first half billion francs, and four more before the close of September, 1871, after one billion more was paid.

## 3. NEGOTIATIONS TO HASTEN EVACUATION.

So successful were the French loans that negotiations were started in August, 1871, to hasten payments and evacuation. (Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, I, p. 337.) An agreement was reached with Gen. Manteuffel, commander of the army of occupation, but Bismarck disavowed it. He predicted to the French chargé d'affaires at Berlin that France would fight Germany again rather than pay the last three billions in 1874, when due. (Marquis de Gabriac, *Souvenirs diplomatiques de Russie et d'Allemagne*, p. 139.) The rapid recovery of France after the disasters of war made many German statesmen fear a war of revenge. (Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, I, p. 312.) Hence Bismarck wished to evacuate as little French territory as possible.

October 12, 1871, a new convention was made in Berlin, providing for almost immediate evacuation of six more departments of France and for the earlier payment of another half billion francs. (Ibid., pp. 340-344; *Memoirs of M. Thiers*, pp. 187-188.) The occupying army was cut down to 150,000 men and 18,000 horses, and the cost to 1.50 francs a man and 1.75 francs a horse per diem. This left in German hands only six departments and Belfort, a strip from Belfort northwest about half way to the channel. The French negotiator was able to get these terms partly because the people of Alsace-Lorraine wished the privilege of free export of their products into France extended after its expiration in September, 1871, and the South Germans supported them. (*Memoirs of M. Thiers*, pp. 183-184). General Manteuffel also helped the negotiation along.

## 4. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS HALTED BY BISMARCK.

By the spring of 1872 President Thiers again wished to hasten full evacuation of France by earlier payments. But the rebuilding of the French Army on the Prussian model and the debates in the



National Assembly regarding it made the German war party try to provoke another conflict with France before her full recovery. (*Ibid.*, pp. 351-355, pp. 236-237.) Chauvinistic agitation spread throughout Germany. This delayed negotiations till late spring. Bismarck often showed a disposition to doubt the honest intentions of the French. (Busch, *Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History*, II, pp. 103-104.) He affected to believe they would make war as soon as they recovered their fortresses, though the French envoy pointed out that they would hardly be so foolish as to fill the German treasury in advance if they were planning war. Bismarck demanded that the army of occupation remain as large as before, even after it held little but the French eastern fortresses of Verdun, Toul, and Belfort. Thiers feared that Bismarck planned to get the money and then find some excuse to hold Belfort. (*Memoirs of M. Thiers*, pp. 246-247.)

#### 5. THE CONVENTION OF JUNE 29, 1872.

At last, June 29, 1872, a new treaty was made enabling France to pay the rest of the indemnity in installments up to March 1, 1873, or hasten the payment and secure quicker evacuation. (*Ibid.*, pp. 367-369.) Two departments were to be evacuated 15 days after payment of one-half billion, two more after the second billion, and the rest, including the forts, 15 days after the last billion was paid. But, until the full evacuation, those departments were not to be garrisoned by more French troops than were needed to keep order. No further fortifications were to be built there by either French or Germans until evacuation was complete.

#### 6. CONVENTION OF MARCH 15, 1873.

After further negotiations Thiers succeeded (March 15, 1873) in arranging for simultaneous evacuation of Belfort and the four remaining departments, providing the fourth billion francs be fully paid on May 5, 1873, and the fifth paid in the following four months. (*Memoirs of M. Thiers*, pp. 310-318; *Annual Register*, 1873, pp. 124-125, 148-149. The German occupying army appears already to have been reduced to 50,000 men.) These payments were promptly made, and accordingly Belfort and Nancy were evacuated August 1. Verdun was kept till September 16 following the final payment of the fifth billion francs, with interest, on September 5, 1873. Thus full payment was made and evacuation secured nearly two years before required by the earlier treaty.

#### 7. INCIDENTS AND QUARRELS.

During the German occupation there were some unpleasant incidents and quarrels between the civilian population and the Germans.

In November, 1871, French juries acquitted two men accused of killing German soldiers. The German officers then had accused persons tried by military courts, which imposed the death penalty. (Zevort, *Histoire de la troisième république*, I, pp. 453-454.) Bismarck was rather brusque in his diplomacy. June 16, 1871, he telegraphed that French soldiers had occupied some districts reserved for Germans, and that they would be fired on that midnight unless withdrawn. (Ibid., p. 286.) This worried Thiers greatly, because he feared Bismarck was seeking an excuse for an attack on France. Thiers ordered the French officials to be very polite to the German officers, and sent a special commissioner as a sort of diplomatic agent to represent him at the headquarters of Gen. Manteuffel. (Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, I, pp. 312-313.) This helped greatly in smoothing out these difficulties. In the six departments to be evacuated last Thiers had new barracks built to house the German soldiers. Their officers complained that these buildings were unhealthy, and sometimes billeted the soldiers on the people instead. (Memoirs of M. Thiers, p. 192.) This caused much friction. But, as a whole, the French people were quiet and the German soldiers behaved themselves. (Annual Register, 1873, p. 149.) There was little of the recrimination between them, so common during the war.

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### 13. THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF THE THREE EMPERORS.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, with its accompanying completion of German unification and the erection of the modern German Empire, Bismarck, the German chancellor, whose diplomacy had been mainly responsible for the war and its political results, saw clearly that Germany would not gain by further territorial aggression, but rather by the maintenance of peace. With this thought in mind, and also with the idea of strengthening Germany's position so as to make France hesitant about attacking her for the purpose of recovering French losses in the war just ended, Bismarck undertook to maintain the previously existing close friendship with Russia and to effect a rapprochement with Austria. He had purposely treated Austria with great moderation after her defeat by Prussia (the leading member State of the new empire) in 1866, with a future reconciliation in view, and by the close of the Franco-Prussian War Francis Joseph, the Austrian Emperor, was so far reconciled to existing conditions as to be willing to consider an offer of alliance. The dynastic relations between Germany and Russia were already very friendly, the Russian Czar, Alexander II, being a nephew of William I, the Prussian King, now invested with the additional title of German Emperor.

#### 2. NEGOTIATION.

Under these circumstances Bismarck found his task an easy one. He persuaded his Emperor to take the first step by paying a visit to Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl (August, 1871). A second meeting between the two Emperors took place at Salzburg the next month, and the next year Francis Joseph visited the German Emperor at Berlin. As a result Austro-German relations grew sensibly more friendly. Russia now became concerned over this rapprochement in the making, and the Czar asked to be admitted as a third party. His request was readily granted, and from the time (December, 1872) of the conference of these three rulers at Berlin dates what has been called, although improperly, the alliance of the three emperors.

## 3. TERMS.

The thing that was formed was, in reality, only an entente which did not result in any formal treaties. It was generally believed at the time that an understanding for cooperation was secured on the following points:

First, to maintain, territorially, the status quo on the basis of the latest treaties.

Second, to seek in common the solution of whatever difficulties might arise in the Orient; and

Third, to repress revolution under its new form, socialism.

## 4. CONCLUSION.

This arrangement was, in substance, a new Holy Alliance, from which its adherents hoped great things. However, friction speedily developed between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, and the entente after the Congress of Berlin fell apart.

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## 14. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR SCARE OF 1875.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

In the spring of 1875 there occurred the first of several sudden alarms, such as from 1871 to 1914 periodically disturbed Europe, by indicating that war between France and Germany was about to be resumed. To this day the facts of the episode have not been entirely cleared up, but their general trend is fairly plain.



## 2. ORIGIN OF THE SCARE.

There was undoubtedly a party in Germany which looked upon the rapid recovery of France from her defeat with astonishment and anger. Especially the reform of the French Army, including the creation of a fourth battalion to each regiment, was pointed to as threatening a war of revenge. Would it not be wise, they said, even a Christian duty, to provoke a conflict before France should have recovered her full strength and found an ally? There is no ground for supposing that the German Emperor himself had any such design. But opinion differs whether the ensuing plot was furthered by Prince Bismarck or by a military party acting apart from the chancellor and even in spite of him. Bismarck afterwards claimed that the whole affair was an intrigue of his enemies, especially among the clericals at home and abroad, for the purpose of discrediting him (*Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 188), and German writers are prone to accept his version. It is true he sometimes deprecated "wars of prevention," but again he would let fall ominous threats like the following: "We want to keep the peace; but if France goes on arming so that she is to be ready in five years and bent on war at the end of that time, then we will declare war in three years." (*Denkwürdigkeiten des Fürsten Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst*, II, p. 107.)

## 3. THE THREAT OF WAR.

Early in April, 1875, the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the *Berliner Post*, and the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, papers usually in close touch with the Government, sounded the alarm by a series of inflammatory articles to the effect of "War in sight," "France preparing a war of revenge," "The Orleans princes thus to conquer the throne again," etc. To the French ambassador at Berlin rumor became a positive threat when Herr von Radowitz, one of Bismarck's trusted agents, intimated the plan of the German armies to invade France, to threaten the capital, to demand an indemnity of ten milliards, which should be paid in not less than 20 years, and to require a permanent reduction of French armaments (*Blowitz*, p. 102).

## 4. WHY THE PLOT FAILED.

If this was the actual plot, it was foiled by two agencies, namely, the Czar of Russia, who was then about to visit Germany, and the *London Times*. On May 6 the *Times* published an article from its Paris correspondent (M. de Blowitz) revealing the whole matter to a startled public. Who inspired the article? It may have been the French foreign minister, the Duke Decazes, as Blowitz says, or possibly the German ambassador, as Decazes gave out. At all events

the revelation served its purpose in making the project of a sudden war for the time impossible. The Czar, who under the circumstances could not pretend ignorance, intimated to the Kaiser his feeling against it, while his minister, Gortschakoff, scored a personal triumph over Bismarck by issuing a circular, "Now, peace is secured." Queen Victoria also is known to have written letters to the Czar and to the German Emperor in the interest of peace. (Lee, S., *Queen Victoria*, p. 431.)

#### 5. CONCLUSION.

Naturally, no one ever avowed participation in a plot which failed so discreditably. Whether it was instigated by Bismarck or his rivals, the intention seems to have been, if not actually to provoke a war, at least to terrorize France and so broach the subject of her disarmament. Perhaps there was mingled a wish to feel the diplomatic pulse of Europe. In the latter case it proved only that the isolation of France was not as complete as had been supposed. From this moment there were at frequent intervals signs of a trend of Germany away from friendship with Russia and of the approach of Russia toward alliance with France.

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## 15. CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1872-1876.

### 1. JAPAN'S ACQUISITION OF THE LOOCHOO ISLANDS, 1872-1879.

Japan began to pursue a vigorous foreign policy within a few years after the restoration of the authority of the Mikado in 1868. As early as 1872 she took up against China the case of some shipwrecked Loochooans who had been murdered off the southern coast of Formosa by Formosan savages. She claimed that the Loochooans, who had been paying tribute to both China and Japan, were Japanese subjects. China denied all responsibility in the matter. In 1872 Japan secured from the King of the Loochoo Islands a surrender of the treaties which his Government had made with the United States, France, and Holland. In 1874 the Japanese sent a military expedition to Formosa to exact penalties and obtain indemnity. The controversy almost led to war between Japan and China, Japan even going so far as to send an ultimatum to China, but at the last moment the British minister at Peking offered his mediation, with the result that China agreed to pay an indemnity and the Chinese Government tacitly recognized that the Loochooans were Japanese subjects. In 1879 the islands were finally and definitely incorporated as part of the Japanese administration.

### 2. THE KOREAN WAR SCARE OF 1875.

In September, 1875, a Japanese gunboat was fired upon by a fort in Korea, with the unhappy consequence that its garrison was practically annihilated. There was considerable excitement in Japan, and, as in 1872, a demand on the part of Japanese chauvinists for war, but wiser counsels prevailed, and an expedition was sent which succeeded in negotiating a treaty of "peace and amity." This treaty, signed on February 26, 1876, recognized the "complete independence" of Korea; but, though putting an end to Korea's

isolation, it marked the beginning of her gradual, but probably not then intended, subjugation to Japan (See article, *Chino-Japanese Rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894*).

Strange to say, China was induced not only to assent to the Japanese proposals, but even to advise Korea to agree to them. She cited her own example as a warning. Great and powerful though China was, her Government, she said, had found it impossible to close their country against foreigners, and had found protection by entering into friendly relations with them.

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### 16. THE KULDJA AFFAIR, 1876-1881.

#### 1. THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KULDJA, 1876.

As far back as 1871, owing to certain disturbances in Central Asia, where Yakub Beg seemed to be establishing an empire and the Tunganis were causing no end of trouble, the Russians had intervened for the purpose of preserving peace on their borders. With China's consent Russian troops had occupied the Province of Kuldja or Ili, and were still in possession when the Chinese undertook the reconquest of the rebellious provinces in 1876, and the State of Kashgaria, over which Yakub Beg ruled, was finally recovered.

#### 2. THE LIVADIA CONVENTION OF 1879.

The successful conclusion of this campaign brought the Kuldja question to the foreground. During the negotiations which had led up to the Muscovite occupation of the province, the Russians had freely admitted that the Chinese were entitled to possession as soon as they had occupied it effectively. The Chinese, accordingly, sent Chenghow as special envoy to St. Petersburg, where he arrived early in 1879. After protracted negotiations a convention was drawn up at Livadia by which Russia surrendered the Kuldja Valley but retained that of the Tekes, which left in her hands the control of the passes through the Tianshan range into Kashgar. It was also agreed that China should pay an indemnity of 5,000,000 rubles toward the expenses of the Russian occupation.

This Livadia convention was so unpopular in China that it was unanimously condemned and the unfortunate envoy, Chenghow,



deprived of all his honors and condemned to decapitation. His life was, however, spared through the intercession of Queen Victoria.

### 3. THE TREATY OF ST. PETERSBURG, 1881.

The negotiations having thus been rudely broken off, the Chinese sent another envoy in the person of the Marquis Tsêng, who had been appointed as minister at the Court of St. James. Marquis Tsêng succeeded so well that he recovered almost the whole Province of Ili, including Kuldja and the passes. In exchange for this restoration he agreed to pay an indemnity of 9,000,000 rubles. To the treaty of St. Petersburg (See Appendix I, 19), which was signed on February 12, 1881, there were added certain commercial regulations which conferred many advantages upon Russian merchants engaged in overland trade with China.

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## 17. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1875-1877.

### 1. THE HERZEGOVINA INSURRECTION.

In the summer of 1875 there was an insurrection in Herzegovina. Sufficient grounds for an outbreak existed in the friction between Christian and Mussulman, and in the inefficiency of Turkish rule. The uprising was characterized by barbarities, and threatened to spread to the surrounding regions. The Disraeli ministry took the position that the Turkish Government should put down the revolt without the intervention of the powers. Only with reluctance, at the request of Austria, Russia, and Germany, did it authorize the British consul to cooperate with the consuls of the other powers that had guaranteed the Treaty of Paris of 1856, to localize the conflict by preventing the participation of Serbia and Montenegro, and to win the Porte to a policy of redress of grievances. The effort had no result, for the insurgents were unwilling, without a European guarantee, to trust the reform measures published by the Porte.

## 2. THE ANDRASSY NOTE, DECEMBER 30, 1875.

In December the three empires concerted a plan for pacification by persuading the Porte to grant five reforms: Complete religious liberty; the abolition of tax farming; the application of direct taxes to local needs; the erection of a commission, half Moslem and half Christian, to superintend the reforms; and amelioration of the condition of the peasants. (See Appendix, I, 5.) The project was drawn up by Count Andrassy, the Austrian minister, and all the powers concurred unreservedly, except Great Britain, who gave her consent rather reluctantly, promising general support, but reserving judgment on the details, some of which she considered of doubtful practicability. She pointed out that some of the reforms had already been promised by the Porte. In February the Porte announced that it found four of the suggestions acceptable, but that the local application of direct taxes would not fit into its system. The reforms were proclaimed, but the insurgents, still distrustful, did not lay down their arms. On the contrary the movement spread.

## 3. THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM.

Again the three empires consulted and issued a memorandum from Berlin (May 13, 1876) with the request that France, Italy, and Great Britain concur. It was proposed that a two months' armistice be demanded, during which action could be taken to pacify the insurgents, to localize the trouble, and to allow negotiations between the Porte and representatives of the revolted populations on the bases suggested by the latter. These were: Assistance in the repatriation of refugees, distribution of relief by a commission, concentration of Turkish troops, arms to be left with Christians as well as Mussulmen, and supervision of reform by the consuls of the powers. The paper closed with an intimation that the powers were prepared to take further action were these measures not successful. (See Appendix I, 6.)

## 1. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM.

France and Italy gave immediate consent. The British Government expressed regret (May 19) that it was unable to cooperate. Some of the proposed measures it characterized as unlikely to serve the desired end, others as subversive of the authority of the Sultan. The letters to British representatives which accompanied the reply showed that in this instance the Porte had not requested England's concurrence, as it had done on the two former occasions. (See Appendix I, 7.) They also showed annoyance that Great



Britain had not been consulted in the framing of the memorandum. On the other hand, the ministry did not suggest any alternative plan, although one of its members had one ready. (See Lang, Sir Stafford Northcote, vol. 2, p. 101.)

To one portion of the Berlin memorandum the ministry agreed. It had suggested the sending of vessels, with instructions, to give protection in case of need to the Christian subjects of Turkey and to foreigners. Lord Derby announced that British vessels were being sent with orders to protect foreigners should necessity arise. The point was made that nothing should be done by the fleets to interfere with the Sultan's authority, and this, together with the number of British vessels sent and the position they occupied, caused Great Britain's action to be regarded by the other powers as menace rather than cooperation.

#### 5. THE BULGARIAN MASSACRES.

The Berlin memorandum was not presented to the Porte, because the Turkish Revolution in May, 1876, seemed to promise a better order of things. This promise was proven illusory, however, by events in Bulgaria. Bashi Basouks and Circassians were sent to quell an uprising there, and they set about it in a barbarous fashion. The English ambassador protested against the use of these irregular troops, but to his home government reported the rumors of atrocities as greatly exaggerated. Disraeli was content to accept this view of the case, and took no steps until the stirring up of English public opinion by the newspapers and a fervid campaign by Gladstone forced him into action. (See Morley, Gladstone, vol. 2, p. 549, ff.; Gallenga, vol. 2, p. 149, ff.)

But the other powers were not content with the situation. Russia was indubitably the leader in the effort to bring pressure on Turkey. While Austria had been the prime mover in the Andrassy note, Russia was chiefly responsible for the Berlin memorandum, which was much firmer in tone. In June she turned to England for advice as to the next step. The régime Russia favored for the affected region was the creation of tributary States, with rectified boundaries and local autonomy. This England approved, but ascertained that Austria-Hungary objected to such an arrangement and also, apparently with Italy, objected to the proposal, approved by Russia and Great Britain, that Montenegro be given a port. On Russia's request for information whether non-intervention would be Great Britain's attitude should Serbia enter the war, the answer was affirmative, but that she refused to bind herself in case of the pursuance of a different policy by other powers. On June 30 Serbia entered the war and Montenegro followed on July 2.

## 6. REICHSTADT CONFERENCE AND TREATY OF PESTH.

Russia came to an agreement with Austria at a meeting of the two sovereigns at Reichstadt in July. The result made known at the time was a decision for non-intervention. The arrangements made confidentially at Reichstadt were crystallized early the following year in a treaty signed at Pesth. This secret treaty has never been published in its entirety, but some of its provisions were that Austria should be neutral in case of a war between Russia and Turkey and that in case of the complete success of the Russian arms Austria was to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. No large State, Slav or other, was to be erected in the Balkans, and Constantinople was to be a free city. (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1876-7 and Goriainow, 334, ff. Cf. Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 235, American edition.) The treaty was dated January 15, 1877, but was not signed until March 18. Between the conference and the treaty Russia made an unsuccessful attempt to learn what would be the attitude of Germany in case Russia should take independent action. (See Goriainow, 319, ff., Bismarck, ch. 28.)

## 7. BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT PACIFICATION.

On August 29, 1876, Lord Derby telegraphed to Elliott, the British ambassador at Constantinople, that British sympathy with the Porte had been entirely destroyed by the accounts of the Bulgarian atrocities, and that public opinion would not allow British interference, even in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. He must therefore use every effort to persuade the Porte to make peace. A fortnight earlier Great Britain had intimated to Serbia, which was being badly beaten, that an application to the powers for mediation would be favorably received in England, and the application had been promptly made. Great Britain thereupon with the assent of the powers proposed a several weeks' armistice. This the Porte refused to grant, but instead ordered an informal suspension of hostilities, stating the terms on which it was willing to make peace with Serbia. Great Britain declared these terms inadmissible, and suggested others, to which it had secured the assent of the other powers, including, after much difficulty, Austria-Hungary. These terms provided the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro; local or administrative autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, guaranteed by the mediating powers; and guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria. In submitting them the British ambassador explained that the state of public opinion in Great Britain made it impossible for the Government to render the Porte "the support which they might otherwise have hoped for," and that the terms represented modifications Great Britain had obtained from the other powers.



## 8. RUSSIAN MEASURES.

While Turkey was raising objections to the terms, Russia proposed that if the Porte refused them, Bosnia be occupied by Austrian troops and Bulgaria by Russian troops, while a joint naval demonstration be made by the powers in the Bosphorus. Great Britain objected to the first part of the scheme, and still more to the latter part, in which she would play the dominant role. Hostilities having recommenced, Russia consented to another demand being made by Great Britain for an armistice, to be followed by a conference. The Russian suggestion was for an armistice of six weeks, and Great Britain asked for one of not less than a month. The Porte offered to grant one of six months. Russia, feeling that such a long armistice would be injurious to Serbia and Montenegro, protested, and sent an ultimatum to the Porte, threatening to break off diplomatic relations if within 48 hours a six weeks' armistice was not granted. The Porte immediately complied.

## 9. ENGLISH VERSUS RUSSIAN VIEWS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

The conference proposed by Great Britain was to meet at Constantinople, and her suggestions as bases for discussion were the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey, and the abjuring by the powers of selfish designs against her. The bases for pacification were to be those already proposed—the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro, and local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See Appendix I, 9.) These bases were approved by the powers, although Russia made the specific objection that the word "territorial" be omitted, as occupation might be necessary for pacification, and the general objection that the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to considerations of humanity and peace. (Parliamentary Papers (Turkey), 1877, No. 1, p. 705 (Cd. 1028).)

In these Russian objections lay the key of the Russian and British positions. Beaconsfield's preoccupation with British interests in India and Egypt explains his policy of maintaining the Turk as Keeper of the Gates. His ministry made clear that they were suspicious of Russian ambitions in that direction, and attention had been called, among other things, to the large number of Russian soldiers in the Serbian forces. The zeal of the Russian people for the cause of the Balkan Slavs was undeniable, and the Czar endeavored to dispel British suspicions on November 2 by stating definitely that he had no ambitions either in the direction of India or Constantinople (Hertslet, IV, 2509). In view of the arrangements for that city which Alexander II made with Francis Joseph a few months later we can believe in the sincerity of the Czar, but a powerful party in his dominions had other views. Disraeli certainly was not convinced, as

was shown by his sabre-rattling Guildhall speech of November 9, which gave the text for the famous Jingo refrain of the music halls. Two days later the Czar spoke of the Russians shedding their blood among the Serbs for the Slav cause and announced that if concerted efforts failed to ameliorate the Balkan situation, Russia would act alone (Hertslet, IV, 2518). A few days later he showed that he was anticipating this eventuality by announcing the beginning of the mobilization of the Russian troops.

#### 10. THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE.

A well-informed British diplomat wrote (Appendix I, 10) during the conference at Constantinople that Lord Salisbury had come there convinced that no power was disposed to shield Turkey and that a new policy was therefore necessary for England; that Bismarck was working for a war that would weaken Russia and break up Turkey; and that, therefore, it was desirable to draw near Russia. (Life of Sir William White, 116-118.) His instructions (See Appendix I, 11), too, indicated greater firmness with Turkey. Unfortunately the well-known Turkish sympathies of his colleague, Elliot, and certain actions of the British ministry, created the impression with the Porte that they were still to have British support. Derby sent word to the Porte as well as to Salisbury on the eve of the opening of the conference that the Government would not assent to or assist in coercive measures against Turkey, but that in the event of war it could expect no assistance from England. The former part of the message more than counteracted the effect of the latter and created an impression of great friendliness, an impression which the ministry took somewhat tardy steps to dispel. (Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1877), Nos. 78, 87, 148, 150.)

The conference was in session from December 23, 1876, to January 26, 1877. But as Russia had objected to the representation of Turkey and Great Britain had insisted upon it, preliminary sessions without the Turks were held from December 11 to December 22, a proceeding very galling to the Porte. On the first day of the formal session the proceedings were interrupted by a salvo of artillery, which the Grand Vizier announced had been fired to welcome the proclamation of a new constitution for Turkey. He intimated that the work of the conference would in consequence be superfluous, but the delegates declined to take his view and the deliberations continued. The proposals finally submitted to the Porte were modified through the efforts of the British delegates to a point where it was hoped they would be acceptable. They included the appointment of the governors of the revolted Provinces for five years, with the



assent of the powers, an international committee of surveillance, local control of taxation, and admission of Christians into the militia. Salisbury solemnly warned the Porte of the danger of refusing the findings of the conference, but after deliberation it decided that they were unacceptable. The ambassadors thereupon, according to the conditions they had made, withdrew from Constantinople, leaving the embassies with the *chargés d'affaires*.

#### 11. THE LONDON PROTOCOL.

Within two weeks Abdul Hamid, who had been reigning since the previous August, dismissed the author of the new constitution from office, and with him went the slight prospect there may have been of a more liberal régime. But peace was made with Serbia and negotiations begun with Montenegro, and the powers again adopted a policy of watchful waiting. Russia, however, sent a special mission to discuss measures by which her demobilization and that of Turkey might be carried out, and the result of this mission was a protocol, signed by the powers on March 31. (See Appendix I, 12.) It recognized the progress already made by Turkey, but threatened joint action if the Porte did not immediately take full measures of pacification, putting reforms into execution and placing its forces on a peace footing. Russia annexed a declaration that Turkey, if it accepted the protocol, should send a special envoy to St. Petersburg to treat of disarmament and gave warning that recurrence of atrocities would cause her to stop demobilization. England declared that should reciprocal disarmament and peace between Russia and Turkey not result, the protocol would be null and void. Italy declared that she would be bound by her signature only as long as agreement between the powers was maintained. These indications of divided counsels scarcely added to the force of the document, which the Porte proceeded to decline.

#### 12. THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF WAR.

The Porte's refusal was issued April 9, and Russia thereupon decided to act alone. On April 19 she announced that her armies were about to cross the Turkish frontier, on the 23d broke off diplomatic relations, and on the 24th declared war. Turkey protested, pointing out that according to article 8 of the Treaty of Paris (1856) Russia should have resorted to the mediation of the powers before making war. On receiving the Russian declaration of April 19 Great Britain also made a formal protest against the act as a breach of the Treaty of Paris (1856). Further action she confined to a declaration of neutrality and a formulation of English interests in the East.

## 13. APPRAISEMENT.

It has been customary to lay the blame for the outbreak of the Turkish War largely upon the policy of Disraeli in subordinating the English policy in Turkish matters to the interests of Great Britain in India and Egypt and refusing to put pressure upon the Turk, who never yields except under pressure. There is also a school of historians who see in Bismarck the power that pulled the wires and brought about the war. Their case is not well documented, however, and the evidence so far available indicates that he rather played a waiting game. Recent studies based on Russian and Austrian archives tend to prove that Andrassy, far from being a mere tool of Bismarck, had a strong Austrian policy of territorial aggression, and that he gave Russia every encouragement to pull his chestnuts out of the fire (Goriamow, ch. 14). Exactly to what extent Alexander II's desire to befriend the Slavs under Turkish rule was supplemented by territorial aims can not be estimated with the evidence available. But it seems very clear that Turkey, whose failure to reform her ways brought on the war, was encouraged in her policy by her knowledge that the Three Emperors' League (See article, The Formation of the League of the Three Emperors) was not the firmest of alliances, that she had friends in the English ministry, and that in case of war there was a chance of Great Britain's intervention to defend British interests in the East.

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## 18. THE SERBO-TURKISH WAR OF 1876.

### 1. ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

Serbia's declaration of war upon Turkey, June 30, 1876, was made largely in consequence of her sympathy with the revolting provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She had waited nearly a year in the hope that the great powers would induce Turkey to make reforms there. (Proclamation of the Prince of Serbia of war against Turkey. Hertslet, IV, No. 463.) The powers could not agree among themselves and were inclined to defer collective action until Abdul Hamid, who had just become Sultan, should have made clear his temper and policy.

### 2. THE ARMISTICE.

Late in August the Prince of Serbia asked the powers to mediate. (Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 30, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 467, p. 2488.) September 14, Turkey submitted to "the judgment and equitable appreciation of the mediating powers" the following peace proposal: Serbia to abolish her militia, to permit her fortresses to be reoccupied by Turkish troops, to send home emigrants from limitrophe provinces, to pay an indemnity, to allow the Ottoman Government to construct a railway from Belgrade to Nish. (Turkish Memorandum, Sept. 14, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 466.) September 21 the powers suggested as a basis for peace: (1) The status quo, speaking roughly, for Serbia and Montenegro;

(2) local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; (3) guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria; (4) a formal armistice.

The powers did not present a united front with respect to the armistice. (Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 30, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 467.) Russia therefore took the matter into her own hands and sent an ultimatum to Turkey demanding an armistice of six weeks or two months. (Russian Ultimatum, Oct. 31, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 468.) Turkey complied.

### 3. THE CONFERENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

England suspected Russia of working for her own ends in Turkey. (Dispatch from Lord Loftus, Nov. 2, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 470; dispatch from the Russian Government, Nov. 3, 1876. Ibid., No. 471; Russian dispatch, Nov. 19, 1876. Ibid., No. 474.) She therefore proposed a conference, the basis for the deliberations to be (1) the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; (2) a declaration that the powers do not intend to seek any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or commercial concessions; (3) the bases of pacification proposed to the Porte September 21. (Circulars addressed by the Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's representatives at Paris, Berlin, etc. Hertslet, IV, No. 472. See also article, *The Eastern Question, 1875-1877*, sec. 10.)

Russia contended that "the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guaranties demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace." (Russian dispatch accepting proposals for a conference, Nov. 19, 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 474, p. 2524.)

The conference finally came to an agreement in a series of protocols. (Hertslet, IV, No. 475.) These were materially modified to meet the wishes of the Turkish plenipotentiaries (Protocols of Conferences, Dec. 23, 1876-Jan. 20, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 477), only to be rejected by them in the end. The chief reason given for the rejection of the protocols was that they failed to observe "the limits laid down by the English program and to conform to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris as regards the nonintervention of the powers in the internal affairs of the Empire." (Dispatch from Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Jan. 25, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 478, p. 2545.)

### 4. TREATY OF PEACE.

February 28, 1877. Turkey of her own accord made peace with Serbia on the basis of the status quo, amnesty for the Ottoman and Serbian subjects "compromised in the late events," and evacuation within 12 days by Turkish and Serbian troops from territory "outside the ancient frontier demarkation." (Protocol for the Restoration of Peace, Feb. 28, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 480.)



## 5. CONCLUSION.

The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876-77 is only one factor in the whole Balkan crisis of 1875-1877, and its diplomatic problems can be fully understood only in connection with that crisis. (See article, *The Eastern Question, 1875-1877.*)

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## 19. AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ACCORD OF 1876-1877.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

The revolts in the Turkish Balkans in 1875 and Turkish barbarities in attempting to suppress them claimed the special interest of Austria and Russia. These powers joined with Germany in a "confidential exchange of ideas" and formulated a program of reforms to be demanded of Turkey. Acceptance by the Sultan could be secured only if it was apparent that the program had the united

support of the powers. But unanimity could not be obtained. Each power suspected the motives of the other powers. The British Government was especially distrustful of Russia. (See article, *The Eastern Question, 1875-1877.*) Under these circumstances Russia, which was more intent on action against Turkey than any other power, sought an understanding with Austria-Hungary.

## 2. ACCORD OF REICHSTADT, JULY, 1876.

The Emperors of Russia and Austria with their prime ministers met at Reichstadt in July, 1876, to formulate an agreement regarding the Balkans. The text of this arrangement has never been officially published, but Sosnosky describes the agreement as covering two possible situations. If the Turks defeated the Serbs and Montenegrans, with whom war was in progress (See article, *The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876*), the status quo was to be preserved. If, on the contrary, the Turks were defeated, the basis of settlement should be as follows: Serbia and Montenegro were each to receive additions of territory, but Austria was to acquire the greater part of Bosnia, and Russia to extend her control over southern Bessarabia and the Black Sea. Greece was to obtain Thessaly. Crete, Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania were to be autonomous states. Constantinople and the adjacent country was to be constituted as a "free state" (Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, vol. I, p. 152). This agreement apparently presupposed the defeat of Turkey by the Balkan principalities, and when their military operations collapsed it became unworkable, except possibly to leave Austria a free hand in Bosnia. (See article, *The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876.*)

## 3. THE CONVENTIONS OF PESTH, 1877.

Two secret conventions, signed at Pesth in January and April, 1877, superseded the Reichstadt accord. These conventions, also, have not been published. Fournier and Goriainow give the terms, probably with substantial accuracy. If war broke out between Russia and Turkey the Dual Monarchy was to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Russia and was to support her diplomatically. The most significant stipulations, as regards the permanent Balkan settlement, were that Austria-Hungary was left at liberty to take possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia was to get back Bessarabia, lost in 1856, and was to consent that no "larger Slavic State" should be erected from the territory of Turkey.

## 4. CONCLUSION.

The Austro-Russian accord of 1876-77 explains in large measure the neutrality of Austria-Hungary during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the attitude of the Dual Monarchy toward the Treaty



of San Stefano, and the reason why at the Congress of Berlin Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria-Hungary to occupy and administer. (See articles, The Congress of Berlin, and Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.)

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## 20. THE RUSSO-ROUMANIAN ALLIANCE OF 1877-1878.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

At the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 Moldavia and Wallachia formed a separate State, but it was still tributary to Turkey. Though calling itself Roumania, it was known to Europe under the name of "The United Principalities." For some years (since about 1870) Roumania or The Principalities had been forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia (See article, Roumania and the Balkan Settlement).

### 2. THE RUSSO-ROUMANIAN CONVENTION OF 1877.

At the conference of the powers which met at Constantinople in 1876-1877, as also through attempted negotiation, Roumania tried in vain to secure a guaranty of her neutrality. Failing to secure the desired guarantee, Roumania determined to take its stand on the side of Russia.

Consequently, there was concluded on April 16, 1877, a Russo-Roumanian convention in which Prince Charles of Roumania assured to the Russian Army free passage through Roumanian territory. Russia, on her part, agreed to maintain and respect the political rights of the Roumanian State, as also to maintain and defend her actual integrity.

The situation created by the Russian use of Roumanian territory led inevitably to war between Roumania and Turkey and implied a Russo-Roumanian alliance.

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### 21. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 1878.

#### 1. INEFFECTUAL NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE-DECEMBER, 1877.

On June 8, 1877, Russia informed England of her war aims (*Parl. Papers*, Turkey, 1878, XV, No. 1), and on July 20 the Czar, though not willing to suspend operations, was ready to treat for peace if the Sultan would make "suitable propositions" directly to Russia (*Ibid.*, IX, Nos. 1 and 3). The Turks were not ready to treat (*Ibid.*, II, No. 7), though England and Austria were afraid Russia might make peace independently with Turkey (*Goriainow*, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, p. 351). By September Turkey sent terms to Berlin for communication to Russia (*Hardy*, *A Memoir*, II, p. 32); in November, after the fall of Kars, Russia drew her terms for Berlin and Vienna to be used as direct basis with Turkey (*Goriainow*, p. 355) in connection with the fall of Plevna, December 10.

#### 2. TURKEY ASKS FOR PEACE DECEMBER, 1877.

December 12, following a hint from England, Turkey appealed to powers through England (*P. P.*, Turkey, 1878, II, No. 1). Joint mediation failed, Germany refusing to act (Nos. 3, 5, 6), and Derby for England claimed ignorance of Russia's terms. England asked for Turkish terms (No. 4); December 26 the Sultan asked for English mediation (Nos. 8, 9). Derby communicated this to the powers, asking France to help at St. Petersburg (*Archives diplomatiques*, second series, vol. 6, p. 1); Gortchakoff replied that Russia was ready for peace if the Porte would communicate directly with Russian field



headquarters, where they would learn terms of armistice (P. P., Turkey, 1878, II, No. 16). Derby thought that Russia was trying to make peace "over the head of Europe" (Goriainow, p. 359) and declared an armistice was for generals, but terms of peace were for governments, and other powers were interested (P. P., II, No. 16). Meantime, December 29, the Czar sent terms of peace to Grand Duke Nicholas in the field (Goriainow, p. 359). Turkey tried unsuccessfully once more through England (Nos. 19, 20, 21). On January 8 the Turks finally communicated with the Russian commander, only to find that the Czar's instructions, sent by messenger, would not arrive for a week or ten days. The Grand Duke warned the Turks that acceptance of bases of peace must precede armistice (Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34-38), though hostilities stopped in Bulgaria January 14 (No. 41).

### 3. RUSSO-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS, JANUARY, 1878.

In spite of Russian warning the Turkish delegates who reached Russian headquarters at Kyzanlik January 19-20 were not ready to accept Russian terms (Pears: *Forty Years in Constantinople*, p. 27; P. P., Turkey, 1878, II, No. 40; III, Nos. 11, 14, 25). The Czar had refused to stop the Russian advance (Ibid., III, No. 9), and Philippopolis was taken January 16, Adrianople January 20. The Sultan considered possibility of abdication and flight to England (Hardy, II, p. 47). In a panic the Turks gave way (P. P., III, Nos. 12, 13, 15-19; Goriainow, p. 361), though Derby had telegraphed that any treaty affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European treaty and would be invalid without assent of other signatories (P. P., Turkey, 1878, III, No. 6). Schouvaloff, Russian ambassador at London, January 25, gave terms to Derby, who had received only garbled versions from Layard at Constantinople (Ibid., Nos. 33-38). Russia also promised that the question of the straits would not be settled independently (Ibid., No. 43, V, Nos. 10, 11, 14-16; Goriainow, p. 362), although Ignatiev already had instructions to include that matter in a general sense in the Turkish agreement and to uphold the principle of the closing of the straits. This was on January 27, when Layard at Constantinople had been begging for an English fleet (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VI, No. 1; Goriainow, p. 363). Such a situation led the English Government to recall the fleet from the mouth of Dardanelles. Meantime Russian headquarters were moved to Adrianople, and further delay in negotiations ensued while the Russian armies advanced "on all sides" toward Constantinople (P. P., Turkey, IV: V, Nos. 4, 5, 9, 13; VI, No. 3). The Grand Duke had received permission to use the greatest liberty of action if English should disembark troops at any point (Goriainow, p. 364).

## 4. ARMISTICE OF ADRIANOPLE, JANUARY 31, 1878.

Under these circumstances the Turks gave up bargaining, signed preliminary bases of peace (Hertslet: *Map of Europe by Treaty*, IV, No. 514), and an armistice (No. 515) which led to further Russian advance (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VII, Nos. 2, 4, 6). England protested vainly (Ibid., XII, No. 7), when she learned that the Turks had surrendered even the main line of defense for Constantinople and that the Russians were going to San Stefano (Ibid., XI, No. 2; XII, No. 3; Goriainow, pp. 366–368). Safvet Pasha, Turkish foreign secretary, openly denounced England as betrayer of Turkey (Thompson: *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield*, II, p. 376, quoting *Daily News*, Feb. 7). For a time there was possibility of a Russo-Turkish alliance following the peace. Under these circumstances the English fleet passed the Dardanelles in spite of Turkish protests. (P. P., Turkey, 1878, XIV.) The Czar ordered an advance on Constantinople, and the Turks were unable to secure the withdrawal of the British fleet. Thus matters stood February 13–21 until Russia and England agreed not to occupy either shore of the Dardanelles and the Grand Duke disregarded the Czar's order to occupy Constantinople. (Ibid., XVII; Goriainow, pp. 364–368.)

## 5. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 1878.

In the negotiations Ignatiev, with Czar's approval, tried to establish as many points as possible but was restrained by Gortchakoff, who was anxious not to break with England. (Goriainow, p. 368.) The Turks, encouraged by Austria and British ambassador, openly said there was no use in arguing, as this treaty would be revised at a congress. (Goriainow, p. 365.) The treaty (See Appendix I, 14) based on agreement at Adrianople provided for:

(1) Independence and increase of territory for Montenegro and Serbia.

(2) Independence of Roumania, with cession by Turkey of Dobrudja, including the valuable port of Constanza, by way of indemnity for surrender by Roumania of Bessarabia to Russia.

(3) Bulgaria an autonomous tributary principality, with Christian government and national militia and a large increase of territory in Thrace and in Macedonia. Russian military occupation limited to two years.

(4) War indemnity to Russia of 1,410,000,000 roubles.

(5) In lieu of 1,100,000,000 roubles of the indemnity Russia was to obtain Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, Bayazet, and the territory as far as the Saganlough, in Asia, and Dobrudja, in Europe, the last of which was to be exchanged with Roumania for Bessarabia.



(6) Rosphorus and Dardanelles to remain open to neutral merchant shipping in time of war.

(7) Reforms in government of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Crete, Epirus, Thessaly, and other parts of Turkey in Europe and of Armenia.

(8) Amnesty and protection of rights of individuals.

(9) Renewal of treaties of commerce.

(10) Evacuation and exchange of prisoners.

(11) Ratifications to be exchanged within 15 days.

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## 22. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Congress of Berlin assembled on June 13, 1878, and ended its labors by signing the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, one month later. The fashioning of this important document, which has been called the constitution of the Balkan Peninsula during the following 30 years, might seem to have been marveously speedy. As a matter of fact, nearly all of its more significant features had been agreed upon beforehand, so that the congress had little to do beyond gathering existing understandings into a unified, elaborated, and harmonious whole. The more important of the preliminary agreements which prepared the way for the Treaty of Berlin will be mentioned.

### 2. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1876-1877.

On July 8, 1876, Emperor Francis Joseph and Czar Alexander II met at Reichstadt, and the former promised to remain neutral in a war between Russia and Turkey, provided he should be allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bareilles (*Les Turcs*, 160-161) quotes Carathéodory Pasha, who says that the Roumanian delegate, Cogalcinéano, had handled the original memoranda of this meeting, in which Gortchakoff and Andrassy had set down the cession of southern Bessarabia to Russia and the extension of Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1877.) On November 2, 1876, Lord Loftus, British ambassador to Russia, reported to his Government that the Czar had spoken to him of the provisional occupation of Bosnia by Austria and of Bulgaria by Russia, with a naval demonstration by the British at Constantinople, and of the erection of Serbia and Roumania into independent kingdoms. (Hertslet, pp. 2509-2510.)



At the preliminary meetings of the Conference of Constantinople, December 11–22, 1876, arrangements were proposed for peace and reform in the Turkish Empire, including new autonomous organizations for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro were to be enlarged. (Ibid., 2526–2530, Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 2, 1877.) These plans were elaborated and proposed at the regular meetings of the conference and rejected by the Turkish representatives January 20, 1877 (Hertslet, pp. 2541–2544. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 68, 1104 ff.), as tending to destroy Turkish sovereignty in those areas. (Hertslet, 2547.)

### 3. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877–1878.

On June 8, 1877, after war had been begun between Russia and Turkey, Count Schuvaloff communicated to the Earl of Derby some views on Russian and British interests in the East, in which he suggested that Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Balkans, become “an autonomous vassal province under the guaranty of Europe” and that Montenegro and Serbia receive increases of territory. Russia should have compensation in southern Bessarabia and around Batoum, Roumania in a portion of the Dobrudja, and Austria in Bosnia and “partly in the Herzegovina.” (Ibid., 2634–2639.)

The war continued, and after the fall of Plevna in December, 1877, the way to Constantinople was open. The British Government, supported by public opinion, began to fear the results of the Russian success and prepared to take diplomatic and military action. Austria likewise became suspicious, and prepared to post troops in Transylvania, near the Russian line of communication. On January 3, 1878, the Porte appealed to the powers for mediation. The refusal of Germany to take part in such a mediation made the British public apprehensive that Russia, supported by Germany, would try to force her own terms on Turkey. (Rose, I, Development of Modern Europe, I, 265.) On January 15 the British ambassador at Petrograd handed to Prince Gortchakoff an opinion of the British Government that any treaty between Russia and Turkey affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European treaty in order to be valid. (Hertslet, 2657.)

### 4. THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE.

Russia and Turkey signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878, a document (See Appendix I, 13) which combined with an armistice the “preliminary bases for peace,” and provided for an autonomous Bulgaria, with a national Christian government and militia; the independence of Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, with increases of territory; autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reforms in other

Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe; an indemnity to Russia; and an understanding to secure the rights and interests of Russia in the straits. (Ibid., 2658-60). On February 5, 1878, the Austrian Government proposed a conference at Vienna of the powers signatory to the treaties of 1856 and 1871. (Hertslet, 2668.) Baden was substituted later as the place of meeting, and on March 7 it was proposed that not a conference but a congress be held, and that the place be Berlin (Ibid., 2697).

Bismarck announced, in a speech to the Reichstag on February 19, that he proposed to act as an "honest broker," with no partiality in favor of any country.

#### 5. THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, 1878.

Russian and Turkey agreed on a "preliminary treaty of peace" at San Stefano on March 3, 1878 (See Appendix I, 14), which set forth, with annexed maps, new boundaries for Montenegro and Serbia. (See article, The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878.) Bulgaria was laid out extensively, including all areas which were believed to contain a majority of Bulgarians. The plan proposed at the conference of Constantinople for the organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be put into effect. Improvements and reforms were to be provided in Armenia. An indemnity of 1,410,000,000 rubles was to be paid by Turkey to Russia, but in lieu of 1,100,000,000 rubles of this sum the Dobrudja and the districts of Ardahan, Kars, Batum, and Bayazid were to be ceded. Ratifications were to be exchanged within 15 days (Hertslet, 2672-2696; Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 22 (1878). Holland, Eastern question, 335-348, etc.). This treaty proposed an arrangement very favorable to Russian and Bulgarian interests. It was, however, as regards its disposition of the Balkan peninsula, much more nearly conformable to the principle of nationality than was the Treaty of Berlin. While it has often been considered an attempt to "tie the hands of the Congress" (Rose, I, Development, 1, 272), it became very serviceable to that body in exact conformity with its denomination as a "preliminary peace."

#### 6. NEGOTIATIONS FOR CALLING CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

There was a sharp exchange of views between the British and Russian Governments as to the extent to which this treaty should come before the congress for discussion, which was settled by Prince Gortchakoff conceding "full liberty of appreciation and action" to all the powers to be represented. (See account in Salisbury's circular note, referred to below, and Gortchakoff's dispatch, Hertslet, IV, 2707.) Gen. Ignatieff was sent to visit the European courts, and is supposed to have offered Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria.



The Hapsburg power, however, was not pleased with the blocking of the road to Salonika by the interposition of the great Bulgaria, and asked special rights in Serbia and Montenegro, with control of Bosnia and Albania (Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique*, II, 515). Apparently it was this attitude of Austria that caused Russia to yield full discussion of the treaty (Skrine, *Expansion of Russia*, 259). Count Andrassy a few days later made a secret agreement with England, obtaining thereby English support at the coming congress for the Austrian claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Fournier, *Wie-wir zu Bosnien kamen*, p. 63.)

Lord Salisbury issued a circular note on April 1, 1878, proposing modifications of the Treaty of San Stefano, in the direction of removing exclusive Russian advantages, protecting British interests, and securing, without impairing Turkish sovereignty, improvement in the position of the subject peoples of Turkey (Hertslet, 2698-2706). Prince Gortchakoff answered this on April 9, asking for specific proposals, and adding comments in an annex. Russia's armies in Turkey were losing effectives rapidly. She was not prepared for a general war, nor was any ally in sight in case one should break out. She was therefore ready to make considerable concessions. Count Shuvaloff, Russian ambassador at London, served as intermediary in carrying personally to Petrograd (starting May 7) a statement of the British objections to the Treaty of San Stefano. On his return he was able to reach, by May 30, a secret agreement with Lord Salisbury, which was later embodied in the entire Treaty of Berlin (Rose, I, 278-282. The text of this agreement was published in the London Globe on June 14, 1878. Paul, II., *History of Modern England*, vol. 4, 52-53. It was reprinted by The Times, June 15, 1878. The French text is in *Staatsarchiv*, vol. 34, No. 6749). The principal features were that the Bulgarian regions south of the Balkans were not to be withdrawn wholly from Turkish control; that the Sultan would have the right to canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria; that England would present the cause of the Greeks of Thessaly and Epirus to the powers; that while feeling "profound regret" at the cession of southern Bessarabia to Russia, she would not dispute it; and that Bayazid, controlling the main route from Asia Minor into Persia, should be given back to Turkey. Russia thus made considerable concessions, but in recompense Lord Salisbury abandoned the right to discuss at the congress questions not mentioned in the secret agreement, and thus almost all independence of decision was removed from the congress.

#### 7. THE CYPRUS CONVENTION.

On the very day when this arrangement was made Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Layard at Constantinople to negotiate about

guaranteeing the Sultan's Asiatic possessions and receiving the administration of Cyprus (Parliamentary papers, Turkey, Nos. 36 and 43, 1878. Hertslet, IV, 2717-2720). A secret agreement to this effect was drawn up June 4 (See Appendix I, 16), with such promptitude as to suggest previous preparation. (Ibid., 2722-2723). Debidour (*Histoire Diplomatique*, II, 520) suggests that England would have been glad to take Egypt instead of Cyprus, but that France would not have consented. She had stipulated that Egypt be not taken in hand by the congress. The principal features of the Treaty of Berlin and of the Cyprus Convention, which, while it stands separate, counts as a part of the same great settlement, were thus fully determined before the meeting of the congress. (See article, *The English Protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914.*)

#### 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS, JUNE 13 TO JULY 13.

Prince Bismarck dominated the proceedings of the congress and used his authoritative presence to drive the deliberations rapidly, suppressing at will the representatives of small states when they were permitted to appear for short hearings before the Congress, and limiting debate on the questions already arranged (Bareilles, *Les Turcs*, 148-175, gives extracts from the report of the Turkish delegate, Carathéodory Pasha). The material to be embodied in the document was drawn together in 20 sessions during 31 days. In spite of the preliminary arrangements there were vigorous debates between the representatives of Russia and England. Austria regularly voted with England, France usually did likewise.

The English plenipotentiaries, supported by the French, insisted upon admitting representatives from Greece to a hearing when the disposition of Epirus and Thessaly should come up. The Bulgarian question occupied four days (June 22 to 26). The new principality was reduced to about one-third of that arranged at San Stefano. Another third, under the name of Eastern Roumelia, was to have a separate status and a different organization, while the remainder was given back to Turkey to constitute, under the name of Macedonia, that theater of robbery, arson, rape, and murder which, in full sight of Europe, disgraced the opening years of the twentieth century. On the 28th the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (See article, *Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878*) by Austria was gently proposed, to the surprise perhaps of none but the Turkish delegates (Debidour, *op. cit.*, II, 525; Bareilles, *op. cit.*, 168-170, relates how on July 13 the Turkish delegates, on peremptory orders from Constantinople, required Andrassy, after fierce debate, to sign a separate paper affirming that the Austrian occupation would be provisional). The increments assigned to Serbia and



Montenegro at San Stefano were materially reduced, so that, in Austria's interest, the two small States might be carefully insulated from each other. To secure this object more thoroughly, it was provided that Austrian garrisons be stationed in the Sanjak of Novi-bazar, which was to lie between Serbia and Montenegro. To recompense Serbia in part the territories of Pirot and Vrania were assigned to her. By this action animosity between Serbia and Bulgaria was made almost inevitable, since Bulgaria regarded the region as Bulgarian territory. The Greek representatives were heard, but received no award of territory. The Roumanians, forced to surrender southern Bessarabia in order to soothe Russian pride for its loss in 1856, as well as to bring Russia to the Danube River, were assigned the infertile Dobrudja, enlarged a little at the south at the expense of Bulgaria. The Armenians, left with a Turkish promise of reform, were not even to have the direct supervision of a single power, but a futile reliance upon the joint consideration of the powers. (See article, *The Armenian Question, 1878-1897*.) The revelation on June 4 of the Cyprus convention (See article, *The English Protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914*) gave Beaconsfield a dramatic prominence that rejoiced his soul, and he showed no signs of qualms of conscience because of the inconsistency of the episode with the principles for which England and he himself were standing of the integrity of Turkey and the inviolability of the Sultan's sovereignty. England did indeed assume not only the defense of the Sultan's Asiatic possessions, but the protection of the Armenians, both of which engagements she quietly abandoned within a few years without returning Cyprus to the Porte. The only power that showed any attachment to the principle now regarded as of paramount importance, the self-determination of peoples, was Russia, but even she did not hold to it against what she conceived to be her interests. The powers are all paying to-day, quite directly, in the catastrophe of the World War, for their selfish departures from justice at the Congress of Berlin. Even at the time none of them was satisfied with their work. "Not one of the interested parties but returned from the congress with some discontent, some disquiet, some new germ of hatred or of strife" (Debidour, *op. cit.*, II, 530).

#### 9. TREATY OF BERLIN (SEE APPENDIX I, 17).

The Treaty of Berlin, as signed July 13, 1878, contained 64 articles, of which the principal contents were as follows: Articles 1 to 12 established Bulgaria as an autonomous and tributary principality under the Sultan of Turkey, defined its boundaries, provided for the election of a prince and the preparation of an organic law, a provisional Russian régime of not exceeding nine months, commercial and financial regulations, and so on. Articles 13 to 22 provided for

the Province of Eastern Roumelia, with administrative autonomy, delimitation of boundaries, a governor general, European commissions to arrange its organization and administer its finances provisionally, etc. Article 23 affirmed the organic law of Crete and provided for applying similar laws elsewhere in the Turkish Empire. The frontiers of Greece were to be rectified (art. 24). Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, and the latter State was to have the right to keep garrisons and maintain military and commercial roads in the Sanjak of Novibazar (art. 25). Articles 26 to 33 declared Montenegro independent, enlarged its boundaries, and arranged its relations with Turkey. Articles 34 to 42 provided similarly for Serbia, and articles 43 to 51 for Roumania. The control of the Danube by a European commission was continued in articles 52 and 57. (See article, *The Danube Question, 1871-1901*.) Article 58 ceded to Russia the districts of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan in Asia, and the three subsequent articles dealt also with Asia, the last (61) providing for reforms in the provinces inhabited by Armenians. Article 62 defined religious liberty for the Ottoman Empire, and the last two articles continued the treaties of Paris (1856) and London (1871) in points not superseded and arranged for ratification.

#### 10. APPRAISEMENT OF THE CONGRESS.

The Congress of Berlin, which assembled on June 13, 1878, will be forever famous for the great personalities which composed it and for the unsatisfactory settlement of the great questions brought before it. Undoubtedly it left conditions in the Near East much better than they had been in 1875, but scarcely an advantageous change can be credited to the deliberations of the congress itself. Both the improvements in the situation, such as the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania, and the autonomy of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, and the shortcomings, such as the incomplete liberation of the Christian subjects of the Porte and the violation of the principle of nationality in the acquisitions of Russia, Austria, and England had been prepared beforehand. The predetermined compromise settlement which "in the Name of Almighty God" was sanctioned by the signatures of the brilliantly clothed plenipotentiaries was filled with the seeds of oppression, bloodshed, and war, not excepting those of the World War.

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Page 2766, map of Bulgaria showing the boundaries as proposed by the Treaty of San Stefano and as fixed by the Treaty of Berlin. *Stanford's Geographical Establishment*; c. 26 $\frac{2}{3}$  m. to 1 inch; names of places taken from Austrian staff map.

Page 2774, Eastern Roumelia (*Stanford's*, etc.).

Page 2782, Montenegro (*ditto*).

Page 2786, Serbia (*ditto*).

Page 2790, Bessarabia, Dobrudja, Danube Delta, Isle of Serpents, etc. (*ditto*).

Page 2794, Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia (*ditto*, except scale, which is c. 33 $\frac{1}{3}$  m. to 1 inch).

Page 2798, Turkey in Europe, to illustrate Treaty of Berlin (*ditto*, except scale, 90 m. to 1 inch).

Page 2798 (immediately following previous map), map showing territory restored to Turkey by Congress of Berlin (*ditto*).

Page 2798, map illustrating Treaty of San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin.

Rose, *Development of European Nations*, I, 284. (*Stanford's*, London, 133 m. to 1 inch.)

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## 23. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

### 1. CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORING AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Austria-Hungary entered the Congress of Berlin (See article, that title) in 1878 under circumstances exceptionally auspicious for the realization of the aims which Count Andrassy, minister of foreign affairs, formulated for the Dual Monarchy. Shortly before the

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 began Austria-Hungary had come to an understanding with Russia (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1876-77) which undoubtedly contained stipulations very favorable to the designs of the Dual Monarchy upon Bosnia-Herzegovina. The strong opposition which Austria-Hungary immediately manifested to the Treaty of San Stefano could count with certainty upon the firm support of Great Britain, which as well as the Dual Monarchy was bitterly hostile to the proposed Great Bulgaria. The attitude of the small Balkan States was not to count for much in the congress unless in conjunction with that of a great power. Austria-Hungary could, therefore, make use of the hostility of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania to the idea of Great Bulgaria to break down that scheme and could then disregard the wishes of those States whenever that course should prove convenient. Finally Austria-Hungary could count upon the firm support of Bismarck, who, though claiming to play the rôle of the "honest broker," was intent upon using the occasion to make more solid the close understanding between Germany and Austria-Hungary, even if that should produce some difficulty as regards the third member of the League of the Three Emperors (See article, that title).

## 2. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN

Under the circumstances it was not surprising that Austria-Hungary secured its wishes on practically all points where its interests were involved. By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix I, 17) Austria-Hungary obtained the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the inhabitants were by large majority Serbs and refusal to annex them to Serbia left that State outraged in national sentiment and shut off from all access to the sea (See article on Serbia and the Balkan settlement of 1878). That Austria-Hungary was to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina instead of annexing them outright was not due to any reluctance on the part of the Congress of Berlin to permit annexation nor to any consideration for Serbia. The chief reason for the arrangement was to be found in the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. In Hungary the Magyars and in Austria the Germans were not willing at that time to increase the strength of the Slavic forces in the Dual Monarchy. Occupation and administration was therefore more acceptable than annexation.

Novi-Bazar, lying between Serbia and Montenegro, and inhabited by Serbs, though much coveted by those States, each of which asked for its division between them, was chiefly through Austro-Hungarian influence, restored to Turkey. But article 25, also secured to Austria-Hungary the right to keep garrisons and have military and



commercial roads there. (See article, *The Austrian Occupation of Novi-Bazar, 1878-1909.*) At Austria's insistence Montenegro was restricted in extent as compared with the Treaty of San Stefano and subjected to various conditions formulated in the interest of Austria-Hungary. (See article, *Montenegro and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.*) In short, the settlement of 1878 represented a successful first step in the *Drang nach Osten*.

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See bibliography of the Congress of Berlin and of other articles dealing with different phases of the Balkan settlement of 1878.

### 24. SERBIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Though Serbia had been unsuccessful in its war against Turkey in 1876 and had engaged in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 on the side of Russia only at a comparatively late date in the struggle, the Serbs were not without some hope, as the end of the latter war drew near, that their little state might emerge from the approaching settlement of Balkan affairs with its long standing national hopes realized.

These hopes aimed chiefly at two things: (1) Independence, (2) extension of the Serbian boundaries to include all of the territory inhabited by Serbs and still under Turkish authority. The territory in question fell into two divisions: (1) Old Serbia, a somewhat vaguely defined region lying to the east, south, and southwest of Serbia, (2) Bosnia-Herzegovina.

#### 2. SERBIA AND THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

The Treaty of San Stefano was the first disappointment for Serbia. It stipulated for the independence of Serbia, also for an increase of territory. But the amount of territory which it proposed to bestow on Serbia was inconsiderable, only a small fraction of Old Serbia. It was evident that Russia intended to bestow its favor chiefly on Bulgaria.

#### 3. SERBIA AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

The calling of the Congress of Berlin revived the hopes of Serbia. But it became evident at a very early stage that the Serbs had very little basis for expectation of a favorable outcome from its deliberations. The Serb representatives were refused admission to the congress. Later on they were not even permitted to appear before the

congress to present an argument in behalf of the Serb claims. From the French delegates the Serb representatives learned that Bismarck attached the greatest importance to securing the satisfaction of Austria-Hungary and that Serbia would succeed only in so far as she was in accord with Austria.

Under the circumstances, since it was well known that Austria-Hungary was intent upon the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina for herself and there was some knowledge of her understanding in regard to that subject with Russia (See article on the Austro-Russian Accord of 1876-1877), Serbia did not venture in the formal papers which she communicated to the congress to lay claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina, knowing well that by so doing she ran the risk of getting very little of Old Serbia.

#### 4. THE TREATY OF BERLIN AND SERBIA.

The Treaty of Berlin provided, so far as Serbia was concerned, a solution which was altogether such an one as Austria-Hungary wanted for Serbia. As a distinguished French historian has remarked (Émile Dénis, *La grande Serbe*, p. 108), it was in line with the Hapsburg policy as pursued toward Serbia ever since: To tolerate the existence of Serbia as long as she would be a docile vassal and would serve to extend little by little her (Austro-Hungarian) influence toward the south; to crush her without pity from the moment when it should attempt to fulfill freely her destinies as an independent power. Serbia got a recognition of its independence and a slightly larger but somewhat different extent of territory than had been contemplated in the Treaty of San Stefano.

#### 5. SERBIAN DISAPPOINTMENT.

The passionate disappointment of Serbia at this outcome can be judged by two contemporaneous Serb utterances. One is that of a Serb publicist in 1875 when the rising in Bosnia had raised Serb hopes that at length the time was approaching when the Serbs of that region might be united with those of Serbia. "Bosnia-Herzegovina is for us not only that which Trentino and Triest are for Italy and the Alpine Provinces of Austria are for Germany. It has for Serbia the importance which the environs of Moscow have for Russia and the most vital parts of Germany and France for the Germans and the French." The other is that of a Serb poet, writing after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. "The Treaty of Berlin has a little enlarged the chains of Serbia, but thereby rendering them more terribly solid. The light of day breaks only to reveal the mutilation of Serbia, only that its wounds may be clearly discerned and that it may be struck where it is still intact. The night



has dispersed only in order that the Serbs may no longer dream of their unity, that unity for which they have undergone so many sacrifices."

#### 6. APPRAISEMENT.

The Balkan settlement of 1878 in the case of Serbia exhibits in striking fashion two things: (1) The failure of all the powers to take into account the rights of nationality as represented by the Christian States of the Balkan peninsula, to which failure must be attributed in large measure the unhappy state of affairs which prevailed in southeastern Europe from 1878 to 1914, which condition became one of the most potent factors in bringing about the World War; (2) the failure of Russia in 1878 to appreciate its responsibility toward the Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe other than the Bulgars, thereby leaving them defenceless in the presence of an ill-informed and indifferent Europe to the tender mercies of Austria-Hungary, already well embarked upon its *Drang nach Osten* policy.

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### 25. BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

At the beginning of 1876 all of Bulgaria was an integral part of Turkey. In the first part of that year the Christians of Bulgaria rose in revolt against the Turkish officers. The officers used irregular troops called *bashi-bazouks* to repress the revolt and committed such atrocities that the peoples of Europe were stirred. Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey. Disraeli, the premier of England, feared Russia too much to help the cause of Bulgar freedom, while Gladstone and the English people sympathized too much with

the Bulgars to permit the English Government to help Turkey. On April 24, 1877, the Czar of Russia declared war on Turkey, disclaiming any desire for Constantinople. After the Russian entrance into Adrianople on January 20, 1878, the Sultan sought peace. On March 3, 1878, Russia and Turkey agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano.

## 2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

By this treaty Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian governor freely elected by the population, confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the powers. This Bulgaria represented the "Greater Bulgaria" of the Middle Ages. By the boundaries defined in the treaties it would extend, roughly, from the Danube on the north to the Aegean on the south and westward to Albania. All of this region was to be one principality.

## 3. CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

When the treaty became known the English Government feared that such a Bulgaria would be the avenue through which Russia could reach the Aegean and threaten the English trade route to India. Austria feared that because of the development of the Pan-Slavic feeling in Serbia and Montenegro, Russia would not live up to the Convention of Pesth (See article, The Austro-Russian Accord of 1876-1877), in which Russia had agreed that Austria might occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Greece protested against the inclusion of Macedonia and the Aegean littoral in Bulgaria, and Serbia against the inclusion of territory on her eastern and southern frontier. Roumania was grieved at the loss of southern Bessarabia, and Turkey saw an opportunity of regaining part of her territories. Austria proposed a conference at Vienna, but the powers preferred to accept the invitation of Bismarck to come to Berlin. England, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, Italy, and Turkey signed the Treaty of Berlin on July 13, 1878.

## 4. TREATY OF BERLIN.

By the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix I, 17) "Greater Bulgaria" was divided into three parts. The part north of the Balkans, minus a few square miles in Dobrudja assigned to Roumania, was erected into an autonomous tributary principality under the suzerainty of Turkey, precisely as arranged for by the Treaty of San Stefano. The region south of the Balkans was to be called Eastern Roumelia and was to remain subject to the direct political and military authority of the Sultan under conditions of administrative autonomy. A



European commission, acting with the Sultan, was to fix the administrative and judicial system. The governor-general was to be a Christian, nominated by the Sultan for a term of five years with the assent of the powers. Macedonia, the third portion, was to remain a part of Turkey, as before the war. A Russian army of 50,000 men was to occupy Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia for nine months after the ratification of the treaties.

#### 5. RESULTS OF THE SETTLEMENT FOR BULGARIA.

For Bulgaria the chief results of the settlement were: (1) The Treaty of San Stefano added the sandjak of Toultscha, in the Dobrudja, to Roumania. This was occupied by a mixture of Bulgars, Roumanians, and Turks. Berlin added a part of Dobrudja to the south of Toultscha occupied almost exclusively by Bulgars. This raised an "irredenta" question for Bulgaria against Roumania; (2) because the efforts of Russia in behalf of Bulgaria, the latter looked to Russia for direction, 1878-1886; (3) because San Stefano erected a "Greater Bulgaria," it aroused in the Bulgars the hope of restoring the Bulgaria of the Middle Ages. At that time there was a nationalist feeling in Bulgaria and Roumelia, but none in Macedonia. The desire in Serbia and Greece to acquire parts of Macedonia was not at that time so developed as later on. It seems quite probable that, if liberally treated in other matters, they might have finally acquiesced in Bulgarian possession of that region if San Stefano had been allowed to stand. When the Congress of Berlin handed Macedonia back to Turkey it encouraged Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria with the hope that ultimately they might annex parts of that region, thus leading to the antagonisms which finally brought on the Second Balkan War, 1913. (See articles on the Macedonian question, 1878-1908, 1908-12.)

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See also bibliography of article, *The Congress of Berlin*.

## 26. ROUMANIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

During the period 1870–1877 the statesmen of France lost interest in Roumania, those of England continued to neglect her, and those of Austria-Hungary for the most part continued to oppose her. Roumania was forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia. When war between Russia and Turkey became imminent, the Roumanian cabinet voted to remain neutral and Prince Carol tried to get the Great Powers to guarantee this neutrality. Failing in this, Carol agreed to a convention April 16, 1877, granting free passage to Russian troops through Roumania, Russia promising to respect political rights and to maintain and defend actual integrity of Roumania. (See article, *The Russo-Roumanian Alliance of 1877–78.*) Turkey interpreted her suzerainty over Roumania literally and began bombardment of Roumanian towns on the Danube, whereupon Roumania declared her independence of Turkey May 23, 1877. When the Russian troops were halted before Plevna in Turkey, the Czar urgently plead for Carol to lead the Roumanian Army to the rescue. Carol went, and turned the tide.

### 2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

The Roumanians were not admitted into the negotiations of the Treaty of San Stefano between Turks and Russians. By this treaty Turkey recognized the complete independence of Roumania and ceded to Russia the Dobrudja with the right reserved to Russia to cede Dobrudja, a little favored region occupied for the most part by non-Roumanians, to Roumania in exchange for southern Bessarabia. The Roumanians protested to the powers against the ingratitude of Russia and were among those who desired a conference.

### 3. CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

At the Congress of Berlin the Roumanians were not admitted as members, but on the insistence of Lord Salisbury their delegates were permitted to state their case. (Protocol No. 9. Hertslet, IV, 2744.) The congress in general confirmed the arrangement of San Stefano so far as Roumania was concerned, with the exception that the Berlin congress drew the southern boundary line of Dobrudja from a point east of Silistria on the Danube to a point south of Mangalia on the Black Sea, instead of the line from Cheravavoda to a point north of Mangalia, as provided in San Stefano.

### 4. APPRAISEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT.

The added region was occupied almost entirely by Bulgars. The settlement turned the Roumanians against Russia because: (1) Of



resentment at the ingratitude of Russia, whose army had been saved at Plevna by the Roumanians; (2) of the fear that Russia would insist on crossing Roumania in developing her hold upon the Balkans; (3) Russia's reaching the north bank of the mouth of the Danube would threaten Roumania's economic outlet to the Black Sea and through the Dardanelles; (4) Russia's annexation of 350,000 Roumanians in southern Bessarabia who had been subject to Roumania since 1856 aroused discontent among the Bessarabians and the "irredentist" party in Roumania. The settlement left friction between Bulgaria and Roumania because: (1) In adding Dobrudja to Roumania it raised an irredenta question with Bulgaria; (2) in failing, through the opposition of Russia, to include the fortifications around Silistria in Roumania it exposed Roumania to attack from the south. The negotiations at Berlin had disclosed the fact that little help would come from England or France. For this and the above reasons Roumania chose to revolve (1879-1913) in the orbit of Austria, a Government for which Roumanians had no love because she held three and one-half million unredeemed Roumanians, but a Government too powerful and near to be the object of unfriendly treatment until Roumania had grown stronger (See article, Roumania and the Triple Alliance, 1883-1914).

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## 27. MONTENEGRO AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

### 1. MONTENEGRO AS EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

In her war with Turkey, declared July 2, 1876, Montenegro's armies occupied in general the following districts: (*a*) To the north and east the region of the Piva in the Herzegovina and part of Bihor in Novi Bazar; (*b*) the Zubci district and the coast of Spizza to the Boyana River (including Dulcigno, Antivari, and Spizza);

(*c*) Niksie; (*d*) the Kuci region and parts of Albania. (Congress of Berlin, Protocol 8, annex 2, in Parliamentary Papers, Turkey. No. 39 (1878). Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12, pp. 386 seq.)

By the bases of peace signed at Adrianople (Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, No. 514. Russia and Turkey) January 31, 1878, it was provided that "the independence of Montenegro shall be recognized by the Porte, and that Montenegro shall have an increase in territory equal to that which fell into her hands by the fate of arms, the definitive boundary to be fixed hereafter."

Hence by the Treaty of San Stefano (See Appendix I, 14), March 3, 1878, Montenegro was dealt with as follows:

(*a*) She received a very large increase of territory (See, too, Hertslet, No. 578, Lord Granville's letter in 1880 for statement of these gains and the maps in Hertslet referred to below) in the Bosnian cazas, in Novi Bazar where her line was nearly coterminous with Serbia's, the Gusinje region of Albania, and in addition Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno on the coast. A European boundary commission was to fix the boundaries, the general course of the frontier being indicated in the treaty (art. 1).

(*b*) The Porte recognized "definitivement" her independence.

(*c*) Other provisions regulated her relations with Turkey, the position of inhabitants of the border districts, and military works.

This large increase of territory may have contributed to the calling of the Congress of Berlin. Austria-Hungary took the initiative in suggesting the congress. She was the power especially affected by the extension of Montenegro's frontier in Novi Bazar, and was intent upon obtaining possession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. She and Italy were interested, also, in the Adriatic ports.

## 2. MONTENEGRO AS EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

At the congress of Great Powers at Berlin the most important questions raised (for the protocols of this congress, in which the discussion is recorded, see Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Turkey. No. 39 (1878). Hertslet, No. 528, summary) with regard to Montenegro were:

(1) Her independence. Great Britain took exception to the word "definitivement," since she had not recognized Montenegro's independence (protocol 10). The other powers had recognized it, in principle, or formally.

(2) The extension of territory. The objections of the Porte were that more land had been taken than was conquered (protocols 8, annex 2). The Porte desired back certain strategic positions, the Gussinié and Plava regions, which were Albanian and Antivari, which it said was Albanian. It had no objection to the cession of Spizza and the Bosnian districts.



Austria's objections on this point were that she herself desired Spizza. Her reasons as given, on request, to Italy, who also "had important interests to protect on the Adriatic" (protocol 12), were that Spizza was very small, that it commands Antivari, and can "alone insure and facilitate the object of Austria-Hungary, which is to take care that the port of Antivari and its coast should preserve a purely commercial character." (Protocol 12. See Driault, p. 231.)

Hence by the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878 (See Appendix I, 17), Montenegro's independence was recognized and her territory was reduced to the limits indicated in the protocols of the congress, limits which even so doubled her original territory. She lost some of the Herzegovina on the north, her line followed the Tara, not the Lim River (leaving Priepolje and other places in Novi Bazar to Turkey, to be garrisoned by Austria: see treaty, art. 25, and footnote to Holland, p. 293, and to Hertslet, p. 2780); she gave up Dulcigno to Turkey, and Spizza to Austria to be incorporated in Dalmatia. She kept Antivari under severe restrictions: she could have no ship or flag of war, her waters were closed to all ships of war: she accepted Austrian maritime and sanitary police, the Dalmatian maritime code, and received Austrian consular protection. She was allowed a free railway. Other articles of the treaty provide for the security of Ottoman property and religious foundations in the annexed districts, for diplomatic agents, the evacuation of territory, and for the determination by the powers and the Porte, of Montenegro's share of the Ottoman debt for the new territories.

### 3. ADJUSTMENTS AFTER THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

The boundary commission sat from April 30 to September 8, 1879; from May 10, 1880, to January 28, 1881; and again in February, 1881. The protocols (See Parliamentary Papers, 1880, Turkey, No. 2) are important in showing the policy of the powers, the obstruction measures of Turkey, and also the social and racial conditions in Albania.

The first difficulty arose over discrepancies between the Austrian staff map used at the congress and local nomenclature, and the allowance to be made for racial and religious differences.

The second difficulty arose over the Gussinié-Plava region of Albania. Here Turkey used the Albanian League as her instrument, inciting rebellion. The Corti Compromise was adopted April 18, 1880 (Hertslet, Nos. 563, 564). To compensate Montenegro for the fertile Gussinié-Plava region, she was to be given the sterile region of the Kuci Kraina, which, however, was Slavic and dominated Podgoritzá. Turkey agreed to accept this, but delayed, offering excuse after excuse, notwithstanding an identic note of the powers on June 11.

At last an alternative suggestion was made on Lord Granville's initiative, that the port of Dulcigno go to Montenegro in exchange for Gussinié-Plava. (See Documents Diplomatiques, loc. cit., pp. 196 et seq.). Austria required that it be subject to article 29 of Treaty of Berlin. The Porte requested also Dinosi. (Ibid., pp. 350 et seq.) This was granted; but a naval demonstration at Antivari (September 28, 1880) was necessary, and also a threat by Great Britain to occupy Smyrna, October 4, 1880 (Ibid., No. 2, pp. 95, 113 et seq.), before Dulcigno was yielded by the Porte, November 25, 1880. (Ibid., No. 2, p. 120 et seq. Hertslet, No. 579.) Dulcigno's boundaries were established by the second session of the commission. (Ibid., No. 580 and map.) Spizza's were received from Austria at the third. (Ibid., No. 581 and map.) There were some later slight readjustments of the Albanian line with Turkey. (Ibid., Nos. 603, 604, 605.)

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## 28. THE ENGLISH PROTECTORATE OVER CYPRUS, 1878-1914.

### 1. ACQUISITION AS A PROTECTORATE BY ENGLAND, 1878.

The question of Cyprus grew out of the events of the war of 1877-78 between Russia and Turkey. The main aim of British diplomacy was the defense of Asia Minor against Russia, and it was evidently considered that the island of Cyprus would be a good base from which the British cooperation in this defense could be directed. It was also valuable as a defense of the Suez Canal. To this end a convention was negotiated with Turkey, June 4, 1878 (See Appendix I, 16), by which, if Russia retained Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan, or made further attacks on Asia Minor, England would cooperate with Turkey in their defence, and Cyprus should be given over to English occupation and administration (analogous to Bosnia and Herzegovina). Reforms were promised by Turkey for Asia Minor. England was to pay a fixed tribute yearly for the island.

### 2. BRITISH OCCUPATION, 1878-1914.

With the turning of Russian interests to the eastward, the defense of Asia Minor through this means became unnecessary, and Cyprus has never been converted into a strong military base. With the acquisition of Egypt by England it lost, at least relatively, its importance for the defense of the Suez Canal. The majority of the inhabitants are Greeks, and Cyprus has become more and more to Greece "unredeemed" territory. England has, however, retained it, feeling, up to 1914, that if British control was withdrawn, honor demanded that it be given back to Turkey.

### 3. ANNEXATION, NOVEMBER 5, 1914.

In 1914, with the entrance of Turkey into the war, the conventions lapsed and England annexed Cyprus. (See Decree, Nov. 5, 1914 *Near East*, Vol. 8, p. 16.)

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## 29. THE ABROGATION OF THE NORTH SCHLESWIG PLEBISCITE AGREEMENT.

### 1. THE TREATY OF PRAGUE.

By article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, August 23, 1866 (See Appendix I. 1), Prussia agreed "that the inhabitants of the northern districts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if they express a wish to be united thereto by vote freely given." The treaty, however, did not contain any stipulation as to the period of time within which the vote was to be taken, nor did it specify the extent of territory covered by the words "the northern districts of Schleswig." The article in question was put into the treaty at the request of Napoleon III, who had been asked by the Danes of northern Schleswig, against their will separated from Denmark in 1864, to take an interest in their behalf.

### 2. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTION.

Afterwards Prussia showed no haste to carry out the terms of article 5. The request of a delegation from North Schleswig for an audience with King William to thank him for the inclusion of the article in the treaty was refused. In the Prussian Parliament the article was criticized. Bismarck in reply, while defending the article, declared that the principle of nationality could not be conformed to in all cases and pointed out that the vague character of the article gave a certain latitude in the execution of it. When a little later the French Government called attention to the matter with a view to bringing about the execution of the article, Prussia denied vigorously the right of France to concern itself in the question. In 1867 there were negotiations between the Danish and the Prussian Government on the subject. Prussia professed a readiness to carry out the stipulation but demanded guarantees in behalf of Germans living in the region. The demands put forward have been characterized by Emil Elberling (*Question du Schleswig*) as follows: "The concession of such guarantees would have inevitably involved a continual interference of Germany in Danish affairs and would



have rendered Denmark dependent upon Germany." Under those conditions the negotiations came to nothing. Later negotiations had the same result. After the Franco-Prussian War many German newspapers, probably taking their cue from the Government, argued that the article having been inserted in the treaty at the instigation of Napoleon III, was no longer to be regarded as obligatory, unless Austria should demand it.

### 3. ABROGATION.

In 1878, when Austria-Hungary had recently incurred considerable obligation to Bismarck for the manner in which he had favored her program at the Congress of Berlin, and while the pourparlers leading to the Dual Alliance of 1879 were in progress, Germany induced Austria-Hungary to consent to a treaty abrogating article 5 of the Treaty of Prague. Some excuse for the disregard of the claims of Denmark in the matter was made out of the fact that a Danish princess had recently married the Duke of Cumberland, the pretender to the Hanoverian throne who had refused to renounce his claim to that throne, though Hanover had been annexed to Prussia in 1866.

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## SECTION II.—1878–1890.

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### 30. THE GRECO-TURKISH FRONTIER QUESTION, 1878–1881.

#### 1. GREECE AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN.

In February, 1878, the Greek Government sent troops across the Turkish frontier, on the pretext that Thessaly was in a state of insurrection. A few days later they were withdrawn. (Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, IV, 2780.) Shortly after, when the affairs of the Near East were being settled at the Congress of Berlin, M. Waddington, the French representative, proposed that the Greek frontier should be rectified by being extended so as to include Thessaly and Epirus. Supported by the Italian plenipotentiary, he gained the assent of all members of the congress, except the Turkish, and the 24th article of the Treaty of Berlin provided that in case Turkey and Greece were unable to agree about the rectification suggested, the powers reserved it to themselves to offer mediation. (Ibid., pp. 2749, 2750, 2779, 2780.) M. Waddington's suggestion was made July 5, a week before the congress concluded its sessions, and is embodied in the 13th protocol. (Hertslet, IV, 2749–50.) Article 24 of the treaty of Berlin provided:

“In the event of the Sublime Porte and Greece being unable to agree upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia reserve to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties to facilitate negotiations.”

#### 2. NEGOTIATIONS, 1878–1880.

Not long after the congress had broken up, the Government of Greece notified the powers that it had addressed the Sublime Porte, but that the answer returned after some delay was altogether evasive. It therefore asked for the exercise of the right of mediation reserved to them, since otherwise there seemed small prospect of putting the decision of the congress into effect. (British and Foreign State Papers, LXXII, 405–407.) Mediation was undertaken, but the Turkish Government employed very dilatory tactics, hoping, as usual, that



the jealousies of the powers would prevent real intervention for Greece. Several Greco-Turkish commissions assembled, but were unable to agree.

### 3. CONVENTION OF MAY 24, 1881.

In June, 1880, after an interchange of notes, a joint communication was sent to the Porte, that it was to the interest of the powers for the matter to be settled. (Hertslet, IV, 2958-2961.) The result was that a convention was signed, May 24, 1881, giving to Greece much of Thessaly and part of Epirus, altogether somewhat less than 9,000 square miles. The treaty signed May 24, 1881, is entitled "Convention between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the settlement of the frontier between Greece and Turkey." (British and Foreign State Papers, LXXXII, 382-9; Hertslet, IV, 3042-3052.) The more important provisions were: the frontier between Turkey and Greece was minutely described, a line running from above the headwaters of the Salemorias and the Arta by an irregular course eastward to the sea; the inhabitants of the regions ceded to Greece were to have rights equal with those of the Hellenic citizens; life, property, customs, and religion were to be scrupulously respected; proprietary rights granted by the Sultan were to be recognized by the Greek Government; the Sultan was to dispose of his crown properties in the districts ceded; inhabitants of neighboring regions might continue to enjoy old rights of pasturage in the ceded districts; freedom of religion and worship was guaranteed to Mussulmans; the Government of Greece was to assume a proportional part of the Turkish public debt; inhabitants desiring to retain Ottoman nationality might have three years in which to leave; full amnesty was granted on both sides. (Ibid.) Some of these provisions are interesting with reference to characteristic Balkan problems. (See also Hertslet, IV, 2966-2973.)

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## 31. THE DANUBE QUESTION, 1871-1904.

### 1. TREATY OF PARIS.

The Treaty of Paris in 1856 applied the principles of free navigation as declared by the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the Danube. It created two commissions for the river. One was the Danube Riparian Commission composed of representatives of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Austria, Turkey, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria—the riparians—and was to be permanent. It was given the duty of (1) drafting navigation and river police regulations; (2) abolishing the obstacles of every nature to free navigation on the river; (3) carrying out necessary improvement works; and (4) maintaining the navigability of the mouths of the river and the neighboring seas after the dissolution of the European commission.

The other was the European commission, which was authorized to deepen the delta channels of the river and the bars in front of its mouths, so that seagoing ships could ascend to river ports. It was “understood” that the commission would be dissolved in two years, but, in fact, its work was scarcely begun in that time. As the riparian commission proved a failure and a navigation authority at the mouths of the river was imperative in view of the inefficiency of the Turkish Government, the European Commission was continued and its powers increased by giving it control over the police and regulation of navigation on that part of the river under its jurisdiction, by various agreements from 1858, which were incorporated in the Public Act of 1865, signed by the powers represented (British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 55, pp. 93-127). The works and personnel of the commission were neutralized by the Public Act (article 21).

### 2. TREATIES OF LONDON AND BERLIN.

By the Treaty of London, March 13, 1871 (See Appendix I, 3, and article The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871) the European Commission was continued until April 24, 1883, and the neutralization of the commission, its works and personnel expressly sanctioned. In the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878 (See article, The Congress of Berlin), Roumania was given a seat in the commission, whose jurisdiction was extended up the river to Galatz, the first important Roumanian port, “in complete independence of the territorial authority” (Roumania). To meet the new situation caused by Russia becoming a riparian, the independence of Roumania and its acquisition of the former Turkish delta of the Danube, and the autonomy of Bulgaria, “and to increase the guarantees” of freedom of navigation, all fortresses on the river were to be razed, no new ones erected, and warships prohibited below the Iron Gates. Regulations for the river from Galatz to the Iron



Gates, where a series of cataracts interfered with navigation—and the Austro-Hungarian boundary began—were to be drawn by the European Commission, assisted by delegates of Serbia and Bulgaria as riparian States.

### 3. TREATY OF LONDON, 1883.

By the Treaty of London, March 10, 1883 (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 20-22), the jurisdiction of the commission was extended to Braila in Roumania, practically the head of navigation by seagoing ships, and it was continued for 21 years, to April 24, 1904, then for three-year periods unless one of the parties, a year before the expiration of a term, announced its intention of proposing modification in its constitution or powers. Control of the northern embranchment of the delta, on which Russia for part of the distance owned one bank, Roumania the other, was turned over to the riparian powers, and a mixed commission composed of Austria-Hungary, the riparian powers of Russia, Bulgaria, and Serbia was created to administer the admirable regulation drawn up for the Braila-Iron Gates section. Because of the opposition of Bulgaria and Roumania, who were not represented at the conference which drafted the treaty, the mixed commission never came into being and the regulation never took effect.

### 4. CONCLUSION.

The European Commission has accomplished a universally commended work as an engineering organ in improving the channel and the bar and in building up the port of Soulina at the mouth of the river. It has also efficiently policed navigation in the jurisdiction, at first through Turkish officials under its control, but since 1882 through officials appointed by and responsible solely to itself. It has met all its expenses from tolls on shipping paid directly into the treasury. It is a striking example of an efficient international organ which in a limited sphere has operated to general satisfaction.

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## 32. THE SUEZ CANAL, 1881-1904.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In 1854 F. de Lesseps obtained from Said Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, a concession to organize a universal company for the financing of the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez. This concession was later ratified by the Sultan of Turkey, and the canal was formally begun in 1859. But owing to various difficulties, among them the diplomatic opposition of England, the work was delayed many years.

A new firman was obtained in 1866 which contained the clause declaring the canal always open to all merchant vessels without distinction of nationality. The canal was formally opened to traffic in 1869.

In 1873 an international commission, called by the Sultan, met at Constantinople and declared the navigation of the canal open and common to warships and to vessels not used for the transport of troops.

Events like the purchase by the British Government, in 1875, of the Khedive's shares, giving Great Britain a controlling interest in the canal, and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 were the cause of general concern, and resulted in a demand for the so-called neutralization of the Suez Canal.



## 2. CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1885.

The bases for an arrangement of this kind were proposed in the celebrated circular note (See Appendix I, 22) of January 3, 1883, which Lord Granville addressed to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and St. Petersburg. A conference, composed of delegates from nine States, met at Paris, on March 30, 1885, but it failed to come to an agreement. Long diplomatic negotiations followed which finally resulted in the Treaty of Constantinople.

## 3. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1888 (SEE APPENDIX I, 37).

This treaty was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey. It declares (Art. 1) that "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag."

The other main provisions of the treaty are as follows: The canal must never be blockaded, and no act of hostility may be committed either in the canal or in its ports of access, nor within the 3-mile limit. Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. \* \* \* Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed 24 hours, except in case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. \* \* \* (Art. 4.) "In time of war belligerents shall not embark within the canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war." (Art. 5.) At no time shall belligerents keep warships in the waters of the canal, but nonbelligerents may station warships in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of such war vessels not exceeding two for each nonbelligerent power. (Art. 7.) The execution of the treaty is placed in the hands of the agents in Egypt of the signatory powers and of the Egyptian and Ottoman Governments. (Art. 8.)

Article 10 recognized the right of the Sultan and the Khedive to take such "measures" as they "might find necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order." England had taken such measures when she crushed the revolt under Arabi Pasha.

It should be noted that, according to the terms of the Treaty of Constantinople, the Suez Canal is not, strictly speaking, neutralized, for this would require that it be closed to all belligerent warships. It is, in a sense, internationalized, inasmuch as it is made free and open to the vessels of all nations.

It should also be noted that at the Paris conference of 1885 the British delegates had formulated a general reservation as to the ap-

plication of the principles proposed in so far as they "might fetter the liberty of their Government during the occupation of Egypt by the forces of Her Britannic Majesty." In 1888 Lord Salisbury renewed this reservation. In 1898 Lord Curzon declared in the British House of Lords that, owing to these reserves, "the convention of Constantinople had not been brought into practical operation." By article 6 of the Anglo-French declaration of April 9, 1904 (Appendix I, 68), relating to British and French interests in Egypt and Morocco, the British Government declared that they adhered to the stipulations of the treaty of October 29, 1888, and that they agreed to their being put into force. But whether with or without express reservation, it must be conceded that Great Britain has the right to take such measures as may be necessary for the defense of the Suez Canal.

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### 33. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE, 1879.

#### 1. TREATY OF OCTOBER 7, 1879.

The pact between Austria and Germany, known as the Dual Alliance, was signed at Vienna on October 7, 1879. It provided (See Appendix I, 18) that the two powers, if either should be attacked by Russia, should make war and conclude peace together. Should either power be attacked by an aggressor other than Russia, the other power agreed to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward its ally. But if Russia should come to the support of the attacking power, the agreement to lend mutual assistance should become operative and war should be waged and peace concluded in common as if Russia were the aggressor. The treaty was to be kept secret.

#### 2. WHY THE ALLIANCE WAS MADE.

An alliance between Austria and Germany had long been in the mind of Bismarck. As far back as the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 he demanded moderation in the treatment of Austria from the military party, urging that Prussian statesmen must keep in mind the possibility of such an alliance at some time in the future (Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, ch. 20). After 1870 the danger of French efforts to regain her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine could not be dismissed. To offset this Bismarck had dexteriously brought about the League of the Three Emperors, a league of the rulers of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. (See article, The Formation of the League of the Three Emperors.) With Russia relations had been particularly cordial because of the friendship between Emperor William and the Czar. This friendship was severely tried by the outcome of the Congress of Berlin and Bismarck's so-called neutrality. Russia had stood faithfully by Prussia when her affairs were at a critical stage, and she now felt that her loyalty had been very badly rewarded. Bismarck com-

placently allowed the congress to give to Austria the administration of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus starting her on a course of ambitious expansion in the Balkans and raising an insuperable barrier between Russia and Austria-Hungary by intensifying their rivalry in the Balkans. (See article, *The Congress of Berlin*.) In the face of this it was an open question whether the League of the Three Emperors could be maintained, even though Bismarck had left the congress pledged to its continuance. Sooner or later he had to choose between his two allies.

Pan-Slavists denounced Germany's conduct, and a bitter controversy raged between the newspapers of St. Petersburg and Berlin. Further irritation was caused in Russia by the apparent hostility of the German representatives on the international committee for the determination of the boundary of Bosnia. During the winter of 1878-79 the Russian press even talked of a Franco-Russian alliance, and the Government increased the army in Poland. The critical moment came when Alexander II, getting more and more resentful at the trend of Bismarck's policy, expressed himself in emphatic terms against the efforts to sacrifice the good relations with Russia for those of Austria.

### 3. NEGOTIATIONS.

Bismarck felt compelled to take decisive measures, and on August 27-28, 1879, held a conference with Count Andrassy, the Austrian prime minister, at which a closer alliance between the two countries was favorably discussed. But they had scarcely separated when William I and his nephew, the Czar, met at the Russian frontier town of Alexandrovo. The two monarchs became completely reconciled, and the Kaiser returned to Berlin absolutely opposed to the idea of an Austro-German alliance directed against Russia.

In this crisis Bismarck threatened to resign. William I finally agreed to negotiations for a defensive alliance which must, however, not be specifically directed against Russia. When Bismarck reached Vienna on September 21 he found Count Andrassy unwilling to sign a general treaty of alliance. Russia, from the standpoint of Austria, was the only menace; against attack from this source alone should provision for common defense be made. As this view coincided entirely with that of the German chancellor, if not with his instructions, the terms of the agreement were drawn up, and later in September laid before the respective Governments for ratification.

### 4. OPPOSITION OF WILLIAM I.

Again Emperor William refused to accept Bismarck's view, declaring that ratification of the treaty by him would be a breach of faith with the Czar. He protested that he would abdicate rather than



give his consent, and urged that Russia be admitted to the alliance and the League of the Three Emperors be renewed. Bismarck once more threatened to resign. But he had taken the precaution of enlisting the support of the leading statesmen of the Empire. The King of Bavaria and the crown prince were on his side. Von Moltke brought the influence of the military authorities to his support. Finally the entire ministry threatened to resign if the treaty were not ratified. The Emperor at last yielded and gave his consent, stipulating that, although the terms of the treaty remain secret, he might in case of need inform the Czar of its scope.

#### 5. PUBLICITY.

The news of the alliance soon transpired. In Russia the Pan-Slavists' anger increased in bitterness and their denunciation continued. Alexander II, to whom the Kaiser sent the preamble of the treaty on November 4, was less resentful. Indeed, his letter, while not reassuring, was friendly in tone. The full text of the treaty was not made public until February 3, 1888. The agreement then appeared simultaneously in the Berlin Official Gazette, in the *Abenpost* of Vienna, and the *Pester Lloyd*, with the explanation that publicity was given to it in order to put an end to doubts as to the purely defensive character of its provisions.

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### 34. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1882.

#### 1. TERMS.

The Triple Alliance was made in 1882 between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. It was really an extension of the Dual Alliance (See article, *The Formation of the Dual Alliance*), entered into in 1879 by the first two powers. Only one of the treaties in operation during the earlier years of the alliance have been published. It appears, however, that there were three separate treaties and that the Austro-German treaty was that of 1879 made public in 1888 (See article, *The Formation of the Dual Alliance, 1879*). The effect of the three treaties was to create an arrangement of substantially the following form: If France attacked Germany or Italy, the two powers were pledged to act together against her; if Russia attacked Germany or Austria, both were to make war on Russia; and if France and Russia attacked any of the three powers, all three would declare war. By 1912, if not earlier, it appears that a single treaty had replaced the earlier separate treaty. By its terms, if one or more members of the Triple Alliance should be attacked by one or more of the Great Powers outside of the Alliance, without direct provocation being given, the other members were to go to the assistance of the member attacked. If a member of the Alliance, believing that its security were threatened by a Great Power outside of the Alliance, should declare war on that Power, the other two members were to observe a benevolent neutrality toward their ally while each had the right to determine for itself whether to make common cause with its ally. (Text of the articles in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, "Diplomatic Documents concerning the relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy" (1915), pp. 189-190.)

#### 2. WHY ITALY ENTERED.

The circumstances that brought about this extension of the alliance are fairly well known. Bismarck, though feigning indifference at first, welcomed the new ally that not only made Germany's position impregnable, but caused a more tractable mood in Austria and Russia. But it was Italy which sought an alliance that seemed so out of accord with her history and her interests. The reasons are clear. She had been completely isolated for some years, particularly since the Congress of Berlin; she feared intervention by outside powers to restore the temporal power of the Pope; she was bitterly disappointed



over her lost opportunity in Tunis, and indignant at French occupation in 1881 of that territory.

The Italians not only came away from the Congress of Berlin with empty hands, but, in the words of Crispi, they had been "humiliated at Berlin as the last people in Europe \* \* \* slapped and despised." (Chiala, *Pagine di Storia Contemporanea*, II, p. 17.) Upon the outburst of popular anger against France and the fall of the Cairoli ministry, Crispi visited Berlin to sound Bismarck on the possibility of an alliance. The latter gave him to understand that Germany was on good terms with Austria-Hungary, and that any agreement would have to be made in accord with Vienna. Encouraged, Italy opened negotiations with her old enemy. Germany soon took a hand, and on May 22, 1882, two identical agreements, save for the Balkan article (not included in the German-Italian treaty), were signed.

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## 35. RENEWALS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Triple Alliance was renewed at least four times, the first time in March of 1887, the second time in June, 1891, the third time in June of 1902, and the fourth time early in December, 1912. It has often been asked why Italy should have been willing to continue for so long a period in an alliance from which she received but doubtful benefits at first, and which as time went on seemed to be clearly out of accord with her national policy. That the sentiment of opposition to the agreement grew as the years passed appears very clearly in the press and in the Chambers of Deputies at the time of the later renewals.

In 1882 the alliance made secure the possession of Rome as the Italian capital in return (1) for Italy's virtual renunciation of her ambition to acquire what remained of unredeemed Italy in Austrian hands, and (2) for the adoption of a costly increase of her army and navy. As the years passed the possession of Rome became assured without the support of the Triple Alliance agreement, while the military obligations Italy had undertaken as a member of the alliance continued, and the sentiment of the Italians toward the completion of national unification grew in strength. This was accelerated by the fact that the interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary clashed in the Balkans. As a result of the absence of any real national or economic basis for the continuance of the treaty in the later years of its existence, each renewal gave rise to vehement protests.

### 2. RENEWAL OF 1887.

The first renewal in 1887 occurred before the existence of the alliance was publicly acknowledged, and there was no expression of opinion one way or the other. A year later it became known. William II, speaking in his first address to the Reichstag, after referring to the Dual Alliance, said: "Similar historical associations and similar national considerations at the present time bind us to Italy. \* \* \* our existing agreements with Austria-Hungary and Italy," etc. (See Appendix I, 36.)

### 3. RENEWAL OF 1891.

The second renewal of the treaty was effected in 1891, a year before the time for its expiration, and apparently for six years with a provision for its continuance automatically for six years more, if it was not formally denounced before. Much heralded royal visits followed. Italy's royal pair visited Berlin, while Emperor William II and the Empress attended the silver wedding of Humbert and his



consort in Rome in the following year. The good feeling continued till about 1898, after which difficulties between Italy and Austria, the revival of an intense Italian nationalism, and a better understanding between Italy and France began to undermine it.

#### 4. RENEWAL OF 1902.

The alliance was only renewed in 1902 through the personal efforts of Von Bülow and of Francis Joseph. In 1911 came the war upon Tripoli, in which Italy found her allies secretly hostile. Austria brusquely demanded that the operation of the Italian fleet against Epirus be discontinued, because she claimed it was a violation of article 7 of the treaty relative to the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Italy accepted the situation, but her resentment was very keen. Public opinion in Italy became more and more hostile to the alliance.

#### 5. RENEWAL OF 1912.

Nevertheless in 1912, a year before the time set for the serving of notice, the three powers, anxious over the difficulties in the Balkans, again renewed the treaty. From the Italian point of view this was significant because of the cordial relations with France and the manifest understanding with the rival group of powers in regard to Morocco and Tripoli earlier. Many publicists in the countries of the Triple Entente favored this renewal, fearing lest a failure on the part of Italy to renew the alliance might become the occasion for some decisive act by Germany and Austria-Hungary which would seriously imperil the peace of Europe. An interpellation was addressed to the foreign minister by Signor Barzilai, who charged the Government with weakness in its dealings with Austria-Hungary and alleged that the Triple Alliance was both useless and burdensome to Italy. The Marchese di San Giuliano replied that the Triple Alliance, kept alive and made fruitful by the close relations between its members, must remain the foundation of Italian foreign policy and the pivot on which it turned. The Chamber indorsed his declaration, and two days later it adjourned until February 6, 1913.

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## 36. ROUMANIA AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1883-1914.

### 1. ROUMANIA'S RELATION TO THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

Although Roumania was never actually a member of the Triple Alliance, through a treaty entered into in accordance with the provisions of the Roumanian constitution, there was a close connection maintained with the Triple Alliance from 1883 to 1914 by means of a personal adherence signed by King Charles. This agreement, whose existence had been long suspected in well-informed circles, became definitely known at the beginning of the World War, when King Charles informed the cabinet of the arrangement, and urged that Roumania join the Central Powers. The cabinet declined to recognize the legal validity of the arrangement and the King was forced to yield.



## 2. REASON FOR ROUMANIAN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

The reasons which moved Roumania to take up a position favorable to the Triple Alliance were: (1) The memories of the treatment received by Roumania at the hands of Russia during the crisis of 1877-78, and fear of further aggressions on the part of Russia in her advance to Constantinople. (See article, Roumania and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) (2) The feeling of racial and cultural difference separating them from the Slavs, and a resultant opposition to Slav ambitions in the Balkans. These interests, being parallel to those of Austria-Hungary, led them into close relations with that State and through her to Germany. German schools were established in which many of the Roumanian leaders were trained (Mitrany, *The Balkans*, p. 302), and Germany and Austria together controlled 65 per cent of Roumanian imports. (Lewin, *German Road to the East*, p. 275.)

## 3. ROUMANIAN ALIENATION FROM THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1908-1914.

The Triple Alliance was never very popular in Roumania owing to the ill-treatment of the Roumanians of Transylvania by Hungary. At the same time, parallel with Italy, whose policy Roumania had tended of late to follow on account of racial and cultural relationship, Roumania took a more independent attitude toward the Triple Alliance and built up good relations with Russia. In the First Balkan War Roumania preserved neutrality, but at its conclusion a boundary dispute arose between Roumania and Bulgaria over the Dobrudja frontier, of which the former demanded a rectification and the latter refused. Despite the offers (Mitrany in *The Balkans*, p. 303) and threats (Beyens, *Germany before the War*, 263, quoting the declaration of M. Take Jonescu) of Austria, in behalf of her Bulgarian protégé, Roumania entered the Second Balkan War on the side of Greece and Serbia. This completed the breach with Austria, although not with Germany, who appears to have given her approval to this policy. (Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswaertige Politik*, 380.) In 1914, despite the efforts of King Charles, Roumania followed Italy into a policy of neutrality.

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### 37. BISMARCK'S REINSURANCE TREATY.

#### 1. SITUATION LEADING TO THE TREATY.

After the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 Bismarck rightly judged that his greatest task was the keeping of what had been gained. He always feared that his work might be lost through attack by some hostile coalition. Therefore he strove to surround Germany with friends and allies and at the same time to isolate France. First he drew together Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany in the League of the Three Emperors (See article, that title), but this was weakened as Russia and Austria drew apart because of rivalry in the Balkans. He next entered into the dual alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879. (See article, *The Formation of the Dual Alliance*, 1879.) But Bismarck was skeptical as to the permanence of any alliance, and, although he justly had much confidence in Austria, resolved to provide against eventualities and at the same time make his position still stronger by drawing Germany and Russia together again. He was resolved, therefore, that the wire to St. Petersburg should not be cut. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, 158.) He would, as it were, take out a policy of reinsurance. (Matter, Bismarck, III, 516.) The manner in which he carried out this reinsurance policy has been involved in much obscurity. Serge Goriainow, formerly archivist of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, by the publication in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1918, of an article entitled, *The End of the Alliance of the Emperors*, has made possible a clear understanding of the matter.

#### 2. THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1881 AND 1884.

Doubting the stability of the alliance effected between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1879, and fearful of the possibility of an alliance between Russia and France, Bismarck contrived to bring about the signing of a treaty June 18, 1881, to which Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary were the parties. The first article of this treaty stipulated that if any of the three powers should find itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two powers would preserve a benevolent neutrality and would strive for the localization of the conflict. This stipulation was to apply to the case of a war between one of the three powers and Turkey, only in a case a previous



agreement had been arranged between the three courts as to the results of such war. The treaty was for the period of three years. In 1884 it was renewed with some modifications for another period of three years.

### 3. NEGOTIATION OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1887.

In 1887, when the question of renewing the treaty of 1884 came up, Russia was unwilling to renew it. The clash of interests between Russia and the Dual Monarchy in Balkan affairs, especially in the matter of the Bulgarian Revolution of 1886 (See article, that title), made Russia unwilling to continue the earlier arrangement. After considerable negotiation, however, between Bismarck and Shuvaloff, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, a new treaty between Germany and Russia was signed June 18, 1878. This was the reinsurance treaty.

### 4. TERMS OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1887.

Article 1 stipulated that if either power should find itself at war with a third great power, the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality and devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict. This stipulation, however, was not to apply to "a war against Austria or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two powers by one of the high contracting parties." This meant, of course, that Germany would help Austria-Hungary if Russia attacked the Dual Monarchy, while Russia need not remain neutral if Germany should attack France.

By article 2 Germany recognized "the rights historically acquired by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia." Both courts pledged themselves to permit no modification of the territorial status quo in the Balkan Peninsula without a previous agreement between them. By the third article the parties agreed to uphold the existing rule in regard to the use of the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for belligerent purposes.

### 5. TERMINATION.

Negotiation for the renewal of the reinsurance treaty were in progress at the time of Bismarck's dismissal in 1890. (See article, The Dismissal of Bismarck, 1890.) Bismarck was anxious for renewal. After the dismissal of Bismarck the Russian ambassador was sent for by the Kaiser and informed that German foreign policy would not be changed, and that Germany was entirely disposed to renew the treaty. A little later there was a change in German policy. The negotiation was transferred to the Russian capital and then allowed to drop. There has been much discussion about the reasons

why the German Government abandoned the reinsurance treaty policy. Opinion on the matter is still divided. Shuvaloff believed that the failure of Germany to renew the treaty could have two explanations: One, that the Kaiser counted on the accession of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance; the other, that Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, took more seriously than had Bismarck the German relations with Austria-Hungary involved in the Triple Alliance arrangement. Whatever may have been the Kaiser's motives, the decision not to renew the reinsurance treaty was of importance. Russia, already showing considerable inclination toward an alliance with France (See article, Formation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1893), was manifestly influenced in large measure to that course of action by the German decision as to the reinsurance treaty.

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### 38. THE BULGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1885.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In the agreement reached by Lord Salisbury and Count Shuvaloff, May 30, 1878, regarding a modification of the Treaty of San Stefano (See article, The Congress of Berlin, 1878), the outstanding



feature was the provision that the regions south of the Balkans which were inhabited mainly by Bulgarians should not be wholly withdrawn from Turkish control. (*The Times* (London), June 15, 1878; *Staatsarchiv*, vol. 34, No. 6749.) Russia and England alike, failing to realize the independence of the Bulgarian character, anticipated that the new province would come easily under Russian control. Russia desired and England feared the weakening of the Turkish power. Inasmuch as Russia had become willing to make concessions to prevent a war for which she was not ready, she accepted the reduction of the new Bulgaria.

## 2. BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

As formulated in the first articles of the Treaty of Berlin, Russia's Bulgaria was cut into three parts—the principality of that name, lying between the Danube and the Balkans; the Province of Eastern Roumelia, south of this; and a remaining irregular portion, most of which was restored to the tender mercies of Turkey. England and Austria insisted upon this arrangement. Russia and the remaining members of the congress acquiesced. The feature most insisted upon was that the principality and the province should be entirely separate in government. Both were nominally still a part of Turkey, but Bulgaria was nearly independent, while Eastern Roumelia was subject to the quinquennial appointment of a governor (a Christian chosen by the Porte with the consent of the powers) and to the stationing of Turkish garrisons along its northern frontier.

## 3. RUSSIA AND BULGARIA, 1878-1885.

The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 consisted in the union of the province with the principality. The events of seven years had so changed the situation that now Russia was opposed to the union, while England desired and supported it. The Russian attempt at domination in both regions had met with increasing resistance from prince and people, and it had become evident that instead of being a foothold for Russia near Constantinople, Bulgaria was a barrier of increasing strength in the path of the Muscovite.

Bulgaria remained under close Russian control until 1883, in which year, on September 18, Prince Alexander restored the constitution which he had suspended two years before, and henceforth followed as independent a policy as he found practicable. In September, 1884, the three emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany met at Skiernewice, and made an agreement for three years, one of whose provisions is said to have been that they would not oppose the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia "if it comes about by the force of circumstances." (Quoted by Rose, *Development of Modern*

Europe, II, 20-21, from Elie de Cyon, *Historie de l'Entente Franco-Russe*, 1895.) They also agreed not to allow Turkey to fortify the Balkan passes, and themselves not to occupy the Balkan principalities. This agreement may have bound the Czar's hands to some extent, but it also provided him with a solid backing, as long as harmony prevailed between himself and his colleagues.

#### 4. RUSSIAN AIMS IN BULGARIA ABOUT 1885.

Russia appears to have desired to unite the two portions of Bulgaria, but she wished first to secure the removal of Prince Alexander, who had crossed her wishes, and perhaps to secure the appointment of the Czar as Grand Duke of Bulgaria. If the union could be accomplished under Prince Alexander, he would be strengthened. If accomplished after his rule had been supplanted by Russian control, the area of that control would be doubled. It is affirmed that in the summer of 1885 the Czar's agents endeavored to bring on war between Roumania and Bulgaria in order to weaken the "ungrateful" states and give an opportunity for Russian intervention. (R. Leonoff, *Documents secrets de la politique russe en Orient*, 81-85, quoted by Rose, *op. cit.*, I, 310 ff.)

#### 5. UNION PROCLAIMED.

The time was ripe, however, for other action. Eastern Roumelia had thriven in seven years of comparative freedom, and most of its people desired to clasp hands with their brothers beyond the Balkans. A sudden uprising at Philipoppolis on September 18, 1885, resulted in the gentle expulsion of Gavril Pasha, the second Christian governor appointed by the Porte, and a prompt invitation to Prince Alexander to accept the rulership of Eastern Roumelia. (In *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 76, pp. 1243-1315, is to be found a series of dispatches dealing with the Eastern situation in the latter part of 1885.) On September 21 Alexander announced his election and acceptance as Prince of Eastern Roumelia, and asked the intervention of the British Government toward obtaining the Sultan's sanction, "to avoid the useless effusion of blood, since the people have decided to defend with their lives the fait accompli."

#### 6. PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE.

The Porte appealed on September 23 to the powers to rectify the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin. A conference was proposed to be held at Constantinople to decide on what advice to offer the Prince. The English ambassador was instructed to labor to induce the Sultan to abstain from military intervention and to appoint



Alexander as prince for life over Eastern Roumelia. The British representatives at Athens and Belgrade were also instructed to work in the interests of peace. The Czar had been greatly enraged at the news, and prepared to order the withdrawal of the Russian officers from the Bulgarian Army, believing that he would thus leave it helpless. Germany, Austria, and Italy abstained from taking a positive attitude. Serbia and Greece promptly began to prepare for war, resenting the enlargement of Bulgaria, fearing the reestablishment of the Great Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, and demanding equivalent enlargements of their own territory. The conference of ambassadors drew up a declaration on October 4 and 5 deprecating the violation of the Treaty of Berlin and urging peaceful dispositions. After some modifications this declaration was sent to the Porte and the Government of Bulgaria on October 14. On the following day the Austrian ambassador proposed, as agreed with Russia and Germany, that a formal conference be held at Constantinople, which should request Prince Alexander to withdraw his troops from Eastern Roumelia on penalty of the Sultan's use of force, and with the intimation that compliance would be followed by a union of the provinces.

#### 7. CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE.

Lord Salisbury, on October 21, objected to the threat of force, but approved the formal conference. He desired a preliminary basis for discussion to be agreed upon. The proposal made by the Porte laid down as a basis for the conference the maintenance of the Treaty of Berlin in conformity with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, the conference to consider the affairs of Eastern Roumelia alone. Lord Salisbury accepted the invitation, and on November 2 sent a long dispatch elaborating the British point of view, and indicating clearly that a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia was not desirable. He took exception to the "balance of power" theory for the Balkan States. The Czar on November 3 gave indication of his intentions toward Prince Alexander by dismissing him from the Russian Army.

#### 8. THE SERBO-BULGAR WAR, 1885.

Such was the situation when Serbia declared war on Bulgaria on November 14. The circumstances suggest strongly that this was with the approval of Russia and Austria, with Germany acquiescing. (These three powers were bound by the Skiernewice compact of 1884, and they acted together regularly during the events under discussion.) The Bulgarians, though without the help of Russian officers, promptly showed themselves more than a match for the Serbians. (See article, *The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885-1886*.) The

three Emperors agreed on a proposal for an armistice on November 24, to which England, France, and Italy adhered, and Count Khevenhüller enforced it on the Bulgarians. November 28, by the threat of Austrian military support of Serbia and Russian occupation of Bulgaria. (Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 324, states that the Russian chancellor, on hearing of this threat, informed Vienna that the Czar would be very much displeased if the Austrian end of it were carried out.) Perhaps at this point the cooperation of the Emperors broke down. The pressure toward restoring the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia slackened at about this time, and the English view of accepting the union rose toward acceptance.

#### 9. TURKISH THREAT OF WAR.

At the same time, Turkey, encouraged by Austria and Russia, and attempting to proceed without the knowledge of England, gathered troops on the border of Eastern Roumelia, and sent two delegates to Philippopolis with a proclamation which purported to convey the decision of the conference, but which had not been approved or even seen by the British representative. This proclamation aimed at restoring substantially the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia. Gradually, however, the Turks came around to see that Bulgaria was not hostile to them and not inclined to be aggressive, and that it was rather to their interest to make her strong and friendly than divided and discontented. To this belief no doubt Lord Salisbury contributed. (See his conversation with the Turkish ambassador on December 23, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 76, p. 1311.)

#### 10. SETTLEMENT.

On February 1, 1886, a Turco-Bulgarian convention (See Appendix L, 31) was drawn up, which conformed closely to the Treaty of Berlin, in that Alexander was appointed governor of Eastern Roumelia for a period of five years. Certain border districts were transferred back to Turkey. Mutual military aid was provided between Turkey and Bulgaria. The three emperors objected to the military alliance of Turkey and Bulgaria, and the implacable attitude of Czar Alexander toward his namesake was shown by the former's refusal to permit the latter's name to appear in the convention. The British Government accepted these changes, and the convention was signed on April 5, 1886. It provided for the essential aim of the revolution of Philippopolis, in that the two portions of Bulgaria were left united.

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### 39. THE SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR OF 1885-1886.

#### 1. PRELIMINARIES OF THE WAR.

King Milan of Serbia held that the union of Bulgaria and Roumelia (See article on the Bulgarian Revolution of 1885) meant a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Finding the proceedings of the conference of the powers at Constantinople too dilatory he proceeded to constitute himself the champion of the Treaty of Berlin. He had reason to believe that his aspirations after territorial compensation would not be judged unjustifiable in Austro-

Hungarian circles. (Phillips to Salisbury, Nov. 9, 1885; Parliamentary Papers, 1886, vol. 75, No. 1, p. 249. See also Protetch, S., *The secret treaty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary*, *Fortnightly Review*, January, 1909, vol. 85, pp. 838-849.) Serbian newspapers began in the autumn of 1885 to write of the balance of power and to air grievances against Bulgaria.

## 2. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

The Serbian troops, which had been mobilized, ostensibly against Turkey, since the revolt in Philippopolis, were massed on the Bulgarian frontier. The Bulgarian prince sent a friendly letter to King Milan, which the latter refused to receive, and thereupon Bulgarian troops were sent to the Serbian frontier. To a remonstrance from Bulgaria that Serbian troops were in Bulgarian territory Milan returned a denial, and Prince Alexander issued a proclamation that as the Serbian king had stated that the 300 Serbians on Bulgarian soil were not Serbian soldiers they were to be treated as brigands. The reply of the Serbian monarch was a reiteration of his denial, and the statement that Bulgarian troops had attacked Serbian forces on Serbian territory, and that renewal of such attacks would be considered a *casus belli*. The next day he issued a declaration of war, basing his action upon changes in the Balkans, innovations in Bulgarian customs regulations designed to injure Serbian trade, ill treatment of Serbian subjects in Bulgaria, and attacks upon the Serbian Army. Alexander appealed to the powers and to the Porte. The Porte laid the responsibility of the war on his head because of the Eastern Roumelian affair.

## 3. TREATY OF BUCHAREST, MARCH 3, 1886.

The Bulgarian troops met the situation with unexpected spirit, and after a short and sharp campaign drove the invading army back across the frontier. Prince Alexander was invading Serbia when a special envoy from Austria-Hungary on November 28 demanded that he grant an armistice, threatening, if he refused, to send troops to Serbia's assistance. This was apparently not an independent action of Austria, as joint action for pacification had been agreed upon by Austria, Russia, and Germany some time before, and England had been using her good offices to the same end. (Parliamentary Papers, 1886, v. 75, No. 1, pp. 284 (No. 496) 301, (No. 503), 307 (No. 511), 308 (No. 515), 310 (No. 519).) The armistice was proclaimed, and on March 3, 1886, largely through the good offices of Great Britain, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, restoring the status quo ante bellum.



## 4. APPRAISEMENT.

There has been much speculation as to why King Milan went to war, but a sufficient explanation is that probably he saw in Bulgaria's case the possibilities of successful aggression and reckoned on the tradition of the old Serbian Empire to rally his people to a successful war, which would bring him much needed popularity. Bulgaria's armies were believed to be demoralized by the withdrawal of their Russian officers and the greater part of them were on the Turkish frontier. Serbia as the champion of the Treaty of Berlin, which had robbed her of the chance of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, seems absurd enough; on the other hand, it is not remarkable that Serbia, having been denied by the Treaty of Berlin the acquisition of territory which she felt legitimately belonged to her, should have been unwilling to see that treaty infringed to the advantage of a neighboring State and to her own relative detriment.

By assuming that rôle, too, she might feel more sure of the support of Austria-Hungary, to whom, in addition Milan's exploit, gave the opportunity to show how far she felt bound to carry out the spirit of the convention of 1881. The success of her army assured Bulgaria of the continued possession of Roumelia, while it disappointed the hope of a greater Serbia.

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## 40. THE PACIFIC BLOCKADE OF GREECE, 1886.

### 1. CIRCUMSTANCES.

At the Congress of Berlin the powers had recommended to the Porte to grant Greece a rectified frontier, and in 1881 Greece obtained about 9,000 square miles of territory in Thessaly and Epirus. But only a part of the territory claimed by the Greeks was actually secured (See article, *The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, 1878-1881*). On January 4, 1886, the Greek Government addressed a note to the powers, demanding as compensation for the union of Bulgaria with Eastern Roumelia (See article, *The Serbo-Bulgar War of 1885-86*), that the boundary between Turkey and Greece be that originally fixed by the Berlin congress, and threatening naval and military action.

### 2. THE INTERVENTION BY THE POWERS.

On January 24, the powers delivered a collective note at Athens, stating that "no naval attack by Greece against the Sublime Porte would be permitted." On the same day the Greek fleet left Salamis Bay; and all the great powers, with the sole exception of France, decided at the instigation of Lord Salisbury, to send warships to Suda Bay, in Crete, in order to prevent Greece from landing troops on the Turkish coast or attacking Turkish vessels. On February 2 the Greek premier insisted that any interference with the free disposal of her naval forces would be "incompatible with the independence" of Greece. The combined fleet of the powers met at Sulva Bay soon afterwards, but Greece continued her warlike preparations.

The allied squadron then proceeded to the Piraeus, and on April 26 another collective note was delivered at Athens inviting the Greek cabinet "to place its land and sea forces on a peace footing as promptly as possible." Still another collective note was presented on May 6, and on May 8 the powers declared their intention to "establish a blockade of the coasts of Greece against all ships under the Greek flag \* \* \*. All ships under the Greek flag attempting to run the blockade will render themselves liable to be detained."

### 3. THE BLOCKADE.

On May 10, the pacific blockade of Greece was declared and its limits and scope carefully defined. It applied only to vessels under the Greek flag and such vessels were only to be detained.

It would seem that the number of ships actually detained was about 70. The blockade resulted in some scarcity of provisions in certain places, but the British commander was given authority to relieve any cases of actual distress.



Meanwhile a new cabinet was formed in Athens for the purpose of carrying out the wishes of the powers; disarmament proceeded apace and the Greek forces were ordered to withdraw from the frontier. The Porte also announced its intention to demobilize as soon as the Greeks should do so.

After a good deal of diplomatic correspondence between the powers, an agreement was reached and a joint note handed to the Greek Government on June 7. The blockade was raised, though a small squadron was left at Sulva Bay to see that the wishes of the powers were carried out.

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### 41. THE SCHNAEBELÉ INCIDENT, 1887.

#### 1. THE MAIN FACTS.

On April 21, 1887, the Havas agency published a dispatch to the effect that M. Schnaebelé, a French police inspector, had been arrested on the Franco-German frontier, near Pagny, as he was on his way to Ars-sur-Moselle to have an interview with the German police inspector there at the latter's request.

A dispute followed as to whether the arrest had taken place on French or on German territory, the French claiming that under the circumstances M. Schnaebelé was entitled to immunity even on German territory, since he had been invited to a conference by German officials. The reason given by the German authorities for the arrest was that in an inquiry into charges of treasonable practices against a number of Alsatians, evidence had been produced that M. Schnaebelé was concerned in transmitting to Paris information as to German fortresses furnished by Alsatians in the pay of the French Government, and that an order had been given to arrest him if ever he should be found on German soil.

#### 2. SIGNIFICANCE.

Within a week after his arrest, on April 28, M. Schnaebelé was released by order of the German Emperor. In a dispatch of the same date to the French ambassador at Berlin, Prince Bismarck

explained that though the German Government considered, in view of the proofs of guilt, the arrest to be fully justified, it was deemed expedient to release M. Schnaebelé on the ground that business meetings of frontier officials "must always be regarded as protected by a mutually assured safe conduct."

The excitement caused by the arrest of M. Schnaebelé was very great, particularly at Paris. It occurred soon after a parliamentary campaign on the part of the German Government to secure the passage by the Reichstag of the Septennate army law, or seven years credit for military expenses; and it was accompanied by such threatening and provocative language as to cause serious concern, not only in France, but throughout Europe. In France Gen. Boulanger and his party wanted to send an ultimatum demanding the release of Schnaebelé and an apology. A large section of the German press demanded that Germany make no concession. Elie de Cyon (*La France et la Russie*, *La Nouvelle Revue*, vol. 63, p. 69, April 15, 1890) asserts that Bismarck brought about the incident; that Czar Alexander III, made apprehensive for the peace of Europe, wrote an autographic letter to William I in regard to the matter, and that the Kaiser, going over the head of his chancellor, ordered the release of Schnaebelé. There is still much mystery about the affair. The reasons for the arrest and release of Schnaebelé have never been satisfactorily explained. It seems not unlikely that Bismarck provoked this and one or two other "incidents" about 1887 for the purpose of putting pressure on France to counteract the Boulanger agitation.

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## 42. FRANCO-ITALIAN ANIMOSITY, 1886–1896.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The taking of Tunis by France in 1881 (See article, *The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881*) created much ill feeling in Italy, where the public was looking forward to an Italian occupation at an early date. Five years later this tension had not diminished. Then a series of clashes between the French and Italian Governments over a number of matters led to a decade of such pronounced Italian animosity against France that it became a factor of considerable importance in the international situation.



## 2. TARIFF WAR.

In 1886 a new commercial treaty between France and Italy was negotiated, but was rejected by the French Chamber of Deputies. Its rejection caused deep irritation in Italy, which retaliated by denouncing the existing commercial treaty of 1881, thereby leaving the two countries without any commercial treaty between them. From this action quickly developed a tariff war between the two countries which deeply affected their trade relations. French exports to Italy fell from 308,000,000 francs in 1887 to 181,000,000 in 1888, to 133,000,000 in 1889, and still lower the next year. French imports from Italy fell within two years from 372,000,000 francs to 227,000,000

## 3. CATHOLIC MISSIONS—ABYSSINIA.

The use of Italian influence to try to take away from France its long exercised right of protecting Roman Catholic missions in China caused irritation in France, while several instances of mob misuse of Italian workmen in France led to sharp demands for their protection by the Italian Government. Italian colonial activities in the Red Sea region were producing friction with King Menelik of Abyssinia, who turned for support to France, as French interests in the region were also affected by the forward colonial policy of Italy. Some encouragement appears to have been given to Menelik by France. His success in holding his own against Italy was naturally attributed by Italians to French support.

## 4. CRISPI.

Throughout these years Crispi, whether in office or not, was the most potent personality in Italy. His intense animosity toward France, a thing of earlier origin, was accentuated by his enthusiasm for the recently developed connection with Germany and the Dual Monarchy in the Triple Alliance. Crispi's influence, always active against France, was of great power in intensifying the ill feeling in Italy against France.

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### 43. THE PARTITION OF AFRICA, 1878-1885.

#### 1. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN AFRICA IN 1877.

When Stanley emerged from the interior of Africa in 1877, the hold of European nations upon that continent was a slight one. Great Britain held the Cape, with West Griqualand and Natal, and on the west coast had settlements at Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Lagos. The extent of these settlements was about 241,461 square miles. France held Algeria and had settlements on the west coast in Senegal and on the Gold Coast, the whole amounting to about 426,523 square miles. Portugal held Senegambia and Portuguese Guinea on the west, Angola in the southwest, and Mozambique in the southeast. The Spanish had a settlement at Corisco Bay. The total territory claimed by European powers was thus about 702,371 square miles.

#### 2. EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN HOLDINGS. 1877-1885.

After the explorations of Stanley and Livingstone the topography of Africa was known roughly, and some glimpse had been given of its possibilities. It was not strange that the movement toward expansion that began about 1878 should have turned toward this great unoccupied field. The first indication of widespread interest in African colonization was given by the formation of the Royal African Association under the leadership of the Belgian King Leopold, which led to the establishment of the Congo Free State. (See article, *The Formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885.*) Great Britain gradually obtained control of Egypt and the territory to the southward, until by 1883 her influence was paramount there. (See articles, *The Dual Control over Egyptian Finances, 1876-1883*; *The British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914*; *The Soudan Question, 1881-1899.*) In 1885 she proclaimed a protectorate in Nigeria. During the same period her colonies already established were, almost without exception, extending their boundaries. In 1881 Tunis accepted a French protectorate (See article, *The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881*), and by 1885 the extension of the influence of France in West Africa and the Congo region had immensely enhanced her holdings. Her claim to Obock, near the southern entrance to the Red Sea, was an old one, but the region was not actually occupied until this period. Spain's claim in West Africa was finally recognized as entitling her to several thousand square miles. German colonization of Africa began with the establishment of a protectorate over Angra Pequena in 1883, but her zeal was so untiring that by 1885 she had acquired 371,000 square miles.



## 3. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN 1885.

Thus in a period of less than 10 years the colonial possessions of Great Britain in Africa had increased from 241,000 square miles to 868,000; those of France from 426,000 to 726,000, those of Portugal from 34,000 to 195,000, and Germany had acquired 371,000. In addition there had been established the Congo Free State, of over a million square miles, and Spain, from an indeterminate claim, had acquired a colony of 243,000 square miles. While in 1878 Europeans were in control of about 702,371 square miles of African territory, in 1885 they controlled about 3,461,128 square miles.

*Table of European holdings in Africa, 1877 and 1885.*

## GREAT BRITAIN

1877.	Area.	1885.	Area.
	<i>Sq. miles.</i>		<i>Sq. miles.</i>
Griqualand, West .....	17,800	Basutoland .....	10,290
Cape .....	201,000	Bechuanaland .....	185,000
Gambia .....	21	Cape Colony .....	241,900
Gold Coast .....	6,000	Gambia .....	69
Lagos .....	5,000	Gold Coast .....	15,000
Natal .....	11,172	Lagos .....	73
Sierra Leone .....	468	Natal .....	21,150
		Sierra Leone .....	468
		Walvisch Bay .....	450
		Niger districts .....	
		Egypt (Protectorate) .....	394,240
Total .....	241,461	Total .....	868,640

## FRANCE.

	<i>Sq. km.</i>		<i>Sq. km.</i>
Senegal settlements .....	250,000	Senegambia .....	250,000
Gold coast and Gaboon .....	20,000	Gold Coast and Gaboon .....	20,000
Algeria .....	418,000	Congo region .....	430,000
		Obock .....	10,000
		Algeria .....	418,000
		Tunis (Protectorate) .....	42,000
Total .....	1,688,000	Total .....	1,170,000

## GERMANY.

	<i>Sq. miles.</i>
Togoland .....	400
Cameroons .....	115,000
Damara and Great Namaqua .....	230,000
Usagora .....	20,700
Wituland .....	5,200
Total .....	371,000

## PORTUGAL.

	<i>Sq. miles.</i>		<i>Sq. km.</i>	<i>Sq. miles.</i>
Senegambia and Guinea .....	1,687	Senegambia, Bissao, etc. ....	26	3,500
Angola, Benguela, and Mossamedes .....	14,700	Angola, etc. ....	312,509	15,000
Mozambique and Sofala .....	18,000	Mozambique and dependen-	382,683	80,000
		cies .....		
		Congo districts .....		
Total .....	34,387	Total <sup>3</sup> .....	695,218	195,350

<sup>1</sup> 426,523 square miles.<sup>2</sup> 726,938 square miles.<sup>3</sup> Portugal claimed a large hinterland that other powers did not admit; the latter figures are the British estimate, the former the Portuguese. The latter are used in estimating the total.

*Table of European holdings in Africa, 1877 and 1885—Continued.*

## SPAIN.

1877.	Area.	1885.	Area.
Station in Corisco Bay . . . . .		Rio de Oro and Adrar . . . . .	<i>Sq. miles.</i> 243,660

## KING LEOPOLD II.

		Congo Free State . . . . .	<i>Sq. miles.</i> 1,056,269
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Total, 702,371 square miles for 1877 and 3,461,123 square miles for 1885.

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#### 44. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE OVER TUNIS, 1881.

##### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The conquest of Algiers by France in 1830 and the physiographic continuity of that province with the backward state of Tunis may be regarded as the real basis of the French protectorate over Tunis.

##### 2. RIVALS OF FRANCE IN TUNIS, 1861-1881.

For about 20 years prior to the establishment of the French protectorate both Italy and Great Britain displayed a good deal of interest in Tunis, and it seemed not unlikely that Tunis would shortly pass under either Italian or British control.

Immediately after the achievement of Italian unification Italy began to exhibit a deep interest in the future of Tunis. When the Bey went bankrupt in 1869 a triple control over Tunisian finances was established under British, French, and Italian controllers. In 1880 the Italians bought the British railway from Tunis to Galetta.



There was in Tunis a considerable and rapidly increasing Italian population.

The general international situation in Europe from 1878 to 1881 undoubtedly helped to bring about the French occupation. Italy had returned from the Congress of Berlin (1878) with empty hands and yet with hopes of gaining Tunis, to which her eyes had been directed since 1862. During the sessions of the Congress of Berlin the French representative, Waddington, had been encouraged both by Lord Salisbury and by Bismarck to go into Tunis, although this encouragement was not known to the world for some years. (Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Tunisie, Supplément, pp. 67-71, for correspondence between Britain and France. Bismarck's encouragement is briefly set forth, with references, in Rose's *Development of the European Nations*, II, pp. 14-15 and notes. See also Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, *Memoirs*, II, 279-280. Eng. tr.)

### 3. WHY FRANCE TOOK CONTROL, 1881.

France's decision to send an army into Tunis in 1881 was partly due to Italy's increasing activities in the country (Fitoussi, pp. 120-26), and was publicly based upon the necessity of quieting the Tunisian natives who were raiding over the Algerian frontier despite French protests. (Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Tunisie, 1871-1880.) Emile Bourgeois, a weighty authority, doubtless puts the motives in their proper perspective when he says: "\* \* \* From the Province of Constantine, the valley of the Medjerda inevitably led the French toward Tunis, where the acts of brigandage of the Kroumirs on March 31, 1881, gave a legitimate ground for interference." (Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12, p. 129.)

The Sultan of Turkey attempted to interfere diplomatically on behalf of Tunis, but his pretensions to suzerainty over Tunis (Fitoussi, appendix, pp. xxvi-xxxvi) were brushed aside by the French.

### 4. THE TREATY OF BARDO.

After all opposition in Tunis was put down the French imposed upon the Bey the Treaty of Bardo, May 12, 1881, which established the protectorate. The convention of June 8, 1883, modified the relations of the two powers in some respects. (Texts of treaty and convention in Fitoussi, appendix, pp. xxxvii-xxxix.)

### 5. INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TUNIS AFTER 1881.

Turkey refused to recognize the accomplished fact and later only implicitly abandoned her claims to suzerainty. From the legal point of view, as the French agreement admitted, the powers of Europe which had treaties of "capitulation" with the Government of Tunis,

retained their rights thereunder after the establishment of the French protectorate (Fitoussi, pp. 168–74), but these were successively abrogated by mutual agreement, Great Britain being the first and Italy the last to consent. (Documents Diplomatiques, *Revision des Traités Tunisiens*, 1896–Janvier, 1897.) In judicial matters, therefore, the subjects of foreign States living in Tunis are substantially in the same position as if they were in France itself.

#### 6. THE FRENCH RÉGIME IN TUNIS.

The Bey retains his titles, dignities, flags, coinage, etc., but the State's foreign relations are controlled by France through the French Resident, and more and more the Bey tends to become a dignified figurehead, necessarily permitting the Resident to shape domestic policies.

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### 45. THE DUAL CONTROL OVER EGYPTIAN FINANCES, 1876–1883.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Dual Control over the finances of Egypt grew from the misrule and the impoverishment of the country by Ismail Pasha and from the political and financial interests of France and England in Egypt, especially in the Suez Canal. By the extravagance of Ismail, Egypt was led to the verge of bankruptcy. The Egyptian debt rose from £3,000,000 in 1863 to £91,000,000 in 1876. About £16,000,000 were spent on the Suez Canal; a considerable sum went into public works and experimentation which, if successful, would have increased the



prosperity of the country; but a very large proportion of the whole sum was squandered by the extravagant personal expenditure of the Khedive. The Khedive, needing money, imposed heavy taxes, and in 1875 sold his shares in the Suez Canal Co. to Great Britain for about £4,000,000.

## 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CAISSE DE LA DETTE, MAY 2, 1876.

Foreign financial intervention was precipitated by the action of the Khedive, who on April 8, 1876, issued a decree suspending payment on his treasury bills. Protests in behalf of the bondholders were made by foreign governments. To meet the situation the Khedive, by decrees of May 2 and 7, 1876, established the Caisse de la Dette, and provided for the consolidation of the debt. Two commissioners were appointed who, in addition to the discharge of certain specified duties, were in general to act as the representatives of the bondholders.

## 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL CONTROL, NOVEMBER 18, 1876.

This arrangement caused much dissatisfaction, especially in England. As a result the Goschen-Joubert commission, organized by the British and French creditors, undertook a mission to Egypt for the purpose of obtaining modifications of the financial scheme which the British and French bondholders considered necessary. This commission negotiated a new financial arrangement, the Dual Control, which was embodied in a khedival decree of November 18, 1876. Two controllers-general were to be appointed, one to supervise the revenue and the other the expenditure. A small body of European officials invested with more ample powers than had previously been conferred on European functionaries was now introduced into Egypt. But the Khedive had failed to recognize the importance of the changes to which he had assented. Cordial cooperation between the Khedive and the European officials was not secured. Egyptian finances remained in a chaotic condition.

## 4. OPERATION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, 1876-1878.

On March 30, 1878, the Khedive issued a decree providing for a commission with extensive powers of inquiry. After four months of laborious investigation this commission made its report in August. The Khedive hesitated as to the course he should pursue, but finally decided to adopt the recommendations of the commission. At the same time he announced the adoption of the principle of ministerial responsibility and the appointment of a new ministry, which included among the members the two commissioners of the Dual Control. The officials of the Dual Control having thus been appointed to

offices which gave them increased power over the finances of Egypt on December 12 the Dual Control was provisionally suspended, upon the ground that its continuance was incompatible with the plan for the new ministry.

#### 5. SUSPENSION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, DECEMBER 8, 1878.

Had the Khedive been disposed to work loyally with the new ministry it was, perhaps, possible that the new plan might have worked successfully. But Ismail soon showed that he was intent on regaining his personal power. On February 20, 1879, Nubar Pasha, the head of the ministry, was dismissed. A new cabinet, in which the two European ministers retained their seats, was appointed. But on April 7 it was abruptly dismissed and a new purely Egyptian ministry was put in its place. The excuse given for this action was the new financial plan supported by the minister of finance. A counter financial project was brought forward by the Khedive. A note of warning was sent by the British Government on April 25. The German Government took more decided action. The German consul general at Cairo delivered to the Egyptian Government the following protest:

“The decree of the 22nd April, by which the Egyptian Government fixes, of its sole authority, the settlement of its debts and annuls acquired and recognized rights is regarded by the Government of Germany as an open and direct violation of the international obligations which the Egyptian Government assumed when they adopted the judicial reform.

“The Government of Germany refuse, therefore, to recognize the said decree as having any obligatory effect, either as regards the rights of German subjects or the competency of the mixed tribunals; and they hold the Khedive responsible for all the consequences which may result from his illegal proceedings.” (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 70, p. 1079.)

Identical protests from all the other great powers were delivered within a few days.

#### 6. REESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL CONTROL, SEPTEMBER 4, 1879.

The powers had now become convinced that no dependence was to be placed on Ismail. After the concurrence of the Sultan had been obtained Ismail was advised, first by France and England, afterwards by Germany and Austria, to abdicate. He did not heed the advice. On June 26 the Sultan telegraphed Ismail inviting him to “retire from government affairs,” and announcing that his son Twefik had been appointed his successor.



The deposition of Ismail was followed, September 4, by the restoration of the Dual Control. A period of comparative quiet followed. The Controllers-General showed themselves men of "good sense and good temper." The Dual Control, in the face of serious obstacles, worked fairly well; some beneficial reforms were carried out; "matters were improving in Egypt." (Cromer, I, 173). But the Arabi Bey "nationalist" insurrection was in process of development. The outbreak of that revolt in 1882 brought on the British occupation of Egypt (See article, that title).

#### 7. ABOLITION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, 1883.

The Dual Control in financial matters continued for a time after the British occupation began, but was abolished January 18, 1883, by decree of the Egyptian Government. Its abolition caused considerable friction between the British and French Governments. (For the correspondence, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 1285-1318). England argued that its abolition was necessary, because the quasi-political position of the controllers and the necessity of agreement both by them and their governments constituted a serious obstacle to good administration. (Ibid, p. 1296). France objected on the ground that the English plan to replace the Dual Control by a single financial councillor amounted to nothing more than the exclusion of the French controller. (Ibid, p. 1287.)

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## 46. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT, 1882-1914.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Dual Control over Egyptian finances (See article, that title), established in 1876, paved the way for more extensive foreign intervention in Egyptian affairs, though there is no evidence to show that such was the intention of either the French or British Governments. It is now manifest that the same considerations which had led to French and British control in financial matters were bound to lead to more extensive intervention in Egyptian affairs, unless through the operation of the Dual Control a more stable condition of affairs in Egypt could be secured within a comparatively short period. Whatever chance there may have been that Egypt might escape passing under foreign rule was destroyed by the hostility of Ismail to the Dual Control and, after his deposition in 1879, by the rapid development of the Arabi Bey insurrection.

### 2. THE ARABI BEY INSURRECTION.

That insurrection has been variously appraised. It has been described (e. g., by Rose, II, 153) as a chiefly military revolt, incited by restless and dissatisfied native officers in the Egyptian army for personal advantage. The opposite point of view has been well expressed by Morley (Gladstone, III, 73). "It was in truth national as well as military: it was anti-European, and above all, it was in its objects anti-Turk." The movement began among the Arab officers who complained of the preference shown to officers of Turkish origin, later expanded into an attack on the privileged position and predominant influence of foreigners, and finally was directed against all Christians, whether native or foreign. The leader was a fellah officer

known as Arabi Bey, who even found his way into the Egyptian cabinet. The cry "Egypt for the Egyptians" was raised, and the danger of a serious rising which could put in jeopardy the lives and property of Europeans made necessary the formulation of an Egyptian policy by European governments, especially the French and British.

### 3. FRENCH AND BRITISH COOPERATION, 1881-1882.

In France the Gambetta "Grand Ministry" had taken office November, 1881. Gambetta had a clearly conceived and definite policy. He was opposed to permitting intervention in Egyptian affairs in any form by Egypt's nominal sovereign, the Sultan. As he believed that intervention in some form had become necessary, and that England would not be likely to regard with approval a purely French intervention, Gambetta strongly advocated an Anglo-French entente looking to common action, if actual intervention should become necessary. Gambetta proposed to the British Government, December 30, 1881, that the two governments transmit to the Khedive identical declarations announcing their support in the present and the future for the Government of the Khedive against any peril which might arise (*Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'Égypte*, 1881-1882, pp. 11-12). The British Government, on the other hand, fearing the complications which might arise from the operation of such a policy as that advocated by Gambetta, was strongly inclined to favor the idea of a Turkish intervention. This policy was based upon the theory that the Sultan, as suzerain of Egypt, was best entitled to act, if intervention became necessary, and that he could be held accountable for what he did in Egypt and the conditions which obtained there. The correspondence between the French and British Governments and their common action in sending the joint note of January 2, 1882, to the Khedive, indicate that the British Government was about ready to yield its views and accept those of Gambetta.

### 4. FRENCH WITHDRAWAL.

The overthrow of the Grand Ministry in January, 1882, exerted a decisive influence upon the Egyptian question. The British Government was released from pressure in favor of an Anglo-French intervention. French policy, under Gambetta clear and precise, entered into a period of the greatest uncertainty. René Millet (*Revue des deux mondes*, 5th period, vol. 21, p. 780) asserts, with possibly a measure of exaggeration, but with substantial truth, that the Freycinet ministry, which succeeded that of Gambetta, changed its conduct 10 times within five or six months. "Our ministry," he



says, "rejected at first all intervention in Egypt (Feb. 3, 1882). A few days later it proposed that of Europe (Feb. 6). On May 27 it declared itself hostile to the cooperation of Turkish troops, which it accepted on the 29th, rejected anew on June 3, and rallied to on the 17th. At the beginning of May it accepted the idea of acting with the English, but at the end of the same month it preferred a conference at Constantinople. On June 24 it rejected limited action for the protection of the Suez Canal, accepted it on the 15th, hesitated again on the 27th, finally made a decision (in favor of the course) and fell on the 29th."

Responsibility for the wavering course taken by the French Government has usually been laid at the door of Freycinet, head of the ministry at that time. Unquestionably a large share of the responsibility belongs to him. But his lack of decision reflected the state of mind of the French public opinion. The French protectorate over Tunis (See article, that subject) had been established less than a year. It was reported that at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck, as well as Salisbury, had encouraged the French to go into Tunis. There was widespread fear that Bismarck wanted to get France embarked upon a policy of colonial and foreign adventure which would leave her weak and helpless in the face of Germany. To avoid falling into that trap it was necessary for France to proceed with great caution as to Egypt. Clemenceau, in the debate which led to the fall of the Freycinet ministry, expressed the prevalent feeling: "Gentlemen, the conclusion from that which is happening at the moment is this: Europe is covered with soldiers; everybody stands alert; all the powers reserve their liberty of action for the future; let us reserve the liberty of France." (Quoted by Freycinet, *La Question d'Egypte*, 311.)

##### 5. ALEXANDRIA AND TEL-EL-KEBIR, 1882.

While the British and French Governments were endeavoring to come to an understanding, the situation in Egypt became so serious that some immediate action was required. In May, British and French fleets were sent to Alexandria, and on the proposal of France an ambassadors' conference met at Constantinople, but accomplished nothing. On June 11 there was a massacre of Europeans at Alexandria. A few days later the French Government, learning that the English would use force against the insurgents, if the rebellion was not speedily suppressed by the authority of the Khedive, ordered the French fleet to withdraw. Finally, on July 11, the British fleet bombarded Alexandria. After the bombardment the British Government invited the cooperation of the French and Italians in military measures against Arabi Bey, but both declined to act. The British Government thereupon decided to act alone. An army was sent to

Egypt under Gen. Wolseley, who defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, 1882, and seized Cairo. The rebellion quickly collapsed. The Khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo. Matters were temporarily adjusted by Lord Dufferin, the British ambassador at Constantinople, who was sent to Egypt as high commissioner.

#### 6. BRITISH INTENTIONS IN 1882.

There has been much discussion as to the intentions of the British Government at the time when the occupation of Egypt began. The charge has been frequently made that the British Government maneuvered to bring about intervention by England alone and intended that the British occupation should become permanent. A large body of evidence bearing upon the question is now accessible. It includes many of the private papers of most of the men who exerted any considerable influence on the course taken by the English Government. The evidence clearly shows that England intervened alone because France was not ready to act with her and that it was the sincere intention of the British Government, of which Mr. Gladstone was then the head, to restore the power of the Khedive, to keep him on the right path for a time by friendly advice, and then to withdraw the British forces. Later on it seemed to successive British Governments, whether liberal or conservative, that this course could not be carried out. Withdrawal would leave Egypt a prey to anarchy and might lead to serious complications with other powers.

#### 7. THE GRANVILLE CIRCULAR OF JANUARY 3, 1883.

On January 3, 1883, Lord Granville issued from the foreign office a circular dispatch (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, pp. 676-679) which became "the original charter of British policy in Egypt" (Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, II, 306). It began by calling attention to the fact that "the course of events" had thrown upon England the task which it "would willingly have shared with other powers" of suppressing military insurrection and of restoring peace and order in Egypt. No definite time limit for British occupation was named, but Granville assured the powers that England desired to withdraw her military forces "as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it." Meanwhile, Granville announced, the situation imposed upon England "the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess elements of stability and progress." The circular was generally accepted as an additional and peculiarly solemn pledge that England would withdraw from Egypt within a few years at the latest.



## 8. FRENCH AND BRITISH TENSION OVER EGYPT, 1882-1904.

Owing to the condition of affairs prevailing in Egypt and especially in the Soudan, on account of the Dervish insurrection (See article, *The Soudan Question*, 1883-1899) the English Government did not see its way clear to withdraw from Egypt as promptly as was expected in 1882-1883. The failure to withdraw, in accordance with the announcement of the Granville circular, gave great umbrage to France, in which country there was much regret that she had not joined England in the occupation of Egypt in 1882. For over 20 years ill-feeling over the Egyptian question was the principal cause for a considerable tension between France and England, which on a number of occasions became very acute. The inability of France and England to come to an understanding over Egypt contributed much to the success of Bismarck's efforts to keep France isolated, and was a leading cause for the "splendid isolation" of England, 1882-1904.

During the earlier part of the period a number of efforts were made to arrange for the withdrawal of the British from Egypt. In 1884-1885 a plan for British withdrawal and for the neutralization of Egypt was discussed by the British and French Governments in connection with an adjustment of the Egyptian debt. Differences of opinion over the financial question made the effort fail. The effort which gave the greatest promise of success came in 1885-1887.

## 9. THE DRUMMOND WOLFF CONVENTIONS, 1885-1887.

On October 25, 1885, Drummond Wolff, for the British Government, signed a convention with Turkey (British and Foreign State Papers vol. 76, pp. 442-445) which to a certain extent at least sanctioned the British occupation until a further convention could be arranged providing for British withdrawal. Such a convention, stipulating for withdrawal in 1890, was signed at Constantinople, May 22, 1887 (Ibid, vol. 78, pp. 1080-1086). Owing to dissatisfaction in regard to an article which made possible reoccupation by the British, if disorder followed their withdrawal, French and Russian influence at Constantinople was successfully exerted to prevent ratification of the convention. Shortly after that event the attitude of the British Government as to withdrawal began to change. For a time there was no abandonment of the idea of ultimate withdrawal, but action in the near future was no longer considered practicable. After a time the Government, acting in harmony with a strong feeling which gradually developed in England, tacitly accepted the idea of permanent occupation.

## 10. ACCEPTANCE OF THE BRITISH OCCUPATION, 1904.

After the outcome of the Fashoda affair (See article, that title) had frustrated the effort an influential group in France to bring the

Egyptian question before an European conference, public opinion in France began to recognize that further opposition to the continued British occupation of Egypt would probably prove futile and that it stood in the way of desirable cordial relations between the two countries. In 1904 advantage was taken of the changed attitude by the two Governments. The convention of April 8, 1904, included a declaration in regard to Morocco and Egypt (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*), France agreed "not to obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner" (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 97, p. 39). On August 8, 1904, the British Government was able to announce in the House of Commons that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had also made the same agreement as to Egypt (Hansard, Fourth Series, vol. 139, pp. 1351-1352).

#### 11. THE PRESENT STATUS OF EGYPT—A BRITISH PROTECTORATE.

Up to the outbreak of the World War, Egypt was a case of double or ambiguous sovereignty. Nominally, she was an autonomous Province of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by a Khedive or Viceroy. The Khedives admitted the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, to whom they paid an annual tribute. Really Egypt was governed by the British consul general, who ruled Egypt through advisors in the different ministers. In fact, all matters of importance were decided at the British Agency.

At the outbreak of the World War the reigning (but not ruling) Khedive Abbas Hilmi was at his summer home on the Bosphorus. He refused to declare for the Allies and remained in Turkey after Turkey had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. This gave the British an opportunity to depose the unfriendly Khedive and establish a definite status for Egypt by making her an integral part of the British Empire.

After six weeks of negotiation Prince Hussein Kamel, the oldest living representative of the family of Mohammed Ali, was induced to accept the position of Sultan of Egypt under a British protectorate.

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## 47. THE SOUDAN QUESTION, 1881-1899.

### 1. LOSS OF THE SOUDAN, 1884-1885.

Through her intervention in Egypt in 1882 (See article, *The British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914*), England became involved in an enterprise which resulted in humiliation and disaster. In 1884-1885 the Soudan, an Egyptian dependency, was in a state of open rebellion which threatened the speedy destruction of Egyptian control over the region. This rebellion had been stirred up by a religious fanatic known as the Mahdi, or leader, who succeeded in arousing the fierce religious fanaticism of the Soudanese by claiming to be a kind of prophet or Messiah. He had proclaimed a religious war, and an army of 10,000 men under an English officer sent to repress the revolt had been annihilated in November, 1883. The Gladstone Government decided to abandon the Soudan, which the Egyptian governing class greatly desired to reconquer.

### 2. GORDON'S MISSION AND DEATH AT KHARTOUM, 1884-1885.

But the Soudan could not be wholly abandoned at once. It was necessary to make at least some effort to rescue certain troops who had been driven into fortresses and besieged there. The British Government was unwilling to send a military expedition, but finally decided to send Gen. Gordon, former governor general of the Soudan under the Egyptian Government, who reached Khartoum, but was

in his turn besieged. A cry went up in England for the relief of Gordon. The Government was extremely dilatory, but finally sent an expedition in September, 1884. It was too late. It reached Khartoum on January 28, 1885, only to find that the place had been stormed a few days earlier, and Gordon, together with 11,000 of his men, had been massacred. This unfortunate outcome contributed in large measure to the downfall of the Gladstone ministry.

### 3. THE RECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN, 1896-1898.

For the next decade the Soudan was abandoned to the dervishes. But various factors, such as the desire to avenge Gordon's death, a sense of humiliation over the loss of the Soudan, the need of controlling the Upper Nile, the growth of British imperialism, and especially the bad effect of conditions in Soudan upon Egypt, made it certain that the reconquest of the Soudan would one day be attempted.

In 1896 an Anglo-Egyptian army was sent into the Soudan under Gen. Kitchener. Building a railway as he advanced, he progressed slowly but surely. At the Battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898, the power of the Dervishes was completely annihilated.

The British and Egyptian flags were both raised over the Soudan, and the Government established there was nominally a condominium—a dual or Anglo-Egyptian rule. But for practical purposes the Soudan as well as Egypt became a part of the British Empire.

The administration of the Soudan was organized on the basis of an agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments signed on January 19, 1899. According to this agreement, the British and Egyptian flags are to be used together, and the supreme military and civil command is vested in a governor-general who is appointed by the Khedive on the recommendation of the British Government. By this plan the administrative difficulties experienced in Egypt from the capitulations, mixed tribunals, and the general complexity of the legal system are avoided.

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## 48. THE ACQUISITION OF MADAGASCAR BY FRANCE, 1882-1897.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In the scramble for Africa that began after the Congress of Berlin of 1878, England and Germany encouraged France to take her share—England, because of her complications with Egypt; Germany, in order to distract France from the Vosges. Under the energetic leadership of Jules Ferry, Madagascar experienced the results of the new policy.

In spite of friction between England and France in Madagascar, by 1882 the countries through an informal understanding had adopted an "identic attitude" toward the Hova, the most powerful of the Malagasy tribes and had recognized their supremacy over the whole island.

### 2. CAUSES OF THE DISPUTE IN 1882 BETWEEN THE HOVA GOVERNMENT AND FRANCE.

(1) France objected to the Hova flags in the regions which she claimed by treaties made in 1840 and 1841 with various Sakalava chiefs. (Islands of Mayotte and Nossi-Be; protectorate over mainland opposite.)

The Hova Government asserted that France had abandoned her claims by the recognition of Hova supremacy in the treaty of 1868.

(2) By article from above treaty, France claimed the lands of the late French consul, Laborde, for his heirs.

The Hova Government held that a Malagasy law of 1881 forbade alienation of land to aliens.

(3) France demanded an indemnity for injuries to her citizens.

### 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE, 1883-1885.

In spite of Hova missions to Paris and to London, France sent the Hova Queen an ultimatum on June 1, 1883 (See Appendix I, 23). It was rejected on the 9th. The war was ended by the treaty of December 17, 1885, practically establishing a French protectorate. France obtained complete control of Hova foreign affairs, but recognized Ranalvo III as Queen over the whole island except the Bay of Diego Suarez. (Ceded outright to France.)

In accordance with article 34 of the Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the powers were notified of this treaty.

On August 5 and November 17, 1890, England and Germany respectively recognized the French protectorate. (See Appendix I, 39, 40.)

#### 4. CONVENTION OF 1896.

Continued disturbances resulted in the French ultimatum of October, 1894, which was rejected by the Hova. After defeat in war, Ranalvo III signed the treaty of October 1, 1895, recognizing the protectorate "with all its consequences." Internal and foreign affairs were to be controlled by France. The treaty was never ratified by the French Government.

On January 18, 1896, Ranalvo signed a "unilateral convention," recognizing that France had taken possession of the island. (See Appendix I, 45.) On February 11 the powers were notified. On August 6 a law was passed declaring that France had taken possession of the island. Early in 1897 Ranalvo was deposed and deported.

Since 1897 there have been occasional protests by other countries, but no serious challenge of the right of France to the island.

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## 49. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA, 1883-1886.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Anglo-German colonial competition in South Africa began with the controversy in the Angra Pequena incident. Previous to 1883, Germany took but little part in African affairs. Bismarck, who had little interest in colonies, postponed successfully her entrance into the field of colonial politics until he had secured the position of the new German Empire through the adoption of his tariff program (July, 1879) and the creation of the Triple Alliance in 1882. At that time neither the German Government nor any of her traders had territorial possessions in Southwest Africa. The Gesellschaft der Rheinischen Missionen, which had been at work in this region since 1842, had 12 mission stations and considerable property in Great Namaqualand and Herreroland. In 1863 and in 1880, the British Government was asked by Germany to give protection to these missionaries during the periods of conflict between native races. Great Britain declined to use force, but sent representatives who settled the troubles by mediation. As a result of the opening of trade between British merchants and the natives along the coast, 10 islands near Angra Pequena Bay were put under British protection in 1863 and 1869, which was extended to Walfish Bay and 300 square miles adjacent to it on March 12, 1878. But the British Foreign Office was unwilling to assume the burden and responsibility of establishing a protectorate over the entire region between the Orange River and Portuguese Angola.

### 2. THE LÜDERITZ EXPEDITION.

The German Imperial Government, fully cognizant of these facts, determined to start a colony on a part of this unoccupied territory. On February 7, 1883, Count Herbert Bismarck raised the question of territorial jurisdiction in Southwest Africa in an interview with Sir Julian Pauncefote, undersecretary of state, at the foreign office. He said the German Government, without having the least design to establish any footing in South Africa, was ready to extend its protection to a German trader who was about to set up a factory on that coast, in case England was unwilling to do so, or had no jurisdiction in that region. In April Herr F. A. E. Luederitz, a Bremen merchant, was permitted to send an expedition to Southwest Africa which secured 150 square miles of land on Angra Pequena Bay, increased in August to a large strip of territory extending from the



Orange River to latitude 26° S. and reaching 20 miles into the interior. On September 10 a "memorandum" was left at the British Foreign Office stating that Herr Luederitz had purchased 150 square miles of territory on Angra Pequena Bay and asking if England claimed suzerainty over that district. This was followed by an inquiry on November 16 requesting a definite statement of the British claims in this region and the basis of these claims. Lord Granville replied on November 21 that British sovereignty had been proclaimed over Walfish Bay and the islands near Angra Pequena Bay. But, he added, "Her Majesty's Government consider \* \* \* that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18° S. and the frontier of Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, p. 531.)

### 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN PROTECTORATE.

The British Foreign Office, without taking any further steps to assume a protectorate over the territory in question or to define clearly its own position, permitted the Colonial Office to occupy the next six months in persuading the Government of Cape Colony to take over the jurisdiction of the region north of the Orange River. Meanwhile, impelled to action by pressure from Germany and by intimations, confidently given on June 4 and 14, that Bismarck could not recognize the right of Cape Colony to annex Angra Pequena and that England's delay was a cover for Cape Colony's action in seizing the land, the British Foreign Office declared on July 14, 1884, that it would not oppose the German claim to a protectorate over Angra Pequena. On August 7, the German warship *Elisabeth* took possession of the whole coast from the Orange River to latitude 26° S. At first the British Government protested against this extension of claims, but on September 19 it recognized the German protectorate over Southwest Africa from the Orange River to the Portuguese possessions on condition that their own claims to Walfish Bay and the islands along the coast were not questioned. To this Germany assented.

### 4. ADJUSTMENT OF BOUNDARIES.

A joint commission was appointed to settle the question of private claims such as those of De Pass and Luederitz; and Great Britain officially recognized German suzerainty over the whole region embracing approximately 215,000 square miles between the Orange River and the Portuguese boundary at latitude 18° S. The eastern boundary of this new German possession was finally fixed in the Anglo-German treaty of July 1, 1890, by which Germany received a

large accession of territory and access to the Zambesi River. (See article, *The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890*.) The northern line was determined in an agreement with Portugal, signed on December 30, 1886, by which the German boundary was pushed north to the Kunene River. Thus the German Empire acquired its first African colony comprising 322,450 square miles of territory.

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### 50. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN EAST AFRICA, 1885-1890.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Sultans of Zanzibar had been overlords of East Africa since 1837. Their suzerainty on the mainland extended from Tungi Bay northward to Witu, and as far inland as Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza; but their claims to all this territory had never been clearly established, and their hold over many of the local chieftains was slight.

#### 2. BEGINNING OF GERMAN ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA.

Through the efforts of the German East African Co. (chartered in February, 1885) and its agents, who were busy making treaties with native chiefs between November, 1884, and July, 1885, German protection was officially extended to some 60,000 square miles of territory in the interior of East Africa, opposite the island of Zanzibar. Sultan Bargash, ruler of Zanzibar, protested officially, on April 27 and May 11, to the Governments of Germany and England, respectively, against the activity of these German agents. Great Britain declined to interfere; and, on August 11, 1885, Bargash was compelled by a German naval demonstration to recognize



the German claims, and to withdraw his troops from the territory in dispute as a preliminary to a settlement.

### 3. ANGLO-GERMAN CONVENTION OF 1886 (SEE APPENDIX I, 34).

Through the influence of the British Foreign Office, however, a commission of three was appointed to delimit the boundaries of the Sultan's possessions. This commission made its report on June 9, 1886; and, on the basis of its recommendations, Great Britain and the German Empire reached an agreement concerning the position of the Sultan and their own territorial claims in East Africa on October 29 of the same year (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, 1130-1132). The islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, and Mafia, and a strip of the coast 10 miles wide, extending from the middle of Tungi Bay to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana River (together with five towns north of Kipini), were assigned to Sultan Bargash, who accepted the decision on December 4.

### 4. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

The two Governments defined roughly their respective "spheres of influence" in the interior as reaching from the Umba River as a dividing line, north to the Juba River for England, and south to the Rovuma River for the German Empire. As considerable uncertainty existed concerning the geographical features of this inland region, it was agreed that the claims of both States were to extend westward as far as Victoria Nyanza in accordance with the new German theory that possession of the coast implied ownership of the interior. The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Baron von Plessen also shows, that an understanding existed to the effect that the Germans were to keep south of Lake Victoria in their explorations and expansion, and the British north of it, the boundary being a line drawn from the north of the Umba River past the northern base of Mount Kilimanjaro to a point where the first degree of south latitude intersects the shore of Lake Victoria. In order to secure seaports and control of the coast trade, both England and Germany (1888) leased the coast strips bordering on their claims from the Sultan of Zanzibar.

### 5. TREATY OF JULY 1, 1890.

Baron Lambertmont ended the Anglo-German dispute concerning the control of the islands of Lamu, Manda, and Patta, and the ports of Kismayu, Brava, and Merka, by an award in favor of England in 1889 (Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, pp. 891-899). And on July 1, 1890, the German and British Governments signed an

agreement, after several preliminary discussions, which set definite limits to their protectorates in East Africa, and brought to an end a number of lively controversies. By this treaty (See article, The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890. See also Appendix I, 38) Witu, Zanzibar, and Uganda passed under British protection, while Heligoland (in the North Sea) and a large district west and south of Lake Victoria went to Germany, bringing her boundaries to Lake Tanganyika and Nyassa. Of East Africa, the Imperial German Government received 384,000 square miles of territory.

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## 51. THE QUESTION OF WEST AFRICA.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

This article deals with the portion of West Africa lying between the southern boundary of Morocco and the Congo River, there being elsewhere articles treating Morocco, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese West Africa, and German Southwest Africa. It is confined to international relations, neglecting national activity and individual colonial growth.

### 2. THE MINOR INTERESTS OF WEST AFRICA.

There is one nominally sovereign State, Liberia, founded by free negroes sent from the United States by the American Colonization Society nearly a century ago and declared an independent nation a little before the middle of the nineteenth century. Of Portuguese territory, which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and for some time thereafter nominally embraced the entire coast, there remains within the limits set, Portuguese Guinea (a small portion of the mainland a short distance southeast of that nation's much more important Cape Verde Islands) and two cocoa islands, San Thomé and Príncipe, in the Gulf of Guinea, near the Equator. Spain has Rio de Oro, extending some 700 miles along the coast opposite to her Canary Islands; the island of Fernando Po, in the Gulf of Guinea; and a little block of nearby continental territory between German and French possessions.

### 3. THE LEADING ASPIRANTS FOR WEST AFRICA.

The remainder of West Africa was divided, during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, between France, England, and Germany. The last has two detached territories—the small Togoland north of the Gulf of Guinea, and the much larger Cameroons east of that gulf, stretching inland to Lake Chad. England has four detached possessions—the very small Gambia wedge a little north of Portuguese Guinea, the larger Sierra Leone Colony some distance southeast, the still larger Gold Coast Colony lying west of German Togo, and the princely domain of Nigeria, lying on both sides of the lower course of the River Niger and extending toward the heart of the continent to Lake Chad. Lying back of and touching all of the others named and containing several times as much territory as all of them combined, is the great French imperial domain, having six separate frontages on the coast, bounded on the south by the Belgian Congo, on the east by the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan and Italian Tripoli, and on the north by the Mediterranean Sea.

## 4. BEGINNING OF THE RIVALRY.

Missionaries, explorers, and traders from the three chief contesting nations had been active during most of the nineteenth century, and English and French political authority had been established and recognized at several isolated spots, but Germany made no attempt to secure a political footing until 1884. In that year the scramble for the still unclaimed regions of Africa began, not only in West Africa, but in all other parts of the continent, which continued with increasing intensity for more than a decade, and at the end of the century left very little of the great continent unclaimed or unoccupied by one of the three.

About 1870 the French from the Senegal settlements in the extreme west had begun activity toward the interior, and by the end of that decade had reached the Upper Niger, establishing their authority and securing recognition from the native chiefs. To counteract expanding French influence the English from the Lower Niger organized more efficiently in 1879, began extending their treaty relations with the native chiefs, and by the middle of the next decade had secured recognition of British authority well up the Middle Niger and in the valley of its eastern tributary, the Benuë, as far as Lake Chad. They had even bought out some of the French claims. When the French, going south from the head of the Niger, approached British Sierra Leone settlements the two Governments entered into an agreement in 1882 for the settlement of their territorial claims in that region. This was the first of a long series of agreements for that purpose to be noticed further on.

## 5. GERMAN ACTIVITY.

As in the case of English and French, German enterprise began by the activity of individuals or private organizations. In 1878 the German African Society was formed and four years later the German Colonial Society. Many Germans, officials as well as others, opposed the establishment of colonies. Even Bismarck was slow in being convinced that Germany should embark on an African colonial policy, and after he started he moved slowly and cautiously. As is shown in the discussion of the matter elsewhere (See article, Anglo-German rivalry in Southwest Africa), it was not until Great Britain had refused, after being repeatedly questioned (1883) to assume responsibility for the protection of German subjects in Southwest Africa outside of Walfish Bay that Germany declared a protectorate over that region early in 1884. He also requested and obtained assurances of courteous treatment by British officials in Africa for Dr. Nachtigal, who, it was represented, was going to make explorations and learn the state of



German commerce in the Gulf of Guinea. But, following the example of France and England, Dr. Nachtigal proceeded to make treaties with native chiefs with whom neither of the western powers had yet concluded treaties, although many of the same chiefs had requested that English sovereignty and protection should be extended over them. As a consequence of these agreements, a German protectorate was declared over Togo and the Cameroons in the middle of the same year, 1884. The English officials had been trapped and were much disturbed because they had failed to see and forestall Bismarck's schemes.

#### 6. BERLIN CONFERENCE, 1884-85.

Between May and November of 1884, by means of an extensive correspondence, the cabinets of London and Berlin arranged for the international conference on African affairs which sat at the latter capital from November 15, 1884, to February 26, 1885, and decided on rules to govern the future activity of the powers in Africa, especially what should constitute spheres of influence and a valid occupation of territory (See article, *The Berlin Conference of 1884-85*). Thereafter ensued the race between the three contestants to see which would secure the most of the unoccupied territory. England and France had a considerable start, and they maintained their lead. The rich Niger Valley, already in their control, was left to them, and the Nile was dominated by England. Leopold of Belgium had preempted the Congo Basin, and Portugal claimed the Zambesi. To Germany, so late in the field, seemed to be left only the less productive and less hospitable portions; but she proceeded to appropriate the most and best she could get her hands on.

#### 7. ANGLO-GERMAN ADJUSTMENTS.

In May, 1885, the first of a series of agreements was reached drawing a line between British Nigeria and German Cameroons; and Germany's protectorate over the latter was recognized by England in spite of the latter's resentment over the outcome of Dr. Nachtigal's activities. A contest followed to obtain possession of the Upper Benue and Lake Chad, which resulting in an agreement of 1886, recognized accomplished facts by admitting Germany to a small portion of the headwaters of the Benue and the southern shore of Lake Chad, but leaving England the rest of the valley of that river and the western shore of the lake. In 1893 a very important agreement recognized as within the German sphere all of that central African region lying south and east of Lake Chad between Nigeria on the west and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan on the east. It was thought that Great Britain had gained much by admitting Germany here in order to block the efforts of France to unite her possessions in the

Soudan with those in the Congo by means of a wide strip of this territory touching the eastern side of Lake Chad. This Anglo-German settlement confirmed the friendly relations established by the Zanzibar-Heligoland transfers of 1890 (See article, *The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890*). A convention of 1901 provided for the marking of the boundary between the British Gold Coast Colony and German Togoland, as had been partially settled by conventions in 1890 and 1899; and in 1904 notes were exchanged recognizing the description of this boundary as drawn by the commission. In 1906, 1907, and 1909 conventions and reports of commissions established and described the line between Nigeria and Cameroons from Lake Chad to Yola; and in 1913 another agreement recognized the continued markings from Yola to the sea.

#### 8. FRANCO-GERMAN ADJUSTMENTS.

Between France and Germany preliminary agreements of 1885 and 1887 prepared the way for the important convention of 1894 by which Germany transferred to France by far the larger portion of the central African territory which in the preceding year England had recognized as within the German sphere. Thus, contrary to the wish of England, France instead of Germany became neighbor to the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan and was admitted to the eastern shore of Lake Chad. The boundary was drawn between the German Cameroons and what thus became French Equatorial Africa. An agreement of 1897 fixed the boundary between German Togo on the one side and French Dahomé and Soudan on the other, and in 1912 a declaration was signed concerning the delimitation of this frontier. Early in 1908 a new convention defined the boundary between the French Congo and the German Cameroons. In consequence of the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, *that title*), readjustments were agreed upon in November, 1911, and in September, 1912, of the boundary between the German Cameroons and French Congo and Equatorial Africa, so that a wedge of German territory extended southward from the Cameroons to the Congo, and another eastward to the Ubangi, admitting Germany to the great central African waterway and cutting off the French Congo from the rest of the equatorial possessions of that power, breaking the continuity of French territory from the Mediterranean to the Congo. However, so long as that river remains a free international highway, the actual loss to France is negligible.

#### 9. ANGLO-FRENCH ADJUSTMENTS.

The long series of Anglo-French agreements begun in 1882, as stated above, continued through 1890-1893 and 1895, drawing boundary lines between the French Soudan on one side and English Nigeria,



Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia on the other, and providing for commissions to mark them. In 1896 an agreement was effected accepting the report of a commission which marked the boundary between Dahomé and Nigeria. In the middle of 1898 a new agreement was signed concerning the delimitation of the frontier on both sides of the Niger River from Lake Chad to the sea, which was to be ratified within six months, and notes were exchanged providing for the simultaneous evacuation of territories which each had yielded to the other. But the Anglo-French crisis of that year over their activities on the Upper Nile, usually known as the Fashoda incident (See article, *The Fashoda Affair, 1898-1899*), strained their relations almost to the breaking point, and the time specified for evacuation was allowed to lapse without exchange of ratifications; but later in the year, after amicable settlement of the difficulties on the Nile, the time for exchanging ratifications of the West African agreement was extended to one year. On the day before its expiration the exchange was effected, June 13, 1899. In the meantime, on March 21, a declaration had been signed completing the West African settlement and drawing a line between French Soudan and Anglo-Egyptian Soudan. Amicable relations were resumed. As a part of the Anglo-French entente (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*), effected in 1904, those powers arranged for the settlement of all unsettled boundaries between their West African (as well as other) possessions. Commissions appointed to mark the unmarked portions reported and their reports were accepted by agreements of 1906, 1910, 1911, and 1913.

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#### NARRATIVES.

From the many books treating the subject it is difficult to select the few most useful. Among them are:

Keltie, J. S., *Partition of Africa* (2d ed., London, Stanford, 1895), for agreements and events before the date of its publication, and for very many useful maps.

Gibbons, H. A., *New Map of Africa, 1900-1916* (New York, Century Co., 1916), for the period since 1900, and in some chapters antecedent events are traced.

Johnston, H. H., *Sir, Colonization of Africa* (2d ed. Cambridge, University Press, 1913), which in addition to good textual material has an extended bibliography and a chronology.

Rose, J. H., *The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900* (5th ed., New York, Putnam, 1916), for a brief general discussion.

*Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 12 (New York, Macmillan, 1910), for a still briefer treatment and in the appendix a bibliography.

## 52. THE FORMATION OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1876-1885.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Livingstone's discoveries and Stanley's exploration of the Congo River system in equatorial Africa from 1874 to 1877 had aroused



intense interest in Europe on the part of statesmen and traders as well as missionaries, scientists, and philosophers.

## 2. KING LEOPOLD'S CONFERENCE OF 1876.

In 1876 King Leopold of Belgium called a conference of leading explorers and geographers to "discuss the question of the exploration, and the civilization of Africa, and the means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enterprise of the civilized world," and to consider measures for extinguishing "the terrible scourge of slavery known to prevail over wide and populous tracts in the interior of the continent." This conference met and was participated in by representatives from Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. As a result of its deliberations an International African Association was formed with its seat at Brussels, whose purpose was the exploration and civilization of central Africa.

## 3. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CONGO, 1878.

The Belgian committee at Brussels displayed the greatest activity, especially after the return of Stanley, who visited Brussels at the invitation of King Leopold. On November 25, 1878, a separate committee of the International Association was organized at Brussels. It soon afterwards became the "International Association of the Congo," which in turn was the forerunner of the Congo Free State. The Belgian King from the first supplied most of the funds of the association, which, naturally, assumed more and more the character of a Belgian enterprise. Mr. Stanley, acting as its agent in the Congo, was displaying great activity in founding stations and making treaties with various native chiefs.

## 4. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 26, 1884.

The activity of the International Association of the Congo began to attract the attention of interested European powers. Portugal and France both advanced claims to the Congo region, based on discoveries and explorations. On February 26, 1884, Earl Granville, the British secretary for foreign affairs, concluded a convention with Portugal, recognizing both banks of the Congo as Portuguese territory. This convention was never ratified, but it led directly to the summoning of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (See article, that title), and to the recognition of the International Association as a sovereign State. On April 23, 1884, Col. M. Strauch, the president of the association, addressed to the French minister for foreign affairs a note (Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 12, p. 326)

in which he declared that the association would not cede its possessions to any power "except in virtue of special conventions which may be concluded between France and the association for fixing the limits and conditions of their respective action." The note further declared that the association engaged to give France the right of preference if, through unforeseen circumstances, it were compelled to sell its possessions.

#### 5. RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1884.

The United States was the first great power to recognize the association as a sovereign State, on April 22, 1884. The next power to recognize the flag of the International Association as that of a friendly power, doing so on November 8, 1884, was Germany. Her action was followed by that of Great Britain on December 16, of Italy on December 19, of Austria-Hungary on December 24, of Holland on December 27, of Spain on January 7, 1885; of France and Russia on February 5, of Sweden and Norway on February 10, of Portugal on February 14, and Denmark and Belgium on February 23.

#### 6. BOUNDARY TREATIES.

Thus, early in 1885, King Leopold had secured the recognition of the association as an independent State, but its territorial limits were not as yet clearly defined. The boundaries were fixed in a series of treaties with France, Portugal, and Great Britain bearing dates ranging from 1885 to 1906. (For a list of these boundary treaties see *Encyclopedia Britannica* [12th ed., 1910], Vol. VI, p. 919.)

#### 7. KING LEOPOLD BECOMES HEAD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1885.

On April 28, 1885, the Belgian chamber authorized King Leopold "to be chief of the State founded in Africa by the International Association of the Congo," but declared the union between Belgium and the new State of the Congo "shall be exclusively personal." The Belgian King at once began the work of organizing and administering the new State. On August 1, 1885, he addressed to the powers a circular note in which he declared the neutrality of "the Independent State of the Congo," which had been proclaimed by the Berlin conference (See article, *The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885*).

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For brief accounts, see Rose, J. H., *The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914* (New York, Putnam, 1916), Vol. II, ch. 8; Harris, N. D., *Intervention and Colonization in Africa* (Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 2; and Keltie, J. S., *The Partition of Africa* (London, Stanford, 1893), ch. 14; Reeves, J. S., *The origin of the Congo Free State, considered from the standpoint of international law*, *American Journal of International Law*, III, 99-118, January, 1909.

### 53. THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1884-1885.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In 1884 the activities of the International Association of the Congo had begun to attract the attention of interested European powers (See article, *The Formation of the Congo Free State*.) On February 26, 1884, an Anglo-Portuguese convention (which, however, was never ratified) recognized both banks of the Congo as Portuguese territory.

This disposition of the Congo called forth a flood of criticism. Apart from interested motives of some of the colonizing powers it was generally felt that to hand over this region to a backward State like Portugal was to condemn it to a régime characterized by unprogressiveness and corruption. As early as April 22, 1884, the United States recognized the International Association of the Congo as a sovereign State—a step which was also taken by Germany on November 8 and by other European States in the latter part of 1884 and the first part of 1885.

#### 2. THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE BERLIN CONFERENCE.

In October, 1884, Chancellor Bismarck, who was just beginning to show an interest in African colonization issued invitations to the

interested powers (including the United States) to a conference at Berlin which should base its discussions and conclusions upon the following principles:

- (1) Freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths of the Congo.
- (2) Application to the Congo and Niger of the principles adopted by the Congress of Vienna, with a view to sanctioning free navigation on several international rivers, principles which later had been also applied to the Danube (See article, *The Danube Question, 1871-1904*).
- (3) Definition of the formalities to be observed in order that new occupations on the coast of Africa might be considered effective.

### 3. THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

The conference consisting of delegates from all the countries of Europe (excepting Switzerland) and the United States, met at Berlin on November 15, 1884, and continued its deliberations until February 26, 1885. The decisions of the conference were incorporated into a general act (See Appendix I, 29), of which the main points may be thus summarized:

- (1) The 14 States which signed the general act of the Berlin Conference obligated themselves in a general way to "strive for the suppression of slavery and especially of the negro slave trade" (article 6); and article 9 declared:

Conformably to the principles of the Law of Nations as they are recognized by the signatory powers, the slave trade being interdicted, and as the operations which, by land and sea furnish slaves to the trade ought to be equally considered as interdicted, the powers who exercise or shall exercise rights of sovereignty or an influence in the territories forming the conventional basin of the Congo, declare that these territories shall not serve either for a market or way of transit for the slaves of any race whatever. Each of the powers engages itself to employ all the means in its power to put an end to the commerce and to punish those who are occupied in it. (See article, *The Brussels Antislavery Conference of 1890*, for further measures against the slave trade.)

- (2) The act declared that "the commerce of all nations shall enjoy complete liberty" within (a) "all the territories constituting the basin of the Congo and its affluents" (b) "in the marine zone extending along the Atlantic from the parallel  $2^{\circ} 30'$  southern latitude to the mouth of the Loge," and (c) in a carefully defined zone east of the Congo Basin, extending as far as the Indian Ocean. The conventional basin of the Congo was defined as comprising all the regions watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, with its eastern tributaries.

- (3) Freedom of navigation of the Congo, the Niger, and all their affluents was also provided for.

- (4) Trade monopolies were prohibited, and provision made for civilizing the natives, the suppression of the slave trade, and the protection of missionaries, scientists, and explorers.



(5) As regards navigation only such taxes or duties were to be levied as had "the character of an equivalent for services rendered to navigation itself"; and it was further provided (article 16) that "the roads, railways, or lateral canals, which may be constructed with the special object of obviating the innavigability or correcting the imperfection of the river route on certain sections of the course of the Congo, its affluents, and other waterways, which are assimilated to them by article 15, shall be considered, in their quality of means of communication, as dependencies of this river and shall be equally open to the traffic of all nations. And as on the river itself, so there shall be collected on these roads, railways, and canals only tolls calculated on the cost of construction, maintenance and administration, and on the profits due to the constructors"; while as regards the tariffs of these tolls, strangers and natives of the respective territories were to be treated "on a footing of perfect equality." This régime was also to apply to the Niger (articles 27-29).

(6) Each power having territories comprised in the conventional basin of the Congo could declare its territory neutral. The signatory powers bound themselves to respect such neutrality, provided the duties of neutrality were observed, and also to lend their good offices to have such territory neutralized during a time of war. In case of serious dissension over matters arising from the act there was to be recourse to mediation or arbitration before an appeal to arms.

(7) The power which henceforth shall take possession of a territory upon the coast of the African continent situated outside of its present possessions, or which, not having had such possessions hitherto, shall come to acquire them, and likewise the power which shall assume a protectorate there was required to address a notification to the other states which were parties to the Congo act (article 34).

"The signatory powers of the present act recognize the obligation to assure, in the territories occupied by them, upon the coasts of the African continent, the existence of an authority sufficient to cause acquired rights to be respected and, the case occurring, the liberty of commerce and of transit in the conditions upon which it may be stipulated" (article 35).

#### 4. THE UNITED STATES AND THE BERLIN ACT.

The delegates of the United States at the Berlin Conference signed the act, but President Cleveland, "holding that an engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the Congo would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume," abstained from submitting the act to the Senate for ratification. (Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1885. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1885, p. ix.) The United States, therefore, did not become a party to the Berlin act.

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Catellani, E. L., *Le colonie e la Conferenza di Berlino* (Turin, 1885) seems to be the most complete study of the work of the conference.

For the English text of the general act, see *Supplement to American Journal of International Law* for 1909, Vol. III, pp. 7-25, or Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, II, pp. 468-486. The protocols of the conference are in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 75, pp. 1178-1257, vol. 76, pp. 1021-1054.

For the protocols and proceedings of the conference, see *Protocoles et Acte Général de la Conférence de Berlin, 1884-1885*. See also *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Congo et de l'Afrique Occidentales* (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1885); and *Correspondence concerning the Berlin Congo Conference* (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 196, 49th Cong., 1st sess.).

## 54. THE DELIMITATION OF EUROPEAN COLONIES IN CENTRAL AFRICA, 1885-1899.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The occupation of Central Africa by European States was a gradual and haphazard affair. There was no prearranged scheme of partition or agreement among the powers to follow any generally prescribed lines in their expansion. In the main, the movement had its inception in certain small settlements of the different European States whose holdings and spheres of influence were increased through the agency of explorers and trading companies until they came into touch with similar agencies extending the control of other European powers in the same region. Competition for certain valuable areas or advantageous positions then arose, which led to sharp diplomatic controversies and caused considerable popular excitement in the home countries. Fortunately, recourse to arms never took place, though bitter feeling was often aroused. As there was plenty of room in Africa for the acquisition of large colonies, a



reasonable and fair compromise was always possible. The peaceful adjustment of these and other African disputes constitutes one of the greatest achievements of European diplomacy during the period between 1871 and 1914.

For purposes of analysis, it is necessary to classify carefully the various agreements between European States concerning their interests in central Africa. They may be readily grouped under four headings: The Congo Free State treaties, the Anglo-French treaties, the Anglo-German treaties, and the Franco-German treaties.

## 2. CONGO FREE STATE TREATIES.

Between November 8, 1884, and February 23, 1885, a series of agreements was concluded between the International Association of the Congo and a number of European States, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal, by which the Congo Free State was created and its boundaries definitely fixed. (See article, *The Formation of the Congo Free State*.) It was to embrace about 900,000 square miles and to extend from the French Congo and the Ubangi and Mbomu Rivers on the north, to Portuguese West Africa and Northern Rhodesia on the south, and from the Congo River on the west to the borders of British Uganda, German East Africa, and Lake Tanganyika on the east. Portugal relinquished a small strip on the north bank of the Congo to the Free State, but was compensated by the control of the south bank as far as Noki and the Province of Cabinda. The exact boundary lines were all adjusted later by special agreements and by special commissions which surveyed the country accurately and set up boundary posts, such as the Congo-Portuguese commission headed George Grenfell, which delimited the Congo-Portuguese boundary line between May, 1892, and June, 1893.

## 3. ANGLO-FRENCH TREATIES.

(a) By the treaty of June 28, 1882, the watershed between the Mellicouri and the Great Scarcies Rivers was fixed as the dividing line between French Guinea and Sierra Leone (British).

(b) The treaties of August 10, 1889, and of June 26, 1891, determined the boundaries between the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos, and the adjoining French colonies on the west coast as follows: Gambia was to include all the land within 10 kilometers of both sides of the Gambia River, and to extend into the interior as far as Yarbata. Sierra Leone was to end at latitude  $10^{\circ}$  N., and Gold Coast, Lagos, and Dahomey at the  $9^{\circ}$ ; but the two latter were to be separated by a line running north from the intersection of the meridian of Ajarra Creek with the coast.

(c) By the treaty of August 5, 1890, a general boundary was drawn roughly between the British and French spheres of influence in Central Africa by a line running from Say on the Niger River due east to Lake Chad (Sokoto to be included in the British sphere).

(d) The treaty of June 14, 1898, provided for the delimitation of the Dahomey-Nigeria boundary line, the disputed Borgu-Boussa district being divided between England and France; also, the northern boundary of the British Gold Coast Colony was moved up from latitude  $9^{\circ}$  N. to latitude  $11^{\circ}$  N.; and all boundary questions relating to the French and British possessions in West-Central Africa were settled. The negotiations leading to this treaty began with an agreement between England and France on January 15, 1896, which provided for the appointment of a commission of four to determine, by an examination of titles and claims, the most equitable delimitation of the French and British possessions on the lower Niger. The commission held two sessions: February 8 to May 22, 1896, and October 24, 1897, to February, 1898; and the results of its efforts were summed up in two notes presented by the representatives of England and France, respectively, on February 18 and 24, 1898, and embodied in the convention of June 14, 1898.

(e) The treaty of March 21, 1899, stipulated for a settlement of the boundary between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the French sphere of influence on the upper Congo and Lake Chad regions. Bahr el Ghazal and the old Province of Dar Fur were retained for Egypt, while the Kingdom of the Wadai, with the two valuable oases of Tibesti and Borku, went to France. This treaty was the outcome of the expedition of Major Marchand from the upper Congo to the Nile and of the resulting Fashoda incident. By its provisions the French rounded out their Sahara possessions south of Tripoli, joined them securely with their Lake Chad lands, and these again with the French Congo colony. (See article on the Fashoda affair.)

By this series of five treaties (or groups of treaties) a definite and permanent connection was established between all the French colonies in West, Central, and South Central Africa, and the boundary lines between the British and French protectorates (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the French Congo) in western and central Africa were successfully delimited.

#### 4. ANGLO-GERMAN TREATIES.

(a) *Southwest Africa*.—In 1884 Great Britain, in correspondence with Germany, recognized the German claims on the southwest coast. By the treaties of October 29, 1886, and July 1, 1890, the final boundary of German Southwest Africa was determined on the east



and south, giving access to the Zambesi River. A supplementary treaty between Germany and Portugal on December 30, 1886, established the northern boundary of German Southwest Africa from the Cunene River to the Zambesi.

(*b*) *East Africa*.—A preliminary boundary line (from the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Victoria) was established between the British and German spheres of influence in East Africa by the treaty of October 29, 1886. The final delimitation of boundary between German and British East Africa, by lines drawn from the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Victoria (east shore), from the west shore of the same lake to the Congo Free State border (leaving Uganda and Unyoro to England), and from Lake Nyanza to Lake Tanganyika (separating northern Rhodesia from German East Africa), was effected by the treaty of July 25, 1893. The treaty of December 30, 1886, fixed the boundary between German and Portuguese East Africa.

(*c*) *West Africa*.—The boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons was carried near to Yola by notes exchanged in April and May, 1885, and July and August, 1886. It was adjusted by treaties of July 1, 1890, and April 14, 1893, and prolonged to Lake Chad (giving both England and Germany access to the lake and assigning most of the Adamaua district to Germany) by treaty of November 15, 1893. The Togoland-Gold Coast boundary was also adjusted by the treaty of July 1, 1890.

##### 5. FRANCO-GERMAN TREATIES.

In the treaty of December 24, 1885, the southern boundary of the Cameroons was fixed as the River Campo and the definition carried inland to 15° E. By the treaty of March 15, 1894, the northern portion of the French Congo and German Cameroons had their borders determined. The French claims to the Baghirimi country were recognized, thus giving France access to Lake Chad. By the treaty of July 23, the Togoland-Dahomey line was extended to the 11° N. latitude.

From the above analysis it will be seen that the main lines delimitating the possession of European States in Central Africa and those fixing the boundaries of these regions with adjacent colonial possessions of European powers in West, East, and Southwest Africa were all completed between 1885 and 1899 by negotiation and treaties. In nearly every instance these lines were surveyed and marked out carefully later by joint commissions working in Central Africa.

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## 55. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE TRANSVAAL OR SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1877-1884.

### 1. THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1877.

In 1877 the Transvaal, whose independence had been recognized by Great Britain in 1852, was annexed by Lord Beaconsfield's Government on the ground that its independence was a menace to the peace of other British possessions in South Africa. A delegation of Boers (among them Paul Kruger) was sent to England to protest and demand the restoration of independence. This mission was unsuccessful.

### 2. THE PRETORIA CONVENTION, 1881 (SEE APPENDIX I, 20.)

In December, 1880, the Boers rose in revolt and on February 27, 1881, defeated a small detachment of British troops on Majuba Hill. Mr. Gladstone, who had succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as head of the British Government, restored to the Boers their independence. But the Pretoria convention of 1881, which sanctioned this arrangement, contained an express reservation of the suzerainty of the British Crown.

This arrangement was far from satisfactory. The word "suzerainty" had no precise meaning and was resented by the Boers as a limitation upon their independence.

### 3. THE LONDON CONVENTION, 1884 (SEE APPENDIX I, 26.)

In 1884 this unsatisfactory Pretoria Convention was replaced by a new treaty called the London Convention, which restored to the Transvaal the old name of South African Republic, omitted the preamble of the Pretoria Convention in which the unfortunate word "suzerainty" occurred, and inserted a provision (very important



in view of what occurred later) to the effect that "white men were to have full liberty to reside in any part of the Republic, to trade in it, and to be liable to the same taxes only as those exacted from citizens of the Republic."

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### 56. BRITISH RELATIONS TO THE BOER REPUBLIC, 1884-1899.

#### 1. CONVENTION OF 1884 (SEE APPENDIX I, 26).

The political relationship between Great Britain and the Transvaal after 1884 was based upon the convention of Pretoria 1881 and upon that of London 1884. Both are in the form of grants from a superior to an inferior. (See Appendix I, 20 and 26.) The earlier convention gave to the Boers of the Transvaal a large measure of local self government under British "suzerainty." The latter convention, restoring to the Transvaal its old name of South African Republic, gave almost complete local autonomy to the Boers, while narrowly restricting their freedom of action in foreign affairs.

The word "suzerainty" did not appear in the convention of 1884. Because of this omission the Boers claimed that the former British right of supervision, implied in the word suzerainty, had now been abrogated. (Despagnet: *La Guerre Sud Africaine*, pp. 2-8.) The British at first, through their colonial minister Lord Derby, admitting that the word suzerainty had been eliminated, insisted that they had kept "the substance" (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9507, p. 34) of their control. Later British statesmen argued that not even the word suzerainty had been allowed to disappear, because, they said, the convention of 1884 was not a substitute for the entire convention of 1881, but merely for the articles of that convention. Hence they insisted that the preamble of the earlier convention with its recognition of British suzerainty was binding after 1884, as before. (Mahan, *The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute*, *North American Review*, vol. 170, pp. 314-315.) The fact appears to be that the convention of 1884 was loosely and hastily drawn, with no thought that its uncertainty of phraseology would later endanger the peace of the world. (Sydney Brooks, *England and*

the Transvaal, *North American Review*, vol. 169, p. 66. Westlake: *L'Angleterre et la Republique Sud Africaine*, in the *Revue de Droit International et legislation comparée*, vol. 28, pp. 275-276. See also his *Angleterre et Les Republiques Boers* in the same *Review*, vol. 32, p. 546.)

## 2. GRIEVANCES OF THE UITLANDERS AFTER 1886.

The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 led to a great influx of English miners and speculators. Difficulties quickly arose between the native Boers and the aggressive foreigners—the Uitlanders. The ambitious plans of Cecil Rhodes, who dreamed of a South Africa united under British rule, clashed sharply with the ambitions of the Boer leaders for the maintenance unimpaired and possibly even the extension of the powers and territory of the South African Republic. The immediate occasion of the clash between Boers and Uitlanders was the determination of the former to maintain Boer supremacy in the Republic. The Uitlanders published broadcast accounts of their grievances. Naturalization and the acquisition of the right to vote were made very difficult for them. They were forced to bear a disproportionate share of the taxes and of the military service. (Bryce: *Impressions of South Africa*, 2d ed., p. XVIII.)

## 3. THE JAMESON RAID.

Exasperated by these abuses and the apparent failure of their attempt to obtain redress through appeals to Great Britain, and inspired, possibly, by the hope of displacing the Boer Government, Dr. Jameson, the British administrator of Rhodesia, with a few hundred troopers, invaded the Transvaal in 1895. This unfortunate aggression had the two-fold result (1) of deeply embittering the Boers against the Uitlanders, and (2) of making it increasingly difficult for the Government of Great Britain to demand redress for their grievances. This difficulty was greatly increased by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger (See article, *The Kruger Telegram*, 1896).

## 4. THE MILNER MISSION, 1897.

A special commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, sent from England in 1897, reported to his Government (*Staatsarchiv*, vol. 63, pp. 263-283) that the condition of British subjects in the Boer Republic was intolerable. He insisted that the Boers were planning to extend their hegemony over the whole of South Africa. The issue, as he put it, made an instant appeal to Englishmen.



## 5. NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-99.

During 1898 and 1899 a series of conferences were held between the representatives of the British and the Boer Governments in a vain attempt to adjust the difficult controversies, particularly that over the franchise for the Uitlanders. (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9404, 9518, and 9521. The Boer franchise law of July 26, 1899, and the British and Boer proposed modifications of the law are contained in the supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy*, vol. 16, pp. 47-57.) Elaborate legal arguments by the parties over the terms of the two conventions of 1881 and of 1884 hid the basic and fundamental causes of friction. These were political, economic, and racial antagonisms between the two peoples. Unable to accept Great Britain's terms, the South African Republic, October 9, 1899, issued its ultimatum. (Supplement to *Annals of American Academy*, vol. 16, pp. 57-61.) The British reply, which meant war, was issued October 10, 1899. (Ibid, p. 61.) The Orange Free State, since 1852, practically independent, threw in its lot with its sister Boer Republic, by the resolution of its Volksraad, September 27, 1899. War followed in October between the two Boer Republics and the British Empire. (See article, *The Treaty of Vereeniging*.)

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## 57. THE QUESTION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Portugal was the leader in modern colonial expansion. In the sixteenth century she claimed the whole of Africa, southern Asia, and eastern South America; and her claim was not seriously disputed by any strong rival. But her Asiatic colonies, except a few unimportant posts, were lost at the beginning of the seventeenth century and her South American possessions early in the nineteenth. She never actually controlled more than a few isolated spots on the African coasts; and when, late in the nineteenth century, the great European powers began their energetic efforts for African colonies, Portugal was in no position to resist their encroachments. However, she still retains in her feeble grasp enough territory to make her the fourth colonial power of Europe. Besides her Madeira and Cape Verde Islands off the north-western coast she has, not far from the latter, Portuguese Guinea on the mainland, the cocoa islands of San Thomé and Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea, the large territory of Angola, or Portuguese West Africa, and the smaller but more important Portuguese East Africa. Until after the scramble for the partition of Africa was well advanced, Portugal still hoped to retain sovereignty over a wide strip of territory stretching across the entire continent between the last two; but British activity from the Cape, especially the imperial ambitions of Rhodes, crossed her path.

### 2. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ADJUSTMENTS.

In 1875 the possession of Delagoa Bay was submitted for arbitration to the President of France, who awarded it to Portugal, assuring her complete control of that bay and its important port, Lourenco Marques, the natural and almost essential outlet for the northern part of British South Africa, and the only really profitable spot in Portugal's South African possessions. Between 1887 and 1891 a long correspondence and several negotiations ensued be-



tween England and Portugal respecting efforts of the latter to retain sovereignty over territories not effectively occupied according to the rules agreed upon at the Berlin colonial conference of 1884-5 (See article, *The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885*) and her attempts to control the trade by way of the Zambesi, neither of which the former would admit. In 1890 a convention was finally signed, but it was not ratified. A *modus vivendi* was thereupon arranged for a short time, and when it was about to expire, renewed until June 11, 1891, when a treaty was concluded, which, Gibbons says, "destroyed forever the hopes of Portugal to a transcontinental African colony." (Map of Africa, pp. 245-246.) It delimited in general terms British and Portuguese territory in southeast, southwest, and south central Africa. Portugal accepted the inevitable, and cordial relations were restored. In 1892 the boundary of the British enclave south of Lake Nyassa was more carefully defined. A dispute having arisen over the execution of a provision in the treaty of 1891 respecting Manica, the matter was, after three years of discussion, submitted to the arbitration of M. Vigliani, former president of the Cour de Cassation of Florence, and decided in favor of England in 1897. In 1901 Lord Milner, for England, concluded a temporary agreement maintaining treaty arrangements entered into earlier between Portugal and the then independent Transvaal Republic, assuring a certain minimum of traffic from the latter by way of the Portuguese railway from Lourenco Marques to the Transvaal frontier, giving to goods coming by that route the same advantages as if they had come by way of the Cape or Natal, and permitting in exchange for these favors the recruiting in Portuguese territory of necessary native labor for the Transvaal mines and other industries. Cape Colony and Natal objected to the arrangement; but it was sustained in London, slightly modified three years later, and in 1909, just before the Union of South Africa was effected, a new treaty was concluded by the Transvaal-Colony continuing these privileges for 10 years, in spite of serious objections by other members of the incipient union. In 1907, 1911, and 1912 there occurred exchanges of notes recognizing demarcations of various boundaries between British and Portuguese dominions.

### 3. ADJUSTMENTS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY.

While suffering from British encroachments where her ancient claims were not supported by effective occupation, Portugal has been supported by England against encroachments by a third power. In 1884 threatened efforts of France to extend her Congo claims over northern Angola were thus resisted and the Portuguese position on the southern bank of the lower Congo recognized and preserved. In

1886 a Portuguese-German agreement established the boundary between their Southwest African possessions, and another of the next year drew a line between their East African territories, a river constituting the dividing line throughout most of its extent in each case. German merchants, supported by their Government, maintained a persistent and successful policy of increasing their commerce with the Portuguese colonies, arousing suspicions that they intended to secure political influence, if possible. In 1891 limits were drawn between Angola and the independent, or Belgian, Congo.

#### 4. PORTUGAL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HER COLONIES.

Much of Portugal's African soil is rich and would be productive if it were efficiently governed and intelligently developed; but inefficiency and mismanagement have characterized her colonial policy. Apart from the cocoa islands and the port of Lourenco Marquez, her African colonies are none of them self-supporting; and the surplus from these profitable possessions falls far short of counterbalancing the deficits in the budgets of the rest. Abuses in connection with the contract labor system (virtual slavery) by which workers have been recruited in Angola for the unhealthy cocoa islands have caused numerous riots and revolts, roused world-wide criticism, and occasioned international intervention. There has been considerable recent opposition in Portugal to the persistent colonial deficits and talk of abandoning or profitably disposing of the colonies, but the recent scramble of other European powers for African territory has increased the determination of Portuguese officialdom to cling to their unprofitable over-seas dominions, hoping that they may yet be able to reform abuses and make them both creditable and profitable.

#### 5. PROJECTED PARTITION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES.

In the last decade of the last century, when the relations of England and Germany were fairly cordial, there were persistent rumors that they were planning to divide the Portuguese possessions between themselves. Johnston (*The Colonization of Africa*, p. 115) says:

In 1898, when the unsettled state of Africa and the rivalry between Britain, Germany, and France made it advisable to forecast an allotment of the Portuguese colonies, should they slip from the grasp of Portugal or be offered for sale, an agreement was entered into between Britain and Germany partitioning the Portuguese African possessions into spheres of influence. But it is understood that at a later date Great Britain, on renewing her old alliance with Portugal, guaranteed her the undisturbed possession of her colonial dominions.

Gibbons states (*Map of Africa*, p. 247) that according to this treaty, which was never published, Germany was to have acquired



Portugal's Asiatic possessions, the northern part of her East African and the southern part of her West African territories, and Wallish Bay from England, and the latter was to have had all the rest of Portuguese Africa. In 1903, and again in 1909, rumors were rife in England that Germany was negotiating to get footholds on Portuguese possessions, and violent criticism of German intrigues were voiced by the British press. (Ibid., pp. 249-250.) "During the four years between the birth of the [Portuguese] Republic and the beginning of the European war there were constant rumors of the intention of Portugal to sell her colonies to Germany. Discerning readers could see in the way these reports were commented upon a clear indication of how Great Britain and Germany were drifting toward war" (Ibid., p. 273). Partially successful efforts were made to reach understandings concerning their naval, commercial, and colonial rivalries. "Shortly before the outbreak of the war it was the belief in Portugal that the two great rivals had come to a new understanding. \* \* \* The Times declared that there was nothing in the new Anglo-German accord to diminish the value of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and no intention to despoil Portugal, either by purchase or by any other means, of any of her colonies." (Ibid., pp. 273-274.) In another place (p. 262) Gibbons says:

In the spring of 1914, however, the [Portuguese] colonial minister told Parliament that not less than \$40,000,000 was required, and that something must be done immediately to demonstrate to the world the ability of Portugal to administer and develop this colony.

Gibbons adds in a footnote that the minister "had undoubtedly received official intimation of the serious 'conversations' going on at that moment between Great Britain and Germany. He accepted during the same month, without Britain opposing, offers of a German syndicate and German banks to help in Angola."

Prince Lichnowsky in *My London Mission, 1912-1914*, states (p. 281) that in the projected Anglo-German accord of 1914 (See article, that title) "An arrangement had been reached between us [Germany] and England, delimiting the interests of the two parties" in the African colonies of Portugal. His description of the projected agreement is as follows (p. 283):

Thanks to the conciliatory of the British government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely corresponded to our [Germany's] wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Príncipe, which lie north of the equator and therefore really belong to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic but unavailing protests.

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed the boundary.

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## 58. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1878-1887.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

Afghanistan and Turkestan are far away from the Balkan peninsula and Egypt, nevertheless, because of the extent of the great em-



pires of England and Russia, the fortunes of the four regions have been closely connected during recent decades. For example, the Balkan crisis in 1878 led to the Afghan War of 1878-1881, and the action of England in Egypt in the early eighties accelerated the Russian advance in Turkestan during the same years.

## 2. RUSSIAN ADVANCES, 1856-1878.

After the Crimean War the Russian expansive energy, curbed for the time in southeastern Europe, found an outlet in advancing southward the line across Central Asia. England, after the Sepoy mutiny, was willing that her rival should bring the power of Europe to bear upon the independent portions of Asia, especially since the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, etc., were fierce, barbarous, and disorderly. The circular which Prince Gortchakoff issued in 1864 (Rose, *Development of European Nations*, II, 59), explaining that Russia could not keep the peace with uncivilized and predatory tribes, and must press on until she came to regions controlled by a strong State, was accepted by England, especially since the doctrine was useful to herself. Tashkend fell in 1864, Bokhara became a vassal state in 1868, and Khiva in 1873. This brought the Russian advance to the neighborhood of Afghanistan, which had long been in special relations with England.

## 3. ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN, 1856-1875.

After the unsuccessful Afghan War of 1842, the English were content with non-intervention, the payment of occasional subsidies, and the recognition of *de facto* rulers. When the Ameer Dost Mohammed died in 1863, the British Government refused special favors to his favorite and most capable son, Sher Ali, until the latter had established himself by the defeat of his opponents. The Ameer came to conference with Lord Mayo in March, 1869, and requested a guaranty of dynastic succession and a regular subsidy, while declining to admit a British resident into his capital. (Rose, *Development of European Nations*, II, 66-67.) He was promised only non-interference and the support of his independence. In 1873, alarmed at the Russian advance, Sher Ali proposed an alliance with the British. They refused and the Ameer began to despise them and to think of throwing in his fortune with the then more active Russians.

## 4. THE BRITISH "FORWARD POLICY," 1875-1878.

Sir Bartle Frere, representing a group of advocates of "the forward policy" in India, proposed on January 1, 1875, that agents be established in Afghanistan and that Quetta be occupied. (Rose, *Development of European Nations*, II, 77.) Disraeli was nothing loath

to abandon the policy of "masterly inactivity," and presently appointed as viceroy of India Lord Lytton, a man inclined to action, and, like the premier himself, ready on occasion to subordinate scruple to his purposes. In 1877 he reported that Sher Ali was lost to the British, and that "it is rather the disintegration and weakening, than the consolidation and establishment of the Afghan power at which we must now begin to aim." (Quoted by Rose, *Development of European Nations*, II, 83.) In the following year he planned the creation of a State of West Afghanistan under a prince of British choosing, who should even claim Merv, which the Russians considered to be within their own sphere. A few months later he gave up the idea of getting Merv, but advised the conquest and occupation of enough Afghan territory to secure the northwestern frontier of India.

#### 5. RUSSIAN ADVANCE, 1878-1887.

On the day of the assembling of the Congress of Berlin, June 13, 1878, when it was considered practically certain in England that no agreement would be reached, Gen. Stolietoff left Samarcand on a mission to the Ameer. He was admitted into Afghanistan, and plans were ready for three columns of troops to follow him. Russia, according to a plan of Gen. Skobelev, would thus have anticipated England in the Afghan territory had it come to war between the two Empires. The signing of the Treaty of Berlin defeated this plan, but Stolietoff is believed to have made an agreement with the Ameer.

On the 22d of September the guard of Sher Ali in the Khyber Pass refused to admit a British representative. An ultimatum was sent and no answer having been received, war was begun on November 20. Beaconsfield had said, November 9, that a scientific frontier was needed at the northwest of India, and this caused much criticism in England. Russia gave no active support to the Afghans. Kandahar was taken and Sher Ali fled. The British recognized his nephew, Yakub Khan, who accepted a British resident at Kabul. Major Cavagnari was appointed but was murdered with his guards in September, 1879. The war was renewed. Abdurrahman, a claimant to the throne, who had been hiding in Russia, was given Russian aid and crossed the frontier. Being an intelligent and shrewd man, he presently came to agreement with the British, who recognized him on July 20, 1880, and gave him £900,000. Lord Roberts made his famous march to Kandahar and rescued the British garrison there. The city was evacuated April 15, 1881, and the British withdrew from Afghanistan. The situation of eight years before was thus restored. Afghanistan, without a British resident, was a friendly State to England.

The Russians had begun war on the Turkomans in the autumn of 1878. After preliminary failures, Gen. Skobelev took the last strong-



hold of the Turkomans on January 23, 1881. The Russians began a penetration of the Khanate of Merv, and in 1884 began a further advance, supposedly in large part to obtain recompense for the British occupation in Egypt. It is supposed that the three emperors sanctioned this advance at their conference at Skiernewice in September, 1884, but the English were greatly incensed and thought of war. Merv was taken, but the British acquiesced, and a boundary commission was appointed to determine the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan. (Correspondence between Great Britain and Russia respecting Central Asia, Merv, the Northwest frontier of Afghanistan and 1883-1885 in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, pp. 1102-1232.)

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## 59. THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF UPPER BURMA, 1885–1886.

### 1. THE CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1876.

The Chefoo convention of 1876 stipulated that the viceroy of India, at any time he saw fit, might send an expedition to Yunnan, one of the southern provinces of China. (Appendix I, 8.) In 1884 an expedition was planned, but the Chinese protested on account of the size of the force which was to be sent, and during the negotiations which followed a compromise was arranged by which Chinese susceptibilities were saved and the British obtained an important concession in Burma.

### 2. THE O'CONER CONVENTION, 1886.

For some years British relations with Thebaw, King of Burma, had been unsatisfactory. Consequently, Mandalay was occupied, Thebaw was taken prisoner, and Burma was formally annexed on January 1, 1886. But China claimed suzerainty over Burma. It was, therefore, agreed by the O'Coner convention, signed at Peking on July 24, 1886, that the mission contemplated in the Chefoo Convention should be abandoned in exchange for China's renunciation of claims of suzerainty over Burma. (See Appendix I, 33.)



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## 60. FRANCO-SIAMESE RELATIONS, 1893-1904.

## 1. EARLY FRENCH AGGRESSIONS, 1866-1892.

In another article (See *The Franco-Chinese War of 1882-1885*), it has been shown how France established a protectorate over Annam and obtained possession of Tonquin. She had also established certain rights over Cambodia on the plea that this country was tributary to Annam. On the same principle she urged that the eastern Provinces of Siam should owe allegiance to her. The French were constantly coming into conflict with the Siamese authorities along Siam's eastern frontier; France particularly claimed the western bank of the river Mekong from the Chinese Province of Yunnan to its mouth. The Siamese Government protested in vain against these claims and proposed a neutral zone 30 miles in width until an international commission should determine the legitimate frontier.

## 2. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM OF 1893.

In 1892-93 a French officer and his escort were murdered in Siamese territory and another officer was captured. An ultimatum was at once presented at Bangkok, which included the following demands: (1) A recognition of the right of Annam and Cambodia [and through them of France] to the left bank of the Mekong and the islands; (2) evacuation of the posts held there by the Siamese within a month's time; (3) satisfaction for the various aggressions against French subjects in Siam and against French ships and sailors; (4) punishment of the culprits and pecuniary indemnities to the families of the victims; (5) indemnities of 2,000,000 francs for various damages inflicted on French subjects; (6) an immediate deposit of 3,000,000 francs as a guaranty for these claims, or in default, an assignment by way of security of the revenues of Battambang and Angker. (*Documents diplomatiques. Affaires de Siam* (1893), pp. 6-7.)

## 3. TREATY OF BANGKOK, 1893 (SEE APPENDIX I, 42).

The result of this ultimatum was a treaty signed at Bangkok, October 3, 1893. The following were its main provisions: (1) The Siamese Government renounced all claims to the whole of the terri-

tories on the left bank of the Mekong and to the islands in the river. (2) The Siamese bound themselves not to place or navigate any armed vessels on the waters of the great Toule Sop Lake, the Mekong, or their tributaries situated in the territory indicated in the next article. (3) In the third article the Siamese agreed not to construct any fortified post or military establishment in the provinces of Battambang and Sien Rap, or within a radius of 15 miles from the right bank of the Mekong. (4) Inasmuch as the development of navigation on the Mekong renders necessary certain works on its right bank or the establishment of relay stations for boats for wood and coal depots, the Siamese Government bound itself to give, at the request of the French Government, all the necessary facilities for this purpose. (Ibid., pp. 14-17.)

#### 4. TREATY OF 1902.

In 1902, taking advantage of some differences relating to the correct interpretation of the treaty of 1893, France concluded another convention with Siam by which three additional provinces lying strictly within the basin of the Mekong River were ceded to her. (Ibid., 1903, pp. 70-73.) But France showed a disposition to advance within the basin of the Menam River. This was within what Great Britain regarded as her sphere of influence.

#### 5. ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904.

The consequence of this apparent conflict of interests was that in the Anglo-French Convention of April 8, 1904, there was included with the assent of Siam, an agreement (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale) by which the influence of these two powers in this region was strictly defined. It was mutually agreed that "the influence of Great Britain shall be recognized by France in the territories situated to the west of the basin of the River Menam, and that the influence of France shall be recognized by Great Britain in the territories situated to the east of the same region, all the Siamese possessions on the east and southeast of the zone above described and the adjacent islands coming thus henceforth under French influence, and, on the other hand, all Siamese possessions on the west of this zone and the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under British influence." At the same time, the two contracting parties solemnly disclaimed all idea of annexing Siamese territory. (See Appendix I, 68.)

#### 6. CONVENTION OF 1907.

In 1907 a further convention was concluded between France and Siam (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 1028-1034)



by which Siam returned to the French protectorate of Cambodia the Province of Battambang, recovering from France in return certain parts of the maritime Province of Krat which had been ceded in 1904. This convention also modified the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by France in Siam.

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## 61. THE EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN THE FAR EAST, 1875-1887.

### 1. THE GENERAL SITUATION.

In 1868, when the restoration of the authority of the Mikado had been effected and a progressive or "enlightened" government installed, the new Japan found herself facing a number of European footholds or vantage points on the mainland of eastern Asia.

Russia was in possession of the Pacific Coast (including the Island of Sakhalien and Primorsk Province) as far south as Vladivostok. China had ceded Hong Kong to England in 1842, Macao to Portugal (1887), and had lost all control over the important port of Shanghai as a result of a series of concessions, extending over a number of years, to several European powers.

### 2. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE DISPUTE RESPECTING SAKHALIEN AND THE KURILE ISLANDS, 1875.

In 1875 a Russo-Japanese dispute of some years' standing respecting the possession of the Island of Sakhalien was ended for the time being by Japan giving up to Russia the whole of Sakhalien in return for the recognition of Japan's complete sovereignty over the

whole group of the Kurile Islands. In 1905 Japan again secured possession of the southern half of Sakhalien Island (See article, *The Treaty of Portsmouth*). In 1876 Japan also incorporated the Bonin Islands.

The encroachments of the French in Annam and the gains made by France at the expense of China during the period from 1882 to 1887 are dealt with elsewhere. (See articles on *Franco-Siamese Relations, 1893-1904*, and *The Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885*.)

### 3. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM PORT HAMILTON, 1885-1887.

In 1885 occurred an incident which must have given to Japan considerable food for thought. Taking advantage of the quarrel between Japan and China over Korea, which resulted in the treaty of Tientsin (1884-85), Russia proposed a convention that would have placed Korea under the virtual control of the Czar. But the intrigue became known; and, at the instigation of China, the King of Korea refused to sign the proposed convention.

Determined to prevent such a danger in the future, Great Britain decided to occupy the group of islands off the southern coast of Korea forming the harbor known as Port Hamilton. The Chinese Government consenting, the British flag was hoisted on these islands in April, 1885.

Russia at once protested and, after a heated controversy, the British withdrew from Port Hamilton on February 27, 1887, after Russia had given a positive assurance that under no circumstances would she encroach on Korean territory. China also gave an understanding that no foreign power should ever be permitted to take possession of the islands.

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## 62. THE FRANCO-CHINESE WAR, 1882-1885.

### 1. TREATIES OF 1862 AND 1874.

The effort to establish French authority in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, after a series of unsuccessful attempts going back to the eighteenth century, was resumed by the government of Napoleon III.



A treaty, signed at Saigon in 1862, conveyed certain provinces in southern Annam to France. In 1874 another treaty was concluded with the King of Annam at Saigon by which the King recognized French sovereignty over all territory actually occupied by them. France, in her turn, recognized the sovereignty and "entire independence" of the King of Annam, though the latter engaged to conform his foreign policy to that of France.

## 2. PROTEST OF CHINA.

China took exception to this latter treaty, pointing out that Annam was a dependency of China. Whereupon the King of Annam, in 1877, sent an embassy to China with tribute. In 1881 Marquis Tsêng declared formally that his Government repudiated the treaty of 1874—a right which France refused to acknowledge. There seemed serious danger of war between the two countries, but China was not prepared for war.

China chose another method of embarrassing the intruder. She subsidized the leader of the Black Flags, a roving band of marauders, to make incursions across the southern border. In 1882 this band succeeded in inflicting two serious reverses on the French. It was necessary to send troops from France in order to restore the prestige of French arms.

## 3. ANNAM DECLARES WAR ON FRANCE, 1882.

In the meantime, the King of Annam declared war on France (1882). The capital, Hue, was soon occupied, and a protégé of France placed on the throne. The following year (1883), Annam, in a new treaty, "recognized and accepted the protectorate of France." This is known as the treaty of Hue, signed August 25, 1883.

## 4. FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS.

The Chinese were now thoroughly alarmed. Li-Hung-Chang was appointed commander in chief in South China. Instead of proceeding to the proposed seat of hostilities, this astute Chinese statesman got no further than Shanghai, where he opened negotiations. But, desirous of shifting responsibility from his own shoulders to those of Marquis Tsêng, he suddenly left Shanghai for Tientsin. Meanwhile, the marquis had been at work trying to secure the intervention of one of the western powers. The United States offered to arbitrate, but the offer was rejected by France.

On August 20, 1883, Prince Kung was informed officially that a French fleet would at once blockade the ports of Tonquin and Annam. Prince Kung protested, declaring that China would never give up her suzerainty over Annam.

War was now within measurable distance, but several bridges had to be crossed before that happened. Negotiations had meanwhile been transferred to Paris, but they also continued at Peking. Marquis Tsêng was, however, soon recalled from Paris, and Prince Kung was dismissed at Peking. It looked as though the Empress Dowager was determined on war.

#### 5. THE FOURNIER CONVENTION, 1884.

A strange event now happened. On May 11, 1884, there was concluded at Tientsin between Li-Hung-Chang and Capt. Fournier, commander of a French man-of-war, who was invested with full powers by a telegram from Paris, what is known as the Fournier convention. (See Appendix I, 27.) By this convention France bound herself to respect and protect against all aggression by any nation and under any circumstances the southern frontiers of China and Tonquin. China agreed that she would at once withdraw her garrisons from Tonquin and would respect the treaties concluded between France and the King of Annam. The dates of evacuation were not fixed in the treaty, but simply marked down in a memorandum. Li-Hung-Chang seems to have greatly exceeded his instructions and characteristically misrepresented the nature of the concessions made by China to the Empress Dowager, who appeared satisfied with the terms of the treaty as reported to her.

The natural consequences followed. The Chinese commandant received no instructions to withdraw the garrison from Tonquin, and when the French advanced to take possession an inevitable conflict followed, in which the French were defeated.

France protested against what she claimed was an infringement of the Fournier convention. The Chinese Government claimed that the French had broken the treaty by attacking Chinese troops.

#### 6. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM, JULY 12, 1884.

France now sent an ultimatum. China appealed in vain to the treaty powers. In the short war that followed both sides gained some successes and suffered some reverses.

#### 7. TREATY OF HUE, 1884.

On June 6, 1884, another treaty, signed at Hue, was concluded between France and Annam, by which the Annamese agreed to accept a French protectorate. In return France bound herself to guarantee the integrity of their territory.

#### 8. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, 1885.

Through the good offices mainly of Sir Robert Hart, terms of peace were finally arranged at Tientsin on June 9, 1885, between



France and China. (See Appendix 1, 30.) It was agreed: (1) That France and China mutually agree to maintain order in the provinces adjoining their respective borders. (2) That China do nothing to compromise the work of fortification undertaken by France and agree to respect all the treaties, conventions, and arrangements between France and Annam. (3) That within six months commissioners fix the frontier between China and Tonking. There were also a number of articles relating to the trade permitted to Chinese and French merchants, the regulation of passports, imposition of customs dues, trade in arms and munitions, the expedition and importation of opium, the construction of railways, etc. More purely commercial treaties were also negotiated in 1886 and 1887.

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### 63. THE JOURNEYS OF WILLIAM II TO THE NEAR EAST.

#### 1. FIRST JOURNEY, 1889.

The first visit of William II to the Sultan took place in November, 1889, and marked a very significant change in German policy toward the Near East. Bismarck had always claimed to be disinterested in that region, and although his statement that "the whole eastern question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier" may understate his interest, yet he does not appear to have considered the Near East as a sphere of German expansion. But William II, backed by and under the influence of German industrialists, seems early to have decided on the policy of pushing German interests in that region. Bismarck, also, considered the friendship of Russia, to whom the Near East was a vital question, to be of sufficient importance to Germany to avoid wounding Russian susceptibilities by German action at Constantinople. The new policy of friendship for Turkey and German penetration in the Near East seems to have led to the clash between William II and Bismarck and was possibly one of the reasons for the fall of the chancellor in 1890. (See article, *The Dismissal of Bismarck, 1890.*)

## 2. GERMANY AND PAN-ISLAMISM.

After 1890 German policy in regard to the Near East began to work with the Pan-Islamic plans of Abdul-Hamid. Ever since the 80's the Sultan had been cherishing the idea of uniting all the Moslems of the world around the government of Constantinople. Emissaries were dispatched as far as Afghanistan to win over the Moslems. A propaganda was carried on in Persia, while in Africa strenuous attempts were made to win the Senussi—a border tribe between Tripoli and the Soudan—as well as the Moslems of Tunis and other North African protectorates. If this movement could be controlled by Germany it would mean a powerful leverage against both England and France, whose Moslem subjects numbered many millions.

## 3. THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES.

The connection between German policy in the Near East and the Pan-Islamic movement began to appear at the time of the Armenian massacres of 1895. These and similar massacres of later date were due to efforts on the part of Pan-Islamic forces to root out from the Turkish Empire all the non-Moslem peoples and thus unify the State as a Moslem power. The refusal of the German Government to act with the other powers in the interest of the Armenians made effective action by the powers collectively and individually impossible. (See article, *The Armenian Question, 1878-97.*) The German ambassador at Constantinople even refused to assist in the distribution of charitable aid. The German Government held the value of German-Turkish friendship above the dictates of humanity. This policy resulted in the strengthening of German influence at Constantinople and facilitated the granting by the Turkish Government of a number of economic concessions to German interests.

## 4. SECOND JOURNEY, 1898.

In 1898 William II made his second visit to the Near East. His aims at this time appear to have been two: (1) To win for Germany control of the Pan-Islamic movement, and (2) to secure further economic concessions for Germany in Turkey. In pursuit of his first aim he made a sensational speech at the tomb of Saladin in Damascus. "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans that are scattered throughout the world," he declared, "may rest assured that the German Emperor will eternally be their friend." (Quoted by Hugronje, *The World War "Made in Germany,"* p. 71.) And he also gave high praise to Saladin. The effect of this speech is dubious. It may well have captured the hearts of the leaders of Pan-Islam, but as Prof.



Hugronje points out (pp. 71-72) the average Moslem had little interest in Pan-Islam and had little remembrance of Saladin.

In his second aim William II appears to have been more successful. In 1899 came the first concessions for the Bagdad Railway (See article, that title) and in 1903 followed the firman for its construction. From this time on the Bagdad Railway formed a cornerstone of German policy in the Near East.

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### SECTION III.—1890-1904.

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## 64. THE DISMISSAL OF BISMARCK, 1890.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The dismissal of Bismarck was only to a very small degree dependent on foreign policy, but was a question of authority—"whether the Bismarck dynasty or the Hohenzollern dynasty should rule." (Hohenlohe, II, pp. 424, 426.) Nevertheless the chancellor's cultivation of Russia at the expense of Austria lay to some extent in the background. After secret treaties in 1881 and 1884, in 1887 Bismarck had entered into his reinsurance treaty with Russia, which stipulated that if either found itself at war with a third great power the other would maintain toward it a benevolent neutrality. France was thereby isolated. (See article, Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty.) The treaty, or agreement, was for three years, and 1889-1890 found Bismarck eager for its renewal.

### 2. THE DISMISSAL AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.

From William II's accession Bismarck seems to have urged the cultivation of Russia. In July, 1888, four weeks after his accession, the Emperor visited the Czar, afterwards paying his respects at Vienna and the South German capitals. To a reporter of the *Novoe Vremja* (May 10, 1890), Bismarck said that he had advised against the Emperor's visit to Constantinople in 1889, as likely to offend Russia. The Czar visited the Emperor October, 1889, and it is said that the Emperor intended to visit him at the hunting chateau Spala, in Lithuania, when Bismarck's objection (possibly fearing that too many meetings might cool Alexander's friendship), brought on a public display of temper against the chancellor October 13, 1889. (Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 384, for the rather uncertain proofs of this.) In the following March, just as the inner administrative conflict was coming to a head between them, the Emperor was greatly incensed because Bismarck had failed to mention to him a delayed communication from the German Consul Raffauf at Kiev, regarding Russian military preparations. William felt that Austria should have been warned. Bismarck's action was probably due to anxiety lest this probably exaggerated report might prevent the renewal of the "reinsurance treaty." (All sources in Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 388,



who claims personal information.) William told his generals after Bismarck's resignation that the chancellor was too friendly to Russia at the expense of Austria (second-hand to Hohenlohe, II, p. 425); he told Hohenlohe (pp. 426-27) that Bismarck had misrepresented him to Alexander. The Kiev report was one of the matters that brought the demand that Bismarck yield or resign. It echoes in the obscure paragraph in Bismarck's resignation letter of March 18 (first published by M. Busch in *Berlin Lokalanzeiger*, July 31, 1898; now convenient, with the Emperor's replies of March 20, in *Egelhaaf*, Bismarck, 433 ff.). Bismarck's determination to retain Russia's friendship was undoubtedly combined with a fear of British influence on the Emperor.

### 3. RESULTS.

The results of Bismarck's retirement were:

(1) The loss of Russia's friendship: (a) the "reinsurance treaty" was not renewed (Cf. for debate in Reichstag concerning this, Penzler, VII, pp. 159, 163); (b) Caprivi tried to conciliate the Poles (against Russian policy) by language concessions (1891), by the confirmation of Stabilewski, a national Polish leader, as archbishop of Posen-Gnesen (1891), etc.; (c) although visits between the Emperor and Czar continued to take place, the French and Russians drew nearer together, the rapprochement culminating in the visit of the French fleet to Kronstadt July 23, 1891, and the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance (1891-1893).

(2) An improvement in relations with England, shown by the toast of the Emperor at the banquet to the Prince of Wales, March 21, 1890, with its reference to joint maintenance of European peace (Hohenlohe II, p. 422), and the conclusion of the Zanzibar-Helgoland treaty, June 18, 1890. (See article, that title.)

(3) The improvement of relations with Austria and Italy by the removal of the fear that Germany was too friendly to Russia and by the reciprocity treaties, concluded by Caprivi in 1891.

### 4. CONCLUSION.

When Caprivi retired in 1891 the Franco-Russian alliance had stabilized matters, and the era of Weltpolitik began independently of Bismarck policies. The lasting result of Bismarck's dismissal was the Franco-Russian alliance, something which the chancellor might have delayed, but could hardly have prevented.

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## 65. THE BRUSSELS ANTISLAVERY CONFERENCE OF 1890.

### I. PURPOSE.

The 14 signatory powers of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 (See article, that title) had obligated themselves to "strive for the suppression of slavery and especially of the Negro slave trade." But these provisions were ineffective and the same powers participated in another conference called together at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of "putting an end to the crimes and devastation engendered by the traffic in African slaves, of efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa, and of securing for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization."

### 2. TERMS OF THE GENERAL ACT.

The general act of the Brussels Conference (consisting of 100 articles) conceded a limited right of visit and search of vessels whose tonnage is less than 500 tons within a great maritime zone extending from the western coasts of the Indian Ocean (the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea included), from Baluchistan to Cape Tangalane (Quillimane), to a conventional line which first follows the meridian from



Tangalane till it intersects the twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, is then merged in this parallel, then passes around the Island of Madagascar by the east, keeping 20 miles off the east and north shore, till it intersects the meridian at Cape Ambre; from this point the limit of the zone is determined by an oblique line, which extends to the coast of Baluchistan, passing 20 miles off Cape Hodd (art. 21).

For the purposes of investigation and trial, each signatory power agreed to appoint in the zone in question territorial or consular authorities, or special delegates, competent to deal with the cases covered by the convention. Such a magistrate, when an arrested vessel is turned over to him, must proceed to make a full investigation according to the laws of his own country, in the presence of an officer belonging to the foreign cruiser. If it is proved that a flag has been fraudulently used, the arrested vessel is to remain at the disposal of the captor (art. 51). If the examination shows an act connected with the slave trade, proved by the presence on board of slaves destined for sale, or any other offense connected with the slave trade, for which provision is made by special convention, the vessel and cargo are to remain sequestered in charge of the magistrate. The captain and crew are then to be turned over for trial to the tribunal of the nation whose flag they used (arts. 54-57), and the slaves are to be set at liberty as soon as judgment has been pronounced. Damages are to be allowed where a vessel has been illegally arrested (arts. 53, 58).

An international maritime bureau, at which each of the signatory powers may be represented by a delegate, shall be established at Zanzibar in order to "centralize all documents and information of a nature to facilitate the repression of the slave trade in the maritime zone (arts. 74-80).

### 3. RESULT.

It would seem that there has been an honest effort on the part of the great majority of the powers concerned to enforce the provisions of the Brussels conference, and that, as a consequence, the African slave trade is practically extinct or merely sporadic by sea, and on its way to extinction or at least greatly decreased on land.

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## 66. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1887-1893.

### 1. FRENCH ISOLATION, 1871-1887.

The provocation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia came from Germany, though its formation was probably assisted by the differences which both France and Russia had with England. After the Franco-Prussian War, Germany, in the person of Bismarck, dominated international politics in Europe and Bismarck's foreign policy was directed in the main toward keeping France isolated and weak. To that end he formed the so-called League of the Three Emperors in 1872 (See article, that title) with Russia and Austria-Hungary. Later, when Russia and Austria fell out over the Balkan question, he signed a defensive alliance with Austria (1879), enlarged in 1882, by the inclusion of Italy, into the famous Triple Alliance (See articles, *The Formation of the Triple Alliance* and *The Renewals of the Triple Alliance*). Russia was not a party to it, but by the secret treaties of 1881 and 1884 and the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 Russia pledged herself to remain benevolently neutral in case Germany were attacked. (See article, *Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty*.) Thus Bismarck isolated France from three of the four possible strong allies in Europe. The fourth, England, had many outstanding quarrels with France over African and Asiatic questions. Bismarck trusted to them to keep England and France apart.

### 2. FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1871-1887.

Naturally France wished to escape from this isolation. The tradition of her diplomacy indicated an ally to the far side of Germany, namely, Russia. With Russia she had no quarrel and Russia shared her antipathy to England. French republicanism, of course, was distasteful to Russian autocracy and the Russian Czar was close-bound to the German Emperor both by treaty ties and by ties of kinship. Yet the Czar was plainly becoming dissatisfied with his



German ally, particularly as he found Bismarck more disposed to support Austria's policy in the Balkans than his own. He had moreover manifested his disinclination to acquiesce in German designs against France. He had intervened when Germany threatened France in 1875. (See article, The Franco-German War Scare of 1875.) Two years later he seems to have refused to allow Germany a free hand against France in return for a free hand in the Balkans. In 1887 he moved troops toward the German frontier when Franco-German relations were critical. His whole attitude, in fact, invited French advances.

### 3. ADVANCES TOWARD ALLIANCE, 1887-1891.

These advances took form in 1887 in a project to float a Russian loan in Paris which was realized in December of 1888. Other loans quickly followed and served to establish close financial relations between France and Russia. A further step forward was taken in 1889, when the Russian Government was allowed to purchase army rifles in France. In the spring of 1890 a Russian grand duke visited Paris; in July of 1891 a French fleet visited Kronstadt and was royally entertained. All these things paved the way for a protracted and delicate negotiation, the details of which were little known and much misunderstood until the publication in September, 1918, of a French Yellow Book, which made public most of the correspondence and documents (Documents Diplomatiques L'Alliance Franco-Russe. In the remaining sections of this article the figures enclosed in brackets refer to the numbers of the documents in that collection.).

### 4. DRAFTING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION.

Conversations looking toward and alliance began as early as August, 1890 (1). Progress at first was slow, though in March, 1891, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a dispatch communicated to the French Government did speak of the "*entente cordiale*" between France and Russia as "the best guarantee of peace" and as "necessary for the maintenance in Europe of a just balance of forces" (2). By July, 1892, the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the reported "indirect accession of England" led the two governments to consider whether "the new situation created by that event for France and Russia would not render desirable one step more in the way of entente" (3). In August an entente was reached (17 and annexe). A draft of a military convention was then drawn up, the form being adjusted only after much delicate negotiation. This was signed for more effective presentation to the Czar by the Russian Minister of War and by General Boisdeffre for France (71). It

was expressly understood that these signatures added nothing to the binding character of the entente already existing (71).

#### 5. SIGNING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION.

The French Government, apparently owing some hesitation on the part of Freycinet, the Prime Minister, sought to secure a number of changes in the convention (75). This may have had something to do with the failure to get promptly the signature of the Czar or of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. For some reason which the published documents do not fully disclose, the Czar at this point delayed action and apparently became anxious to postpone the signing of a definite instrument of alliance. More than a year passed during which the French Government, despite much effort, failed in every attempt to secure the formal signing of the convention. Finally on December 27, 1893, the convention was duly signed. Even then the French Government had to be content with an instrument which bore neither the signature of the Czar or of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter, however, transmitted to the French Government a letter marked "Tres secrete" (91 and annexe). It declared that the text attested in August, 1892, "can be considered as having been definitively adopted in its actual form." No treaty of alliance was ever actually signed. There was an alliance, but it rested on the entente reached in August, 1892, and the military convention finally accepted by Russia in December, 1893.

#### 6. TERMS OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION.

The military convention stipulated (71):

"If France is attacked by Germany or by Italy, supported by Germany, Russia will employ all its disposable forces to fight Germany.

"If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria, supported by Germany, France will employ all its disposable forces to fight Germany."

#### NOTE.

#### STATEMENTS MADE BY FRENCH MINISTERS IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES THROWING LIGHT UPON THE TERMS OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

1. On June 10, 1895, M. Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs, made the following reference to the alliance:

Deux grandes puissances, portées l'une vers l'autre par l'attraction de leurs sentiments et de leurs intérêts respectifs, se sont donné la main. Elles ont noué une entente qui les rapproche naturellement dans le travail incessant de la politique courante, et qui, toujours pacifique, leur garantit une sécurité réciproque.



2. On the same day, M. Ribot, the prime minister, made the following reference to the same subject:

Oui, nous avons allié aux intérêts d'une grande nation les intérêts de la France; nous l'avons fait pour la sauvegarde de la paix et le maintien de l'équilibre de l'Europe. Et s'il n'y a rien de changé dans les aspirations, dans la direction supérieure, dans le but suprême de notre politique, il y a pourtant quelque chose de changé en Europe depuis 1891. (Archives diplomatiques, second series, vol 54, pp. 357, 370.)

3. On the 14th of June, 1912, M. Poincare, the prime minister, made the following statement:

Notre alliance avec la Russie, consacrée non seulement par des accords positifs, mais par l'épreuve du temps, trouve son application sur tous les points du globe au bénéfice des deux nations. Elle n'a de pointe dirigée contre aucune puissance, mais elle permet aux deux gouvernements alliés de combiner leur action diplomatique pour la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts respectifs et de collaborer au maintien de la paix. (Ibid., third series, vol. 122, pp. 246-247.)

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## 67. THE ZANZIBAR-HELIGOLAND TREATY OF 1890.

### 1. THE PERIOD OF BRITISH INFLUENCE, 1875-1884.

Though a treaty made between Great Britain and France in 1862 recognized the "independence" of Zanzibar, British influence was supreme in Zanzibar during the period extending from 1875 to 1884. This was mainly due to the efforts of a single individual, John Kirk, British consul to Zanzibar for 20 years. His influence was so great that it was said he was more powerful than the Sultan.

### 2. GERMAN ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA, 1865-1885.

As early as 1865 a German by the name of Kersten had advocated the annexation of East Africa by Germany. Years before that Hamburg trade had found a footing at Zanzibar. Again, in 1875, Vice-Admiral Lurniss had urged that Zanzibar be taken under German protection. But it was not until 1884 that suspicion of German intentions was aroused at the British Foreign Office. On November 28 the British ambassador at Berlin obtained an assurance from Prince



Bismarck that "Germany was not endeavoring to obtain a protectorate over Zanzibar." On January 14, 1885, Earl Granville sent a communication to Berlin, somewhat timidly drawing attention to the mission to Zanzibar of the German African explorer, Dr. Rohlfs, at the same time expressing a confident belief that Germany did not mean to annex Zanzibar. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 1099-1100.) On February 25 Earl Granville was informed that Dr. Rohlfs, who had been appointed German consul-general at Zanzibar, was "commissioned to exert his influence" to secure freedom of commerce in the Sultan's dominions. (Ibid., p. 1103.) The British Foreign Office professed itself satisfied with the vague assurances from Berlin.

At the same time Dr. Carl Peters was extremely active (in 1884-1885) in founding a Society of German Colonization and the German East African Co. In 1884, disguised as mechanics, Dr. Peters and Dr. Jühlke made their way to Zanzibar, and were soon at work making "treaties" with native chiefs and acquiring enormous stretches of territory in East Africa which was claimed by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

### 3. ANGLO-GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AMENITIES.

On May 25, 1885, Lord Granville assured Prince Bismarck that the British Government had no intention of offering any obstruction to German projects, but welcomed Germany's cooperation in developing the resources of East Africa and in trying to suppress slavery. Consequently, the protests of the Sultan of Zanzibar were of no avail.

When, in June, 1885, Lord Salisbury succeeded Earl Granville at the head of the British Foreign Office, he was quite as favorable as his predecessor to the adoption of a conciliatory policy in East Africa.

### 4. THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1886.

On October 29 and November 1, 1886, the British and German Governments came to a definite agreement in respect to the territory, which should be recognized as remaining under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, to which agreement the Sultan gave his assent on December 4. According to this agreement, the domains of the Sultan were mainly restricted to a strip of mainland along the coast 10 miles in width and to the island of Zanzibar and Pemba, together with some smaller islands. The Sultan gave up all claims to Kilimanjaro, though the aspirations of the embryo British East African Co. were to some extent satisfied by the definition of a boundary to the north of which Germany would not inter-

fere with their "sphere of influence." As a partial consolation for these losses of territory, Germany recognized the "independence" of the Sultan, as England and France had done in 1862.

#### 5. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1886-1890.

In 1886 there was formed the British East African Association which obtained various rights and concessions, and displayed considerable activity in the course of which they experienced considerable difficulty with Dr. Peters and his friends. German methods of dealing with the natives had also brought on an insurrection which was suppressed with some difficulty with the aid and cooperation of England.

#### 6. THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1890.

There resulted from these various difficulties the famous Anglo-German agreement, signed on July 1, 1890. (See Appendix I, 38.) By this agreement the northern boundary of German East Africa was drawn from the mouth of the Umba to Victoria Nyanza in 1° S. latitude, keeping the snowy Kilimanjaro in the German sphere, but leaving Taveta to England. The line was then drawn straight across the lake and westward until it reached the boundary of the Congo Free State, only deflecting southward so far as to include Mount Mfumbiro within the British sphere (though its precise position remains doubtful). Witu, at the mouth of the Tana, was given to England. On the south the German boundary line was drawn along the river Rovuma to Lake Nyassa.

The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were recognized as under British protection.

The two powers engaged that "neither will interfere with any sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I to IV." (Art. VII.) They also agreed to "apply in all the portions of their respective spheres, within the limits of the free zone, defined by the act of Berlin of 1885 (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885), the provisions relating to freedom of trade, the freedom of the navigation of rivers, lakes, canals, and ports, etc., the prohibition of trade monopolies, transit dues, differential treatment as regards transport or coasting trade, etc."

#### 7. CESSION OF HELIGOLAND TO GERMANY.

Article XII provided for the cession of the Island of Heligoland to Germany—a transaction scoffed at by Bismarck (then in retirement), and commonly regarded as a barren rock of little value to either England or Germany. At that time there seemed to be little



realization either in England or Germany of the immense strategic importance of this "rock" in any future maritime conflict between these two great sea powers. (See article, *The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890.*)

#### S. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER ZANZIBAR.

On November 4, 1890, the Sultanate proclaimed a British protectorate over Zanzibar. By a Zanzibar order in council in 1906, the protectorate was limited to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.

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### 68. THE DREYFUS AFFAIR.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Dreyfus affair, despite its close connection with the relations between France and Germany, entered immediately and directly into diplomatic history only in small measure. Its chief immediate significance was for the internal rather than the foreign affairs of France, though indirectly and at a somewhat later date the foreign policy of the country was affected by the defeat of the anti-Dreyfusards. The heterogeneous coalition which bitterly opposed the attempts to reexamine the verdict passed upon Dreyfus by the first court-martial finally came to include practically all the elements in the country hostile to the Third Republic. In the sequel, triumph over so powerful a coalition of enemies added much to the solidity of the Third Republic. Soon after the close of the agitation the strength thus gained helped enable it to enter upon a more vigorous and independent foreign policy.

#### 2. NEGOTIATIONS.

It occasioned negotiations between France and Germany only in regard to charges made in French newspapers against the German ambassador, who was accused of having relations with

Dreyfus. In view of these charges the Kaiser in a personal message, sent through the chancellor and the German ambassador, informed the President of France that if there was proof that the German embassy was implicated in the affair the French Government should not hesitate to declare it.

### 3. PUBLIC STATEMENT.

In consequence of this dispatch a statement for the newspapers was drafted by the French Government and submitted before publication to the German Government. This statement, published in all the newspapers on January 9, 1895, did not specifically mention the German embassy but announced in the form of a reference to an earlier communication to the press that charges against foreign embassies in newspaper articles on espionage were devoid of foundation.

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## 69. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN TURKEY.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The construction of railways in Turkey has been influenced by political and strategic objects of the powers and by the desire to secure Turkish markets, at least as much, if not more, than the economic value of each particular road. As the Turkish government was unsuccessful in its attempts to build and operate railroads almost all the track in Turkey was built and at the outset of the World War mostly operated by foreigners; the one exception was the Hedjaz pilgrim railway. Capitalists and engineers who built and managed the roads used material from their own countries and the principal employees of the roads, usually of the nations whose citizens control them, "involuntarily act as agents for the introduction" of their national goods. The use of railroads in the international competition for the Turkish market was particularly marked in the German railroad development after 1888, a development strongly backed by the diplomats of the Empire and by its great banks. Political considerations of another sort led Russia to block railroad building in Armenia, which bordered on her territory, except with her consent.



We may leave out of consideration the railroads of European Turkey, as that territory is now almost entirely in the hands of other nations. The Bagdad line is also to be omitted (See article, The Bagdad Railway, 1903-1904), though the later history centers around it.

## 2. FIRST PERIOD, TO 1883.

Railroad history may be divided into four periods, the division being marked by the years 1888, 1903, 1908. In the first, the English were dominant. As early as 1833 there was a serious attempt to work out routes to the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, leaving the seacoast either at Tripoli or at Haifa. The main object was the short route to India. After the middle of the nineteenth century numerous plans were put forward to join the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf at Koweit; in 1856, a concession with a six per cent guarantee on capital invested, by the Turkish government, was obtained; but the financial returns were too doubtful, in view of the competition with Suez, to interest the necessary capital. The concession for the Smyrna and Aidin Railway was given in 1856 and was to expire in 1935. The first section was opened in 1866. The Turkish government guaranteed six per cent on the cost of construction, but its payments fell in arrears; in 1888, in a new convention, the arrears were cancelled, the guarantee abandoned for the future, and the concession extended to 1935, when the government might exercise an option to purchase, but must pay, in addition to the purchase price, a large sum, as the agreed government debt to the company. The company, whose line has been extended up the Cayster and Maender valleys, has since paid dividends to its stockholders without government aid. To the outbreak of the war it remained in the hands of the British. The concession for the Smyrna-Cassaba Railroad was granted to English capitalists in 1863 to expire in 1891. In 1872 it was extended to Alashehr. At that time it made a loan to the government and agreed to build and operate a line to Somah for the government account. Another small road from Mersina to Adana, forty-two miles, was built in 1883 by a Franco-English syndicate. In 1888 the English interests were bought out by the French. The road had no government aid and was not at first successful.

The Turkish Government decided in 1871 to take a hand in railroad construction and operation on its own account. In that year it began to build from Mudania to Brusa, but though the line was only about twenty-six miles long, it was scarcely completed in 1880 and was not opened for traffic, until in 1891 it was conceded to a French company. Operation began the next year. The company had no government aid. At the same time the Turkish Government began a line from Haidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Ismidt.

fifty eight miles, which, though of easy construction, took three years to complete and Turkish operation was so unsuccessful that the line was leased to British subjects in 1880.

### 3. SECOND PERIOD, 1888-1903.

The second period opens with 1888, marked by the beginning of kilometer guarantee, i. e., a stipulated net revenue for each kilometer of road operated, the entrance of the Germans, and the loss of the English position to the French and German. The Haider Pasha-Ismid line was taken away from the English concessionaires on payment of compensation in 1888 by exercise of the right of denunciation and sold to a German syndicate headed by the Deutsche Bank, the great German financial institution for Near East enterprises. The Anatolian Railroad Co., formed to operate the line, got a concession to extend to Angora, three hundred and two miles, with a liberal kilometric guarantee, that is, a guarantee that the gross returns should be so much per kilometer. The guarantee was secured on the tithes (agricultural tax) of the provinces traversed by the road. In addition, the road was to receive interest on sums expended during construction, and, a new and important feature, all mining rights for twenty kilometers on either side of the railway. In 1893, the line was farther extended by two branches, one to Angora, the other to Konia. The company in accepting this concession agreed eventually to extend the line from Angora to Bagdad: but in fact, because of Russian opposition to the route through Armenia, the Konia branch became the next link in the Bagdad railway. These lines were rapidly pushed to completion, the money being raised by sale of stock and bonds based on the Turkish kilometric guarantee, also secured on the local tithes. This company had strong German diplomatic support, in contrast to the attitude of the British Government which, when the Smyrna-Cassaba line asked protection against the danger of being shut off from its natural sphere of penetration by the extension to Konia, replied that it was glad to see the extension of German railroad activity.

The heavy debts of the Turkish Government to the Smyrna-Cassaba company and its ill success induced the company to sell the road to the French investors, the Nagelmacker interests, who got a new concession from the Government on satisfying the claims of the old company against the Government. Turkey agreed to pay a fixed annuity of 92,400 pounds a year for ninety-nine years, the life of the concession, secured by the Government's share of the receipts of the railway and the agricultural tax on the province of Aidin. The Government has the right to repurchase in 1974. The annuity was made the basis for an issue of bonds, and to provide the bulk of



the capital for the new construction authorized, other issues of bonds were to be based also on a kilometric guarantee. The company fell into German hands and a junction was made with the Anatolian railroad.

The most important road of Syria, the *Société Ottomane du Chemins de Fer de Damas, Hama, et Prolongements*, was based on a concession to a native and on a similar one to a Turkish subject for a tramway south from Damascus. The line was without guaranty, as was the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, based on a concession to a native in 1888 and completed four years later. An English concern began a pretentious line from Haifa to Damascus and the Hauran (1891), but ran out of money after 21 miles of rail had been laid out of Haifa. A new railroad policy was struck out by Turkey in 1900, when the Hejaz line was decreed. This was to be a pilgrim route, the money was largely to come in contributions from the faithful throughout the world, the work was to be done by soldiers, and German engineers were permitted only in the non-sacred portion of the track. The lapsed road from Haifa and the French road south from Damascus were taken over and contact between Haifa and Damascus assured.

#### 4. THIRD PERIOD, 1903-1908.

The third period is dominated by the Bagdad road. The Mersina-Adana road was secured by Germans in 1906 by purchase of stock, though Anglo-French directors were still retained. (See article, *The Bagdad Railway*.) On the other hand, the English were given permission in the same year to extend the Aidin road and the French received a concession for one from Heraclea on the Black Sea, where they operated coal mines.

#### 5. FOURTH PERIOD, 1908-1914.

The entire railroad situation seemed passing into the hands of the Germans when, in 1908, the revolution broke out. At first many of the Young Turks were strongly anti-German, few favored that country. The new Government undertook an elaborate program of development, but the ministry of public works favored from the first the principle of balance of powers in railroads and an attempt was made to distribute favors impartially. Complaints were made in the Turkish Parliament against the high kilometric guarantees given the Bagdad road, but German diplomacy was able to make friends with the Young Turks and the concession was not interfered with. Concerns of all sorts of character brought forward all sorts of plans. One, for example, an English scheme,

was that the road should go from Adrianople across the Bosphorus north of Constantinople, parallel but south of the Black Sea, and then to Persia and India. An American concern, the Ottoman-American Development Co. of New York, asked concessions which were variously given as Angora-Sivas-Harput-Van or Alexandretta-Diarbekir-Van and Diarbekir-Suleimania on the Persian frontier. No kilometer guarantee was asked, but 4 per cent was to be given on the cost of construction and 1 per cent for amortization, based on the revenues (tithes) of the six Provinces through which it went. Also, the oil and mineral lands for 20 kilometers on each side of the track were to be given the company. The scheme was approved by the experts and accepted in principle by the minister of public works. Special desire was felt by the Turkish Government that this should develop, as the United States was felt to be free from desire to secure political control, but for some reason the plan did not succeed. Sir Edward Pears says (Abdul Hamid, p. 158) that the failure of the plan was due to German opposition.

In the period just before the war several important developments were put through or were in process of being organized. In Southwest Arabia, the Yemen, the French secured a grant from Hodeideh to Sanaa, and began work. The English, represented by Willcocks, who had already begun the irrigation work in Babylonia, suggested roads from Port Said to Arish, Lydda, Nablus, Rayak, and from Haifa or Tripoli to Hit and Bagdad, but the French Damascus line secured the concession Tripoli-Homs in 1910 and opened the branch the next year. The concession Rayak-Lydda was granted just before the war, but actual construction was completed by the Turks from the junction at Afuleh in the plain of Esdraelon with the Haifa line through Lydda to Beersheba after the war began. The Smyrna-Aidin road began extension to Egedir in 1908, and the next year opened the National Bank of Turkey to oppose the Deutsche Bank which had financed the Bagdad line and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the French concern. Just before the war the French were given the concession Samsun-Sivas-Erzincan-Trebizond, in northeast Asiatic Turkey, for construction and exploitation, through the Régie Générale des Chemins de Fer Ottomans, against a loan of a half billion francs, as part of the consideration for France's consent to an increase of Turkish customs; the extension of the Soma line to the Dardanelles, and thence to the Anatolian road at Ismid; and from Maidos on the Gallipoli Peninsula to Mirathi on the Oriental Railways, the purpose of these last being purely strategic. In conclusion, we should mention the convention of Germany with Russia in 1911, giving her northeast Turkey as her sphere of



influence and the railways built by the British in their advance on Syria and Palestine and on Babylonia.

#### 6. CONCLUSION.

The Turkish railways were a benefit to the population in spite of the burden of the kilometric guarantees, which, especially for the Bagdad Railway, were very high, and an advantage to the Turkish Government in the resulting increase of revenue, particularly as a large part of the Turkish taxes were in the form of a percentage of the crop grown. Without railways to move surplus crops to market, and to move troops to quell disorder, no great economic progress was possible. The kilometric guarantees had the effect of creating a sort of monopoly in the territory covered by the roads, since the government was interested in preventing competition which would lessen the income of a guaranteed road. This consideration, along with German diplomacy, is said to have had considerable influence on the attempts of French and English capitalists to get a concession to parallel the Bagdad road from Homs to Bagdad though without a guarantee.

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A good description of the railroads in Asiatic Turkey in 1895 and their history to that date, with maps, is in *Parliamentary Papers*, Turkey, No. 4 (1896), "Report on Railways in Asiatic Turkey," by Major E. F. Law. A good account, particularly of the Hedjaz rail-

road, is contained in Sir Edward Pears' *Abdul Hamid*, pp. 162-164 (London, Constable, 1917). See also Muratet, *Chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Aurillac, Imprimerie Moderne, 1914); The Hedjaz railway in Petermann's *Mitteilungen*, vol. 54 (1908), *Ergänzungs. Heft* 161. "The Near East" is a most valuable periodical for information on Turkish Railways.

## 70. THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR, 1897.

### 1. ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

This war is only an incident in the long struggle of the Greeks against Turkey for Panhellenism. After the War of Liberation only a small part of the Greek people was included in the narrow boundaries laid down for Greece by the powers. In 1867 a desperate revolt broke out in Crete, but because Turkey controlled the sea it was able to crush the insurrection. At the Congress of Berlin, 1878, upon the insistence of France, steps were taken which ultimately brought it about that those portions of Thessaly and Epirus, known to be inhabited exclusively by Greeks, were added to Greece. (See article, *The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, 1878-1881*.) The provisions of this arrangement had not been fully carried out by Turkey in 1897. The three sources of friction at this time were Macedonia, Thessaly, and Crete. In the latter a Mohammedan pasha had roused the Christian population to insurrection. In Thessaly and Macedonia border warfare was chronic. The massacre of Cretans at Canea, the capital of Crete, roused the Greeks, and Greek soldiers under Col. Vassos landed in Crete in defiance of the warning by the "Concert" of powers. (See article, *The Cretan Question, 1878-1897*.) The Greek Government was accused of aiding the insurrectionists, but in seems that it used its influence for pacification. By February 15, 1897, Crete was in the hands of the Greek troops. The move for liberation was entirely successful. At this point the rebellion was taken in hand by the powers who had assembled a fleet in the harbor of Canea. This allied fleet, March 21, declared a blockade of Crete so that no supplies from Athens might reach Col. Vassos.

### 2. MILITARY OPERATIONS.

Public opinion in Greece and Turkey soon reached the war heat. Troops were massed on the Thessalian and Macedonian frontiers. On the 9th of April armed Greek troops crossed the frontier and on April 17 Turkey announced a state of war. In spite of the enthusiasm exhibited by the Greeks they were unable to withstand the Turks. After a month of almost continuous defeats they asked the powers to intervene. It should be said that the Greek fleet took little part in the war. Premier Delyannis of Greece was accused of



not pushing the war with vigor and was forced to resign. The Greeks were disappointed in the supply of second-hand rifles from France and ammunition bought in Austria was refused at the last moment by the Government. Russia at this time warned Turkey that Bulgaria would mobilize if the Turks carried the war further and an armistice was concluded May 19.

### 3. TREATY OF PEACE.

The ambassadors of the powers at Constantinople took up the work of making a treaty. This was promulgated by the powers at Constantinople, December 4. Turkey was given military preference along a rectified boundary line in Thessaly and Epirus. Greece was to pay an indemnity of £4,000,000 and submit its finances to the control of a commission. Otherwise the status quo ante bellum was forced on the belligerents.

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## 71. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1868-1897.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

There were in the Cretan question four important factors, all constantly interacting:

- (1) The racial and religious situation in Crete.
- (2) Turkish misgovernment there, as elsewhere.

(3) Cretan aspiration for union with Greece.

(4) The attitude of the European powers.

The population of Crete was preponderantly Greek and Christian, with a Moslem minority largely of Greek origin and speaking Greek.

## 2. REBELLION OF 1866-1869.

From 1866 to 1868 Crete was in constant insurrection because of 1, 2, 3 above, and demanded union with Greece. Most of the powers were inclined to press the Porte to yield to Cretan demands. But England was opposed. She, however, urged the Sultan to make reforms. Finally, on January 10, 1868, the Sultan promulgated the Organic Law of 1868 (Holland, *Eastern Question*, 77-83), and the revolt was soon crushed. This seemed to provide some local self-government, and some protection for Christians, but satisfied no one. Insurrection soon broke out again. Greece intervened and rejected a Turkish ultimatum presented December 11, 1868. Russia called a conference at Paris, January 8, 1869, which sent a declaration to Greece demanding her acceptance of Turkish demands. Greece, unprepared for war, yielded, leaving Crete to her fate.

## 3. SETTLEMENT OF 1878.

In 1877 Russia's declaration of war against Turkey caused excitement in the Greek Provinces. A Cretan committee was formed to promote Cretan autonomy, which Turkey refused. Crete appealed to the powers.

By the Treaty of San Stefano, article 15 (See Appendix I, 14), Turkey promised scrupulous application of the Organic Law of 1868. Although at the Congress of Berlin Cretan annexation, as making for European peace, was presented by M. Delgannis, the only result was article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, an undertaking by Turkey to apply the Organic Law to Crete, with equitable modifications. (See Appendix I, 17.) The Cretans in despair requested that the island be made a protectorate of Great Britain (Marriott, p. 353), who, still supporting Turkey, refused. The English consul, however, induced Turkey to modify the Organic Law, and the change was embodied in the Pact of Halépa, October 12, 1878 (*Documents Diplomatiques. Affaires d'Orient. Affaire de Crète. Juin, 1891-Février, 1897*, pp. 3 *et seq.*), and later in the Firman of November, 1878 (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 71, p. 759, *et seq.*). These concessions brought momentary quiet.

## 4. REVOLT OF 1898-1899.

The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 (See article, that title), arousing the resentment of Greece, as of other Balkan States, Greece mob-



ilized against Turkey. Crete took the opportunity to proclaim union with Greece. The powers blockaded Greece to prevent attack on Turkey. (See article, *The Blockade of Greece, 1886.*) England took the lead, seeking to maintain Balkan and European peace. Russia was interested in peace and feared complications with England. France, naturally inclined toward Greece, did not take a decided stand. Greece yielded for the time being, but this situation culminated in the Cretan revolt of 1888-1889, when Greece, still torn between her own desires, Cretan demands, and the powers, demanded from the powers warships or other help in maintaining order and obtaining reform. Failing that, Greece declared for definite action. The powers refused to disturb the peace and warned Greece against intervention at her own risk. In August, 1889, Turkey declared the state of siege in Crete. England urged reform. The outcome was that on November 22, 1889, a Firman (Hertslet, p. 3281 *et seq.*) practically revoking the Halepa was issued. Greece, alarmed by the powers, held back.

European policy shifted somewhat during these years. England's increasing security in Egypt and Suez allowed greater insistence upon Cretan reforms, and less hostility toward Greece (Driault, p. 268), although she still wished maintenance of peace. Austria, France, Germany, and Russia were less zealous for reform. Germany, increasingly influential at Constantinople, desired the integrity of Turkey for her own ends; Austria and Russia desired it because of mutual suspicion (Andrews, II, p. 340 *seq.*); while Russia, France, and Germany opposed England on colonial and commercial grounds. All, however, finally agreed on the need for peace, and proceeded against Greece accordingly.

In 1894 the Cretan assembly demanded a Christian Vali. The powers upheld the demand, and Carathéodory was sent, but recalled in 1895.

##### 5. CRETE AND THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR OF 1897.

In 1896 civil war again broke out in Crete, excited by the National Society of Greece (Marriott, p. 336). On pressure from the powers the Sultan promised reform. Again there was delay, and in February, 1897, Cretan Christians proclaimed union with Greece. Greek public opinion forced the Government to prepare for intervention. The powers were alarmed. English public opinion favored the Cretans, but the Government decided for the *status quo*.

On February 14, 1897, Col. Vassos landed a Greek force at Canea and occupied Crete in the name of Greece. Georgi Pacha, the Christian Vali and last Turkish governor, left Crete upon a Russian warship on the same day. The next day the admirals occupied Canea with a landing party. Vassos was helpless and the insurgents, after

great disorders, were finally overcome by the occupation of other places and by the bombardment of the Cretan coast by the warships of the powers. (See article, *The Greco-Turkish War, 1897.*)

On March 2, 1897, upon the initiative of Russia, the powers, by identical notes at Athens and Constantinople (*Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 4 (1897), p. 1*), announced that Crete could not under existing circumstances be annexed to Greece, but that, because of Turkey's delay in effecting reforms, Crete should enjoy autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Greece was summoned to withdraw her army and fleet; Turkey to concentrate troops in fortresses in preparation for withdrawal. These terms show a compromise between England and other powers—a step toward solution. Greece refused to withdraw her troops till a Cretan plebiscite be taken; the insurgents refused to lay down their arms; therefore the admirals declared that a blockade of Crete would begin March 21. Troubles continuing, the admirals bombarded Malaxa and occupied the principal Cretan ports.

On March 2, 1897, the powers, in a note to the Greek Government, formally declared Crete henceforth under European protection, with autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan guaranteed. Greece acquiesced at the close of its unsuccessful war with Turkey. Crete was thereby left in the hands of the powers already committed to the program of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. (*Ibid, pp. 2-5.*)

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## 72. THE ARMENIAN QUESTION, 1878-1897.

### 1. TREATIES OF SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN, 1878.

The Armenian question may be said to have arisen after the close of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. By article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, Turkey had agreed to "carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms made necessary by local needs in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Kurds and Circassians."

This provision was superseded by article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which stipulated in addition that the Sublime Porte should "give notice periodically of the measures taken to this end to the Powers, who will watch over their application." It should be noted particularly that the obligation undertaken by Turkey at Berlin was to the powers, whereas in the Treaty of San Stefano it had only been to Russia.

Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin declared:

The Sublime Porte having expressed the intention to maintain the principle of religious liberty, and give it the widest scope, the contracting parties take note of this spontaneous declaration.

In no part of the Ottoman Empire shall difference of religion be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity as regards the discharge of civil and political rights, admission to the public employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of the various professions and industries.

All persons shall be admitted without distinction of religion to give evidence before the tribunals.

The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to all, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the various communions or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

Though the Armenians are not specifically mentioned in this article, they were entitled to claim the benefit of its provisions.

By the Cyprus Convention of June 4, 1878, the Sultan also promised Great Britain to introduce necessary reforms "for the protection of the Christians and other subjects of the Porte" in the Turkish territories in Asia. (See article, *The English Protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914.*)

## 2. FAILURE OF POLICY OF ENFORCEMENT, 1878-1882.

It soon became evident that there was to be no attempt to carry out the provisions of the treaties on the part of the Turkish Government. In April, 1879, Lord Salisbury laid it down that "the Sultan is bound not only to promulgate new and better laws, but to actually introduce reforms." In November, 1879, the English Government went the length of ordering an English squadron to the Archipelago for the purpose of a naval demonstration. This brought nothing, but fair promises.

On June 11, 1880, an identical note of the great powers demanded the execution of different clauses of the treaty of Berlin, including that of article 61. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 72, pp. 469-470.) The Ottoman Government replied in a note of July 5, indicating certain so-called executed or intended reforms. (Ibid., pp. 1197-1200.) The powers replied in a collective note, dated September 7, 1880, severely censuring the so-called reforms and proposing others. (Ibid., pp. 1201-1207.) To this collective note of the powers, the Sublime Porte did not even deign to reply; but assuming a haughty tone, merely notified the powers of what it intended to do in a note dated October 3, 1880.

In a circular of January 12, 1881, Earl Granville instructed the British ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, etc., to call the attention of the Governments to which they were accredited to the state of affairs in Armenia. He said:

The way in which the Porte is dealing with its offer of reforms would appear to furnish food for remonstrance, and Her Majesty's Government would be glad if the Governments would instruct their ambassadors at Constantinople to join with his colleagues in a representation to the Sublime Porte on the subject.

Austria declined to act in concert with the other powers, and Bismarck expressed the opinion that it was better for the powers to concentrate on one question at a time. "When the Greek question is over, it will be the moment to begin the Armenian question," he said. France hid herself behind the refusal of Germany. Only Italy and Russia gave a conditional assent. It was, indeed, evident that the policy of enforcement by the powers was a failure.

## 3. PERIOD OF EUROPEAN INDIFFERENCE, 1882-1889.

There followed a period of European indifference to reform in Armenia. The consequence of this indifference and neglect was the rise of a nationalist movement in Armenia and the formation of revolutionary societies. London was a center of propaganda, and the Sultan became very much alarmed. The Russian Government was also



alarmed lest the revolutionary and nationalistic movement spread to Russian Armenia. During this period Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt was intense, and France showed a disposition to support Russian intrigue in the Near East, whereas Germany supported Austria. The foundation and rise of German influence in Turkey, which certainly did not favor the Armenians, can be traced to this period.

#### 4. PERIOD OF AGITATION IN ENGLAND, 1889-1893.

In 1890 there was formed the Anglo-Armenian Association, and an increasing agitation in behalf of Armenia began to manifest itself in England. An active propaganda was also carried on in Turkish Armenia, but was strongly opposed by the Armenian clergy and the American missionaries.

#### 5. MASSACRES OF 1894-1896.

In August-September, 1894, occurred the brutal Sassoun massacres, in which Turkish soldiers took part. In November, 1894, a Turkish commission of inquiry, accompanied by the consular delegates of Great Britain, France, and Russia, was sent to Armenia. It elicited the fact that there had been no attempt at revolt to justify the action of the Turkish authorities. Throughout the year 1894 the British Government, supported in lukewarm fashion by France and Russia, urged administrative reforms in Armenia.

On May 11, 1895, Great Britain, France, and Russia presented to the Sultan a complicated scheme of reforms. Great Britain alone favored coercion. The Sultan delayed his reply, and finally appealed to France and Russia against England.

While these negotiations had been going on, disturbances arose at Tarsus, Armenians were murdered, and the life of the patriarch threatened. On October 1, 1895, a riot occurred in Constantinople in which a number of Armenians and some Moslems were killed.

The British ambassador now pressed the scheme of reforms upon the Sultan, who accepted it on October 17. Meanwhile there had been a massacre at Trebizond on October 8, in which armed men from Constantinople took part. Finding there was to be no coercion, the Sultan refused to publish the scheme of reform he had accepted, and organized massacre followed massacre until the summer of 1896. The number of those who perished in these massacres during this period has been variously estimated at from 20,000 to 50,000. Many were forced to embrace Mohammedanism.

#### 6. FINAL FAILURE OF THE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 1896-1897.

In August, 1896, the powers again demanded action by the Sultan and (on September 2) sent him a collective note reviewing the entire situation. On October 20 Lord Salisbury once more proposed a joint

reform program to be followed by coercive measures in case of refusal by the Sultan. On December 26, 1896, a conference of ambassadors met at Constantinople to discuss matters. It ended on February 10, 1897, without accomplishing any real result. By 1898, when the German Emperor visited Jerusalem and Damascus (See article, *The Journeys of William II to the Near East*), it had become evident that Germany was becoming the power behind the Sultan's throne and that so far at least as Armenia was concerned the treaties of 1878 had long been dead, if, indeed it may be claimed that they were ever alive.

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## 73. THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION OF 1903.

### 1. MURDER OF THE KING AND QUEEN.

On June 10, 1903, King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia were murdered in the royal palace at Belgrade by a band of officers of the Serbian Army. The assassination was followed by shocking indignities to the bodies of the dead and by the murder of two brothers of the Queen and of two ministers. The precise origin of the plot is not yet known. A charge has been freely made and widely accepted that it was hatched under Russian auspices, but H. W. Steed (*Hapsburg Monarchy*, 240-241) asserts that the Austro-Hungarian Government was fully informed of meetings held in Vienna by the conspirators.

### 2. CAUSES FOR THE MURDER.

The murder was due to the long-continued misgovernment of the country under Kings Milan and Alexander (1868-1903), to the fact that under the system of government maintained by King Alexander no political opponent of the King, his wife, or her brothers could count his life safe, and to the fear, apparently well founded, that almost any moment might witness further and more irremediable disgrace for the nation than had been its lot during recent unhappy years. "Political revolution was justified on every ground," says Temperley (*History of Serbia*, 280). It was one of Serbia's many misfortunes that revolution was accompanied by murder. King Peter who was called to the throne by the conspirators, though under no suspicion of personal complicity in the murder of his predecessor, was forced to begin his reign under exceptionally trying circumstances.

### 3. ACTION OF OTHER STATES.

The murder of the royal pair was promptly followed by the withdrawal from Belgrade of the diplomatic representatives of all the European States, except Russia and Austria-Hungary. The ministers of these two States were present at King Peter's entrance into his capital on June 24. Later on even these were withdrawn in order to signify the displeasure of the powers at King Peter's failure to dismiss from service and punish the murderers of his predecessor. But during the year 1904 the States which had withdrawn their representatives at Belgrade, except Great Britain, resumed diplomatic relations with Serbia. At the coronation of King Peter on September 21, there were representatives present of all the powers except Great Britain. Resumption of diplomatic relations between Serbia and Great Britain did not take place until August 17, 1906.

## 4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVOLUTION.

The revolution of June, 1903, marked a turning point for Serbia and the change to which it led in that country reacted upon the whole course of events in the international relations of Europe. Under Milan and Alexander, Serbia had become practically a dependency of the Dual Monarchy. King Peter and the men who surrounded him soon began to show that they aspired to play a more independent rôle. Russian influence in large measure replaced Austrian influence. With emancipation from domination by its powerful neighbor and improved government in internal affairs Serbian national pride began to revive and the hopes of Serbian patriots began to dwell upon the glories of Serbia in the days before the Turkish Conquest. In that situation Serbia was in no mood to acquiesce without vigorous protest in any encroachment upon its rights or in any action which threatened to injure seriously its future development. It was this aspect of the matter which made the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, October, 1908, so portentous an event. (See articles on the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909.)

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## 74. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN RAPPROCHEMENT, 1896-1902.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

The long period of rather strained relations between France and Italy (See article, Franco-Italian Antagonism, 1886-1896) came to a close in 1896, following the retirement of Crispi, to whose influence it had been due in large measure. The next six years witnessed the gradual reestablishment of cordial relations between the two countries.

## 2. STEPS IN RAPPROCHEMENT.

The defeat of Italy at Adowa involving an early adjustment of its relations with Abyssinia removed one cause of strife, for in Italy France had been held largely responsible for the determined resistance of Menelek to Italian expansion at the expense of Abyssinia. Rudini, soon after succeeding Crispi, removed another obstacle to



friendship by adjusting Italy's grievances in connection with the French occupation of Tunis (September 28, 1896). Good commercial relations were reestablished by means of a new treaty of commerce, negotiated in 1897 and ratified early in 1899. The convention of 1902, whereby Italy agreed to give France a free hand in Morocco and France recognized the special position of Italy in Tripoli, completed the process. (See article, Italy and the Morocco Question.) From that date Italy, though still a member of the Triple Alliance, stood in many respects closer to France than to its associates of the Triple Alliance.

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### 75. RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND ABYSSINIA, 1893-1900.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Shortly after the French occupation of Tunis (See article, The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881) Italy, who had hoped to obtain Tunis herself, sought consolation by endeavoring to acquire a colony in the Red Sea region. Her enterprise in that quarter soon brought her to a clash with Abyssinia. A conflict was averted for a time by the Treaty of Ucciali, May 2, 1889. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 81, pp. 733-735.) This treaty, according to Italian interpretation, gave Italy a position of virtual domination over the affairs of Abyssinia and was well calculated to facilitate the expansion of the Italian colony.

Besides the opposition from Abyssinia Italy encountered two rivals in the Red Sea region, England and France. An adjustment of their respective spheres of influence was made by Italy and England in 1891 (*Ibid.*, vol. 83, pp. 19-21). France, however, protested against this arrangement.

Shortly afterwards the clearly foreshadowed conflict with Abyssinia broke out. Kink Menelek repudiated the treaty of Ucciali, asserting that article 17 in the Italian text, which secured for Italy control over the foreign relations of Abyssinia, read in an entirely different fashion from the corresponding article of the Arabic text.

## 2. ADOWA.

The revolt of Bath Agos, who governed Okule Kusai on behalf of Italy, confirmed the Italian suspicions that the Abyssinian troops collected on the River Mareb were for use against Eritrea, and after an unanswered appeal to disband these forces, Baratieri attacked. Successes at Coatit and Senafe (Jan. 13-15, 1895) encouraged Crispi to demand the recognition of the Italian protectorate; and Tigre was formally annexed. But when Menelek gathered his hosts the Italians were defeated at Amba Alaghi, Makalle, and most decisively at Adowa (March 1, 1896). Crispi resigned. With some opposition, from the south of Italy especially, the Marchese di Rudini accepted a peace (October 26, 1896) which definitely annulled the Treaty of Ucciali. (Martens, *Traité*s, second series, vol. 25, pp. 59-61.) "Italy recognizes the independence, absolute and without reserve, of the Ethiopian Empire as a sovereign and independent State." A provisional frontier was fixed at the Mareb, Belessa, and Mouna. Italy was to dispose of none of her land except to Abyssinia. A separate agreement freed the Italian prisoners, and Italy later paid £400,000 for the expense of their support. The following year a treaty of commerce gave the Italians the right to trade and travel in Abyssinia and the benefit of the most favored nation clause. Rudini wished in 1897 to restrict the colony to the town of Massowah, but the boundaries finally agreed upon in 1900 followed the line Tomat-Todluc-Mareb-Belessa-Mouna.

## 3. SINCE 1897.

Since 1897 the relations between Italy and Abyssinia have been peaceful. Abyssinia has jealously preserved its independence, making use from time to time of the friendly influence of France, which has been a consistent friend of the African State. The British influence has been somewhat distrusted as that of a powerful and perhaps dangerous neighbor and one that had been the consistent friend of Italy.

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## 76. THE FASHODA AFFAIR, 1898-1899.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

During 40 years (1857-1897) French explorers and travelers traversed the vast distances of the Sahara and the Soudan, claiming the country for France, and it has been noticed that their operations again displayed the nice symmetry and vastness of design which distinguished the work of the French explorers on the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. From the Mediterranean and equatorial seas they gradually converged to Lake Chad; and if they could go farther to the east and north they would reach the Nile and have most of North Africa. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, pp. 812-813.)\* Meanwhile the English, having taken over the administration of Egypt, had after a period of preparation reconquered the lost Egyptian Soudan. In 1898 the French moving across the continent encountered the British advancing from north to south. The result was the affair of Fashoda.

### 2. THE "GREAT DESIGN."

This affair was the outcome of an ambitious project conceived by a group of French statesmen and colonial officials who belonged to or shared the ideas of the Colonial Party. The design was to send an expedition from the French possessions in the neighborhood of Lake Chad eastward to the upper waters of the Nile, where it was to be joined by another expedition coming westward from Obock. The authors of the project believed that by these expeditions a claim to the regions traversed could be established and thereby France would obtain control of an African territory stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Success would defeat the ambitions of Englishmen, such as Cecil Rhodes, who looked forward to the extension of the various British possessions in Eastern Africa until it would be possible to build the much-discussed Cape-to-Cairo railroad entirely on British territory. Control over the upper waters of the Nile would enable France to force the reopening of the Egyptian question by bringing the matter before a congress of the powers and might compel the British to evacuate Egypt.

## 3. THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO FASHODA.

In September Sir Herbert Kitchener, the British commander, arrived at Khartoum. There he learned that a small party of Europeans were at Fashoda, on the Nile, 300 miles to the south. Proceeding thither, he found that Major Marchand had taken possession of the place for France. Despite peremptory protest, Marchand declined to withdraw, referring the matter to his government at Paris. (*Ibid.*, p. 118.)

## 1. NEGOTIATIONS.

Delicate negotiations followed. In the House of Commons on March 28, 1895, Sir Edward Grey had declared in behalf of the Government that for France to send expedition to the Upper Nile territory, in view of the long standing British claim to the region, "would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by England." (*Hanard's Debates*, 4th series, vol. 22, pp. 405-406.) On December 10, 1897, the British Government had explicitly laid claim to the country, declaring that it did not recognize the right of any other European power to occupy any part of the Nile Valley. (See Appendix I, 49.) But the French had steadily refused to admit these claims, and Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs, in reply on December 24, had continued to reserve right of discussion. (See Appendix I, 50.) Hanotaux had long been an opponent of England, but in June, 1898, Théophile Delcassé had taken his place. From the start (Sept. 8, 1898) he had expressed desire to arrive at an understanding with England. (See Appendix I, 58.) For a time both sides stood fast. The French took the ground that the rise of the Dervish power (See article, *The Soudan Question*, 1881-1899) had destroyed the title of Egypt to the region; that its reconquest was due to the Kitchener and Marchand expedition; and that the disposition of the territory ought, therefore, to be adjusted by agreement. The negotiations make clear that France hoped for a compromise which would give her a part of the region, including an outlet on the White Nile. England declared that the temporary loss of control by the Egyptian Government did not in the least impair its title; that the Kitchener expedition had reconquered the region; and that no suggestion of compromise could be entertained. Throughout the controversy the case for France was much weakened by the fact that on April 5, 1895, Hanotaux had explicitly asserted in the French Senate that the Dervish insurrection in the Soudan had not destroyed the Egyptian title (*Parliamentary Papers*, Egypt, No. 2 (1898), pp. 20-21; *Staatsarchiv*, vol. 62, pp. 91-94). Public feeling in both countries became greatly excited over the con-



troverſy. For a few days there ſeemed to be real danger of war. But France was in no condition to oppoſe the overwhelming ſea power of Great Britain, could not count upon the ſupport of Ruſſia, and was, moreover, diſtracted by the Dreyfus trial. Accordingly ſhe yielded.

#### 5. SETTLEMENT BY DECLARATION OF MARCH 21, 1899.

The declaration ſigned by Lord Salisbury and Paul Cambon, delimited the French and British ſpheres of influences in central Africa. France, abandoning her pretenſions to the Egyptian Soudan, was debarred from the upper reaches of the Nile; on the other hand Great Britain recognized her claims to extenſive regions about Lake Chad, which in effect joined her Sahara dominions with thoſe of the upper Congo. (See Appendix I, 55.) In this manner was paſſed the moſt dangerous criſis which up to that time had reſulted from conflicting colonial ambitions in Africa.

#### 6. DOCUMENTS.

A convention delimiting poſſeſſions in north and central Africa between England and France had been ſigned June 14, 1898. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 91, pp. 38-55. Appendix I, 59.) An additional declaration, March 21, 1899, contained the ſettlement of the Fashoda diſpute (Ibid., pp. 55-57). It provided that "Her Britannic Maſteſty's Government engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the weſt of the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Republic engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the eaſt of the ſame line." Paragraph two drew the line.

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## 77. THE ATTEMPTED FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1898.

### I. ORIGIN OF THE PROJECT.

In the years just preceding the Fashoda crisis the rivalry between England and France appeared to be almost as bitter as that between France and Germany. During these years also Germany turned more and more away from England and associated herself with France and Russia. (Pinon, *France et Allemagne*, p. 87.) With respect to France this was the easier since Hanotaux, minister for foreign affairs, was notoriously opposed to England and in favor of an understanding with Germany; and there were some other Frenchmen who believed that Italy and England were the nearest and most dangerous foes. (Hohenlohe, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, II, 408.) Accordingly, the Kaiser attempted to arrange an understanding with France. He was on intimate terms with the French ambassador at Berlin, and during the winter of 1897-8 held with him conversations which presently advanced so far that the matter was transferred to Paris to be completed between Hanotaux and the German ambassador, Count Münster. (Albin, *Le "Coup" d'Agadir*, pp. 83-84.)



## 2. NEGOTIATIONS.

Just when the negotiations seemed to be going well, the attention of French statesmen was taken up with the Dreyfus case, and then came the Fashoda affair. (Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 53.) June 19 Count Münster presented a memorandum, but a few days later Hanotaux fell from power, and the new cabinet carried the matter no farther. (Pinon, p. 98.) It is said that German diplomacy was thwarted partly by revelations of de Blowitz, who repeated his exploit of 1875. (Fullerton, p. 54, note.)

## 3. TERMS.

None of the official documents bearing upon the transaction have been published. The terms of the proposed entente are known only by inference. A number of qualified observers have supposed that France was to receive some satisfaction in Europe, but while this would have furnished the best foundation for a Franco-German accord, it is doubtful and improbable. (Albin, pp. 83-84.) Fullerton and several French writers declare that the intended arrangement had to do with drawing France and Germany closer together on the general basis of opposition to England, who was to be forced to yield to her opponents some of the colonial spoils of the world; and that in particular the accord concerned a division of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, assistance for France in the valley of the Upper Nile, and for Germany in getting what she wanted in Central Africa, so as to block the ambitions of England there. (Fullerton, p. 53; Albin, pp. 83-84; Pinoñ, pp. 97-98.)

## 4. WHY THE PROJECT FAILED.

The projected accord was abandoned when Hanotaux, its leading French advocate, resigned. There was probably never any real chance for the success of the project. Entrance into such an understanding on the part of France would have involved tacit, if not actual, acceptance of the Treaty of Frankfort as a permanent settlement. Though the French were anxious to maintain peace in Europe and recognized that the long continued animosity between France and Germany was perhaps the chief obstacle to the development among the European nations of a state of mind favorable to peace, France could not agree to leave the Alsatians under the dominion of Germany. In that fact is to be found the fundamental reason for the failure of the projected accord.

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## 78. THE KRUGER TELEGRAM, 1896.

### 1. THE JAMESON RAID, 1895-1896.

On December 29, 1895 (to January 2, 1896), an event occurred which greatly embittered the Boers against the British and Uitlanders. This was the Jameson Raid—a sudden invasion of the Transvaal by a few hundred troopers under Dr. Jameson, the administrator of Rhodesia, with the evident purpose of supporting the Uitlanders, and probably of overthrowing the Kruger government. The raiders were captured and handed over to England. Cecil Rhodes was universally regarded as the man really responsible for the movement, and his name was generally held in abhorrence by the Boers.

### 2. THE KRUGER TELEGRAM, 1896.

On January 3, 1896, the morrow of the failure of the Jameson Raid, the German Emperor sent the following telegram to President Kruger:

I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression.

This message, as we now know, emanated from the Berlin Foreign Office rather than from the German Emperor personally (Sir V. Chirol. *Quarterly Review*, vol. 221, p. 424.) According to the Paris correspondent of the London Times (See Times for Oct. 29, 1918), Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, German minister of foreign affairs, on the day prior to the Kruger telegram, called upon M. Herbette, the French ambassador at Berlin, to inquire whether France would join Germany with a view of securing the integrity and independence of the Boer States. M. Herbette replied that France would like to know whether as a quid pro quo German support in the Egyptian question would be rendered to her, and the



matter went no farther. Prince Bülow admitted in the Reichstag on December 12, 1901, that the telegram was a *ballon d'essai* and that he was disappointed by its reception in France.

It is well established that there had been political intrigues between Germany and the Transvaal ever since President Kruger's European tour which followed the signing of the London convention in 1884. (See article, *The International Status of the South African Republic, 1877-1884.*) In a dispatch, dated February 1, 1895, from Baron Marschall von Bieberstein to Count Hatzfeld, the German ambassador to London, the Baron stated that the beginning and end of German policy in the Transvaal was the protection of the material interests of Germany, which required the maintenance of the Transvaal as an independent State in the measure of the treaty of 1884, and the upholding of the status quo regarding the railways and the harbor at Delagoa Bay. Dr. Jameson's idea that Rhodesia would become the link of the commercial union, amalgamation, or federation of all South African States was antagonistic to German interests.

There was perhaps nothing objectionable in the Kruger telegram as a mere protest against such an international misdemeanor as the Jameson Raid—an act which was promptly repudiated by the British Government; but it was much more than such a protest. It intimated that the maintenance of the independence of the Boer Republic fell within the scope of German interests, and that Germany would not hesitate, under certain conditions, to interfere in South African affairs.

### 3. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the Kruger telegram in the history of Anglo-German relations after 1896. It contributed more, perhaps, than any other single event to the creation of that widespread suspicion and apprehension of Germany on the part of the British public which marked the years from 1896 to 1914, and which was assumed by the German public to prove the existence of hostile and aggressive British designs against Germany. The effect of the Kruger telegram in England thereby helped produce the German state of mind which led directly to the World War.

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## 79. THE SEIZURE OF GERMAN SHIPS DURING THE BOER WAR.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Near the end of the first year of the Boer War relations between Germany and England, already affected by manifest German sympathy with the Boers and apparent dislike of England, were for a while made worse by an episode which aroused great indignation in Germany and occasioned brusque and peremptory diplomatic communications.

### 2. SEIZURES.

In the winter of 1899, when the German steamer *Bundesrath* was at Aden, suspicion was aroused that she was carrying contraband of war and German officers and men to the Boers. About the same time also report came that the German steamship *Herzog* had left the Suez Canal with a considerable number of Germans and Dutch apparently intending to enter service in the Transvaal. In December a British warship brought into Durban the *Bundesrath*, which had been seized off Delagoa Bay. The *Herzog* was also detained soon after. Meanwhile the *General*, of the German East African Line, was stopped at Aden. All of these vessels were held and searched.

### 3. GERMAN PROTESTS AND CLAIMS.

Protest about the *Bundesrath* had been made at once, and on December 30 Count von Bülow sent for the British ambassador in Berlin, and declaring that the Hamburg-American Co. gave assurance that there was no contraband aboard, desired that the vessel be speedily released. Next day the German ambassador in London asserted that such wrongful seizure of mail steamers interfered with common interest. The German Government in pressing its demand that the vessels be given up, protested that no contraband was being carried; but declared that in any event Great Britain had no right to seize and detain these ships, since they were proceeding from one neutral port to another, and that with respect to goods carried to Portuguese territory it was for the Portuguese authorities to prevent them being sent to the Transvaal: "There can not be contraband of war in trade between neutral ports."



It was contended that such had been the view taken by the British authorities in 1863 in the case of the *Springbok* against the judgment of an American prize court. January 7, von Bülow asked for a reply to his complaint, desired prompt release, payment for losses sustained, and cessation of such practices in the future. The Marquis of Salisbury thought that the German communications were of a tone very unusual in diplomatic correspondence.

#### 4. RELEASE OF THE GERMAN VESSELS.

Meanwhile search had been made as speedily as could be, though with unavoidable delay. Notwithstanding discoveries which seemed to confirm the British suspicions there was not what was deemed proof sufficient to warrant sending the vessels before a prize court. Accordingly, while Lord Salisbury replied that Germany had misstated the British position with respect to the *Springbok*, yet that the *Herzog* had been released after search, and the *General* because she was stopped so far from her destination, but that the *Bundesrath* would be held for further action by a prize court. The tone of German communications was softened now; it was explained that the German contention was not pressed because there was hope for an amicable agreement. No more mail steamers were seized on suspicion alone, and presently the *Bundesrath* was released.

#### 5. SETTLEMENT.

In subsequent negotiations the British Government agreed in principle to compensation for the detention of the vessels; it expressed regret, but did not accept the German contention that contraband must be interpreted merely as articles or persons "suited for war." Nor did it accept the German contention that there was no contraband from one neutral port to another, a question which Germany reserved the right to raise at some future time. The matter was finally disposed of in September, 1900, when the joint commission appointed to settle the compensation agreed upon the sum of £79,563 to be paid to German owners by the British Government.

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### 80. TREATY OF VEREENIGING, 1902.

#### 1. ANNEXATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLICS.

Great Britain proclaimed the annexation of the Orange Free State on May 28, 1900, and of the Transvaal on September 11, following. After these annexations the British refused to negotiate

with the Boers on any basis except the surrender of their independence.

## 2. OFFER OF MEDIATION BY THE NETHERLANDS.

In January, 1902, the Government of Netherlands informally tendered its mediation, but Great Britain refused to negotiate except directly with the South African Republics. Lord Kitchener was instructed, however, to transmit copies of the correspondence regarding the Dutch offer to the Boer leaders. These latter replied, almost immediately with a request for a conference on peace proposals to which the British agreed.

## 3. CONFERENCE OF PRETORIA APRIL 12, 1902.

At a conference held at Pretoria of Lords Milner and Kitchener representing the British Government with the Boer leaders, the Boers wished to negotiate on the basis of independence. They offered full political rights to the Outlanders, equality of English with Dutch in the schools, a customs union with Great Britain, arbitration of future disputes, and mutual amnesty. The British, however, refused to "entertain any proposals which were based upon the former independence of the republics." The Boers then decided to refer the British ultimatum to a congress elected for the purpose.

## 4. CONGRESS OF VEREENIGING.

Thirty representatives from each of the Boer Republics met at Vereeniging to consider the terms of peace. The congress appointed commissioners who offered to surrender the conduct of foreign affairs to Great Britain, but asked internal autonomy under British supervision. They also agreed to surrender a part of their territory. These terms were refused. The Boers then asked the British to name their terms.

## 5. TREATY OF VEREENIGING.

Milner and Kitchener formulated a set of articles based on the surrender of Boer independence. These provided for the surrender of all arms, but the Boers were to be returned to their homes without loss of liberty or property. The Dutch language was to be permitted in courts and the schools. Civil government was to be reestablished and representative institutions set up as soon as possible. The Boers were not to pay any special tax on account of the war. Commissions were to be appointed to restore normal conditions and the British Government was to provide a fund of £3,000,000 for the relief of destitution due to the war. Notes and receipts issued by commanders in the field were to be accepted as evidence of "war losses." If additional sums



were needed the British Government agreed to make loans, the first two years to be without interest. Citizens of Natal and Cape Colony who fought for the Boers were to be dealt with according to the laws of their colonies, but immunity was practically promised. Largely through the influence of Gen. Smuts, these terms were accepted, and the treaty was signed at Pretoria on May 31, 1902. (See Appendix I, 66.)

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### 81. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1894-1904.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

At the close of the last century Morocco was the last independent State of Africa Minor. A Mohammedan country, it was submerged in feudal anarchy, which was accentuated by the absence of geographical unity and the fighting propensities of the various tribes. Down to 1894 the Sultan Mulai Hassan and after his death the grand vizier Ben Hamed managed to protect such Europeans as settled in the country for purposes of commerce. But the weakness of the Government and the addiction of Sultan Abdul Assiz to costly refinements of European life brought on bankruptcy, and a tribal revolt in 1903 made European intervention inevitable. With an area of 219,000 square miles and a population of only 5,000,000 Morocco could receive a large number of European settlers; the climate was salubrious; the agricultural possibilities were boundless; and the soil was rich in iron and other ores much in demand by industrial nations.

#### 2. WHY FRANCE BECAME INTERESTED IN MOROCCO.

The power with the most vital interest in Morocco was France. Ever since Algeria became a French colony (1830-1847), the Moroccan frontier had been a source of trouble. After the occupation of

the last Saharan oases in the nineties, Morocco came to be regarded as the necessary keystone of the French African Empire, and the colonial party in France openly expressed its desire for annexation or a protectorate. In the event of a war with Germany, the Republic might supply the deficiency in its own army from the fighting tribesmen; the position of France throughout Africa might be seriously compromised by Mohammedan agents in the pay of Germany operating from an independent Morocco.

### 3. THE RIVALS OF FRANCE IN MOROCCO.

Nevertheless the assertion of French control was no easy task. Spain, with four presidios on the Mediterranean littoral and a small settlement on the Atlantic coast, was not to be ignored. Germany was already in the field as a commerce-gatherer, a treaty of 1890 having secured for her the most-favored-nation treatment; German travelers published numerous monographs about the country, and the expansionists wished to see Morocco, or a part of it, become a German colony. Italy was seeking revenge for the French occupation of Tunis, and in 1895, it appears, the British, German, and Italian ministers considered recommending an Italian protectorate. But the most serious opponent of French designs was Great Britain. She enjoyed the largest share of the trade, and she desired to preserve the independence and integrity of the country; her agents and traders practically controlled the Shereefian Government; her policy required that Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, should not pass into European occupation.

### 4. AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY AND SPAIN, 1902-1904.

France undertook no aggressive campaign until the outbreak of the Boer War. M. Delcassé, the foreign minister, reached an agreement with Italy, 1900-1902 (See article, Italy and the Morocco Question) by which the latter withdrew her pretensions in return for French recognition of her claims in Tripoli. Negotiations were opened with Spain, and in 1902 a secret treaty, negotiated but not ratified, provided for the partition of Morocco; the project was presently dropped by Spain, for fear of offending Great Britain, but the principle was established that Spain was an interested party. (See article, Spain and Morocco, 1894-1912.) M. Delcassé is said also to have negotiated with Germany, but this remains obscure.

### 5. ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTION OF 1904.

After the Boer War the British Government inaugurated a policy of liquidating various disputes which might fetter its freedom of action; a policy the more desirable, if indeed not necessary, in view



of a distinct unfriendliness recently displayed by Germany. The most important matter was the question of Egypt, where the French had systematically hindered the British since their occupation in 1882. In 1903 M. Delcassé made overtures to Lord Lansdowne, the British foreign secretary, for a joint settlement of the Egyptian and Moroccan questions, for which the way had been prepared by the refusal of Lord Lansdowne, in June, 1901, to proclaim a British protectorate over Morocco, as desired by the Sultan.

The result was the agreement of April 8, 1904. (See Appendix I, 68, and article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*.) The published articles bound the two Governments not to "alter the political status" of either Egypt or Morocco, but in secret articles, not published till 1911, they considered "the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco," and they promised mutual assistance in seeking reforms in either country. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-1060.) In other words, France had secured the diplomatic support of Great Britain in her Moroccan policy. As regards Spain, her interests on the Mediterranean littoral were recognized by the public declaration, and France was bidden to come to terms with her. By a public declaration of October 3, 1904, France and Spain declared that they were "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," but secretly they concluded a second treaty which was communicated to the British Government and which bound Spain never "to alienate or cede, in any form, even temporarily, the whole or any part of the territories awarded to her"—a precaution, perhaps, against a German purchase or lease. (See article, *Spain and Morocco, 1894-1912*.)

#### 6. FRENCH PACIFIC PENETRATION.

France was now in a position to develop a more active policy, a policy foreshadowing, and, indeed, the compelling cause of the agreements with Great Britain and Spain. Since 1898 she had been complaining of Moroccan raids on the Algerian frontier and of the murder of several of her citizens. In May, 1901, a squadron appeared before Tangier, and on July 20 a treaty was signed in Paris, to be followed by others on April 20 and May 7, 1902. These instruments provided for a more satisfactory policing of the Algerian frontier and paved the way for *pénétration pacifique*. A serious native rebellion hindered the execution of these agreements and so increased the financial difficulties of the Shereefian Government that in June, 1904, a loan of 62,500,000 francs had to be raised in Paris. The apple seemed ready to fall into the French

lap, and so sure of victory was M. Delcassé that he delayed till February, 1905, to present a program of reforms which would have converted Morocco into a virtual French protectorate.

Unfortunately for France, the battle of Mukden temporarily destroyed the military power of Russia, France's ally; the Kaiser dramatically intervened, thereby precipitating the crisis of 1905-6. (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906.*)

#### 7. APPRAISEMENT OF FRENCH POLICY.

The policy pursued by France, though fully justified at most points in the light of subsequent events, exposed her to two criticisms: (1) That she had publicly committed herself to maintaining the integrity and independence of the Moorish Empire, but was, in effect, secretly preparing its partition and absorption. (2) That she had come to terms with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, but had ignored Germany, even to the point of failing to communicate officially to Germany the convention of April 18, 1904. The French Government doubtless felt that Germany's interests in Morocco were only secondary and commercial. But the course which was followed failed to take sufficient account of the fact that the French Army and Navy were both in ill condition for war, and that Germany, with her powerful military machine, might take advantage of any special opportunity to attempt to force upon France the acceptance of such demands as Germany chose to bring forward. Russia's loss of military power soon offered that opportunity. It was out of this state of affairs that the crisis of 1905-1906 arose. (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906.*)

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## 82. THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO FREE STATE BY BELGIUM, 1889-1908.

### 1. THE BEQUEST BY KING LEOPOLD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE TO BELGIUM, 1889.

The international status of the Congo Free State was from the first an anomalous one. (See article, *The Formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885.*) The first step toward annexation by Belgium may be said to have been taken on August 2, 1889, when King Leopold bequeathed to Belgium "all our sovereign rights over the Independent State of the Congo, as they are recognized by the declarations, conventions, and treaties concluded since 1884 between the foreign powers on the one side, the International Association of the Congo



and the Independent State of the Congo on the other, as well as all the benefits, rights, and advantages attached to that sovereignty." In July, 1890, Belgium acquired, by the terms of a loan to the Congo Free State, the option of annexing the State on the expiration of ten years and six months.

## 2. PROJECTS OF ANNEXATION, 1895-1908.

On January 9, 1895 the Belgian Government made a treaty with the King to take over the Free State with all its claims, possessions, and obligations, as from the 1st of January of that year. A bill embodying these provisions was introduced into the Belgian Parliament, but it was finally withdrawn after long delays and much opposition. In 1901, another bill was introduced in favor of annexation, but upon this occasion it encountered the opposition of the Government.

## 3. CHARGES OF MALADMINISTRATION.

The discussions which took place on this subject of annexation were greatly embittered by the accusations of maladministration brought against the administration of the Congo State. After 1891, when the great wealth of the Congo region in rubber and ivory had become apparent, the character of the Congo administration appears to have undergone a complete change. About 1895 the Government of the Congo Free State became a trading monopoly practicing or permitting the most atrocious tyranny and merciless exploitation of the natives. The regulations laid down at the Berlin Conference (See article, *The Berlin Conference of 1884-85*) were completely disregarded.

## 4. LANSDOWNE'S DISPATCH OF AUG. 3, 1903.

The agitation against these abuses was particularly strong in Great Britain. On August 8, 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, issued a circular dispatch to the British representatives at the courts of the powers which had signed the Berlin act of 1884-85, calling attention to the alleged cases of ill-treatment of natives and to the existence of trade monopolies in the Congo Free State, stating in conclusion that the British Government would "be glad to receive any suggestions which the Governments of the Signatory Powers might be disposed to make in reference to this important question, which might perhaps constitute, wholly or in part, the subject of a reference to the Tribunal at The Hague." (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 96, pp. 536-540.)

Save from Turkey, this dispatch failed to evoke any response, but public agitation on the subject continued and even increased in vio-

lence, particularly after the publication in February, 1904, of a report by Mr. Roger Casement, then British consul at Boma.

#### 5. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, 1904-5.

In July, 1904, King Leopold appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate conditions in the Congo and, if necessary, recommend reforms. The report of the commission was published in November, 1905. The existence of great abuses in the upper Congo was recognized by the report of the commission which also recommended certain mild reforms. The principle of forced labor and the concessions system were, however, upheld. Certain reforms, adopted in 1906, proved illusory.

#### 6. TREATY OF CESSION AND FINAL ANNEXATION, 1908.

The agitation for annexation was now renewed. On November 28, 1907, a treaty of cession between Belgium and the Congo Free State was signed which stipulated for the maintenance of the rights, privileges, and profits of the Crown in the Congo. It was learned that these provisions stood no chance of acceptance by the Belgian Parliament or the British Government. Consequently negotiations between the Belgian King and the Belgian Premier were resumed. Great Britain let it be known that she could not approve any semi-transfer which left the controlling power in the Congo "in the hands of the present authorities." On March 5, 1908, an additional act was signed omitting the objectionable clauses in the treaty of cession. Finally in September, 1908, after a long debate which made it clear that the Belgian people did not desire colonial possessions but saw no other means of escape from an intolerable situation, the treaty of cession (as amended), the additional act, and a colonial law were accepted by the Belgian Parliament. The Congo Free State ceased to exist on November 14, 1908, its rights and obligations of sovereignty having passed over to Belgium.

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### 83. CHINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1876-1894.

#### 1. THE RECOGNITION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE, 1876-1887.

A new phase in the history of the Korean question was begun with the recognition of Korean independence by Japan in 1876. In 1882 a treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded between Korea and the United States. This was followed by similar treaties with Germany and Great Britain in 1883, with Russia and Italy in 1884, with France in 1886-87, and with Austria-Hungary in 1892. These treaties in general provided for the opening to foreign trade of certain Korean ports and the grant to foreign consuls of extra-territorial jurisdiction. (See Appendix I, 21, 24, 25, 28, 32, 41.)

#### 2. CHINO-JAPANESE INTERVENTION, 1882-1885.

This "open door" policy was violently opposed by the "exclusionist" faction in Korea, which in 1882, incited an insurrection directed mainly against the Japanese at Seoul. It resulted in the intervention of China and Japan and the stationing of Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. In December, 1884, as the result of another intervention, incited by the pro-Japanese or "progressive" faction, China and Japan suddenly found themselves on the brink of war. But war was averted at the last moment by the conclusion of the treaty of Tientsin negotiated by Count Ito and Li-Hun-Chang in 1885.

#### 3. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, APRIL 18, 1885.

Both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. "In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea which might necessitate the respective countries or either of

them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood that they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention so to do, and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops and not further station them there." (Hertslet, *China Treaties*, I, 361–362.)

#### 4. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1885 AND 1894.

The Chino-Japanese treaty of 1885 paved the way for the Chino-Japanese war of 1894–1895. Yuan-Shi-Kai, the Chinese resident at Seoul, became the main support of the Korean throne. The nine years which followed (1885–1894) were marked by internal disorder in Korea and by intrigues between the various pro-Chinese, Japanese, and Russian factions.

#### 5. THIRD INSURRECTION OF 1894.

In 1894, in consequence of a third insurrection, Japanese and Chinese troops once more faced each other in Korea. Japan, incensed by the murder of her protégé Kim-ok-Kim at Shanghai, was determined to solve the Korean question by means of certain reforms, as also by the suppression of the insurrection. China, on the other hand, opposed these reforms and, ignoring the Tientsin convention, reasserted her ancient rights of suzerainty.

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### 84. THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895.

#### MAIN PROVISIONS.

This treaty was negotiated at the close of the Chino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 by Count Ito on behalf of Japan and Li-Hung-Chang, representing China, and was signed on April 17, 1895. (See



Appendix I, 44.) It provided, among other things, for the complete independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), Formosa, and the Pescadores, as also the payment to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels.

At the instance of three of the great powers (Russia, Germany, and France) Japan was not permitted to retain the Liao-tung Peninsula; but was required within a few weeks to agree to the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula. (See article, *The Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula*.)

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### 85. RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA BY JAPAN, NOVEMBER 8, 1895.

#### 1. TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895.

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (See article, that title), Japan had, among other things, exacted from China the cession of the Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), which placed in Japan's hands, so to speak, the key to Peking, Manchuria, and Korea.

#### 2. DIPLOMATIC INTERCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE POWERS.

Naturally, the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki had been watched with the keenest interest by the leading European powers. Particularly alert was Russia, who realized the importance of the cession of Port Arthur from the standpoint of her own aims and ambitions. There followed an interchange of views between the foreign offices of St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, and London which has never been published. But it is well known that France readily acceded to the Russian desire for a joint intervention, and that Germany changed her former policy and allied herself with Russia and France in this new undertaking. Great Britain, on the other hand, veered over from the side of China to that of Japan and declined to participate in the proposed intervention.

#### 3. THE INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND GERMANY.

On April 23, 1895, the representatives of Russia, France, and Germany at Tokio joined in a "friendly recommendation" to the Japanese Government declaring that the "contemplated possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan would not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but would also render the in-

dependence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East." Accordingly, "in a spirit of candid friendship for Japan," they advised the Japanese Government to "renounce the definite possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula."

This "friendly advice" on the part of the three powers was reinforced by an augmentation and concentration of their Far Eastern fleets, and by the preparation of the army contingents in the Amur region for quick mobilization on the part of Russia.

#### 4. JAPAN RECEDES THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA, MAY, 1895.

Consequently, the Japanese Government decided early in May 1895, in consideration of an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels from China, to relinquish the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula. On May 10, 1895, the Mikado issued an Imperial Rescript, declaring that "out of regard for peace," he had decided to accept the "advice of the friendly powers," and had commanded his Government to "negotiate with the Chinese Government respecting all arrangements for the return of the particular districts." In accordance with this rescript, a Chino-Japanese convention for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895.

#### 5. IMPORTANCE OF THE RETROCESSION.

The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan to China marks a turning point in the history of Japan, more particularly in her relations with Russia. Japan became convinced that war with Russia was inevitable and that it would come at an early date. Though hardly a fundamental cause of the Russo-Japanese War, this belief probably hastened that day.

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For the text of the Treaty of Retrocession, see Hertslet, *China Treaties* (London, 1908), No. 63, pp. 370 ff.

### 86. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1895-1904.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The name "open-door" has been popularly given to a policy proposed by Secretary John Hay in 1899 to the chanceries of the great powers suggesting an agreement to preserve equality of commercial opportunity among all nations trading with and in China.



The first important step taken by the United States toward formal diplomatic relations with China is the act of Congress approved March 3, 1813, to "establish the future commercial relations between the United States and China on terms of nation equal reciprocity." This resulted in the embassy of Caleb Cushing to China and the conclusion there of a convention of peace July 3, 1844. In a covering letter transmitting his treaty Cushing recognized the obligations of all nations to Great Britain for opening China, and declared it the purpose of the United States to extend the accruing benefit to "all Christendom." (Senate Ex. Doc. 67, 28th Cong., 2d Sess.).

To this principle of equal participation of advantages in China was due America's action, in association with England and France, at the time of the Arrow War of 1857-1860, when a plenipotentiary was sent to negotiate a treaty, not in alliance but in harmony with the aims of the two European powers involved in that conflict. This treaty (of Tientsin, 1858) added nothing directly to the evolution of the open-door idea, but some extension of it was implied in a dispatch of our minister, Anson Burlingame, to Seward, June 2, 1862, urging that if the treaty powers could agree among themselves on the neutrality of China and together secure order in the treaty ports, the interests of humanity would be subserved. He had, therefore, in agreement with the other foreign ministers at Peking, instructed the consul general at Shanghai as to the "extent of the rights and duties of American citizens under the treaty." The purpose of these instructions was to "substitute fair diplomatic action in China for force." The Government of the United States has adhered consistently to these purposes—reciprocity, integrity of Chinese territory, and cooperation with other treaty powers—ever since that time.

## 2. THE HAY DOCTRINE, 1899.

Hay's reenunciation of this policy was prompted by the acquisition of several strategic harbors in China by European powers soon after the defeat of China by Japan in 1895 (See articles, *The Leasing of Kiaou-Chau*, *The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia*, *The Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain*), and by the delimitation of the Empire into "spheres of influence" for its exploitation and control by their nationals and governments. His declaration that the United States would insist that such ports and "spheres" must be open to the world on equal terms implied an objection on the part of the American Government to the appropriation by European powers of Chinese territory at will. He asks (in his dispatch of September 6, 1899, to the American Embassy at Berlin) assurances from Germany and other powers that (1) each power within

its respective sphere of influence will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest it may have in China; (2) that the Chinese treaty tariff shall be applied within such spheres, unless they be free ports, and be collected by the Chinese Government; and (3) that no railway charges or dues on vessels higher than those exacted from its own nationals shall be levied in the sphere of any foreign power. (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, p. 129.)

The so-called Burlingame treaty of 1868 with the United States especially guaranteed to China its rights respecting concessions and grants of land to foreigners, while it discouraged unnecessary dictation or interference in its internal affairs. As Hay was Lincoln's private secretary and personally acquainted with Seward's policy in Asia the inference is suggested that his proposals in this circular note of 1899 were based upon the declarations of our treaties and upon Burlingame's doctrine of "cooperation and fair play." These principles were accepted by France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia. (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, pp. 128-143.) The formal acknowledgment by Germany was in von Bülow's memorandum of February 19, 1900, to Mr. White:

The Imperial Government has from the beginning not only asserted but also practically carried out to the fullest extent in its Chinese possessions absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation, and commerce. If therefore the other powers interested in the industrial development of the Chinese Empire are willing to recognize the same principles, this can only be desired by the Imperial Government, which in this case upon being requested will gladly be willing to participate with the United States of America and the other powers in an agreement made upon these lines, by which the same rights are reciprocally secured. (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, p. 131.)

Hay's circular of September, 1899, was due largely to economic motives—the desire to preserve a potential market. By asking each power separately, each was compelled to answer by itself, and thus assent was secured to a useful principle. No concrete agreement was concluded, but Hay notified the powers that he took their adherence to the principle proposed to be "final and definitive." (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1899, pp. 142-143.) He thus accomplished all that diplomacy could do by itself to prevent the "spheres" in China from passing from one power to another and perhaps prevented China from being entirely absorbed through complete economic domination.

### 3. HAY'S CIRCULAR NOTE OF 1900.

A crisis of the first magnitude confronted the sponsor for this doctrine when the Boxer uprising threatened the lives and property of all foreigners in China in the summer of 1900. (See article, The



Boxer Uprising.) While the legations in Peking were still besieged a circular sent by Hay, July 3, 1900, to American representatives to the great powers announced the course of the United States after the restoration of order. It regarded the situation in Peking as one of virtual anarchy, and declared the purpose of the United States to act with other powers in restoring communication, protecting life and property, and preventing the spread of disorder or a recurrence of such a disaster. Its policy in the premises was to seek such a solution as would bring peace, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, and "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900*, pp. 312-313.)

When, during the military operations of 1900, the Europeans seized tracts in and about the city of Tientsin the American legation served notice upon the others that it might reoccupy a small tract which had formed the American concession there in 1869. The military necessity for this step having disappeared with the end of hostilities, the United States had no further desire to occupy the ground, especially when advised by the Viceroy Li that certain occupants of the land might involve Americans and Europeans in complications and litigation. The project was relinquished in November, 1901, and the American Government remained—as it still does—without any territorial possession in China. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901*, 39.)

#### 4. THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1900.

The Anglo-German agreement of October 16, 1900, upholding the open-door principle, disclaimed territorial designs in China on the part of the signatories, and indorsed the balance of power existing among Europeans located in China by "reserving to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding" in case another power should make use of the existing complications to obtain territorial advantage. Japan agreed to the declaration October 29, as did the United States a little later, while expressing itself unconcerned with the threat implied in the concluding sentence. Russia declined to recognize any new feature in the agreement. (*British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 1, 1900.*)

#### 5. RUSSIA AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Russia's acts in the Amur region and Manchuria, refusing to withdraw her troops from the latter in accord with repeated promises made to Japan between 1901 and 1904 (See articles on Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904, and The Russian Advance into Man-

churia, 1895-1903), precipitated the conflict of 1904-1905, known as the Russo-Japanese War. It was, in fact, a refusal on her part to uphold the open-door principle in practice, though frequently avowed upon her own initiative in her correspondence with other States. The United States had no part in the war. On January 13, 1905, Mr. Hay wrote to the representatives of the great powers disclaiming any thoughts of reserving territorial rights or control in the Chinese Empire, and inviting an expression of their views. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, p. 1.*)

#### 6. MEANING OF THE OPEN DOOR.

The Open Door is a declaration of policy, not an assertion of international law. It calls a halt to further extensions of ownership or control, however disguised. It seeks to arrest a process that has continued for three centuries almost unchallenged in various parts of Africa and Asia. The integrity of China is a corollary to which the United States is committed not from sentiment only but to preserve for present and future use the access to China as **a market.**

"The Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of the western community of nations, does not stand isolated, as an unrelated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact between the East and the West." (A. T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions*, pp. 184-185.)

#### NOTES OR AGREEMENTS AS TO CHINA'S INTEGRITY, 1899-1905.

1899, September 6: Hay's circular note asking six powers to make a formal declaration approving an open-door policy in the territories controlled by them in China.

1900, March 20: Hay's announcement that, as all the powers had accepted the declaration suggested, he would consider the assent given as "final and definitive."

1900, July 3: Hay's circular telegram to eleven powers of American desire to solve the complication in China so as to preserve her entity and safeguard principle of impartial and equal trade.

1900, July 7: Lord Salisbury "emphatically concurs" with the above telegram and tells Commons (August 2) that the British Government "are opposed to any partition of China."

1900, October 16: British-German Agreement to "direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire."

1900, October 29: Hay announces that eleven countries had signified approval of principles stated in his telegram of July 3.



1902, January 30: Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty preamble declaring the two Governments to be actuated by a desire to preserve peace and status quo and "specially interested in maintaining territorial integrity of China and Korea and securing equal opportunities in those countries."

1905, January 13: Hay advises seven European powers of his desire to "strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the integrity of China and the open door in the Orient." Five powers at once declare their adhesion to the policy.

1905, August 12: Anglo-Japanese alliance, first renewal, stipulates: insuring the independence and integrity of China and principle of equal opportunity. On September 6 Lord Salisbury transmits this instrument to the Russian Government, counting on the good will and support of all the powers in seeking to uphold the integrity and independence of China and the principle of equal opportunity.

1905, September 5: Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan and Russia agree to restore to China all of Manchuria occupied by their troops excepting Liaotung, and engage not to obstruct China's measures for its development "common to all countries."

1905, December 22: Chino-Japanese treaty confirming the Portsmouth treaty.

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For Documents, *see* Rockhill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904 (Washington, Govt. Print. Office, 1904); Hertslet, G. E. P., Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and China, and between China and Foreign Powers in Force, 1908 (London, Harrison, 1908), 2 vols.; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899-1904 (Washington); Parliamentary Papers, China, 1900 to 1905 (London).

## 87. LEASING OF KIAO-CHAU BY GERMANY, MARCH 6, 1898.

### 1. CIRCUMSTANCES.

The occasion or pretext for the seizure of the port of Tsingtau at the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau in November, 1897, and the subsequent leasing on March 6, of Kiao-chau, was afforded by the murder on November 1, 1897, of two German Catholic priests. It seems probable from a statement made in the German Reichstag by von Bülow, minister of foreign affairs, on April 27, 1898 (Parliamentary Papers, China (No. 1), 1899, p. 67), that the German Government had concluded that China was about to be partitioned, and that Germany must have her share of the spoils. How Russia, which had manifested a particular interest in Kiao-chau (See article, The Cassini convention), was propitiated is not definitely known, though it may be readily inferred that no obstacles were placed upon the leasing of Port Arthur by Russia a few days later. (See article, The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898.)

However that may be, three German men-of-war appeared suddenly, about November 17, at Kiao-chau and landed a number of marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port of Tsing-tau. The German Minister at Peking then presented six demands, including the preference for German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung, but not including the lease of Kiao-chau. These demands having been accepted by the Chinese Government, a further demand for the lease of the bay and its surrounding territories was made and reinforced by the arrival of a German squadron under the command of Prince Henry. China yielded at once and a treaty with Germany was promptly signed on March 6, 1898.



## 2. PROVISIONS.

By the terms of Section I of the treaty China "cedes to Germany on lease, provisionally for 99 years, both sides of the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau." China agreed that she would abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term of the lease, and conceded the exercise of the same to Germany. China also agreed, while reserving all rights of sovereignty, to permit the free passage of German troops and to abstain from taking any measures or issuing any ordinances in a zone of 50 kilometers extent around Kiao-chau Bay. Chinese warships and merchant vessels would be placed upon the same basis as the ships of other nations on friendly terms with Germany, but no dues were to be demanded from them, "except those which may be levied upon other vessels for the purpose of maintaining the necessary harbor arrangements and quays." Germany agreed to protect the Chinese population in the ceded territory, "provided that they behave in conformity with law and order," and not to take their land, unless "required for other purposes," in which case compensation was to be made. Germany also agreed not to sublet the leased territory to another power. A special stipulation secured for Germany the right of exchanging its Kiao-chau territory for other Chinese territory more to its liking.

"Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiao-chau Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiao-chau and to cede to Germany a more suitable place."

The text of Sections II and III of the treaty have not been officially published, but the substance of these sections is known from unofficial publications, believed to be substantially correct. By them China agreed to permit a German-Chinese company to build two railway lines in the Province of Shantung. Germans were to be permitted to hold and develop mining property within a distance of 30 li (10 miles) of these railroads. China also agreed that if, for any enterprise in the Province of Shantung, foreign capital or assistance was invited the first opportunity should be offered to German merchants and manufacturers. There appear to have been expressions in the treaty asserting that the provisions in regard to railways and mines were conceived only in the interests of trade and had no other design.

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For the text of the German-Chinese treaty respecting the lease of Kiao-chau, in English, see Hertslet, *China Treaties* (London, 1908), I, No. 59, pp. 350-353. So far as known the sections relating to the

railway and mining concessions have never been officially made known, but a *précis* taken from a Parliamentary Paper on China, No. 1 (1899), p. 152, is published in Hertslet, *op. cit.*, p. 353. Rockhill, W. W., *Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904), pp. 45-51, gives the text of the convention and a map. Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1899), contain some important documents, especially Nos. 63-66, 77. An excellent account of the leasing of Kiao-chau may be found in Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Boston, Houghton, 1904), ch. 3. See also Cordier, *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales*, III, 349-361 (Paris, Alcan, 1902); Reventlow *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik*, pp. 109-114 (Berlin, Mittler, 1916); and B. L. Putnam-Weale, *Re-Shaping of the Far East*, I, 334-346 (London, Macmillan, 1905).

## 88. THE CASSINI CONVENTION, 1896.

### 1. INTRODUCTORY.

This reputed secret agreement between Russia and China is supposed to have been negotiated by Count Cassini, the Russian minister at Peking in 1895. Its publication in the *North China Daily News* of October 28, 1896, created a sensation in the Far East and in the diplomatic world. Authorities on the Far East are divided in opinion as to its authenticity. Asakawa and Putnam-Weale believe that such a convention was negotiated and that the published document corresponds closely, if not completely, to the one which was signed. Cordier thinks the published document a compound of two separate agreements. The convention, if actually negotiated, was never ratified. The significance of the reputed convention lies in the fact that the published document, whether fully authentic or not, revealed substantially the terms of agreements which Cassini had obtained or was about to obtain. Disclosure contributed to the defeat of parts of the Russian program, e. g., that in regard to the Kiao-chau, while other parts were carried out through other agreements concluded between Russia and China. Among the most important of these was an open agreement (September 8, 1896) concluded between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank which provided for the construction of a railway through Manchuria connecting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines of the Siberian railway system. (See article, *The Russian Advance in Manchuria*.)

### 2. TERMS.

The reputed convention conceded to Russia privileges of the most important nature "as a response to the loyal aid given by Russia in the retrocession of Liao-tung and its dependencies." These provisions



included: (a) The right to extend the Siberian Railway into Chinese territory across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. The control of all railways built by Russia in northern Manchuria was to be placed in the hands of Russia for 30 years, at the end of which time China was to be allowed to redeem them. (b) The Russian railways in Manchuria were under "protection" of the Chinese authorities, but "owing to the fact that said railways will pass, for the greater part, through barren and sparsely inhabited territory \* \* \* Russia will be allowed to place special battalions of horse and foot soldiers at the various important stations for the better protection of the railway property." (c) Russians as well as Chinese were to be permitted to open and exploit any of the mines of northern Manchuria. (d) Since "Russia has never possessed a seaport in Asia which is free from ice and open the year round," China declared herself willing to leave temporarily to Russia the port of Kiao-chau, the period of such lease being limited to 15 years. (This provision was, however, never executed, for it was made contingent upon the need of military operations.) (e) China was to fortify the ports of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), in which task Russia was to render all necessary assistance. China further bound herself "never to cede them to another country," and in case military exigencies required it, "to allow Russia temporarily to concentrate her land and naval forces within the said ports."

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For the text of the Russo-Chinese Bank agreement of 1906, see *Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904*, ed. by Rockhill, W. W. (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1904), pp. 212-214.

### 89. LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, MARCH 27, 1898.

#### 1. CIRCUMSTANCES.

Within a few days after the forcible leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany (See article, *The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, March 6, 1898*), on March 6, 1898, Russia on March 27, 1898, acquired from

China the lease for 25 years of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), together with the adjacent waters. (See Appendix I, 53.) Russia had long since coveted an ice-free port, and she was now able to gratify her desire in this matter. On December 20, 1897, several Russian warships arrived at Port Arthur—a step which was officially explained by Count Muravieff as “entirely a question of convenience for the ships” and having “absolutely no connection with the occupation of the Bay of Kiao-chau by Germany.”

## 2. MAIN PROVISIONS.

No Chinese troops of any kind whatever were to be stationed within the boundary of the leased territory, all movements of forces, whether naval or military, were to be under the control of the Russian authority. Port Arthur was to be made a closed port, open only to Russian and Chinese warships, while Talien-wan (Dalny) was to be a trading port open to the merchantmen of all nations.

As a means of “restoring the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li,” Great Britain on April 3 of the same year (1898) obtained the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei. (See article, *Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain, 1898.*) France also obtained a lease of the Kwan-chau Bay on the southeastern coast of China.

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The English text of the Russo-Chinese agreement respecting the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan may be found in *Hertslet, China Treaties* (London, 1908), No. 88, pp. 50 ff. The best documented story of the transaction is that given by Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Boston, Houghton, 1904), ch. 4.

# 90. LEASING OF WEI-HAI-WEI BY GREAT BRITAIN, 1898.

## 1. CIRCUMSTANCES.

Soon after Port Arthur had been leased to Russia (See article, *The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia*) on March 27, 1898, Great Britain obtained the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in the same year, though the lease was not actually signed until July 1. (Appendix I, 56.)

## 2. PURPOSE.

The expressed purpose of this lease, which appears to have had the approval of Japan, was to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, which had been materially altered by the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur. (Salisbury to MacDonald, British minister at Peking, March 25, 1898. *Parliamentary Papers, China, No. I* (1898),



p. 54.) The initiative in the matter appears to have been taken by the Chinese Government (MacDonald to Salisbury, February 25, 1898, *Ibid.*). The cordial cooperation of England and Japan in the matter of this lease seems to have helped prepare the way for the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. (See article, that subject.)

### 3. TERMS.

"Sole jurisdiction" was secured to Great Britain over the islands in the bay of Wei-Hai-Wei and a belt of land 10 miles wide, along the entire coast of the bay. In addition Great Britain obtained the right to erect fortifications, station troops, and "take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes" over a somewhat larger adjacent region, the extent of which was carefully defined. China, however, was permitted to maintain troops, warships, and to exercise jurisdiction in the city of Wei-Hai-Wei, "except in so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements." Expropriation or expulsion of the Chinese inhabitants were specifically forbidden. Wei-Hai-Wei was to remain in the possession of England so long as Port Arthur, which had been leased for 25 years, remained in the hands of Russia.

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## 91. THE BOXER UPRISING—NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT.

### 1. EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN CHINA, 1895-1898.

The Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed the weakness of China when pitted against an enemy employing the methods of Western civilization. Following the war the great powers entered upon a rivalry in the exploitation of the commercial resources of China. In 1898 Germany by force acquired the lease of Kiao-chau (See article, that title) for a period of 99 years. Russia a little later obtained control of Port Arthur and Talienwan for a period of 25 years, the former to be open only to the vessels of Russia and China,

the latter to be in part only open to other nations. Great Britain the same year secured the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for a naval station "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, p. 384.) France had during this time secured a 99-year lease of Kwangchau Bay and in addition valuable railway and mining concessions in the Provinces of Kiang-si and Yun-nan.

## 2. HAY'S OPEN-DOOR POLICY.

These proceedings were followed by the agreements or treaties between Russia and Great Britain and between Germany and Great Britain, as to what are termed "spheres of influence" in China, often without consulting the Government of that country or taking its wishes or interests into account." (Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, 415, and article, *Spheres of Influence in China, 1897-1904*.) The policy of the European powers in demanding "spheres of influence," with exclusive railway and mining privileges led to the "open-door" proposal by Secretary Hay which was either explicitly or tacitly accepted by all the powers interested in China. The principles to which Secretary Hay obtained adhesion were these:

(1) That there should be no interference with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of influence" or leased territory which a power might have in China.

(2) That the Chinese treaty tariff should apply equally to all merchandise shipped to and from ports within the "sphere of influence" unless they were free ports and that such duties should be collected by the Chinese Government.

(3) That no higher harbor dues or railway rates should be levied upon the vessels or goods of another nationality than are levied upon the vessels or goods of the country possessing the "sphere of influence." (56th Cong. 18th Sess. House Doc. No. 547.) Such were the principles of the "open-door" policy which sought to protect the sovereignty and integrity of China by aligning the interests of all the powers including China itself against the selfish exclusiveness of any one power.

## 3. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT.

A strong reaction occurred in China in 1898-99 against the foreign influences which were fast undermining the political, social, and religious tenets of the country. This opposition made itself felt against all foreigners and in particular against the missionaries. It became an organized movement in connection with the Society of the Boxers, which arose first in the Province of Shantung and rapidly



spread to the other provinces. Its avowed purpose was to drive out the foreigners and exterminate the Christians. The movement attained dangerous proportions in the fall of 1899 and the American Minister Mr. Conger reported the condition to the American Government. The American minister urged the Tsungli-Yamen to issue orders for the protection of American interests and native Christians. The Chinese authorities in the northern provinces were either unable or unwilling to maintain order. The revolt continued to gain headway and soon the legations in Peking were in danger. The American minister cabled home asking that instructions be given the **American naval officers in Chinese waters to be ready to act in protection of American lives and property.** Conger received instructions to cooperate with the representatives of the other powers in carrying out such measures as might be necessary and proper for the protection of the legations and of American interests, but he was authorized to **"act independently in protection of American interests when practicable, and concurrently with representatives of the other powers, if necessity arise."** (Hay to Conger, June 8, 1900, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, p. 143.)

While the powers were arranging to send larger forces to Peking to strengthen the legation guards an engagement took place between the foreign ships, all except the American, and the Chinese' forts, at Taku. The forts were captured and marines landed who proceeded to the relief of the legations. Meantime the United States hurried a detachment from the American Army in the Philippines and the other powers detached forces from their nearest posts.

#### 4. THE AMERICAN POSITION AS TO INTERVENTION.

In order to set forth clearly the position of the United States in its joint action in China, Secretary Hay addressed a circular note to the cooperating powers. In this note he stated as the purpose of the United States "to act concurrently with the other powers, first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of disorder to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters." (Circular note of July 3, 1900, to powers cooperating in China. Appendix. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Affairs in China, p. 12.) Mr. Hay made the further statement of policy, viz:

The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to

friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. (Ibid.)

This policy was held steadily in view by the American Government throughout the negotiations and in general received the concurrence of the other powers.

#### 5. CHINA'S APPEAL FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE.

The allied forces which finally marched to Peking, numbering about 20,000, succeeded in relieving the besieged legations August 14. Before this event the Chinese minister at Washington (July 20) had transmitted to the President a message from the Emperor of China requesting the friendly assistance of the United States in China's troubles. President McKinley replied, July 23, that the "friendly good offices" of the American Government would, with the assent of the other powers, be placed at the disposal of the Chinese Government upon the following conditions (Ibid., pp. 13-14):

(1) That assurance be given as to whether the foreign ministers were alive.

(2) That if alive the diplomatic representatives be placed in communication with their Governments and that all danger to their lives be removed.

(3) That the Chinese authorities cooperate with the relief expedition.

#### 6. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

Four days earlier, the President had appointed W. W. Rockhill as special commissioner to examine and report upon the situation in China. Rockhill reached Shanghai August 29, and later proceeded to Peking to act as advisor to Conger. Later when Conger was given leave of absence and returned to the United States, Rockhill conducted the negotiations with the powers. Rockhill was directed to be guided by the policy set forth in Hay's instructions of July 3, and as supplementary thereto Hay's note to the Chinese minister in Washington and the President's letter to the Emperor of China, July 23. On the 8th of August by imperial edict Li Hung Chang was appointed envoy plenipotentiary with instructions to propose immediate cessation of hostilities pending negotiations. The United States offered to enter upon negotiations provided a portion of the relief expedition should be allowed to enter Peking and to escort the foreign ministers to Tientsin. Although this was not granted and the powers were obliged to use force to rescue the members of the legations, the United States was still willing to entertain "any overtures for a truce, and invite the other powers to join when security is established in the Chinese capital and the Chinese Government shows



its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective suspension of hostilities there and elsewhere in China." (Adee to Minister Wu, Aug. 22, 1900, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900*, p. 290.)

An imperial edict of August 27 announced that Prince Ching had been invested with full discretionary power to act with Li Hung Chang in the negotiations. The Government of the United States accepted the authority of the Chinese plenipotentiaries and stated that it would authorize the American minister in Peking "to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching" as the immediate representatives of the Chinese Emperor.

#### 7. GERMAN AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

The German Government proposed that as a preliminary condition to diplomatic negotiations the Chinese Government should be required to deliver over the real responsible authors of the crimes committed in Peking against international law. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix, Affairs in China*, pp. 23-24.) The United States took the position that while the perpetrators of the crimes should be held to the utmost accountability, and that while punishment was necessary to "any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China," no punitive measures could be so effective as to have the punishment carried out by the Government of China itself. This it was held was only just to China in order that she should be afforded an opportunity to do this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world. The United States was not "disposed as a preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Government to join in a demand that said Government surrender to the powers such persons as according to the determination of the powers themselves may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs." (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900*, pp. 203, 341.) The view presented by Germany was accepted by Austria-Hungary. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900*, pp. 306-7.) The position of the United States was sustained by Russia. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900*, pp. 375-6.)

#### 8. HOW COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS WAS SECURED.

Foster points out that "four important declarations had been made which had done much to bring the powers into cordial relations, removing suspicion and anxiety as to the possible action of any one power." (Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 425.) These declarations were, first, the one made by Secretary Hay in his circular

note of July 3; the next was the statement by Russia of August 28 that it had "no designs of territorial acquisitions in China;" the third was the proposal on the part of Germany, September 18, that China should give over the leaders of the antiforeign movement to the allies for punishment and the answer of the United States; and the last of the four important declarations was the announcement of the agreement between Great Britain and Germany October 16 to uphold the "open-door" policy.

#### 9. THE FRENCH PROPOSALS.

Before the formal negotiations were opened the French Government, October 4, proposed as a means to secure "appropriate reparation for the past and substantial guarantees for the future" the following demands (Moore, *International Law Digest*, Vol. V, p. 499):

- (1) Punishment of the principal guilty parties, to be designated by the representatives of the powers at Peking.
- (2) Interdiction of importation of arms.
- (3) Indemnities for losses to Governments and individuals.
- (4) Permanent guard for the legations.
- (5) The forts at Taku to be dismantled.
- (6) Occupation of two or three military posts on the road between Tientsin and Peking.

#### 10. DEMANDS UPON CHINA BY THE POWERS.

The French demands were agreed to in general by the other powers. The question arose as to the form in which the demands should be submitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, whether in separate notes or in a joint note signed by all the representatives. The American minister advocated a joint note on the ground that the question was world-wide, that the demands would be strengthened by unanimity, and that it would hasten a final settlement by being more effective than identic notes. (Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 427.) The American method was pursued and the note was signed and delivered to the Chinese representatives December 24. The note as finally drawn up contained 12 demands (Moore, *International Law Digest*, Vol. V, pp. 515-16):

- (1) Mission to be sent to Berlin expressing regret for the murder of the German minister and erection of monument on spot of the murder.
- (2) Condign punishment to be inflicted upon the guilty and suspension of official examinations for five years in towns where foreigners had been ill treated.
- (3) Reparation to Japan for the murder of the chancellor of the Japanese legation.



(4) Expiatory monument to be erected by the Chinese Government in each of the foreign cemeteries desecrated.

(5) Interdiction of importation of arms.

(6) Indemnities for losses to public and private organizations and individuals.

(7) Permanent guard for each legation.

(8) The Taku and other ports between Peking and the sea to be dismantled.

(9) Military occupation of certain points to be agreed upon for keeping open communication between the capital and the sea.

(10) Perpetual prohibition of membership in antiforeign societies.

(11) Chinese commercial treaties to be amended.

(12) Reform of office of foreign affairs and modification of court ceremonials.

On January 16 the Chinese plenipotentiaries gave notice of their acceptance of the 12 demands.

#### 11. PUNISHMENTS AND INDEMNITY.

Two important points remained as subjects of negotiations—the question of punishments and the question of amount and manner of payment of indemnities. The foreign representatives prepared a list of a number of officials whose execution was demanded. The Russian and American ministers objected to the list. Through their influence and that of the Japanese minister the death penalty was confined to four, apart from those already punished by China, and lesser punishments were inflicted upon about 50 others. (Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 429.) In regard to indemnity the United States favored a lump sum, instead of itemized individual and governmental claims. This point was finally gained. The amount of the lump sum was then debated. Sir Robert Hart, advisor of China and the allies, showed that China could not pay more than \$250,000,000 to \$300,000,000. Rockhill, the American representative, proposed that the lump sum should not exceed China's ability to pay and that the claims should be scaled down to that amount and that this amount should be divided equitably among the powers, the apportionment question if necessary to be submitted to The Hague Court (*Ibid.*, p. 427). The American propositions were opposed, Russia and Japan alone agreeing to the reference to The Hague and Japan alone supporting the scaling down of the claims. The position of Germany on the question of indemnity was the most uncompromising of any of the powers. She insisted on being paid to the last cent. (Rockhill to Hay, May 25, 1901. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1901, Appendix, *Affairs in China*, p. 175.) The amount of indemnities was finally fixed at 450,000,000 taels (about \$333,000,000), payable in gold at the rate of exchange fixed in the

protocol, with interest at 4 per cent, to be paid in 39 years in semi-annual payments (*Ibid.*, p. 176-182).

The peace agreement was not signed until September 7, 1901. The other important provisions have been stated in general in connection with the enumeration of the 12 demands; additional stipulations were: River navigation to Tientsin and Shanghai to be improved; the Tsungli-Yamen to be abolished and succeeded by a new board, the Wai-Wu-Pu, which should take precedence over other ministers.

## 12. INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

The influence of the United States was strong in the negotiations for moderating extreme measures in punishment and modifying indemnity claims. It supported measures needful to punish the guilty parties and to guarantee the protection of American citizens and interests for the future. It also strove to further "the interests of the whole world in the cause of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (Rockhill to Hay, November 30, 1901. Moore, *International Law Digest*, Vol. V, p. 529.) The United States was desirous that China should not be impaired in its territorial integrity, nor be weakened in its ability to maintain a stable government. For this reason it was necessary to act with the other powers in order to modify their action. (Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, 432.)

## 13. PAYMENT OF THE INDEMNITY.

In 1902 the first installment of the indemnities was paid by China. The depreciation of silver, the monetary standard of China, subsequent to the signing of the protocol made the payment in gold very burdensome to China. She accordingly asked to be allowed to pay the installment at the rate of exchange when the agreement was made. The United States alone signified its willingness to grant the request. In 1907 the United States further manifested its generosity in the treatment of China by remitting a large part of the indemnity due the United States from China. The amount originally fixed was \$24,440,778.81. All above \$11,655,492.69 was remitted. (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1907, Part I, p. 174.)

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## 92. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

At the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Russia, France, and Germany, acting in concert, deprived Japan of most of the fruits of victory. (See article, The Treaty of Shimonoseki.) There followed a general scramble for Chinese territory and "spheres of influence." Germany, for example, seized Kiao-chau and asserted her claim over much of the Shantung Province (See article, Leasing

of Kiao-Chau by Germany, March 6, 1898), while Russia adopted an aggressive policy in Manchuria and virtually annexed the Liao-Tung Peninsula, including much coveted Port Arthur. (See article, *Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia*, March 27, 1898.) Japan and Great Britain did not stand entirely aloof from the scramble, but, in general with the United States, they endeavored to preserve the territorial integrity of China and maintain the "open door." On January 30, 1902, at a time when Russia was pressing China for concessions in Manchuria, Great Britain and Japan concluded a treaty of alliance. (See Appendix I, 64.) It was made public February 11, 1902.

## 2. NEGOTIATIONS.

The treaty was negotiated at London by Lord Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi. According to the account left by the latter in his *Secret Memoirs* the first suggestion for the treaty came through Baron Eckardstein, of the German Embassy, who in March or April, 1901, expressed to Hayashi the opinion that a triple alliance between Germany, England, and Japan would be the most effective means for the maintenance of peace in the Far East (pp. 119-120). On April 17, 1901, Hayashi first broached the matter to Lord Lansdowne (p. 121). In the negotiations which proceeded from time to time during the next nine months Hayashi was much embarrassed by the desire of some Japanese statesmen to carry on at the same time negotiations for a Russo-Japanese convention (pp. 204-205). Marquis Ito visited St. Petersburg, where he had some conversation with officials of the Russian Government on the subject. Whether the negotiations with Russia was for the purpose of putting pressure on England or whether Japanese statesmen were divided in opinion is uncertain.

The idea of including Germany in the proposed alliance seems to have been dropped temporarily soon after negotiations began between England and Japan. Toward the close of the negotiations the question of including Germany was discussed (pp. 189-191). Both Governments agreed that Germany, if informed of the negotiations, would be likely to use the knowledge to obtain some special advantage for herself. It was, therefore, decided that the whole matter should be kept secret until after arrangements for the treaty had been concluded. Shortly before the signing of the treaty the Japanese Government brought up the question again (pp. 191-192). Prince von Bülow had just made a speech in the Reichstag attacking Joseph Chamberlain and using derogatory language in regard to the British Army. Public opinion in England at the moment was much irritated at the comments of the German press upon the Boer War (pp. 192-193). The time did not seem auspicious



for approaching Germany. In view of the charge that the British and Japanese Governments "of *malice prepense* excluded Germany from participation" (p. 206), it should be noted that Hayashi asserts (p. 206) "that if Germany had wanted to go join the alliance she would have been admitted. From the outset, however, nothing was proposed by Germany nor was any wish to join expressed by her." It seems probable that Germany never seriously desired to be included in the alliance, but was at the time seeking closer relations with Russia. Hayashi sums up the question of the proposal to include Germany in the treaty as follows (p. 195): "On account of the strained relations between Great Britain and Germany we certainly took no special steps to induce her to join the alliance, but on the other hand, if Germany had been really sincere in her earlier overtures and had proposed to come into the alliance, a triple alliance might easily have been concluded. It is not reasonable to suppose that Germany was purposely excluded by Great Britain and Japan."

### 3. TERMS.

The contracting powers declared themselves to be "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." They disavowed aggressive tendencies in China and Korea, but recognized the right of either ally to take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard its existing interests. In case either, in defense of such interests, should become involved in war with a third power, the other contracting party was to maintain strict neutrality and endeavor to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. In case any power or powers should attack the ally engaged in the war, the other ally must then come to its assistance. The treaty was to go into effect immediately after the date of signing and was to remain in force for at least five years.

### 4. CONCLUSION.

The treaty was publicly announced on February 12, and a month later (March 17) Russia and France issued a joint statement professing to find in the treaty the fundamental principles that formed the basis of their policy. (*Revue générale de droit international public*, vol. 9, d. 11.) The alliance did not suffice to prevent the Russo-Japanese War, but it probably helped to localize the conflict.

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### 93. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1895-1904.

#### 1. THE MURDER OF THE KOREAN QUEEN, 1895.

In Korea, immediately after the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Russian and Japanese influences entered into sharp competition for ascendancy in the country. In October, 1895, the Korean Queen and her advisers, who were hostile to Japanese influence, planned a coup d'état for the purpose of disbanding the soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers and of replacing the pro-Japanese members of the cabinet by her "exclusionist" friends. The result was a counter pro-Japanese movement to obtain complete control of the Korean Government through the seizure of the King and Queen. In the course of the execution of this design the Queen was murdered by Japanese and Korean ruffians.

#### 2. THE RUSSIAN COUP D'ÉTAT, 1897.

This revolting crime reacted upon its perpetrators and was speedily followed by another equally discreditable, by means of which Russia obtained control of the Government of Korea for a time. On February 10, 1896, 127 Russian marines landed at Chemulpo and immediately entered Seoul, the Korean capital. The day following the King and his entourage fled in disguise to the Russian legation, where he remained until February 20, 1897. As a result of a royal



edict there issued, the Korean prime minister and two other cabinet ministers were murdered, while others fled to Japan.

### 3. PERIOD OF RUSSIAN ASCENDENCY, 1896-1897.

A brief period of Russian ascendancy over Korea now followed. Among other special privileges, the Russians obtained a valuable timber concession in the Yalu Valley and a mining concession along the Tumen River.

### 4. THE YAMAGATA-LOBANOFF PROTOCOL, 1896.

In the summer of 1896 Japan changed her policy toward Korea and decided to seek the cooperation of Russia. On June 16 of this year there was concluded at St. Petersburg what is known as the Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol (Asakawa, 264). The two powers agreed to cooperate along various lines in Korea, and particularly engaged to try to abandon to Korea herself the maintenance of armed forces and native police.

But the protocol of June, 1896, was no sooner signed than it was violated by Russia. During the same month in which it was signed, Russia tried to gain control of the Korean Army. During the following year she tried to secure control of Korean finances.

### 5. THE NISHI-ROSEN PROTOCOL, 1898.

The suspicions and opposition of the Koreans as well as the Japanese having been aroused by these measures, Russia deemed it advisable to try to conciliate Japan. Accordingly, there was concluded on April 25, 1898, what is known as the Nishi-Rosen protocol (Asakawa, 271). Both powers definitely recognized the "sovereignty and entire independence of Korea," and mutually agreed to "abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." They also engaged, "in case Korea should have recourse to the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the subject." Russia also declared that she would not "obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea."

### 6. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY, 1899-1904.

But in spite of the above agreement the rivalry between Japan and Russia in Korea continued during the next five years (1899-1904). In most cases Russia appears as the aggressor, having repeatedly violated the protocols of 1896 and 1898. Japan seems to have confined herself mainly to commercial and industrial development.

## 7. THE ATTEMPTED LEASE OF MASAMPO BY RUSSIA, 1899-1901.

During 1899-1901, for example, the main efforts of Russia were directed toward the acquiring of certain leases at Masampo on the southern coast of Korea with a view of transforming this valuable harbor into a naval base. But Japan succeeded in checkmating this design of Russia.

## 8. THE SEOUL-WIJU RAILWAY, 1894-1903.

Another bone of contention between Japan, on the one side, and Russia and France on the other was the question of the construction of the Seoul-Wiju Railway. In 1894 Korea had granted to Japan priority of rights in the construction of railways between Fusan and Seoul. In 1898 Japan had obtained control of the short railway line between Seoul and Chemulpo, an American concession, and in the same year Japan had obtained a definite concession from the Korean Government for the construction of the Fusan-Seoul line. Russia seems to have failed in her attempts to secure railway concessions.

## 9. RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENTS IN NORTHERN KOREA, 1903.

But it was the threatened Russian encroachments in northern Korea that caused the greatest anxiety to Japan. In 1896 Russia obtained valuable mining concessions in two districts at the mouth of the Tumen River, and later sought to extend her influence in that region.

Still more menacing, however, to the interests of Japan were the attempts of Russia to obtain an actual foothold on Korean territory at Yong-am-po, on the Korean side of the Yalu River. On April 13, 1903, the Korean Government was suddenly notified that the Russian timber syndicate (in which Russian grand dukes and leading members of the Romanoff family are said to have been directly interested) would at once begin the cutting of timber on the Yalu. Early in May, Russian soldiers in civilian garb were reputed to have occupied Yong-am-po. At the same time Russian troops seemed to be mobilizing on the northern side of the Yalu. In view of the events which had been transpiring in Manchuria, as well as Korea, Japan decided to attempt direct negotiations with the Russian Government at St. Petersburg. (See article, *The Negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War.*)

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## 94. THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE INTO MANCHURIA, 1895-1903.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Russian advance into Manchuria may be said to have begun with the construction of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad of which the Czarevitch cut the first sod near Vladivostok in 1891. The route from Lake Baikal through the Amur Province north of the Amur River proving almost impossible, a more direct and practicable route through Manchuria was determined upon.

By her successful intervention at the close of the Chino-Japanese War (See article, *The Treaty of Shimonoseki*) Russia had placed China under a debt of fear and gratitude—a debt which was further increased by the guarantee of a Russian loan to China on very liberal terms. Ostensibly to facilitate the execution of this loan, but really to promote Russian political as well as commercial designs in Eastern Asia, there was organized, in 1895, the Russo-Chinese Bank which soon obtained from China valuable railway concessions and other privileges. (See article, *The Cassini Convention*.)

### 2. THE BUILDING OF THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1897-1902.

The necessary concessions having thus been obtained, the Chinese-Eastern or Manchurian Railway was begun in 1897. But Russia longed for a port which is ice free the entire year. This was not the case with Vladivostok. An opportunity for securing such a port and at the same time strengthening Russia's strategic position on the Pacific soon presented itself.

### 3. THE LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, 1898.

The German seizure of Tsing-tao in November, 1897, and the subsequent leasing of Kiao-chau (See article, *The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany*) in March, 1898, furnished a precedent or pretext that tended to palliate, though hardly to justify, a similar act on

the part of Russia, which demanded and obtained a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny on March 27, 1898. (See article, *The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia*.) Great Britain followed by securing the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei on July 1, 1898 (See article, *The Leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain*), as a means of restoring the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.

#### 4. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1898-1902.

The southern branch of the Chinese-Eastern or Trans-Manchurian Railway connecting Port Arthur with the main line at Harbin was now begun, but the work was interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion. (See article, *The Boxer Uprising of 1900*.)

#### 5. OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA, 1900-1904.

One of the results of this momentous rebellion was the Russian occupation of Manchuria, which contributed so much toward the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (See article, *Negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War*) in 1904. In order to allay the apprehensions of the powers, the Russian Government issued a circular note on August 28, 1900 (*Parliamentary Papers, China*, No. I (1901), p. 113), in which it was explained that the occupation of Manchuria was only "temporary" and "had been dictated solely by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggressions of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government." Russia furthermore promised that she would not fail to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory, "provided that the action of the other powers does not place any obstacle in the way of such a measure."

In spite of these assurances Russia remained in military occupation of Manchuria, and a strong military force of railway guards was stationed there for the protection of the Manchurian railways. February 6, 1901, Count Lamsdorff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, denied that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in concluding, with China a convention or permanent arrangement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate in Southern Manchuria, though he admitted that the Russian military authorities had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of that province. (*Staatsarchiv*, vol. 66, pp. 142-143.)

Within a few weeks, however, after these official assurances it was learned that the Russian Government was pressing China hard to agree to the so-called Lamsdorff-Yang-yu convention. According to the supposed terms of this agreement, Russia was willing to "restore" to China the whole of Manchuria, but upon such conditions as would have rendered the so-called "restoration" wholly illusory. (No



authentic text of this convention has been made public. The substance of it was published in *The Times* (London), February 28, 1901.) Supported by the protests of Great Britain and Japan, China refused to ratify this convention.

It was not long, however, before Russia was found to be making fresh demands upon China as conditions for evacuation. Finally, as a result of the publication of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 (See article, *The Formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance*), Russia agreed to sign the convention of evacuation of the same year. (See article, *The Russo-Chinese Convention for the Evacuation of Manchuria*, April 8, 1902, and Appendix I, 65.)

#### 6. THE "EVACUATION" OF MANCHURIA BY RUSSIA, 1902.

The so-called evacuation of Manchuria by Russia was actually begun. By October 18, 1902, six months after the conclusion of the convention of evacuation, Russia had actually handed over the Chinese-Eastern Railway to the Chinese Government and withdrawn her troops from the southwestern portion of the Sheng-King or Mukden Province as far as the Liao River. But a considerable number of these troops appear merely to have been transferred to other parts of Manchuria, where they were transformed into railway guards.

By April 8, 1903, the date set for the evacuation of the Provinces of Mukden and Kirin, it was evident from the disposition of Russian forces in Manchuria that not even a nominal withdrawal from the Provinces was intended. Early in April, 1903, seven new Russian demands were made upon China. (*Staatsarchiv*, vol. 69, No. 13,079.) These demands, which were rejected, included stringent measures for closing Manchuria against economic enterprises undertaken by all foreigners who were not Russian, and they practically forbade the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria without the consent of Russia. It is not surprising that Japan, Great Britain, and the United States made strong protests.

By October 8, 1903, the date set in the Russo-Chinese convention for the final evacuation of the Province of Heilung-chang, Russia was still in possession of nearly the whole of Manchuria. She still retained control of Niuchwang, and had even "reoccupied" Mukden, of which there appears to have been a sham evacuation. It had, indeed, become increasingly and conclusively evident that Russia intended to remain in permanent occupation of Manchuria.

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For the main documents see *Parliamentary Papers on China*, *British and Foreign State Papers*, and the various volumes dealing with the foreign relations of the United States published as *House Documents*. *Staatsarchiv*, vol. 66, pp. 129–182, and vol. 69, pp. 37–112, reprint the *British Blue Books*, *China*, Nos. 1 and 5 (1901), and No. 2 (1904), containing many of the most important documents.

## 95. THE RUSSO-CHINESE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF MANCHURIA, APRIL 8, 1902.

### MAIN PROVISIONS.

This famous convention (See Appendix I. 65), providing for the gradual evacuation of the whole of Manchuria within 18 months from the date of signature, was concluded on April 8, 1902. By its terms Russia agreed to the "reestablishment of the authority of the Chinese Government in that region" (Manchuria) on the following conditions: (a) That China "observe strictly the stipulations of the contract concluded with the Chinese Bank on the 27th of August, 1896"; (b) "assumes the obligation to use all means to protect the railway and the persons in its employ, and binds itself also to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria the safety of all Russian subjects in general and the undertakings established by them."

On these conditions and "provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of other powers should not prevent it," the Russian Government agreed to evacuate Manchuria within 18 months in three successive withdrawals, separated by intervals of six months each.

Though actually begun, the Russian evacuation even of Sheng-King, or the Southern Manchurian Province, was never carried out and the convention was never executed. (See article, *The Russian Advance into Manchuria*.)

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## 96. NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1903-1904.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In view of the overwhelming evidence of aggressive Russian designs afforded by the Russian advance in Manchuria and Russian encroachments in Korea (See articles, *The Russian Advance in Manchuria, 1895-1903*, and *Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904*), Japan decided to institute direct negotiations at St. Petersburg with a view of arriving, if possible, at a definite understanding or solution of the Korean and Manchurian questions.

### 2. THE FIRST JAPANESE PROPOSALS, 1903.

On August 3, 1903, the Japanese Government proposed as a basis for any understanding between Japan and Russia (*Staatsarchiv*, vol. 69, pp. 212-214): (a) A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires and to maintain the "open door" in these countries; (b) a reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria. These demands were never materially altered by Japan during the negotiations, and their persistent rejection by Russia, together with the latter's delay in replying and her continued preparations for war, may be said to have finally precipitated the struggle.

### 3. THE FIRST RUSSIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS.

After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia presented her first counterproposals to the Japanese Government, on October 5, 1903 (*Ibid*, p. 221). Russia not only offered less than Japan demanded respecting Korea, but imposed new conditions upon Japan in that country. Most significant of all, Russia ignored the Japanese proposal for a mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire and to maintain the "open door" in China and Korea. Russia not only refused to make any declarations regarding her future policy in China or Manchuria, but required Japan expressly to recognize Manchuria as "in all respects outside her sphere of interest."

### 4. RUSSIAN SIX DEMANDS ON CHINA.

In the meantime Russian military activity was increasing both in Manchuria and Korea. On August 13, 1903, Admiral Alexieff, whose policy was a forward one, was appointed to the position of "Viceroy of the Far East." On September 6 Russia presented six

new demands on China as conditions for the final evacuation of Niuchwang and Manchuria, which were refused by the Chinese Government, acting probably at the instigation of Japan and Great Britain (Asakawa, pp. 315-317). The conduct of the Russians on the Korean frontier became more aggravating and aggressive than ever.

#### 5. JAPAN'S SECOND PROPOSALS.

The Japanese statesmen having agreed upon an "irreducible minimum." Japan, in her second set of proposals, on October 30 made several important concessions (Staatsarchiv, vol. 69, pp. 224-225). These included the guarantee of the freedom of the Korean Straits, the establishment of a neutral zone extending 50 kilometers on each side of the Korean-Manchurian frontier, a "mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway when these railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu," a reciprocal engagement not to interfere with each other's treaty rights in Korea and China, and a "recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interests and recognition by Russia that Korea is outside her sphere of special interest."

#### 6. RUSSIA'S SECOND COUNTERREPLY.

In her counter-reply (Ibid, pp. 231-232), which was delayed until December 11, 1903, Russia repeated her former counterproposals, with the omission of the clause regarding Manchuria and the insertion of the Japanese proposal relating to the connection of the Korean and Chinese Eastern Railways.

#### 7. JAPAN'S THIRD OVERTURE.

On December 21, 1903, Japan made a third overture to Russia (Ibid, pp. 232-233). Baron Komura proposed several slight amendments to the Russian counterproposals respecting Korea and the total suppression of the article providing for a neutral zone in northern Korea.

#### 8. RUSSIA'S THIRD REPLY.

In the third reply of Russia (Ibid, pp. 234-235), which reached Tokio on January 6, 1904, not only was there no mention of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, but Russia again insisted upon the recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of influence. Russia, having agreed to insert a clause to the effect that she would "not impede Japan nor other powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements," on condition that Japan agree not to use any part of the terri-



tory of Korea for strategical purposes, and that she agree to the establishment of a neutral zone in northern Korea.

#### 9. FOURTH JAPANESE PROPOSALS.

On January 13, 1904, Japan made a fourth set of proposals. (*Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.) These included:

(1) Suppression (in the Russian counterproposals) of the clause requiring Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical purposes.

(2) Suppression of the article relating to the establishment of a neutral zone.

(3) Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her (Japan's) sphere of interest, provided Russia engage: (*a*) To respect the territorial integrity of China and Manchuria; (*b*) to recognize the treaty rights, including those of settlement, of Japan and other powers in Manchuria; and (*c*) to recognize Korea and its littoral as being outside her (Russia's) sphere of interest.

(4) Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests.

#### 10. RUSSIA'S FOURTH REPLY.

An early reply to these fourth Japanese proposals was repeatedly requested, but Russia's answer, which was a virtual reiteration of her previous counterproposals, did not reach Tokyo until February 7, 1904, or the day following the severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia on February 6.

#### 11. JAPAN'S SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

On February 6, 1904, Japan notified the Russian Government she has "no other alternative than to terminate these futile negotiations."

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The best account of these negotiations, together with the texts of the various proposals and counterproposals is contained in Asakawa, K., *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* (Houghton Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1904), ch. 19. A briefer documented account may be found in Hershey, A. S., *the International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (New York, Macmillan, 1906), pp. 52-61. See also Japan, Foreign Office Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia (1903-1904).

## 97. THE ABROGATION OF THE JAPANESE EXTRATERRITORIALITY TREATIES, 1872-1894.

### 1. THE TREATIES GRANTING EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, 1858-1869.

When the Western nations entered into treaty relations with Japan they secured, by the terms of the treaties, rights of jurisdiction for their consuls.

The provisions of the American-Japanese treaty of 1858 governing consular jurisdiction were incorporated in similar treaties with other western powers, 1858-1869. These conventions, subject to revision in 1872, extended exclusive consular jurisdiction, in civil matters, to cases in which a citizen of a treaty power was liable to (1) a Japanese subject, (2) a fellow citizen, (3) a citizen of another treaty power; in criminal matters to offenses by a citizen of a treaty power against (1) a Japanese subject, (2) a fellow or foreign citizen, (3) treaty provisions and trade regulations.

The exercise of consular jurisdiction in Japan by the representatives of foreign nations frequently caused friction between the consuls and the Japanese authorities. Japan also resented it as an offense to her national pride. Abolition of consular jurisdiction, therefore, became a fundamental object of Japanese diplomacy from 1872 to 1894-99, when success was finally attained.

### 2. THE JAPANESE MISSION TO THE WEST, 1872.

In 1872 Japan dispatched five of her most eminent statesmen, headed by Prince Iwakura, to observe the institutions of western powers and to approach them on the subject of treaty revision. The United States Government received the mission cordially and expressed a willingness to undertake such revision; but the European States declined to relinquish their jurisdictional privileges without an approximation of Japanese jurisprudence to western ideas and practices. Italy did negotiate a treaty recognizing Japan's judicial autonomy, to a certain extent, but withheld ratification owing to the protests of European powers, led by England and France.

### 3. REFORM OF JAPANESE JUSTICE, 1871-1882.

This situation made a reform of the Japanese system of justice imperative. A criminal code had been promulgated in 1871 containing an infusion of European principles. To aid in the introduction of western jurisprudence, a number of European jurists were invited to Japan. In 1872 a department of justice independent of other branches of the Government was organized, and courts were established with judges who performed no other functions. Torture was abolished in 1879; the following year the regulations



applying to legal practitioners and evidence were improved and modernized. Codes of criminal law and procedure, revised in accord with French models, were promulgated in 1878 and came into operation in 1882.

#### 4. JOINT CONFERENCE AT TOKYO, 1874 AND 1882.

The attempted revision of the treaties by a "joint conference" of the representatives of the treaty powers at Tokyo (1874) ended in failure. To obviate the difficulty of obtaining unanimous consent to revision, the Japanese foreign office negotiated separately (1878) with the powers concerned. The United States expressed its sympathy with Japanese efforts by the negotiation of a commercial convention (1878) establishing Japan's exclusive right to regulate its tariff and coasting trade, but contingent upon the conclusion of similar agreements with the other powers. But Japan was not able to negotiate such treaties, largely owing to the position taken by England.

In 1882 the Japanese foreign minister again undertook treaty revision by means of a joint conference at Tokyo. Nothing definite was accomplished until 1886, when agreement seemed possible on the compromise "Anglo-German project." It bound Japan to accept the establishment of mixed courts, as in Egypt, with prosecuting attorneys of foreign birth. Upon the publication of this project public opinion loudly denounced the foreign minister, Count Inouye, and forced the adjournment of the conference, sine die, on July 29, 1887. Meanwhile, the United States promulgated its extradition treaty with Japan (1886), declaring that one reason for its conclusion was the support it would give Japan in her efforts toward judicial authority and complete sovereignty.

#### 5. ABORTIVE TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND GERMANY, 1887-1889.

The new foreign minister, Count Okuma, reverted to the policy of individual negotiation with the great powers. He secured a treaty with Mexico (1887) fully recognizing Japan's judicial and fiscal competence, the first treaty with a western country on terms of perfect equality. Conventions with the United States, Russia, and Germany (1888-89), provided that (1) Japan should open the entire country to foreigners wholly submitting to Japanese jurisdiction and concede to them the right of holding real and personal property; (2) consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports should be abolished five years after the exchange of ratifications. Accompanying draft notes engaged Japan to appoint competent foreign judges to sit with her supreme court in cases involving a foreigner and to promulgate a

new civil code, based on approved western models, three years before the abrogation of consular jurisdiction in the treaty settlements. Similar proposals were made to England. An irate public, which demanded unqualified recognition of Japan as the equal of western states, compelled the Japanese Government to ask indefinite postponement of the operation of these treaties.

Viscount Aoki, who succeeded Count Okuma, proposed the absolute recognition of Japan's judicial autonomy, but adhered to the concession of the foreigners' right to own real estate after the cessation of consular jurisdiction. The cabinet crisis in 1891 rendered Aoki's efforts abortive.

Addressing the upper house of Parliament in May, 1892, Viscount Enomotto, the foreign minister, said: "Is it not imperative that these codes—our indispensable weapon of offense, so to speak, against these hated consular courts—should be duly carried into operation beginning next year?" His plea was unavailing, for Parliament postponed the operation of the civil and commercial codes until December 31, 1896, again delaying the prospect of treaty revision. When Portugal temporarily withdrew her consuls from Japan an imperial ordinance of July 17, 1892, denounced all treaty provisions with Portugal relating to consular jurisdiction.

#### 6. TREATY WITH ENGLAND, 1894.

Conscious of the large influence which England exercised in this matter, Mr. Mutsu, the next head of the foreign office, concluded that no satisfactory treaty revision could be achieved without England's cooperation. Accordingly, in August, 1893, he instructed the Japanese minister at London to open negotiations with England. The Earl of Kimberley called the latter's attention to statements of Count Ito and Mr. Mutsu which seemed to imply that Japan would resort to repudiation of her treaty engagements should her overtures for revision be rejected, and announced that the British Government adhered to the principles respecting the sanctity of treaties recorded in protocol No. 1 of the London conference of January 17, 1871. (See article, *The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871*.) Negotiations moved smoothly, following a prompt disavowal by the Imperial Government of any intention to repudiate its treaty obligations (April, 1894). Japan pointed to her statutory and constitutional guarantees of competent and independent courts, with jurisdiction defined by law; to the codes of criminal and civil procedure revised in 1891; and the model codes of civil and commercial law, wholly effective on December 31, 1896. On July 16, 1894, a treaty of commerce and navigation was signed, to take effect five years later. It assured to the subjects of each contracting power the enjoyment in



the other's dominions of freedom of travel, residence, commerce, navigation, religion, and access to the courts: abolished extraterritoriality and merged the foreign settlements into the general municipal system of Japan. While England was the first power to waive her right of extraterritoriality, everybody concerned appreciated the importance of American support in the consummation of Japan's treaty revision.

#### 7. TREATIES WITH OTHER POWERS, 1894-1898.

Treaties with other powers, all based on the Anglo-Japanese pact and to take effect in July and August, 1899, followed in quick succession: United States and Italy, 1894; Russia, Denmark, and Peru, 1895; Germany, Sweden and Norway, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 1896; Spain, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, and Siam, 1898. Ratification of these treaties was completed in 1898. The treaty with Mexico (1887) needed no revision.

After a diplomatic struggle of over 20 years Japan had recovered her complete sovereignty and attained full membership in the family of nations.

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See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871-1898; British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 48, 79; Treaties and Conventions between United States and other Powers since 1776 (1871); Compilation of United States Treaties in Force (1904).

## 98. THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899.

### 1. PURPOSE.

The first Hague peace conference was called by Czar Nicholas II of Russia, primarily for the purpose of "seeking, by means of international discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and durable peace, and above all, of putting an end to the progressive development of the present armaments."

The conference which met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, soon realized that even a limitation of the increase of military and naval expenditure was impracticable at that time, and therefore devoted its chief energies to the secondary purpose for which it was called, namely, to devise means of securing the maintenance of a real and durable peace.

### 2. RESULTS.

Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, the Russian plan of inclusive and limited compulsory arbitration was rejected. But the Anglo-American plan of a so-called permanent court of arbitration was adopted in spite of the objections of the German Government, and arbitration was recommended in questions of a juridical character, and especially regarding the interpretation of treaties. A code of arbitral procedure intended to facilitate arbitration was also adopted and recommended.

The convention for pacific settlement of disputes also strongly recommended the use of the good offices and mediation of friendly powers in case of international disputes, and even urged a new method of settling such controversies in case of "differences of an international nature, involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact." This was to be done by the creation of international commissions of inquiry intended to facilitate a solution of such differences by an elucidation of the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.



In addition to the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, The Hague conference of 1899 also agreed to two other conventions, three declarations, and expressed several wishes (*vœux*). Most important was the convention regulating the laws and customs of land warfare, based on the work of the Brussels conference of 1874.

The conference also adapted the principles of the Geneva convention of 1864 to maritime warfare. It agreed to three declarations against (*a*) the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons for five years; (*b*) the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and (*c*) the use of "dumdum" bullets.

The conference also expressed a series of six wishes in favor of considering, at a subsequent conference, questions relating to the right and duties of neutrals; the inviolability of private (enemy) property in naval warfare; and the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force. It even went so far as to express a wish that the Governments might "examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets."

For bibliography, see article, The Second Hague Conference.

## 99. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION TREATY OF 1903.

### 1. PROVISIONS.

The Anglo-French arbitration treaty of October 14, 1903 (See Appendix I, 67), provided that questions of a legal nature or "relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two Contracting Parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy" shall be submitted to the court of arbitration provided for in The Hague Convention of 1899. The agreement went on to declare that "neither the vital interests nor the independence or honor of the two contracting parties" nor the interests of a third State would be considered as coming under its provisions. It was provided also that before "addressing themselves" to The Hague the two parties should draw up an agreement "determining clearly the subject of dispute, the extent of the arbitral powers" and the constitution of the court and its procedure. The convention automatically terminated at the end of five years.

### 2. IMPORTANCE.

This convention was the first application of article 19 of The Hague Convention of 1899, which provided for supplementary arbitral agreements. It was the model for most of the arbitration treaties of the next five years. Delcassé persistently urged it, and the French

foreign office pronounced it the "first step" in the "rapprochement" of the two countries. It was brought about largely through the persistent efforts of Sir Thomas Barclay, aided by numerous French and British organizations. During the next few months Great Britain and France strengthened the solidarity of western Europe by negotiating identical treaties with Italy and Spain.

### 3. PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE CONVENTION.

In both France and England the treaty received general approval. In the former country some public men began to look toward the establishment of a Quadruple Alliance (England, France, Russia, and Italy) to counterbalance the solidarity of the German powers. In the latter the chief criticisms were directed against its limited application, for there was a strong feeling among business and labor opinion that arbitration ought to include broader questions.

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## SECTION IV.—1904-1914.

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### 100. THE FORMATION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE.

#### 1. FACTORS IN THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, 1898-1901.

The salient features of the international situation, 1898-1901, were:

(a) The disappointment in France as to the possible result of the Franco-Russian alliance, when the plan for the First Hague Conference was launched by Russia, August, 1898, for such a plan seemed to block any chance for recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. (Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 27.)

(b) The increasingly aggressive economic and military policy of Russia in the Far East decreased the vigor of the Franco-Russian alliance in European affairs, as Russian interest and influence in central and western European affairs lessened. (Von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, pp. 68-69.)

(c) The Anglo-German official relations seemed to be steadily improving in spite of popular clamor as to the Boer War. Indications of this may be found in the following:

(1) Anglo-German treaty of 1890 which had, by implication at least, recognized England in Egypt, was now followed in 1898 by treaty (never published) relating to possible purchase and division of Portuguese African colonies. (Schmitt, *England and Germany*, p. 144.)

(2) Salisbury at Guildhall, November 9, 1899, speaking of new Anglo-German treaty as to Samoa, referred to Germany as England's closest continental friend. (*The Times*, Nov. 10, 1899.)

(3) Chamberlain had conference with Von Bülow and three days later, November 30, spoke of necessity of alliance of Teutonic peoples. (*The Times*, Dec. 1, 1899; Schmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 145.)

(4) Rosebery, February 15, 1900, declared England had urged alliance on Germany in December preceding. (*The Times*, Feb. 16, 1900. Cf. de Caix in *Questions actuelles*, pp. 30-32.)

(5) An Anglo-German agreement for the Open Door and the integrity of China and joint Far Eastern policy was signed October 16, 1900. (Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in Far East*, p. 237.)

(6) In the spring of 1901 and later the possible share of Germany in Anglo-Japanese negotiations was discussed. (Hayashi, *Secret Memoirs*, p. 119, and article, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902*.) A more extensive Anglo-German alliance as to European and American matters was also discussed. (Chirol, "Origins of Present War," in *Quarterly Review*, October, 1914; Thayer's *John Hay*, II, p. 285.)

(d) The strained Anglo-French relations prevailing. This condition of affairs was due chiefly to:

- (1) Disputes as to French fishing rights in Newfoundland.
- (2) Spheres of influence on the borders of Siam.
- (3) Control of natives in New Hebrides.
- (4) Boundaries in West and Central Africa.

None of these alone was serious enough to provoke war, but taken together they had been the cause of friction, and England spoke of the French "policy of pin pricks."

(5) Rivalry in Egypt (See articles, *The Dual Control over Egyptian Finances*, *The British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914*, and *The Soudan Question, 1881-1899*) which was based on historical, financial, political, and moral grounds, flared out in the Fashoda incident in 1898. (See article, that title.) (*Ministère des affaires étrangères—Documents diplomatiques—France et Angleterre, 1887-1904*, *passim*; Cf. Pressensé, "England and France" in *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 39, p. 194; Simon, "France and England," in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 67, p. 783.)

(6) The severe rebuff to French policy following the Fashoda incident, as shown by treaty of March 21, 1899, forced by danger of war with England. (*Documents diplomatiques, Correspondence relatif à la convention franco-anglaise (1898)*, and *Déclaration additionnelle (Mar. 21, 1899)*. Barclay, *Thirty Years*, p. 144; Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique, 1878-1916*, I, p. 248; Despagne, *Diplomatie de la troisième république*, p. 741.)

(e) During the South African War a suggested diplomatic combination with Russia and Germany directed against England revealed to France that the price of German cooperation was a French guaranty of German territory, including Alsace-Lorraine—a price no French Government could afford to pay. (Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 264.)

(f) The South African War showed England's unpopularity, and her occupation of Egypt (and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan since 1898) lacked international authority and legal basis. (Egerton, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 349; Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2, Parts V and VII.)

(g) The policy of France in Morocco required free field for development. (See the series of articles dealing with the Morocco question.) Hence the Franco-Italian understanding as to the Medi-



terranean and North Africa (1902) and a projected agreement with Spain of like character. (Gourdin, *Politique française au Maroc*, p. 151, 169.) Neither entente was of sufficient form and strength to warrant France in assuming direction in Morocco in spite of Germany's declaration of indifference.

## 2. NEW ELEMENTS, 1900-1903.

The chief new factors in this period were:

(a) New persons were in positions of authority and influence: (1) Delcassé as French foreign secretary, 1898-1905, was anxious to settle matters with England. (2) Paul Cambon, as new ambassador at London, 1898, was friendly and wise. (3) Lansdowne succeeded Salisbury as foreign secretary in 1900, and Salisbury died in 1902. His policy for many years had involved agreements with Germany. (4) The death of Victoria, 1901, was a relief to many Englishmen (Gwynn, Dilke, vol. 2, p. 502), as she was supposed to be pro-German. Edward VII was desirous of peace (Bernstein, *Willy-Nicky correspondence*, p. 47) and friendly to France, but it is a mistake to suppose that prior to 1905 the King was more than an able, sympathetic assistant in relations with France. His alleged "authorship" of the entente is decidedly questionable. (Cf. Sidney Lee's article on Edward VII in *Dictionary of National Biography*.)

(b) Anglo-German relations became less friendly and England rejected the possibility of a German alliance. The chief causes were: (1) The German naval law of 1900, which was a source of alarm to England. (2) The German trade competition became sharper, and the English tariff reform movement took advantage of this in its propaganda. (3) The German press attacked England more bitterly and public opinion on both sides was increasingly aroused on Anglo-German rivalry. (Cf. Tardieu, *France and the Alliances*, ch. 2; Jaray, *La politique franco-anglaise*, p. 14; Bérard, *Questions extérieures*, p. 387; Schmitt, *England and Germany*, p. 96; Lemonon, *Politique britannique*, ch. 7; Dennis, *Tendencies in British Foreign Policy*, in *Proceedings American Political Science Association*, 1909.) (4) England found that agreements with Germany were either unstable, as in the case of China, where von Bülow soon declared that the treaty of 1900 did not extend to Manchuria (Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik*, p. 168), or awkward and unpopular, as in the case of the joint Venezuelan blockade. (Ibid., p. 207; Thayer, *John Hay*, II, pp. 285-286.) (5) The Bagdad Railway plan proposed in 1899 did not gain English support in 1903, and Koweit, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was by English action (1901) protected against German influence under cover of Turkey's flag. (Lemonon, *Politique britannique*, p. 234.)

(*c*) The Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian declaration regarding the Far East (1902) made clear to England and France the danger of friction and the difficulty of maintaining their neutrality should Japan and Russia go to war. (Hornbeck, *op. cit.*, p. 248.) Yet both France and England wished to be neutral and unhampered in Europe. (Tardieu, *Questions diplomatiques de 1904*, p. 31.) All this was further emphasized by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, February, 1904.

(*d*) The Triple Alliance was formally renewed June, 1902, showing the solidarity of central Europe continued.

(*e*) A general movement in favor of arbitration had gained ground since 1899 and many such treaties were being negotiated. A campaign for Anglo-French arbitration had begun. (Barclay, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Jaray, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Despagnet, *op. cit.*, p. 787.)

(*f*) The important work of Sir Thomas Barclay in connection with the Paris Exposition of 1900, the resolutions of numerous chambers of commerce, and international visits stimulated general rapprochement. (Barclay, *op. cit.*, ch. LVII.)

(*g*) Sir Charles Dilke renewed his reasoned appeals for Anglo-French understanding. (Gwynn, *Dilke*, II, ch. LVII.)

### 3. ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-04.

The striking visit to Paris of Edward VII (1903) cleared the air and caught the imagination of Paris. A return visit of President Loubet to London was equally successful. Negotiations for a convention began July, 1903, and a treaty of arbitration of October 14, 1903 (See article, that title), aided the progress of the negotiation. Under cover of these negotiations political questions were discussed until March, 1904. Meantime Franco-Spanish conversations were taking place. On April 8, 1904, a general agreement was signed. It consisted of four documents: (1) A declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco; (2) a convention in regard to the Newfoundland fisheries; (3) a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides; (4) secret articles. The whole group are commonly called the Convention of April 8, 1904.

### 4. ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTIONS OF APRIL 8, 1904.

These agreements provided (See Appendix I, 68):

(*a*) The surrender by France of rights on the shore of Newfoundland, but retention of fishing rights, in consideration of pecuniary compensation and territorial cessions near French Gambia and east of the Niger.

(*b*) Delimitation of spheres of influence on the border of Siam, settlement of the customs dispute in Madagascar and adjustment of the New Hebrides matter.



(c) France accepted England's occupation of Egypt, and England agreed to development of French interests in Morocco, with commercial liberty, equality of taxes, customs, and railway rates guaranteed in both dependencies, their political status unchanged and necessary reforms to be introduced. England to make effective the treaty of 1888 as to the free navigation of the Suez Canal, and France to receive guarantees as to Egyptian debt by a decree of the Khedive, thus leaving England a free hand in the administration of Egyptian revenues. Spain was to receive special treatment and a promise of no fortification opposite Gibraltar was given. A pledge of diplomatic support was also included. (*Affaires Etrangères, documents diplomatiques. Accords conclus entre France et l'Angleterre, 1904.*)

(d) Secret articles (first published November, 1911, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-1059), provided for possibility of change of policy in Egypt and Morocco without destruction of the treaty and the possibility of Spanish acquisition of territory in Morocco under pledge not to alienate it.

#### 5. GENERAL COMMENTS.

France and England now chose to be friendly: old scores were cleared off and possible quarrels were avoided. Each rejected the more or less vague possibility of exclusive accommodation with Germany. Both agreed to disregard the hegemony of Germany, but each was free to negotiate independently. The Entente stood the tests of the Dogger Bank incident, the Morocco crisis of 1905, the Algeiras conference, the Agadir crisis, and the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See articles dealing with each of these matters). It cleared the way for the Anglo-Russian Entente and helped toward common action in the Near East in 1908, 1911, and 1912-13. The attempts to secure a formal alliance were defeated, but common military and naval policies were in effect before 1910 and their significance defined by letters of Grey and Cambon of November, 1912, which were revealed in 1914. (See article, *Naval and Military Conversations between France and England, 1905-1912.*) To break up the Entente became one of the great purposes of German policy from 1905 on. The Entente, however, did not become an alliance until after the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

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## 101. SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KAISER AND THE CZAR IN 1904-1905.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The formation of the Entente Cordiale between France and England (See article, that title), 1904, immediately affected the balance of power in Europe. The Triple Alliance (See article, The Formation of the Triple Alliance) which Bismarck had formed with Austria and Italy had been weakened through the irrepressible conflict of interests between Austria and Italy over frontiers, Albania, and the Adriatic, and by the series of political and economic treaties which Italy had recently made with France. The Dual Alliance between France and Russia had been greatly strengthened by the Entente Cordiale between France and England. England had also made a defensive alliance with Japan in 1902. In these circumstances the Kaiser felt he must win back waning diplomatic prestige by disrupting or weakening the new Entente Cordiale before it should solidify into a definite alliance. Two methods were attempted by him. One was the now well-known method of attempting to use the Morocco question as in 1905-6. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906.) The other method was virtually unknown until the publication of the so-called "Willy-Nicky Correspondence" in September, 1917. It consisted in secret personal negotiations between the Kaiser and the Czar, in which the Kaiser's purpose was to secure from the Czar an alliance between Germany and Russia. The main points in these negotiations follow.

### 2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ALLIANCE IN 1904.

On June 29, 1904, on the very day of exchanging most friendly and pacific public utterances at Kiel with King Edward VII, the Kaiser sent the first of the "Willy-Nicky" telegrams, by which he carried on the secret negotiations with the Czar. This first message of friendly assurances and sympathy for the losses which Russia was suffering in the Russo-Japanese war was followed by others of increasing warmth and solicitude, in which he gave the Czar military and naval advice. Finally, on October 27, 1904, when Russian and English public opinion were greatly excited against one another on account of the Dogger Bank affair (See article, that title), the Kaiser gave the Czar the first definite hint of an alliance between Germany and Russia, which France might be forced to join:

For some time English press has been threatening Germany on no account to allow coals to be sent to Baltic fleet now on its way out. It is not impossible that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest against our coaling your ships, coupled with a "summation" to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would be the absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally, France, of obligations that she has taken over in the treaty of dual alliance with you, the "casus foederis." It is out of the question that France, on such an invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty toward her ally. Though Delcassé is an anglophile "enragé," he will be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combination of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be formed, to attack whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting. (Willy-Nicky Correspondence, pp. 68-70.)

The Czar easily fell into the snare, replying immediately.

I agree fully with your complaints about England's behavior concerning the coaling of our ships by German steamers, whereas she understands the rules of keeping neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time to put a stop to this. The only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon an agreement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind; it will mean peace and rest for the world. (*Ibid*, 74-75.)

The Kaiser lost no time in supplying the draft of the treaty which he himself so much desired, and tried to frighten the Czar into a hasty acceptance of it, but this time he failed. Nicholas II wished honestly to show the text of the treaty to his loyal ally, France, before signing it. To this, the Kaiser objected, on November 26, 1904:

It is my firm conviction that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both have signed the treaty. It would have an effect diametrically opposed to our wishes. It is only the absolute sure knowledge that we are both bound by treaty to lend each other mutual help that will bring the French to press upon England to remain quiet and keep the peace for fear of France's position being jeopardized. Should, however, France know that a Russian-German treaty is only projected, but still unsigned, she will immediately give short notice to her friend (if not secret ally) England, with whom she is bound by "entente cordiale," and inform her immediately. The outcome of such information would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by the two allied Powers, England and Japan, on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia. Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small fleet and Germany would be temporarily crippled. This would upset the scales of the equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm, and, later on, when you begin your peace negotiations, throw you alone on the tender mercies of Japan and her jubilant and overwhelming friends. It was my special wish—and, as I understand, your intention, too—to maintain and strengthen this endangered equilibrium of the world through expressly the agreement between Russia, Germany, and France \* \* \*. A previous information of France will lead to a catastrophe. Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to con-



clude a treaty with me without the previous consent of France, then it would be a far safer alternative to abstain from concluding any treaty at all. (*Ibid.*, 85-7.)

### 3. FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE OF 1904.

But the Czar was not at this time to be convinced or frightened into an alliance with Germany. The net result of the negotiations in 1904 was a coaling agreement. The German Government should continue to facilitate the delivery of coal to Rodjestvensky's fleet, which was then proceeding from the Baltic to the Far East; and in case Japan regarded such deliveries of coal as a breach of neutrality and declared war on Germany, then the Russian Government would "stand by Germany with all means at its disposal" even though England should take up arms to assist her Japanese ally. (This agreement was embodied in notes exchanged at Petrograd, December 11 and 12, 1904. These are not in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence," but were first made known by the German Government in the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 12, 1917.) As, however, Port Arthur fell a few days after this coaling agreement was signed, and the outlook for German colliers accompanying Rodjestvensky's fleet, and for the fleet itself, began to look very dubious, the Kaiser no longer wanted to live up to the agreement. Owing to this a coolness developed between the Kaiser and the Czar, and the "Willy-Nicky" secret telegraphic negotiations ceased for five months.

### 4. THE BJÖRKÖ INTERVIEW, JULY 24, 1905.

In July, 1905, however, the opening of peace negotiations to end the Russo-Japanese war, the diplomatic victory which Germany seemed to have secured in forcing Delcassé's resignation, and the separation of Norway from Sweden, suggested to the Kaiser the desirability of making a new attempt to win the Czar into an alliance. On July 19, 1905, while on a cruise on the imperial yacht *Hohenzollern*, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar suggesting an informal personal meeting between themselves. The Czar was "delighted," and on his yacht sailed to Björkö, south of Viborg. Here at Björkö, on July 24, 1905, took place an interview at which only the two monarchs were present. (There is, of course, no narrative of the interview in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence," but a fairly accurate account of what took place may be pieced together from: (a) Kaiser's telegram to Von Bülow sent the next day and published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 13, 1917; (b) Kaiser's telegram to the Czar, Aug. 2, 1905, of conversations in Copenhagen a week later, printed in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence," pp. 117-121; (c) Izvolsky's recollections, published in the *Paris Matin*, Sept. 15, 1917; and (d) the text of the Bjorko treaty itself, pub-

lished by the Bolsheviki in the Russian *Izvestia*, Dec. 29, 1917.) They began by discussing candidates for the new throne of Norway. Turning to the question of Denmark they were agreed that "in case of war and impending attack on the Baltic from a foreign power [meaning England] Russia and Germany will immediately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on Denmark and occupying it during the war." And finally the Kaiser produced, and secured the Czar's signature to the long-desired alliance. Witnesses were then called in to add their signatures to a document which they probably did not read.

#### 6. THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ, 1905.

The treaty was in the following terms:

Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of All the Russias on the one side and the Emperor of Germany on the other, in order to insure the peace of Europe have placed themselves in accord on the following points of the herein treaty relative to a defensive alliance:

ARTICLE I. If any European State attacks one of the two Empires, the allied party engages to aid the other contracting party with all his military and naval forces.

ART. II. The high contracting parties engage not to conclude with any common enemy a separate peace.

ART. III. The present treaty will become effective from the moment of the conclusion of the peace between Russia and Japan and may be denounced with a year's previous notification.

ART. IV. When this treaty has become effective, Russia will undertake the necessary steps to inform France of it and to propose to the latter to adhere to it as an ally.

(Signed.)

NICHOLAS.  
WILLIAM.

(Countersigned.)

VON TSCHIRSCHKY.  
COUNT BENKENDORF.  
Naval Minister BIRLEV.

Such was the Treaty of Björkö. It was not suddenly improvised on July 24, 1905. It was the culmination of plans which the Kaiser had in view ever since the Kiel regatta in June, 1904. It was what he had aimed to secure in the fall of 1904 after the Dogger Bank episode, but being then unsuccessful, he had accepted, *faute de mieux*, the Coaling Agreement. The Björkö treaty was in form a defensive alliance, but, taken in connection with the understanding in regard to Denmark, was obviously directed against England. It was in conflict with the spirit of the Dual Alliance and would consequently have overthrown the foundation on which Russian foreign policy had rested since 1891. The specious provision for the adhesion of France was incapable of execution as the situation then was. France, suddenly confronted by the united force of a Russo-German alli-



ance, would have been compelled to choose between two alternatives: Either she would have to subordinate herself as an impotent third party to a combination of two great empires, both dominated in fact by the Kaiser; or she would have been forced to give up the Dual Alliance and stand isolated except so far as England offered support before the Kaiser's menacing power. To the Kaiser it would have made little difference which alternative France chose. In either case he would have extricated Germany from that position, far less favorable than in the days of Bismarck, into which his own unwise policy had brought him; he would have an ally in case of war with England; and Germany would again have weakened and humiliated France.

#### 6. FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE OF 1905.

When the Czar some weeks later showed this treaty to Count Lamsdorf, Russian minister of foreign affairs, the latter "could not believe his eyes or his ears." He instantly saw the danger for France and the necessity of nullifying the treaty. He was authorized by the Czar to intrust the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Count von Osten-Sacken, with the disagreeable but necessary task of informing the Kaiser that the treaty of Björkö was incompatible with Russia's obligations to France, and therefore could not be executed. The Kaiser, however, refused to regard this communication as final and sent the Czar strongly worded telegrams in quick succession (Oct. 12 and 15, 1905), arguing that the Björkö treaty did not collide with the Dual Alliance, and anyway "your ally has notoriously left you in the lurch during the whole war, whereas Germany helped you in every way as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality. That puts Russia morally under obligations to us: *do ut des*.

\* \* \* We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows. I therefore think that the treaty can well come into existence \* \* \*. What is signed is signed and God is our testator."

Nevertheless the Czar, now that his eyes had been opened by Lamsdorf, stood firm. With Lamsdorf's assistance he dispatched a letter to William II supported by instructions which Osten-Sacken was to communicate to the German foreign office, making in unmistakable terms that the Treaty of Björkö could not under existing circumstances come into operation.

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the American Historical Review, October, 1918, where the other items of bibliographical information are indicated.

## 102. THE SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL SHIPS BY RUSSIA DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905.

### 1. EARLY SEIZURES.

A few cases of unwarranted detention and seizure of neutral vessels by Russian warships were reported during the early stages of the Russo-Japanese war. Thus, during the second week of the war, three neutral colliers laden with steam coal (probably destined for Japan) were seized in the Red Sea and brought as prizes into the Gulf of Suez within Egyptian territorial waters. Here they were detained for about four days while these waters were being used as a base of anchorage from which neutral vessels were overhauled, in spite of the protests of the Egyptian Government. In response to a telegraphic order from the Czar, the colliers were soon released, however, on the ground that these captures had been made before the Russian Government had formally declared coal contraband of war.

### 2. CASE OF THE ALLANTON.

But it was not before midsummer of 1904 that interference with neutral trade began in earnest. The first case to excite serious controversy was the capture, on June 16, of the British collier *Allanton* in the straits of Korea on her return voyage from a Japanese port to Singapore. One of the grounds on which this vessel was condemned by the Vladivostok prize court was that she had carried coal to Japan on her outward voyage. Her condemnation was a manifest violation of Anglo-Saxon principles of maritime law (See, e. g., the decision of Lord Stowell in the case of the *Imina*, 3 Rob. 168). The *Allanton* was subsequently released by the Admiralty Council of St. Petersburg.

### 3. THE ARABIA AND THE CALCHAS.

Other important cases of seizure and confiscation of neutral vessels and their contraband cargoes were those of the *Arabia* and the *Calchas* in the latter part of July, 1904.

The *Arabia* was a German vessel with a cargo of American flour, machinery, and railway material consigned mainly to Hongkong and Japanese ports. The cargo was shipped in the ordinary course of trade from Portland, Oregon. The United States Government at once asked for the release of the vessel and its cargo, but the Russian prize court at Vladivostok condemned such portions of the cargo as



had been consigned to Japanese ports. The vessel, together with the remainder of the cargo, was released.

The *Calchas* was a British steamer, largely laden with an American cargo of flour, raw cotton, lumber, etc., shipped from Tacoma and consigned to various eastern and European ports. The decision of the Vladivostok prize court was the same as in the case of the *Arabia*.

Both the British and United States Governments strongly protested against the Russian view of contraband as indicated by these and other actions and decisions.

#### 4. CASE OF THE KNIGHT COMMANDER.

There were many cases of the sinking and destruction by Russian warships of neutral as well as enemy merchantmen during the Russo-Japanese War. (For a long list of such vessels see Takahashi, pp. 275-283.) The most interesting and important of these cases was, perhaps that of the *Knight Commander*. This was a British steamer with a general cargo from New York consigned to various eastern ports. She was sunk by the Vladivostok squadron on July 23, and afterwards condemned by the Vladivostok prize court.

The sinking of the *Knight Commander* created a storm of indignation in England and the British Government entered a vigorous protest. Consequently the decision of the Vladivostok court was subsequently reversed, and an indemnity paid by the Russian to the British Government.

#### 5. THE MALACCA AND THE PRINZ HEINRICH.

Another class of Russian seizures of neutral vessels involved the circumstances under which the right of visit and search may be exercised. In July, 1904, the two cruisers, the *Peterburg* and the *Smolensk*, belonging to the Russian volunteer fleet in the Black Sea, made their way out of the Straits of Constantinople into the Mediterranean in the guise of merchantmen, passed through the Suez Canal, and engaged in searching and seizing neutral (mainly British) vessels in the Red Sea. A fierce storm of anger was aroused in England when it was learned that the Peninsula and Orient liner *Malacca*, bound for far eastern ports, had been brought as a prize into Port Said through the Suez Canal on the charge of carrying contraband. Germany also resented the stoppage of the *Prinz Heinrich* and the confiscation of a portion of her mail.

Both the British and German Governments entered vigorous protests. The German Government claimed that, while "the exercise of the *droit de visite* in the case of mail steamers may perhaps be justifiable, the confiscation of mail bags directly contravenes the

provisions of international law." The Russian Government promptly disavowed this action, agreed to return the confiscated mail bags, and promised better behavior in the future.

In addition to a demand for the immediate release of the *Malacca*, the British Government issued what appears to have been a sort of ultimatum. The Russian Government was placed in the following dilemma: Either it had violated a long line of international treaties by sending commissioned warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in the guise of merchantmen, or it had violated one of the most cardinal principles of international law by permitting or authorizing merchantmen to exercise the belligerent rights of visit, search and capture on the high seas.

The controversy with Great Britain was finally adjusted by the release of the *Malacca*, after a *pro forma* examination of the cargo and upon the formal assurance of the British Government that the munitions of war on board the vessel were British Government stores.

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## 103. THE DOGGER BANK INCIDENT, 1904.

### 1. THE INCIDENT.

On the evening of October 23, 1904, several British steam trawlers arrived at Hull, England, and reported that early in the morning of October 22 nearly 50 small fishing vessels had been suddenly attacked and fired upon on the high seas by warships belonging to the Russian Baltic squadron, then on its ill-fated voyage to the Far East. The Russian vessels continued on their voyage without making the slightest attempt to save life or ascertain what damage they had done. It was soon learned that one trawler had been sunk and five others more or less damaged. Several lives were lost.

### 2. THE GOOD OFFICES OF FRANCE.

British feeling was stirred to a high pitch of excitement by this event, which was regarded as the culmination of a series of Russian "outrages." War between England and Russia seemed a possibility, when France tendered her good offices to bring about a settlement.

### 3. THE DECLARATION OF ST. PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 25, 1904.

After considerable negotiation, it was finally agreed, on November 25, 1904, that an international commission of inquiry should be appointed, consisting of five members of high naval rank, three of them in the service of other countries. The commission was empowered to draw up its own form of procedure.

It was further agreed that "the commission shall inquire into and report on all circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and particularly on the question as to where the responsibility lies and the degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting parties or of other countries in case their responsibility shall be established by the inquiry. (Art. 2 of the declaration of St. Petersburg. For the English text of this declaration, see British Parliamentary Papers, Russia, No. 2 (1905). Appendix.)

### 4. THE NORTH SEA COMMISSION, JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1905.

The North Sea commission met in Paris on January 9, 1905, and rendered its verdict on February 25. The majority held in effect that the Russian Admiral Rojestvensky was responsible for the action and results of the firing upon the fishing fleet, but that he was not personally to blame, i. e., though responsible for the firing and not justified in fact, there was an apparent justification for what he did, and he was not subject to trial and punishment. (For the English text of the report of the commission, see Smith and Sibley, *International Law during the Russo-Japanese War*, Appendix I, p. 452.)

There can be little doubt that the firing was due to a state of panic among the Russian officers of the fleet, induced by a fear or belief that they were in great danger of attack by Japanese torpedo boats. The Russian Government recognized its responsibility by the payment of £65,000 as indemnity due the Hull fishermen.

#### 5. APPRAISMENT.

“The institution of the North Sea Commission and its successful working under such trying circumstances must be pronounced a great victory for the principle of international arbitration. Although nominally called an International Commission of Inquiry, analogous to those provided for by Articles 9–14 of the first Hague Convention, it really combined the functions of an International Court or Tribunal of Justice with those of a Commission of Inquiry, and, in accordance with the purposes for which it was organized, it passed upon the questions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘degree of blame,’ as well as inquired into and reported upon the facts or circumstances of the case. It was in fact an arbitration *sui generis*, of a kind new and unprecedented in the history of international relations; for it was not only applied, at a time of great excitement, to a question affecting the national honor and vital interests of both parties to the dispute, but it introduced into our administration of international justice a new method of procedure in cases of alleged violations of the law of nations. It has set a precedent for the establishment of tribunals combining the functions of an International Court of Arbitration with those of a Court of Inquiry for the investigation and trial before the bar of the public opinion of the world, of those charged with international crimes and misdemeanors or serious violations of international law. It is true that the accused in this case, if found guilty, were to have been punished by a national penal sanction; but the power of imposing an international censure was vested in the North Sea Commission by the Declaration of St. Petersburg; and, although the organization and procedure of the Commission may be open to criticism in matters of detail, there is no valid reason why the principles involved in this case should not be given even a more extended application.” (Hershey, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, 240–241.)

Though this mode of settling international disputes appears to be without precedent, there have been many serious controversies to which it might have been applied with good hope of success. A number of international incidents exhibiting more or less analogy to the Dogger Bank incident are cited by Smith and Sibley, *op. cit.*, 295–319.



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## 104. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Russo-Japanese War was terminated by a treaty signed at Portsmouth, N. H., U. S. A., on September 5, 1905. (For the text see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, pp. 824-828; *American Journal of International Law*, Supplement, I, pp. 17-22.) The envoys who signed the treaty, Baron Iutaro Komura and Mr. Kogoro Takahira for Japan, and Mr. Sergius Witte and Baron Rosen for Russia, were formally received by President Theodore Roosevelt upon the *Mayflower* at Oyster Bay on August 5. Thence they were taken upon the *Mayflower* and *Dolphin* to Portsmouth, where their negotiations proceeded.

## 2. PRELIMINARIES OF THE NEGOTIATION.

The peace conference was instituted upon the invitation of President Roosevelt, who, on June 8, 1905, had directed identical notes to the belligerents, urging that they "open direct negotiations of peace with one another," offering to perform any service necessary thereto, and asserting that his sole purpose was "to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace." (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, pp. 807-808.)

Before directing the identical notes President Roosevelt had sounded the belligerents. "From the end of March," says M. André Chéradame (in *Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, Paris, 1906, p. 290), "people were saying that M. Roosevelt was to be the mediator \* \* \* and from day to day the rumors took on solidity."

Says Mr. Roosevelt (in *An Autobiography*, New York, 1914, p. 555), "I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that, naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the other side should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative." Because of this delicacy in the situation the published documents do not show the precise nature of the preliminary inquiries. On June 2, however, it is known that the President had with Count Cassini "nominally a friendly talk," which *The Nation* (June 8, 1905, p. 447) thought "must be regarded as a tentative proffer of good offices," and five days later, June 7, he discussed with the Japanese minister, Takahira, the probable attitude of the Japanese Government toward such overtures. (Griscom to Secretary of State, June 10, 1905, No. 274, quoting Baron Komura, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, p. 809.)

The identical notes were accepted without delay at Tokio and St. Petersburg. At the former capital "the willingness of Japan to treat for peace has been made clear for months past." (*Outlook*, June 17, 1905, p. 399.) "Those who know the real circumstances recognize that at the time the negotiations were in progress it was absolutely necessary for us to make peace," wrote Count Hayashi in his memoirs. (*The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*, edited by A. M. Pooley, New York, 1915, p. 230.) But the President, as John Hay wrote in his diary after dining at the White House on June 19, "was struck with the vacillation and weakness of purpose shown by Russia." (W. R. Thayer, *John Hay*, New York, 1915, II, p. 406.) Simultaneously with the acceptance of the negotiation by Russia the generals in command of her Manchurian armies, Linievitch and others, protested against the act (*Chéradame*, p. 288); while Japan proceeded at once to overrun the island of Saghalien in order that it might be in her hands when the envoys should convene.

### 3. THE NEGOTIATION.

The negotiations at Portsmouth seem not to have been published by either nation, and are revealed only through the surmises of the press. In this the Russian delegation had the advantage, for M. Witte talked freely through Dr. E. J. Dillon and won friends among the American correspondents, whereas the severe reticence of the Japanese tended to estrange the correspondents. (Hayashi, p. 233.) This was of the greater consequence because American opinion throughout the war had been strongly pro-Japanese. The occupation of Saghalien and the conclusion of a renewal of her alliance with Great Britain (at London, by Lansdowne and Hayashi, August 12, 1905. *American Journal of International Law*, I, Supplement, p. 15; V, p. 105) gave to Japan a firmer foundation for her diplomacy.



In Russia the meeting of the Zemstvos congress and the recasting of her constitution tended to disturb her counsels.

At the start Japan presented a long series of demands, to some of which Russia objected categorically. In particular, her demand for a money indemnity and the cession of Saghalien (Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, p. 557), for cession of certain interned Russian ships, and for a limitation of Russian naval armament in the Far East threatened to break up the conference. Toward the end of August President Roosevelt intervened (*Chéradame*, p. 293), suggesting to the Russians a compromise based upon the surrender of part of Saghalien and the waiving by Japan of her claim for indemnity. Upon this basis the peace was signed September 5, 1905.

#### 4. TERMS.

In addition to provisions for the restoration of peace, resumption of commercial relations on the ante-bellum basis, release of prisoners, ratification, and signature (articles 1, 12-15), the Treaty of Portsmouth made provision for three important matters:

(1) Korea. Russia, "recognizing that Japan has predominant political, military, and economic interests in Korea," agreed "not to interfere or place obstacles in the way of any measure of direction, protection, and supervision which" Japan "may deem necessary to adopt in Korea" (article 2).

(2) Manchuria. Both countries agreed "to completely and simultaneously evacuate Manchuria," except Port Arthur and the portion of the Liaotung Peninsula covered by the Russian lease (See article, *The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898*), which was transferred from Russia to Japan, and to restore it "to the exclusive administration of China." Withdrawal of both Russian and Japanese troops was to begin "simultaneously and immediately" after ratification of the treaty and was to be completed within 18 months (additional article 1). Russia declared that it had "no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria of such a nature as to impair the sovereignty of China, or which are incompatible with the principle of equal opportunity" (article 3). Both countries mutually pledged themselves not to place any obstacles in the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and which China might adopt for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria" (article 4). Russia transferred to Japan its coal mines and railroads in Manchuria (article 6).

(3) Saghalin. Russia ceded to Japan its share of Saghalin and the adjacent islands (article 9).

#### 5. CONCLUSION.

The ratifications of the Treaty of Portsmouth were exchanged at St. Petersburg and Tokio on October 15, 1905. Russia regarded the

treaty as a diplomatic victory. In Japan it caused rioting and ministerial disturbance. It is not likely, as Prof. T. S. Woolsey has observed, "that we yet know the full truth as to the reasons underlying the Portsmouth treaty." He believed that "this was far from being a diplomatic victory for Russia \* \* \* [nor] would it be surprising if the future should reveal that Japan in her inscrutable way saw that the psychological moment had come, persuaded Mr. Roosevelt to initiate negotiations in her behalf \* \* \* and won as great a victory in diplomacy as she had done in war." (*American Historical Review*, April, 1907, p. 654.)

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### 105. THE RENEWALS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1905 AND 1911.

#### 1. NEGOTIATIONS.

As no other country joined Russia in her war against Japan in 1904-05, Great Britain did not find it necessary under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to enter the conflict. (See article, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902*.) It was felt in both Great Britain and Japan, however, that the terms of the treaty of 1902 were too restricted, and on August 12, 1905, while the peace conference was still in session at Portsmouth, a new treaty was signed in London, though the fact was not announced until after peace had been agreed upon.

#### 2. TERMS OF TREATY.

The Treaty of 1905 (See Appendix I, 72) differed from that of 1902 in two significant points:

First. It applied to India as well as the Far East. The earlier treaty had applied only to the Far East.



Second. By the treaty of 1902 each party could remain neutral if the other party were attacked by only one enemy. It was in virtue of this feature that England was able to remain neutral during the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty of 1905, however, stipulated (article 2) that "if by reason of unprovoked or aggressive action wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement [i. e., "the regions of Eastern Asia and of India"], the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally." The alliance was, therefore, essentially defensive in character, and limited in scope to India and the Far East. The paramount rights of Japan in Korea were recognized, provided that the measures adopted by her for "guidance, control, and protection in Korea" were not inconsistent with the principle of the open door. The treaty was to remain in force at least 10 years.

### 3. RENEWAL OF 1911.

On June 13, 1911, the alliance was again renewed (See Appendix I, 98) for a term of 10 years. The most important modification was the following clause:

Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

This clause was inserted because an arbitration treaty (subsequently concluded) was then pending between Great Britain and the United States.

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The text of the two renewal treaties, as well as that of the alliance of 1902, may be found in convenient form in *The Japan Year Book for 1912* (Tokio, Japan Year Book Office, 1912) 440-443.

## 106. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1904-1914.

### 1. EFFECTS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

The general disposition of the great powers to abide by the Hay doctrine (See article, *The Open-Door Policy in China, 1895-1904*) as affording the greatest margin of safety in Far Eastern affairs was disturbed by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. The political equilibrium was upset. England's fear of Russia was so far modified that she willingly recognized the latter's predominant position in Central Asia and Mongolia, and entered into an understanding with her in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet (See articles, *The Formation of the Triple Entente*, and *The Persian Question, 1906-1914*). The Anglo-Japanese alliance was so far extended as to include Japan in a defense of India. (See article, *The Renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905 and 1911*.)

Secretary Taft's visit to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War was followed by announcement of a verbal understanding to preserve the integrity of China and maintain the Open Door. A formal agreement guaranteeing this policy immediately followed the trip of the White Squadron around the world. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1908*, pp. 510-512.)

### 2. CONDITIONS IN CHINA.

After the war of 1904-5 Manchuria remained a region of clashing interests which was likely to breed political suspicion and antagonism even if peace could be maintained. China, a vastly larger and more populous area, while politically backward and inert, has certain basic characteristics, a homogeneous people, a common language, and culture with ancient traditions, that may in time restore her to a position as a political force in the world. It could not be a matter of indifference to the United States whether or not China's integrity be preserved during the slow process of reformation and adjustment. The "open door," which involves political equilibrium amongst the nations chiefly interested, had been threatened by Russia. On this account the popular sentiment of America sided strongly with Japan until the end of the war brought ruin to Russian prestige in the East. After the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan showed a disposition to recoup at least a part of her military outlay by monopolizing economic advantages in Korea and by playing the former rôle of Russia in Manchuria. To meet the threatened transfer of all her profitable trade in that province, the United States was confronted with the necessity of entering upon a partnership with one or more of the nations involved to secure a determined share of its exploitation or of renewing her attempt to unite all the powers in



a self-denying agreement to maintain the equality of opportunity promised in the Portsmouth treaty. The first would have been directly contrary to her traditions, her sentiment, and her repeated professions; the other was attempted when Russia and Japan began disputes about the Manchurian railways under the following circumstances.

### 3. JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN MANCHURIA.

Complaints as to Japan's violating the spirit of the "open door" in Manchuria began immediately after the peace in 1905. A secret protocol attached to the Komura treaty with China, December 22, 1905, gave Japan a new and special privilege when China promised not to construct any railway lines parallel to and competing with the South Manchurian railways. (See summary of the protocol in Millard, *Our Eastern Question*, 430-433.) When China tried with British funds to build an extension to the North China Railway from Hsimintun to Fakumen, both Japan and Russia signified disapproval. The construction of the line was forbidden. To protect the rights of all nations which seemed thus to be threatened, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, submitted a scheme that the powers, including Japan and Russia, should loan China enough money to buy all the railways in Manchuria and construct others, placing all under the administrative control of an interested commission. (Telegram—Paraphrase. Knox to Reid, November 6, 1909. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1910, pp. 234-235.) Secretary Knox advocated his plan for the Manchurian railways on the ground that "perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to promote the development of those Provinces under a practical application of the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways, the railroads, under an economic, scientific, and impartial administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds furnished for that purpose by the interested powers willing to participate." (Ibid. p. 234.) Russia and Japan not only announced their disapproval of the scheme, but on July 4, 1910, concluded a convention stipulating for the maintenance of the status quo in Manchuria (*Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 116, p. 66). Japan then proceeded to construct other lines and secure control of coal mines near Mukden.

The outcome of this pooling of Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria was a partial return to the "spheres of influence" idea, which slowly gathered momentum after the revolution, when Russia strengthened her hold upon the entire frontier marching with her boundaries, and Japan added to her industrial investments in both China and Manchuria.

## 4. THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES.

All the political activities of the United States in regard to eastern Asia have steadily kept in view the integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for all nations trading there. Its Government has been credited by others with humanitarian sentiments rather than a clear perception of the disintegrating forces at work.

NOTES ON AGREEMENTS AS TO CHINA'S INTEGRITY AFTER THE PORTS-MOUTH TREATY.

(Based on Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, 444-450.)

1907, June 10: Franco-Japanese convention. The two Governments agreed to "respect the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country." (*American Journal of International Law*, I. Supplement, p. 396.)

1907, July 30: Russo-Japanese convention. The contracting parties "recognize the independence and territorial integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity \* \* \* and engage to defend the status quo and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach." (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 101, pp. 462-463.)

1908, November 30: Root-Takahira agreement. Japan and the United States exchange notes recording their wish to "preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity of all nations in that empire." (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1908, pp. 510-512.)

1910, July 4: Russo-Japanese convention reiterates attachment to principles established by the convention concluded July 30, 1907, and engages to maintain the status quo in Manchuria. (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 103, p. 586.)

1911, July 13: Anglo-Japanese alliance, second renewal. Declares object to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 104, pp. 173-174.)

1917, November 2: Lansing-Ishii agreement. Provides, among other things, for the independence and territorial integrity of China, and recognizes special interests of Japan in China based on her territorial propinquity. Treaty Series [of the United States] No. 630, pp. 3-4 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office, 1917).



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## 107. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA, 1897-1904.

### I. INTRODUCTION.

A "sphere of influence," as distinguished from a territory definitely transferred, or leased for a term of years, or in which a settlement or concession has been permitted or granted by treaty between China and some foreign power, denotes that portion of the territory of China within which some power or powers claim certain exclusive privileges as against another or other foreign powers.

The so-called "spheres of influence" in China were first sought to be established by the various foreign powers as a consequence of the military weakness revealed by the Chinese Government in its war with Japan of 1894 and 1895. Creation of such spheres proceeded so rapidly that within the period of 1897 to 1904 almost all of China was claimed for some "sphere of influence" controlled by a foreign power. The provinces claimed as special spheres of interest were usually those adjoining the possessions of the particular powers and were based on strategic and political considerations. The claims involved, however, not merely a deprivation of Chinese power to alienate the territory in question, but also sought to impress a prior claim upon it in favor of the particular foreign power for railway or mining concessions or both. The spheres were in some cases created by a unilateral declaration on the part of China made at the request of the foreign power; in others it took the form of an exchange of notes between the Chinese foreign office and the minister of the foreign government; while, finally, it was not infrequently embodied in a formal treaty signed by both China and the foreign power, or in a loan agreement between some ministry of the Chinese Government and the foreign concessionaire.

The various foreign powers, in cases where their interests conflicted, entered into agreements among themselves delimiting and defining their respective spheres. These agreements while not considered as binding upon China, were however intended as notice to third powers to refrain from seeking concessions in the spheres so defined.

A brief indication of the location of the various spheres and of the manner of their creation follows.

## 2. SHANTUNG PROVINCE, GERMAN.

By the terms of the convention between the German Empire and China respecting the lease of Kiao-chau signed March 6, 1898, the Chinese Government bound itself in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital, or material might be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question." (See Appendix I, 52. See also article, The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, 1898.)

On April 19, 1898, the British Government made the following declaration respecting Wei-Hai-Wei:

England formally declares to Germany that in establishing herself at Wei-Hai-Wei she has no intention of injuring or contesting the rights and interests of Germany in the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties for her in that Province. It is especially understood that England will not construct any railroad communication from Wei-Hai-Wei and the district leased therewith into the interior of the Province of Shantung. (See Appendix I, 54.)

By agreement of September 2, 1898, at London, the British and German spheres for railway construction were defined. (Appendix I, 57.)

## 3. FUKIEN, JAPANESE.

On April 24, 1898, the Japanese minister to China requested a declaration from the Government of China that it would not cede or lease to any other power any portion of its territory within the Province of Fukien (Rockhill, 1894-1904, p. 181). In its reply of April 26, 1898, the Chinese Government declared that "the Province of Fukien, with all the territory in the interior and along the sea coast within its limits, which is an important part of China, China will never cede or lease to any Power whatsoever (Ibid, p. 125)."

In 1903 mining concessions in this province were granted by the Chinese Government to a French company.

## 4. THE YANGTZE REGION, BRITISH.

On February 11, 1898 (See Appendix I, 51), the Tsung-li Yamen, in reply to a request from the British minister for "a definite assur-



ance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other Power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation," replied that "the Yangtze region is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position (or interests) of China, and it is out of the question that territory (in it) should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power."

While not specifying the provinces otherwise than as those "adjoining the Yangtze," this would include the following: Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan.

On April 28, 1899, by an exchange of notes between the British ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign affairs, "Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the British Government." (See Appendix I, 60.)

#### 5. KWANG-TUNG AND KUANG-SI, FRENCH.

In the exchange of notes of June 12, 1897, between the Chinese foreign office and the French minister at Peking, the second formula stated "It is understood, in compliance with Article V of the Complementary Commercial Convention of June 20, 1895, that in the three southern border provinces, Kwang-tung, Kuang-si and Yunnan, the Chinese Government may call upon French engineers and manufacturers for working mines." The article referred to provided:

It is understood that China, for the exploitation of its mines in the provinces of Yunnan, Kuang-si and Kuang-tung, may call upon, in the first instance, French manufacturers and engineers, the exploitation remaining, nevertheless, subject to the rules proclaimed by the Imperial Government as regarding national industries.

It is agreed that railways, either those already in existence, or those projected in Annam may, after mutual agreement and under conditions to be defined, be continued on Chinese territory. (Rockhill, 1894-1904, p. 23.)

In addition to the provision contained in the exchange of notes of June 12, 1897, regarding mines in Kwang-tung, in June, 1898, and December, 1899, the French Government secured certain exclusive railway and mining concessions in Kwang-tung.

On March 15, 1897, the Chinese foreign office, in reply to a despatch from the French minister at Peking, replied: "Our Yamen considers Kiung-Chou (the island of Hainan) as belonging to the territory of China, which consequently exercises over it right of sovereignty. How could it cede it to foreign nations?" (Appendix I, 47.) This island is under the jurisdiction of the Government of Kwang-tung province.

## 6. YUNNAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH.

The Province of Yunnan is claimed both by Great Britain and France as a sphere of influence, the former by reason of geographical propinquity to Burma, and the latter by reason of propinquity to Tongking.

Great Britain, by the conventions of March 1, 1894, and February 4, 1897 (See Appendix I, 43, 46), secured commercial privileges, mining and railway concessions.

France, by the convention of June 20, 1895, reaffirmed in the exchange of notes of June 12, 1897, received mining and railway concessions. (Appendix I, 48.)

By a joint declaration made at London on January 15, 1896, by Great Britain and France "The two Governments agree that all commercial and other privileges and advantages conceded in the two Chinese Provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen, either to Great Britain or France, in virtue of their respective conventions with China of the 1st of March, 1894, and the 20th of June, 1895, and all privileges and advantages of any nature which may in the future be conceded in these two Chinese provinces, either to Great Britain or France, shall, as far as rests with them, be extended and rendered common to both Powers and to their nationals and dependents, and they engage to use their influence and good offices with the Chinese Government for this purpose." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 88, p. 15.)

## 7. SZUCHUAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH.

An agreement by the Huayi Co., established by the Szuchuan Mining Bureau, and Mr. Morgan, an English merchant, signed April 14, 1899, provided for the working of mines in Szuchuan.

According to a "Memorandum on railway and mining concessions secured by France, and French companies in China," as published in the French Yellow Book of 1900 (See Appendix I, 62), the French consulate at Chungking, in July, 1899, secured from the mining bureau of Szuchuan concessions for the working of certain mines.

According to the joint declaration made at London on January 15, 1896, by Great Britain and France, all privileges conceded to either power in Szuchuan as in Yunnan shall be extended and rendered common to both powers and to their national. (Ibid.)

## 8. EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA, JAPANESE.

Japan has recently asserted a claim to special interests in that portion of Mongolia lying north of the Great Wall and adjacent to Southern Manchuria, known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. This did not, however, receive formal recognition on the part of China until the exchange of notes of May 25, 1915.



## 9. THE TERRITORY WITHIN THE GREAT WALL (CHIHHLI), BRITISH.

By an agreement signed at Peking on April 29, 1902, between the British minister and the Chinese Government it was agreed "that the construction of any new railway within a distance of 80 miles of any portion of the existing lines shall be undertaken by the administrations general of the Imperial Northern Railways." The original loan agreement of June 7, 1898, for the construction of this railway also provided for the rights of mining coal and iron on each side of the proposed lines. (Rockhill, 1894-1904, pp. 317-319.)

## 12. THE REGION NORTH OF THE GREAT WALL—NORTH MANCHURIA, OUTER MONGOLIA.

On April 28, 1899, by an exchange of notes between the British ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign affairs, "Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government." (Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 2 (1899), pp. 87-89.)

On June 1, 1899, the Chinese foreign office sent a note to the Russian minister at Peking stating that "if railways are in future built 'from Peking to the north or to the northeast toward the Russian border,' China reserves the right to construct such roads, but that if it is proposed to have such construction undertaken by another nation, the proposal shall be first made to the Russian Government." The Russian minister in his reply of June 17, 1899, acknowledging the receipt of the foregoing, referred to it as agreeing that if railways are in future built from Peking to the north or to the northeast toward the Russian border, no matter in what direction "Russia should be given the preference."

## 13. CONCLUSION.

The notes sent by Secretary Hay in 1899 to the various powers in regard to the maintenance of the "open door" in China (See Appendix I, 61), and to which formal assent was given by all the powers, related to "spheres of whatever influence" and was not intended to be restricted in its operation to leased ports. The subsequent agreements concluded by Russia with China providing for exclusive privileges in Manchuria were considered by Secretary Hay as violations of the pledges made to the United States. The policy was seriously threatened at the time of the Boxer Rebellion (See article, The Boxer Uprising), when, as a consequence of the military expedition undertaken by the powers and the occupation of Chinese territory by for-

eign troops, it was feared that advantage might be taken of the occasion to seek the extension or addition of spheres of influence. This was, however, forestalled by the Anglo-German agreement of 1900, to which the other powers adhered. (Appendix I, 63.)

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 resulted in a shifting of the spheres of influence of the respective powers in Manchuria and Mongolia, while as a result of the military operations conducted by Japan against Germany, following the outbreak of the European War in 1914, there resulted a replacing of German influence by that of Japanese in the Province of Shantung.

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### 108. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN CHINA, 1863-1914.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The history of railway development in China prior to 1914 may be divided into three periods. In the first or experimental stage, 1863-1894, the opening years were characterized by attempts to persuade the Chinese to permit the building of railways, and the closing years



by efforts on the part of the Chinese to construct a railway net without the aid of foreigners. The second was the so-called "battle of concessions" period, 1895–1905. In the third, 1906–1914, China attempted to formulate a national policy in regard to railroads.

## 2. THE WOOSUNG RAILWAY, 1876.

China's railway history began with the Woosung Railway, of 2 feet 6 inches gauge, built by foreign enterprise and formally opened on June 30, 1876. It was subsequently "redeemed" by the Chinese, and in 1877, the rails were torn up and shipped to Formosa. Ten years later, however, a railway was in operation between Longshan and Tientsin—the nucleus of the present Peking-Mukden Railway—and in 1897 the section from Peking to Tientsin was opened.

This article deals mainly with the second of these periods. Concessions authorizing the construction of railways were sought for as part of the mechanism by which spheres of influence might be established (See article, *Spheres of Influence in China, 1897–1904*), territory acquired by lease for a definite term of years, and commercial, financial, mining, and even strategic rights and privileges exploited. A very complicated situation was thus developed, involving China in disputes with the powers and the powers with each other.

## 3. THE SCRAMBLE FOR RAILWAY CONCESSIONS, 1895–1905.

The scramble for concessions began in 1895, when France and Russia claimed from the Chinese Government some compensation for the services rendered in connection with the retrocession to China of the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. (See article, *The Treaty of Shimonoseki*.) In treaties signed on June 8, 1895, France, in addition to a rectification of the frontiers between China and Indo-China and the grant of mining rights in Yunnan Province, obtained the right to extend the military railways already built, and those in prospect, in Indo-China, into Chinese territory (*Archives Diplomatiques*, second series, vol. 56, pp. 340–343). Russia in 1896 (See Article, *The Cassini convention*) obtained the right to construct a railway across the Manchuria from a point near Stretensk, on the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to Vladivostok, a distance of some 1,400 miles, 960 of which were to be in Chinese territory. This concession was extended two years later, March 27, 1898 (*Rockhill, Treaties, China, and Korea, 1894–1904*, pp. 51–52), permitting Russia to construct a line from a point on the road mentioned above (Harbin) to Port Arthur, approximately 400 miles.

In 1897 (*Convention of February 4, 1896, Rockhill, Treaties, China and Korea, 1894–1904*, pp. 40–44) Great Britain obtained a

concession to connect Burmah and Yunnan Province by rail, and what was still more significant, perhaps, a guarantee from China that she would not alienate to any other power any part of the Yangtze Valley. In this same year Germany seized Kiao-chau Bay, and in March of 1898, in a formal convention, obtained among other things the right to construct a triangular system of railways in Shantung Province. (See article, *The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, 1898.*)

As a result of these concessions, China permitted the establishment of four systems of railways, three of them designed to bring her neighbors by rail to her doors, the Russians on the north and the French and British from the south and west, the fourth establishing Germany on the borders of the metropolitan province. Without any doubt these concessions were mainly for strategic purposes.

#### 4. RAILWAYS CONSTRUCTED OR CONTROLLED BY CHINA.

In an altogether different category from the four systems mentioned above are several railway enterprises which were initiated more or less by China. Their construction was undertaken for commercial purposes, though even in these cases political considerations were of some importance. First, the Peking-Hankow line, a trunk line of some 650 or 700 miles in length, was granted to a Franco-Belgian syndicate in May, 1907. The concession involved the building of the road only. (Rockhill, *Treaties, 1894-1904*, pp. 225-230.) Construction was begun in 1898 and the road was opened to traffic in December, 1905. It was built from a loan of £4,500,000 from Franco-Belgian capitalists, which was redeemed in 1908 from a loan of £5,000,000 from Anglo-French capitalists secured upon sundry taxes. The railway reverted to Chinese control on January 1, 1909.

In 1898 the British obtained a number of concessions for the construction of railways in the Yangtze Valley and in south and south-western China (*Ibid.*, pp. 281-304). The British and Germans together obtained the right to build a line from Tientsin to Pukow, opposite Nanking. The construction of the northern (German) section of this line was begun on July 1, 1908, and it was formally completed on March 31, 1913. The construction of the southern (British) section line was begun in February, 1909, and opened to traffic in June, 1912. The Peking Syndicate, an Anglo-Italian combination, obtained mining and railway concessions in the Provinces of Shansi and Honan north of the Yellow River (*Ibid.*, pp. 305-308). The Russo-Chinese Bank secured the right to build a line from Chengting, on the Peking-Hankow road, to Taiyuan, the capital city of Shansi Province (*Ibid.*, pp. 309-316). French capitalists in September, 1899, signed an agreement by the terms of which they obtained the right to construct the Lungchow-Nanking road.



## 5. THE ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE A NATIONAL RAILWAY POLICY, 1898.

This period of concession grabbing was brought to an end by the action of the Chinese Government in creating in August, 1898, the board of mines and railways, which along with the Tsung-li Yamen, memorialized the throne to the effect that "with the exception of the trunk and branch lines already arranged for and sanctioned, the construction of which will be proceeded with in order, no other lines shall be undertaken for the present." The memorial was approved by the throne and its contents notified to the powers.

About the time this decree was issued the British minister in Peking in a dispatch, subsequently printed in the Blue Book, "Affairs of China" (No. 1, (1889) pp. 344-347) summarized the concessions granted to all nations up to November 23, 1898. The total length of line represented was approximately 6,420 miles, divided according to the nationality of the concessionaries as follows: British, 2,800 miles in 9 different concessions; Russian, 1,530 miles in 3 different concessions; German, 720 miles in 2 different concessions; Belgian, 750 miles in 1 concession; French, 420 miles in 3 different concessions; and American, 300 miles in 1 concession.

## SITUATION IN 1916.

In 1916 China possessed 6,467 miles of railways, with 2,300 miles more under construction. An imperial edict of May 9, 1911, ordered that all trunk lines, under construction or projected, were to be taken over by the government, while branch railways were to be allowed to be undertaken by the people according to their ability. This order, which contributed greatly to the unrest that resulted in the revolution of 1911, had special reference to the Szechuan-Hupeh Railway and the Canton-Hankow Railway. Under the Republic there has been a deeper sense of the advantages of a national system, and steps have been taken to nationalize railway expansion in China. China has in mind a vast program of railway expansion, but lacks the financial resources to carry it out.

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## 109. CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1905-1914.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Some of the most important Chino-Japanese relations during 1905-1914 are covered by the article, *The Question of South Manchuria, 1904-1914*. But there remain some considerations of general policy and a few particular incidents illustrating that policy which should be considered.

### 2. TREATY OF PEKING, 1905, AND SECRET PROTOCOLS.

The limitations imposed upon Chinese activities in Manchuria by Japan in the Treaty of Peking, signed on December 22, 1905, and more especially in the secret protocols of the same date (Rockhill, *Treaties Relating to China and Korea, 1904-1908*, pp. 131-140), were not relished by the Chinese. This was particularly true of article 3 of the secret protocols (See Millard, T. F., *Our Eastern Question*, p. 431), which bound the Chinese Government, "for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway."

### 3. CHINESE POLICY OF OBSTRUCTION.

Consequently China followed a policy of obstruction to Japanese plans, more particularly in connection with the Fakumen Railway scheme (See article, *The Question of South Manchuria, 1904-1914*) and the Antung Railway controversy.

This policy was later abandoned to a certain extent, more especially after the Russo-Japanese entente of 1910 (See article, *The*



Question of South Manchuria) ; but Chinese susceptibilities were frequently outraged by Japan's conduct apropos of certain incidents which occurred from time to time and which were calculated to disturb the harmony of Chino-Japanese relations, had such harmony existed.

#### 1. THE CHANGLI AFFAIR, 1911.

There were many such incidents, but only a few of them attained wide publicity. One of these was the Changli affair. On September 11, 1911, some Japanese soldiers at the railway station in Changli (just outside of Manchuria) filched some fruit from a Chinese peddler. A Chinese policeman who detected them in the act, compelled them to restore the stolen goods. That night the soldiers returned and provoked a quarrel with another peddler. The policeman again interfered when 40 armed Japanese soldiers appeared and, surrounding the station, demanded from the Chinese officer at the station the surrender of the policeman. Upon being asked to return the next day, the enraged Japanese not only killed the Chinese officer, but fired into a group of Chinese policemen and civilians with the result that four policemen and one civilian were killed. After looting the railway station the Japanese soldiers also looted the Chinese police station. When a Chinese magistrate arrived on the scene, he was seized by the Japanese, taken to their barracks, and threatened with death unless he signed a report of the proceedings which they had written.

There being a divergence in the Chinese and Japanese version of the facts in the case, both sides appointed members of a commission which, after an investigation, confirmed the Chinese version. China then made four moderate demands for compensation, but these were ignored until nearly a year later, when the Japanese Government agreed to pay \$13,000 (in Mexican currency) to the families of the five murdered policemen and to order their railway guards to apologize to the Chinese magistrate at Changli.

#### 5. THE NANKING AFFAIR, 1913.

Another of these incidents was the Nanking affair. When Nanking was surrendered by the rebels on September 3, 1913, there followed several days of riot and looting. Among others two Japanese barbers and two shopkeepers were killed. The Japanese Government at once made the following six demands:

(1) The execution in the presence of the Japanese consul of the soldiers who killed the Japanese and looted the Japanese shops, as also the execution or severe punishment of their superior officers.

(2) That Gen. Chang Hsun and his officers be severely reprimanded immediately after the execution.

(3) That Gen. Chang proceed in person to the Japanese consulate and express his regrets.

(4) That an indemnity be paid to the families of the dead and to the proprietors of the shops that were looted.

(5) That the entire regiment to which the guilty soldiers belonged should march to the Japanese consulate and salute with their arms.

(6) That the Chinese Government apologize to the Japanese Government.

These demands were accepted by the Chinese Government and an indemnity of \$641,845 (Mexican) was paid.

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### 110. JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH KOREA, 1904-1910.

#### 1. TREATY OF 1904.

On February 23, 1904, within a few weeks after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan negotiated a protocol with the Korean Government in which she guaranteed the "independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire," and agreed to protect Korea against the "aggressions of a third power or internal disturbances." In return the Korean Government undertook to "place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter regarding improvements in administration." It also gave to Japan the right to "occupy, when circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from the strategical point of view." (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 98, p. 842.)

#### 2. THE PROTOCOL OF 1904.

On August 22, 1904, a new agreement was signed. By the third article Korea agreed: "When concluding any treaty with a foreign power or other important transaction in the nature of agreements granting special rights to individual foreigners, and so forth, the Korean Government will consult the Government of Japan." Korea



also agreed to engage two officials recommended by the Japanese Government. One was to act as financial adviser. His advice was to be "sought and followed in all financial matters." The other was to serve as diplomatic adviser. His advice was to be "sought and followed in all international questions of an important nature." (Ibid., vol. 98, p. 843.)

### 3. CONVENTION OF 1905.

On November 17, 1905, Marquis Ito, acting for Japan at Seoul, secured the signing of a convention which gave Japan complete control over the external affairs of Korea. The Government of Korea agreed "not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character except through the medium of the Government of Japan." A Japanese resident general was to reside at Seoul "primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs." (Ibid., vol. 98, pp. 1139-1140.)

### 4. CONVENTION OF 1907.

Three Koreans, who claimed to act by the authority of the Emperor of Korea, appeared at the Hague during the Peace Conference of 1907 and issued an appeal to the delegates. Their action, if authorized, was a violation of the convention of 1905. The incident led directly to a situation which resulted in the abdication of the Emperor of Korea in favor of the Crown Prince on July 19 and the conclusion on July 24 of a new convention which gave Japan control over the internal affairs of Korea. By the terms of this instrument Korea agreed to "act under the guidance of the Resident-General in respect to reforms in administration;" "not to enact any laws, ordinances, or regulations, nor to take any important measures of administration without the previous assent of the Resident-General;" that appointment and dismissal of all high officials should be made upon the concurrence of the Resident-General. Korea also agreed to "appoint as Korean officials Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General" and that no foreigners should be engaged without his consent. (Ibid, vol. 101, p. 280.)

### 5. THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION, AUGUST 22, 1910.

The attempt to govern Korea indirectly by a Resident-General encountered internal disturbances and difficulties. In 1909 Marquis Ito, who had recently retired from the office of Resident-General, was assassinated and an attempt was made shortly afterward to kill the Korean prime minister. This condition of affairs led to the treaty of August 22, 1910, by which Korea was formally annexed to Japan. (See Appendix I, 96.)

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## 111. CHINA AND THE SIX POWER LOAN SYNDICATE, 1908-1913.

### 1. THE CHINESE RAILWAY LOAN, 1909.

American financiers first showed an interest in Chinese development in connection with the Canton-Hankow Railway enterprise in 1898, when the American China Development Co. was formed. In 1909 China was planning to complete the Canton-Hankow Railway, and English, French, and German banking groups were ready to advance to China the necessary funds.

With the support of the Administration, an American financial group was formed which asked to be permitted to participate in this loan to China. (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1910, pp. 243-245.) The European groups objecting, the State Department took up the matter directly with the Chinese Government, which promptly recognized the justice of the American request and decided that the American group must be included in the negotiations of the four power loan for the Hankow Railway (*Ibid.*). This



loan agreement was concluded in May, 1910 (Ibid., 281-282). (See article, *The Open-Door Policy in China, 1904-1914.*)

## 2. THE REORGANIZATION LOAN, 1911-1913.

After Yuan Shi-kai had succeeded in mastering the Revolution of 1911 and had been selected as temporary President of the new Chinese Republic, he planned to make a large loan from the powers for his schemes of so-called "reorganization." Russia and Japan, though debtor nations, forced their way into the four power loan group or syndicate, which thus became a six power group. The negotiations for this loan lasted two years. The six power loan syndicate undoubtedly aimed at a monopoly of loans to China. (Hornbeck, p. 393.)

There was much opposition to this syndicate in China and much jealousy and wrangling between the powers. But by the spring of 1913 matters had become pretty well adjusted, and a revised proposal was submitted to the Chinese Government, only to be rejected because of the evident attempt to exercise political control indirectly through financial means.

## 3. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DECLARATION, 1913.

Such were conditions in China when President Wilson and Mr. Bryan succeeded Mr. Taft and Mr. Knox. Within a few weeks after his inauguration in March, 1913, President Wilson declared:

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial and even the political affairs of that great Oriental State just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and its obligations to its people. (*American Journal of International Law*, VII, 338.)

Upon this announcement the American group promptly withdrew from the six power syndicate. Though the remaining five powers continued their negotiations with China and finally made her a loan of \$125,000,000, the defection of the United States marked the beginning of the dissolution of the group. The British Government stood for a time by its pledges to the group, but finally yielded to the pressure of British public opinion and lifted the embargo on the independent investment of British capital in China. The loan power syndicate was at an end.

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## 112. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA, 1905–1914.

### 1. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH, 1905 (SEE APPENDIX I, 73).

By the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905, Russia recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea and engaged not to interfere with measures which Japan might find it necessary to take there. Russia transferred to Japan the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur, the railway line south of Chang-chun and appurtenant coal mines—that is to say, all Russian interests and special rights in South Manchuria. The two countries agreed to withdraw their troops completely within 18 months, reserving the right to maintain guards along the railways. They engaged to restore to China the administration of the places evacuated. Russia disavowed the possession in Manchuria of “any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions to the impairment of China's sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.” Both powers promised “not to obstruct any general measure common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industries of Manchuria”; and to use “their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and in no way for strategic purposes,” except in the Liaotung Peninsula (See article, *The Treaty of Portsmouth*, 1905).

### 2. THE PEKING (“KOMURA”) TREATY, 1905.

On December 22, 1905, Baron Komura (who had represented Japan at Portsmouth) secured at Peking a treaty (See Appendix I, 75) wherein China confirmed Japan's new position. China consented to the transfer of rights, which Russia had made in respect to Manchuria, to Japan. The Japanese engaged in regard to the leased territory and the construction and exploitation of railways, “so far as circumstances permit, [to] conform to the original agreements concluded between Russia and China.” China promised to open 16 new towns in Manchuria “for international residence and trade.” China agreed that Japan might “improve” the railway line which she had constructed from Antung to Mukden during the war. Each country guaranteed the other most-favored-nation treatment on the Manchuria-Korea frontier.



## 3. THE SECRET PROTOCOLS.

In connection with the Peking treaty of 1905, there was also framed and signed a set of secret protocols (*Ibid*). The most important article was the following:

The Chinese Government engages, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above mentioned railway.

This engagement was destined to have a telling and disastrous effect upon China's subsequent efforts to hold her own in Manchuria and upon the endeavors of foreign competitors to avail themselves of the existence of the supposed rights of "equal opportunity" in South Manchuria.

Another of the articles, No. 9, provided that:

If no objection be offered on the part of Russia respecting the navigation of the Sungari (by Japanese vessels), China shall consent to such navigation after negotiations.

This is the key to a portion of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 1916.

## 4. JAPAN'S POSITION IN MANCHURIA, 1905.

Japan had declared both at the beginning and at the end of the war that she was saving Manchuria for China. Japan evicted Russia, not from Manchuria, but from South Manchuria; she took Russia's place in South Manchuria, leaving Russia in North Manchuria.

During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese people had come to expect a huge cash indemnity from Russia. There developed among them now the impression that the United States had prevented their diplomats from securing this at Portsmouth. Marquis Ito had arranged tentatively with Mr. Harriman for the sale of the railway lines in South Manchuria to the latter. Baron Komura vetoed this arrangement and elaborated among Japanese statesmen the policy whereby Japan should secure in Manchuria the indemnification which she had not been able to secure by negotiation.

Japan had actually secured through the war and the Portsmouth treaty great gains. By the treaty she escaped the necessity of taking the chance of a further conflict; she gained a free hand in Korea, a free hand in the Liaotung Peninsula for at least the next 18 years, exclusive rights in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway for the next 34 years at least, the sweeping pledges of the secret protocols with China. And while the Portsmouth negotiations were in progress, she had secured the amendment of the Anglo-Japanese agreement which made the alliance both defensive and offensive and

assured her the future support of Great Britain. (See article. The Renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905 and 1911.)

#### 5. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY.

When at various times since 1905, it has been complained that Japan has interpreted the Portsmouth treaty very broadly, the reply has been forthcoming that the Portsmouth treaty is an instrument whose construction is to be determined by and between the contracting parties, Japan and Russia—and in so far as it was ratified by her, China, and that it is not the concern of other powers. This is correct only in so far as the construction put upon the clauses of that treaty or of the treaties accessory thereto does not interfere with the principles of the open door and equality of opportunity to which both Russia and Japan have subscribed in pledges which are essentially international in character.

#### 6. JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA.

By the Portsmouth treaty Japan came into possession in Manchuria of 700 miles of railway, 7,054 square miles of railway zone, certain mines, and 1,300 square miles of land in the leased territory. Russia retained 1,000 miles of railway lines and 513.63 square miles of land. The possession of railway lines means possession of the strategic and economic keys to Manchuria.

The main points of disagreement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments have been with regard to: (1) Railway construction; (2) mines and timber concessions; (3) certain administrative and territorial matters.

#### 7. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.

By imperial ordinance of June 7, 1906, the Japanese Government organized the South Manchurian Railway Co. Nominally an independent company, the South Manchurian Railway has been in fact an instrument of the Japanese Government. This became clear in 1913. The South Manchurian Railway Co. was given very wide powers. By imperial ordinance of July 31, 1906, the government general of Kwantung (the leased territory) was organized. This was amended January 10, 1908. The Kwantung government and South Manchurian Railway Co. have between them performed most of the functions of a colonial railway administration.

#### 8. THE ANTUNG-MUKDEN RAILWAY.

China agreed in the treaty of December 22, 1905, that Japan might "improve" the Antung-Mukden railway, the work to be begun within one year and to be completed within two years thereafter, the



whole line to be purchased by China at the end of 15 years after completion. This would coincide with the year of the expiration of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, 1923. The Japanese did nothing toward the improving of the line until three years later. They then set about a complete reconstruction. This occasioned diplomatic controversies with China, during which Japan threw soldiers into the region and proceeded with the construction. On August 6, 1909, Japan delivered to China an ultimatum. The Chinese then signed the agreement which Japan proposed (August 19, 1909). Japan constructed a first-class broad gauge line which connects the Korean Trunk Line with the Manchurian trunk lines and the Trans-Siberian. Along this line iron and coal mines are being developed.

#### 9. BRANCH RAILWAY LINE TO YINGKOW (NEWCHWANG).

After some controversy concerning rights based on Article III of the Russo-Chinese railway agreement of June 24, 1898, Japan and China arrived at an agreement in Article II of the Manchurian convention of September 4, 1909. (Appendix I, 92.) The Tashichao-Yingkow branch of the South Manchurian railway line was to be held by Japan and to be delivered up to China at the expiration of the term of the concession of the South Manchurian line. This made Newchwang another base for Japan's commercial operations. There is at Newchwang a Japanese "concession" and a Japanese "railway settlement."

#### 10. THE HSINMINTUN-FAKUMA RAILWAY SCHEME.

On November 8, 1907, an agreement was concluded between the British firm of railway constructors, Pauling & Co., and the British and Chinese corporation on the one side, and the Chinese Government on the other, providing for the construction of a railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. This was to be a 50-mile extension of the imperial railways of North China. China had contemplated this extension for several years and tentative agreements of date as early as 1898 had a bearing on the question. In the 1907 project, British business interests and the Chinese Government were concerned. In October, 1907, and in January, 1908, Japan protested; the protests were based on article 3 of the secret protocols to the Komura treaty of 1905 and on provisions of the Russo-Chinese treaty of April 8, 1902. From whatever point of view the controversy is considered, Article VIII of the Russo-Chinese convention of March 27, 1898, should be kept in mind:

This railway concession [the original South Manchurian] is never to be used as a pretext for encroachment on Chinese territory, nor to be allowed to interfere with Chinese authority or interests. (Hertslet, *China Treaties*, I, 208.)

The dispute was settled, temporarily at least, by the signing of the Manchurian convention of September 4, 1909, between China and Japan. (See Appendix I, 92.) There, by Article I, "The Government of China engages that in the event of its undertaking to construct a railway between Hsinmintun and Fakumen it shall arrange previously with the Government of Japan."

#### 11. THE KNOX "NEUTRALIZATION" SCHEME.

In 1909, Mr. Knox, then Secretary of State, resolved to submit to the consideration of the powers a scheme for the neutralization of the railways built and to be built in Manchuria. This he regarded as a logical following up of the efforts which Mr. Hay, as Secretary of State, had made on behalf of the "open-door" policy. Mr. Knox proposed that the powers, especially the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, and France should together loan China the money which would be necessary to purchase the interests of Japan and Russia and to construct further railway lines in Manchuria. To China would be left all her sovereign rights in Manchuria. China's right to buy back the existing lines in 1913 was to be anticipated. (See article, *The Open Door in China, 1904-1914.*) For the time being the lines were to be placed under international control.

It appears that the Knox proposals were deliberately made public in St. Petersburg while still in the stage of confidential diplomatic suggestions. The Russian and the Japanese press denounced both the project and the proposer. The Japanese Government had long since committed itself to the Komura and Katsura policy of Manchurian exploitation, and the Japanese people looked upon Manchuria as theirs by right of conquest. In January, 1910, both Japan and Russia officially announced their disapproval of the Knox proposals. (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910*, pp. 245-251.)

#### 12. MINES AND TIMBER CONCESSIONS.

In the summer of 1907 the Chinese asked for the restoration of a part of the Fushun mines and some others. The matter was disposed of in the Manchurian agreement of September 4, 1909, Articles III and IV. (Appendix I, 92.) The net result is that Japan works and controls the coal mines in South Manchuria.

A dispute between China and Japan with regard to the Chientao region on the Korean-Manchurian boundary was disposed of in part by the "Chientao convention" of September 4, 1909. (*Albin, Grands Traités*, 501-503.)

The dispute concerning the operation of the Yalu timber concession was settled by a compromise in an agreement signed on May 14, 1908.



## 13. REDUCTION OF CUSTOMS DUTY AT TALU RIVER.

When the Antung-Mukden Railway was completed in October, 1911, the Japanese Government made representations to the Chinese Government asking that Japan be given the benefit at Antung of reduced customs rates such as Russia enjoyed on the Russia-China frontier. (France and Great Britain enjoyed similar privileges on other frontiers.) The Japanese claim was based on the most-favored-nation provision in the Japan-China treaty of December 22, 1905, article 11. The Japanese request was granted, and went into effect on June 2, 1913. As a consequence, goods entering South Manchuria, at Antung, by rail from Korean points other than New Wiju, enjoy a reduction by one-third of the customs duties.

## 14. RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF JULY 4, 1910.

The Russian Government confirmed practically everything that Japan had acquired and accomplished in South Manchuria, as well as Japan's position with regard to the Knox neutralization scheme, in the Russo-Japanese convention of July 4, 1910. In this by Article II: "Each \* \* \* engages to maintain and respect the status quo in Manchuria, resulting from the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this day between Japan and Russia, or between either of these two powers and China." (Albin, 504.)

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Books (Tokio, 1906–1917), since 1906 (See chapters on “Diplomacy”; and *The Far-Eastern Review* (Manila, P. I., Shanghai, and Yokohama) since 1904 (See especially for Railway concessions).

### 113. THE THIBET QUESTION, 1880–1914.

#### 1. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

It is important to understand that the territory occupied by Thibetans and popularly known as Thibet is divided, generally speaking, into

First: Indefinite districts on the Chinese frontier bordering the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Szechuen, controlled by small Chinese military forces and recognizing no secular allegiance to the Dalai Lama. They are under local kings or chiefs and comprise a number of ecclesiastical fiefs.

Second: The much greater extent of territory governed by the secular and religious head of the Lama Buddhists, known as the Dalai Lama, who resides at the city of Lhasa. (The Tashi Lama, head of the monastery at Tashilhunpo, is recognized by some worshipers to have superior religious rank.)

The political relations described below pertain to the Lhasa Government, that of the Dalai Lama or grand lama, the Chinese regions of Thibet coming under the authority and administration of Peking.

From 1720 to the present day Thibet has been a State varying in extent of autonomy, but always subject to China, and paying, formerly real, but for many years nominal and insignificant, tribute to Peking. It is a very unproductive farming and cattle raising country of miserable poverty, ignorant and backward. Its military force is almost nothing.

#### 2. RUSSIAN INTRIGUE.

In 1880, at a time when Great Britain feared the aggressive designs of Russia in various parts of the world, a buriat lama named Dorjjeff went down to Lhasa, became intimate with the Dalai Lama and remained with him for a number of years. Dorjjeff proposed a Russian protectorate, encouraged hostility to Great Britain and invited the Dalai Lama to visit St. Petersburg. Both the Chinese resident at Lhasa (called an ambban) and the British authorities in India looked with suspicion on developments resulting from Dorjjeff's intrigue. A few arms were imported from Russia, and Thibetan encroachments took place on the Indian frontier State of Sikkim.



## 3. THE BRITISH EXPEDITION OF 1904.

In 1904 a British military mission under Col. (later Sir) F. E. Younghusband, marched with unimportant opposition to Lhasa, whence the Dalai Lama fled with Dorjief to Urga in northern Mongolia near the borders of Siberia. With those high lamas who remained behind Younghusband negotiated a treaty (See Appendix I, 69) stipulating that frontiers were to be respected; marts to be established at three towns—Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung; Thibet was to pay an indemnity of £500,000 (subsequently reduced to a third of that sum); that no part of the territory of Thibet would be alienated to a foreign power; and no power was to receive any concession in Thibet, territorial or mercantile, or to concern itself with the government of Thibet, without the consent of the British Government. The indemnity was to be paid in 75 annual installments, and the Chumbe Valley was to be occupied by the British until payment had been made.

In 1906 a ratifying convention (See Appendix I, 69) was signed between China and Great Britain approving the Lhasa agreement. Britain engaged to annex no Thibetan territory and not to interfere in the administration of Thibet. China undertook to permit no other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Thibet.

## 4. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907.

The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907 (See Appendix I, 81, and article, The Formation of the Triple Entente), recognized the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, agreed that neither Britain nor Russian should seek concessions there, and that neither should retain an official representative at Lhasa.

## 5. CHINO-THIBETAN RELATIONS, 1910-1911.

In 1910, after a dispute between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama, the latter fled to India because the Chinese sent troops into Lhasa. He was followed to the frontier by the Chinese troops and was deposed by an imperial decree of the Manchu court. He appealed to the British for support, which they declined to give, though they notified the Chinese Government that they expected the Chinese troops to respect the frontiers of the North Indian States of Butan and Sikkim.

Within a year the anti-Manchu revolt so disorganized Chinese power that the Chinese troops withdrew. The Dalai Lama was able to return to Lhasa and immediately proclaimed his independence of China, and many of the Thibetans made preparations for fighting

Chinese troops. In some regions conflicts actually occurred. The British Government in 1911 informed the Peking Government that they would not permit China again to send military forces into Thibet—meaning evidently that portion of Thibet governed by the Dalai Lama. But this is not taken to mean that the British deny the protection of a sufficient bodyguard to the Chinese Amban.

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### 114. THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION, 1881–1915.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The vast stretch of territory in Central Asia known as Outer Mongolia has been tributary to China since 1691 A. D., though the Chinese appear to have admitted the right of the Mongols to local autonomy or self-government.

#### 2. THE RUSSO-CHINESE TREATY OF 1881.

The Russo-Chinese treaty of 1881 (Hertslet, *China Treaties*, I, 483–491), which, among other things, included articles relative to Mongolia, gave to Russia the right to place consuls in certain cities of Turkestan and Mongolia, as also the right to trade free of all duties. Furthermore, Russian merchants were permitted to buy ground and build houses, shops, and warehouses in cities where Russian consulates should be established. In addition to these privileges, a zone was established along the Russo-Chinese frontier within which all imports and exports to or from either country should be entirely free of duty.

The treaty of 1881 was renewed in 1891 and 1901, and was again due for renewal on August 20, 1911.

In 1910 Russia repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese foreign office to alleged infractions of the treaty by Chinese officers, and there were other differences which clearly showed that the terms of the treaty were not interpreted in the same way by the two governments.



## 3. THE CONFERENCE AT URGU, 1911.

In July, 1911, owing to the penetration of numerous Chinese colonists into Mongolia in quest of land and trade, a number of Mongol princes and lamas held a conference at Urgu to consider the situation. They decided to send a deputation to St. Petersburg to ask for Russian aid and protection. Russia appears to have agreed to use her good offices with China, and, accordingly, made certain representations in favor of the Mongols at Peking, which do not seem to have borne immediate fruit.

## 4. THE MONGOLS DECLARE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, 1911.

Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Mongols held a second conference in the latter part of 1911, and formally declared Outer Mongolia independent of China. The Hutukhtu of Urgu was chosen Emperor and crowned with great ceremony on December 28, 1911. The independence of Mongolia received no recognition except by Thibet.

## 5. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT OF 1912.

On November 3, 1912 (See Appendix I, 106), an agreement between Russia and Mongolia was signed in which Russia pledged her aid in the maintenance of Mongolia's autonomy and the right to have her own army, as also to exclude Chinese colonists and troops from her soil. In return for this aid and protection, Mongolia granted to Russians certain rights and privileges, such as the right of free trade, to lease and own real property, of fishing, lumbering, mining, etc.

## 6. THE RUSSO-CHINESE DECLARATION OF 1913.

The Chinese were considerably stirred by these events and there was some talk of war at Peking, but a serious crisis was averted by the Russo-Chinese declaration signed on November 5, 1913. (See Appendix I, 111). By the terms of this declaration, Russia recognized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia, and China, on her part, acknowledged its autonomy. The convention expressly agreed to the principles set forth in the Russo-Mongolian agreement of 1912 and assented to the stipulations regarding Russian commercial privileges set forth in the protocol to that agreement.

## 7. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN RAILWAY AGREEMENT OF 1914.

On September 30, 1914 (See Appendix I, 112), Russia entered into a railway agreement with Mongolia by the terms of which she ob-

tained the right to advise Outer Mongolia in deciding what railway lines were to be built in that region, thus practically assuring Russian control over any future Mongolian railway lines.

#### 8. THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1915 BETWEEN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND MONGOLIA.

The keystone of this whole structure was to have been the tripartite agreement between Russia, China, and Mongolia which was signed on June 7, 1915. (See Appendix I, 114.) This agreement includes the following provisions:

(1) Outer Mongolia recognized the Chino-Russian convention of 1913, which acknowledged China's suzerainty over her, and expressly engages not to negotiate treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial matters, although treaties respecting commercial and industrial matters are permissible.

(2) Both Russia and China recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and agree to abstain from all interference with the internal administration of Outer Mongolia.

(3) Chinese imports into Outer Mongolia are to be free of all duties and Russia's right to free trade in Outer Mongolia is confirmed.

(4) Chinese jurisdiction over Chinese residents of Outer Mongolia is retained, but Chinese-Mongol mixed cases are to be adjudicated, Chinese and Mongol authorities acting conjointly. In Russo-Chinese mixed cases the Russian authorities may take part in deciding and drafting the judgment, even in actions heard in the Chinese court, and in which a Chinese is defendant.

9. China is bound to consult Russia and Outer Mongolia in regard to all questions of a political or territorial nature. Thus, while China is nominally recognized as suzerain, Outer Mongolia is practically under the joint protection of Russia and China according to the terms of this agreement.

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## 115. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905-1906.

### 1. THE GERMAN EMPEROR AT TANGIER, MARCH 31, 1905.

On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor appeared dramatically at Tangier, Morocco, and said:

It is to the Sultan in his position as an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain, open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. (Staatsarchiv, vol. 73, p. 117.)

It should be recalled that when this challenge to France and England was delivered, the Russian Army had just been defeated at Mukden (in February, 1905). The speech itself was a denial of that principle of the Anglo-French convention of 1904 (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*), which had declared that it appertained to France to preserve order in Morocco and to "provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 97, p. 39.) In short, Germany demanded that Morocco be placed under international instead of French control, and a reversal of French policy which almost necessarily involved the dismissal of M. Delcassé, the main French architect of the *Entente Cordiale*. (See article, *The Resignation of Delcassé, 1905.*)

### 2. THE CONFERENCE AT ALGECIRAS, 1906.

After long negotiations between France and Germany during the summer of 1905, it was finally arranged that the conference for the consideration of the Moroccan question should meet at Algeciras, opposite Gibraltar, in southern Spain, in January, 1906.

The conference which consisted of delegates from France, Germany, Morocco, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden, met on January 6 and continued in session until April 7 when the final act was signed. Throughout its sessions, Great Britain gave her hearty support to France, who may, in general, be said to have enjoyed the support of Russia, Italy, the United States, and the smaller States. In fact, it can hardly be said that Germany received any hearty or sympathetic support except from Austria.

### 3. THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS.

The Act of Algeciras (See Appendix I, 77), consisting of 123 articles, laid down the "threefold principle of the sovereignty and

independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality." Apart from regulations for the suppression of the traffic in arms and the better collection of taxes, the main provisions concerned the organization of a police force and a State bank. The organization of the police was entrusted to French and Spanish officers. The capital of the bank was divided into 14 equal shares, of which one share was allotted to each of the 12 signatory powers and the other two to interested French banks. Thus, while France and Spain were to act as the mandatories of the powers in the matters of banking and the police force, in reality they were given a privileged position.

#### 4. APPRAISEMENT.

The speech of the Kaiser at Tangier was not an impulsive personal utterance, but was delivered in pursuance of the advice of the German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Bülow. (See Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, p. 81.) German action in the matter, Bülow subsequently declared, was due to the fact that Germany "was not inclined to recognize the new situation created without her consent by the Anglo-French Moroccan treaty and the action of France in that country." (Ibid.) Germany sought, according to Bülow, to substitute an international agreement for the joint arrangement made by France and England in 1904. (Ibid. See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*.) Though the entire German aim in the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 can not be ascertained and established by indisputable evidence, since many of the documents have not yet been published, there seems no reason to doubt that the main purpose of the German Government was to break up the recently established *Entente Cordiale* between France and England. German statesmen appear to have believed that the danger of a general European war, created by the Kaiser's speech, would frighten the British public, that consequently the British Government would leave France in the lurch, and that in the exasperation which would follow the *Entente Cordiale* would disappear. The course of events showed that these calculations rested upon a false premise. The *Entente Cordiale* emerged from the crisis strengthened, instead of destroyed. By the action of Germany a strong impulse was given toward the formation of the Triple Entente. (See article, that title.)

For other phases of the Morocco question see articles listed in the table of contents under sections three and four.

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## 116. THE RESIGNATION OF M. DELCASSÉ, 1905.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The occasion of M. Delcassé's resignation, June 6, 1905, was his opposition to the demand of Germany that the Moroccan question be settled not by France and England alone, but by a general conference of European powers. The French Government decided to acquiesce in the demand of Germany and M. Delcassé resigned.

### 2. STEPS LEADING TO THE RESIGNATION.

The convention between France and England of April 8, 1904 (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*), which was brought about largely by the efforts of M. Delcassé, gave to France a free hand in Morocco and immensely strengthened her position in Europe. The convention having laid the foundation, the structure of the Entente Cordiale was quickly erected. This could not fail to be displeasing to Berlin, but at first it was treated with some indifference. (See the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of March 25, 1904, and the speech of Count von Bülow in the Reichstag on April 12, 1904. *Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905*.)

A year later, however, Germany showed open and determined opposition by the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906*). It is significant to note that this

visit took place but a few weeks after the decisive defeat of Russia, the ally of France, by Japan at Mukden. Germany now made it plain that there was to be no more "Tunisification" of Morocco. In the address which the Kaiser gave on that occasion he asserted the independence and sovereignty of Morocco in unequivocal language. "The demands of Germany to be consulted about Moroccan affairs" writes Count von Bülow (*Imperial Germany*, p. 98) "were thus announced to the world. \* \* \* Our object was to substitute an international settlement by the signatory powers of the treaty of Madrid for the one-sided arrangement between England and France."

The German Government not only objected to the arrangement itself, but complained that Germany had received no formal notification of it. (Comte de Cherisey, chargé d'affaires de la République française à M. Delcassé, Tangier, February 11, 1905. In *Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-1905, p. 196.) In answer M. Delcassé, while admitting that he had failed to make immediate formal notification, reminded the German Government that even before the signature of the agreement with England he had informed the German ambassador to France of its tenor, and that as its terms had been made public by British authorities immediately after its signature, he had not thought it necessary to send to the German Government information which it already possessed. (M. Delcassé, *Ministre des affaires étrangères* à M. Bihourd, *Ambassadeur de la République française* à Berlin, Paris, 14 avril, 1905. *Affaires du Maroc*, 1901-1905, p. 211.)

Germany now declared that she was supporting the desire of the Sultan in demanding a general conference, but according to France there was a suspicious connection between the arrival of a German agent at Fez and the expression of this desire. (M. Saint-René-Taillandier, *Ministre de la République française en mission à Fez* à M. Delcassé, May 13, May 27, May 30. *Affaires de Maroc*, 1901-1905, pp. 221, 223, 225.) Meanwhile Germany's demands for a general conference became more and more insistent. The chief obstacle to the holding of such a conference was M. Delcassé, who continued an unwavering opposition. On June 6, 1905, he resigned.

### 3. REASONS FOR M. DELCASSÉ'S RESIGNATION.

From what has preceded it is a natural inference that his resignation was due in part at least to German pressure but there was likewise opposition to him from within France. Accounts differ in the stress which they lay on the various factors involved.

*A. Opposition from within.*—This was chiefly from two sources.

(1) *From the socialists and pacifists.*—So great was their hostility that on April 20, M. Delcassé offered his resignation but subsequently



withdrew it. (See *Journal officiel*, April 1, and April 7, 1905. Also Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique*, II, 19.) This hostility, according to one of the pacifists, was due not to dislike of the entente with England, but to the use which M. Delcassé was making of it and to the war which such use was likely to bring about. (Pressensé, *England, France, Germany and the peace of the world*. In *Contemporary*, August 1905, 88: 152-162.) The extent of this opposition has been much exaggerated by German writers. Oncken (*Events which led up to a world war in Germany in relation to the World War*, pp. 465-466) asserts that M. Delcassé's attitude aroused the indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen.

(2) *From French financiers who wanted peace*.—This was voiced by M. Rouvier, the president of the conseil who, it is said, was personally jealous of M. Delcassé. (See Debidour II, 19, also Blennerhassett, "French and German relations," in *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1905, 84: 236-243.) It seems, too, that the Government feared that France was not ready for war.

B. *Opposition from without*.—Besides the general German opposition to M. Delcassé involved in opposition to his policy, there was at least one attempt to bring about his resignation by direct pressure on French public opinion. This was an interview with Prince Henckel de Donnersmarck published by *Le Gaulois* on June—, 1905. (See Appendix I, 71.) While documentary proof that this interview was inspired by the German Government can not be adduced, the inference that it was so inspired is so clear as to leave scarcely any doubt about the matter. The closing words of this famous interview, taken in connection with the whole tone of the utterance, show how direct and menacing was this virtual demand for the retirement of M. Delcassé.

"Believe the word of the German who has always had great sympathies with you. Give up the minister whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe, and adopt with regard to Germany a loyal and open policy, the only one which is worthy of a great nation like yours, if you wish to preserve the peace of the world."

There is much difference of opinion as to how large a share this interview had in bringing about the retirement of M. Delcassé.

#### 4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF M. DELCASSÉ'S RESIGNATION.

At all events, on June 6 at a meeting of the Cabinet at which he defended his position, M. Delcassé found that the Government would not support him and promptly resigned. This time his resignation was accepted. It was thus made clear that in accepting his resignation the French Government, rather than risk a war with Germany, acquiesced in her demand for a general conference.

Immediately after the retirement of M. Delcassé two very competent observers commented:

If we may judge by the present temper of the French Chamber, henceforth no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be tolerated in France whose policy or power is disagreeable to the German Kaiser, the German Chancellor, or the German war party. (E. J. Dillon, "Foreign affairs," in *Contemporary Review*, July, 1905, 88:147.)

The fall of M. Delcassé is the most important event in European politics since the conclusion of the Dual Alliance. It is the first patent result of the collapse of Russia's power in Europe, and opens a new chapter in French politics. (A. F. Harrison, "Germany and Morocco," in *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1905, 58:35.)

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## 117. ITALY AND MOROCCO.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Shortly after the adjustment of the Fashoda affair, France, under the leadership of M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began to seek understandings with countries whose good will and support she might hope to obtain for her aspirations in regard to Morocco. There were three such countries, Italy, Spain, and England. The direct interest of Italy in Morocco was very small. But as a Medi-

terranean power she was in a position to cause serious embarrassment for France if she should choose to exert her influence for that purpose.

## 2. THE AGREEMENTS OF 1900 AND 1902.

The general rapprochement between France and Italy, 1898-1902 (See article, that title), facilitated the negotiation of an understanding in regard to Morocco. The arrangement which was made appears to have been embodied in two conventions or agreements concluded in 1900 and 1902. As the documents have not been published, the precise terms of the understanding can not be definitely stated. It appears, from ministerial statements in the French and Italian chambers and from interviews and obviously inspired newspaper articles, that Italy agreed to give its support for securing to France a free hand in Morocco, while France recognized Italy's claims in regard to Tripoli. The conclusion of this understanding left France free to arrange understandings with England and Spain, whose interests in Morocco were larger and more direct (See articles, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale* and *Spain and Morocco*).

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# 118. SPAIN AND MOROCCO.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

At the opening of the present century Spain alone among European countries possessed a direct territorial interest in Morocco. The two cities of Ceuta and Tetuan, opposite Gibraltar and Melilla, 135 miles to the east, on the Mediterranean, the three island presidios lying off that coast, and the settlement at the Rio del Oro on the Atlantic coast, constituted the sole remnant of the former world-wide colonial empire of Spain. These holdings in Morocco had never been of any real value to Spain, owing to the intense mutual hatred of Spaniard and Moor; their commerce was slight and the inhabitants of the hinterland, the Riff, rigorously set upon any Spaniard who ventured beyond the walls of any town.

## 2. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1902.

After the disastrous American war of 1898, Spanish opinion began to dream of a forward policy in Morocco, and conversations were opened between Madrid and Paris. In 1902 a secret Franco-Spanish treaty was made which provided that "if through the weak-



ness of the Moroccan Government, through its impotence to secure order and security, or for any other reason, the maintenance of the status quo becomes impossible" the limits within which each country should have the right to reestablish tranquillity should be defined according to the plan outlined in the convention in detail. (*American Journal of International Law*, vol. 8, pp. 869-871.) The arrangement virtually provided for a contingent partition of Morocco. As the British Government had not yet reached an understanding with France this convention was not made public and no action under it was taken.

### 3. ANGLO-FRENCH MOROCCO AGREEMENT OF 1904.

On April 8, 1904, France and England reached an understanding in regard to Morocco. (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*.) Article 8 of the Morocco-Egypt declaration declared that the two governments would "take into special consideration the interests which that country [Spain] derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean," and in article 3 of the secret articles, published in 1911, it was agreed that "a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other presidios should, whenever the Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain; that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be intrusted to Spain." In return for these concessions Spain was to accept the principle of the open door in Morocco for 30 years, she was not to erect any fortifications or strategic works between Melilla and the heights commanding the right bank of the Sebou (article 7), and she must "undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence" (article 3 of the secret articles). (For the Morocco-Egypt declaration, together with the secret articles, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 101, pp. 1053-1059.)

### 4. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1904.

Armed with this agreement France proceeded to negotiate with Spain. The public Franco-Spanish declaration of October 3, 1904, obliged both Governments to uphold "the independence and integrity of the Moorish Empire, under the sovereignty of the Sultan," and a secret convention of the same date provided a contingent plan for its partition (*Revue générale de droit international public*, vol. 19, pp. 19-24 *d*). Spain was accorded the entire Moroccan littoral on the Mediterranean, with the hinterland stretching beyond the

mountains of the Riff and including the part of Elkazar on the Atlantic, the Rio del Oro was extended northward and eastward to the watershed between the Wadi Draa and the Wadi Sus, including a section of the French Sahara (map in Statesmen's Year Book, 1912, plate 3). Within her zone Spain was to enjoy all the rights recognized for France by the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, for 15 years. Spain, moreover, agreed to take no action without the consent of France, unless the continuance of the political status quo became impossible or the Moroccan Government should be unable to maintain order, in which case Spain might exercise her right of action without regard to France.

#### 5. TANGIER, 1905.

It has been asserted, but without adequate proof, that a knowledge of this agreement, communicated in some way to Berlin, led the German Government to make the dramatic intervention signalized by the presence of William II at Tangier, where on March 31, 1905, he publicly declared for the maintenance of the integrity of Morocco and independence of the Sultan. Out of this grew the critical situation of June to September, 1905, which ended only when France agreed to submit the Morocco question to an international conference (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-6).

#### 6. ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE, 1906.

Before entering the conference of Algeciras, France and Spain concluded a secret agreement on September 1, 1905 for common action and for the policing of certain ports within the zones allotted to each and for the regulation of certain economic matters (De-loncle, *Statut International du Maroc*, p. 360). France later conceded that Casablanca, which lay in the French zone, should be policed jointly by French and Spanish agents. At Algeciras the duty of organizing an international police in Morocco and the creation of a State bank were intrusted to the French and Spanish Governments. The Spanish were to control the police at Tetuan and Laraiche and to share the control with the French at Tangier and Casablanca; in the matter of the bank Spain was allowed to contribute only one-fourteenth of the capital, as opposed to three-fourteenths allotted to the French. In May, 1907 conventions were signed by Spain with France in regard to preserving the status quo in the Mediterranean, which, together with the restrictions of the act of Algeciras, seemed to postpone indefinitely any actual partition of Morocco.



## 7. SPANISH AND FRENCH OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO, 1907-1911.

So far the harmony of France and Spain had been maintained. But when in 1907 the French commenced military operation at Casablanca, though not until after they had requested Spanish collaboration, Spanish opinion began to grow restive, and the Franco-German convention of February 8, 1909 (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909), which was concluded without reference to Spain, made the tension between Paris and Madrid acute. When disturbances broke out around Melilla in July, 1909, Spain assumed that she also enjoyed liberty of action and sent a military force to the Riff. The operations dragged out so long and so large a force (50,000 men) had to be employed that France became distinctly suspicious. Nor was the situation improved when in 1911, following the French expedition to Fez, the Spanish occupied Larache and Elkazar, without previous consultation with France. Finally, however, in July, 1911, a *modus vivendi* was reached by which Spain agreed to withhold her hand until the conclusion of the negotiations then in progress between Germany and France (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911).

## 8. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1912.

When the treaty of November 4, 1911, secured German recognition for the French protectorate in Morocco, negotiations were resumed between France and Spain. The Spanish Government was disposed to insist upon the letter of the convention of October 30, 1904, but the French contended that as France had paid dearly to Germany for the settlement of November, 1911, Spain should make some compensation to France. In the end Spain obtained by the convention of November 27, 1912 (*Revue générale de droit international public*, vol. 20, p. 9d), somewhat less territory than she had been promised in 1904 (map in *Statesmen's Yearbook*, 1913, p. 8). Within her zone Spain received practically a free hand. As France was responsible, under the act of Algeciras, for the services of Government loans, it was agreed that Spain, while collecting the customs within her zone, should pay over to France 7.95 per cent of the total customs collected in the previous year (about \$100,000). Tangier, at the demand of Great Britain, was placed under international control. From that town to Fez a railroad was to be constructed by a single company, the French supplying 56 per cent of the capital, Spain 36 per cent, and other countries 8 per cent, if they desired.

The partition of Morocco was thus finally effected. Spain was, on the whole, very liberally treated, and doubtless it was the recognition of this fact which led to a distinct political reapproachment between

France and Spain in the autumn of 1913, a rapprochement which proved to be of inestimable value to France when the World War broke upon her in 1914.

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### 119. THE RED SEA CONVENTION OF DECEMBER 13, 1906.

#### 1. EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN RED SEA REGION.

After the construction of the Suez Canal there developed among the European powers serious rivalry for control of the country bordering on the Red Sea. Through this region lay the road to the British possession in the Orient and to the French island of Madagascar. Italy chose this as the field for her colonizing activities, and in 1905 Germany sought and obtained commercial and economic concessions from King Menelek. French, British, and Italian territories, surrounding Abyssinia were the occasion for a rivalry, often



bitter, but the friendly feeling which prevailed between the three countries after about 1902 led them to seek amicable agreements regarding their claims.

## 2. THE RED SEA CONVENTION.

The Red Sea convention, sometimes known as the Agreement respecting Abyssinia, was signed by Italy, France, and Great Britain on December 13, 1906. It followed the usual lines of such agreements (See Appendix I, 79), stipulating for the maintenance of the "political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the state of affairs at present existing" and as established by past agreements of the signatory powers with each other and with the native tribes and states. No one of the contracting parties was to seek concessions in the regions included in the agreement that might injure either of the other parties. They agreed to abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of Abyssinia, and to endeavor to maintain its integrity. They pledged themselves to act together for the maintenance of each other's territorial possessions in East Africa. Provision was also made for a division of railway concessions. At the same time provision was made to stop the unauthorized shipment of arms into any of the territories controlled by the three powers, in Ethiopia, along the Red Sea littoral, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

## 3. ABYSSINIA A PARTY TO THE CONVENTION.

The arrangements were all made during the summer of 1906, but the signing of the convention was delayed until the approval of King Menelek could be obtained. He favored the settlement which was finally signed at London on December 13. Since then, with the cooperation of the Abyssinian Government, the Red Sea regions have been peaceful, and railway construction especially has been greatly expanded.

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## 120. THE PERSIAN QUESTION, 1906-1914.

## 1. PERSIA IN 1906.

Persia is about equal in size to the Spanish Peninsula, France, and Germany, but its area is occupied largely by mountains and deserts. The present boundaries are well adjusted, on the whole, to the habitat of the Persian people, who, numbering about nine millions, are marked off by physical appearance, language, and a special form of the Mohammedan religion, from their neighbors, as well as from the million of Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and others who dwell among them. Increasingly conscious of their nationality, which looks back over some 2,500 years of chequered participation, active or passive, in the great affairs of the world, the Persians developed between 1890 and 1906 a movement to obtain for the people a greater share in their own government. Persian constitutionalism from the first appealed to the sentiment of Americans because of its double struggle for domestic liberty and national independence. Many Europeans, however, despaired of the possibility of self-government in Persia, or of the establishment of internal order except under foreign control.

At the beginning of 1906 the Shah was ruling in traditional fashion, a despot aided by a group of ministers chosen and removable by himself, themselves part of a larger group of nobles and favorites from whom he selected also his governors of provinces. This form of government, never long effective of good results, had undergone decay to the point where it is hard to discern in either the Shah, his ministers, or governors, anything like patriotism or public responsibility, but only the desire to lead as luxurious lives as possible and to accumulate personal wealth and influence. There was no proper law, justice, police, army, or tax system; roads were unsafe; and life, personal liberty, and property most insecure. Looking without, Persians saw all of the four neighboring States, Russia, Britain, Turkey, and Afghanistan, holding great territories once owned by Persia, and the first three were strongly suspected of ardent designs upon what was left. See Parliamentary Papers of British Parliament for 1909 (Cd. 4581), vol. 105, p. 1-6. Summary of events for the year 1906. Also Sykes, P. M., *History of Persia*, II, 487-499.)

2. THE INAUGURATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, JANUARY, 1906,  
TO OCTOBER 7, 1907.

The defeat of Russia by Japan and the revolutionary movement in progress in the Czar's dominions perhaps brought to a head the agitation in Persia against misgovernment and the mortgaging of the country's resources for money to be squandered. Toward the close of 1905 a number of prominent merchants and Moslem clergymen took



sanctuary (*bast*) in the principal mosque of Teheran, and refused to come out until reforms were granted. (E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 112 ff.) This peculiarly Persian weapon was so effective that about January 21 the Shah promised, among other things, to dismiss an obnoxious minister and assemble an elected "House of Justice." The refugees came out, but as happened often thereafter with similar royal promises, the Shah neglected to take action. After further agitation and some bloody repression, the method of Sanctuary was again used, this time with success. Late in July about 12,000 of the prominent men of Persia took up residence in the summer garden of the British legation, and demanded a constitution and a representative assembly. The Shah yielded to all the demands of August 5, 1906. (The text of the Shah's Firman is given by Browne, E. G., *op. cit.*, 353-354. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, p. 526.) An electoral law was published on September 9. (The text in Browne, E. G., *op. cit.*, 355-361.) Elections were held, and the first Persian *Majlis*, or parliament, assembled on October 7. This body promptly refused to sanction a new loan from Russia and England, and its leaders rapidly drew up a constitution. The Shah signed this on December 30, a few days before his death, and his successor, Mohammed Ali, though at heart opposed to limiting his powers, also signed.

The original Persian constitution (text in Browne, E. G., *op. cit.*, 362-371; Hamilton, A., *Problems of the Middle East*, 393-403; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 527-534), in 51 articles, dealt with the establishment of the assembly and its duties, limitations, rights, and methods of doing business, and proposed a senate. Full ministerial responsibility was not granted, but extensive financial control was provided.

The new assembly came into action but slowly, being without experience and party organization, and hindered by the opposition of the Shah and his ministers. It procured the dismissal of the unpopular Belgian director of customs, M. Naus, and voted to seek a French financial adviser. It tried unsuccessfully to erect a national bank with Persian capital. On October 1 the leaders of the conservatives, wearied with continued disorder, joined forces with the constitutionalists, leaving the Shah almost alone in opposition. As a consequence, he accepted on October 7 the supplementary constitutional laws (Browne, E. G., *op. cit.*, 372-384; Hamilton, *op. cit.*, 403-434; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 534-542), which in 107 articles defined much more clearly the organization of the government, including full ministerial responsibility to the two chambers. On November 12 he appeared before the assembly and took the oath demanded of him by article 39 of the supplementary

laws, "to preserve the independence of Persia, safeguard and protect the frontiers of my kingdom and the rights of my people, observe the fundamental laws of the Persian constitution," etc.

### 3. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907.

Meantime, on August 31, 1907, the British and Russian governments had signed the famous convention regarding the affairs of Afghanistan, Thibet, and Persia. (See article, The Formation of the Triple Entente. The text of the convention is in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 555-560. The debates in the House of Lords on February 6 and 10, 1908, and in the House of Commons on February 17 are of great interest.) England had been interested in Persian trade for three centuries, and for at least one century had claimed special interests in the Persian Gulf. Russia had first seized Persian territory two hundred years before, had greatly increased her influence there in the nineteenth century, and with the loans and the new tariff of 1900 to 1903 had obtained a considerable hold upon Persian financial affairs. Russia's defeat by Japan, and the success of the Anglo-French Entente, together with England's desire to secure the peace of the world more firmly, especially against the growing ambitions of Germany, led to negotiations of which something was known some time before their termination. (Browne, E. G., *op. cit.*, 175 says for "more than two years." A question was asked in the British Parliament about pending negotiations with Russia on March 29, 1906: Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 154, p. 1534.)

The agreement provided for amicable relations between England and Russia, who had been suspicious rivals almost constantly for nearly a century. Two spheres of influence were marked off in Persia. Russia's sphere in the north of Persia contained 48 per cent of the area, 72 per cent of the population, 11 of the 12 largest cities, and 7 of the 11 principal trade routes. (See Statesman's Year Book, year 1916, p. 1221, and Lord Curzon's speech in the House of Lords, February 6, 1908. Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 183, pp. 999-1024, esp. pp. 1004-1010.) Britain's sphere was in the desert country of the southeast, containing 22 per cent of the area, 7 per cent of the population, 1 of the 12 largest cities, and 1 of the 11 chief trade routes. There remained a third zone which contained 30 per cent of the area, and 21 per cent of the population. British trade interests were slight in the British sphere, extensive in the unallotted sphere, and predominant over the Russian in Yezd and Ispahan of the Russian sphere. Article 5 proposed joint action in case of default in payment of debts to the two countries. Both in the convention and the public announcements of the time it was strongly affirmed that the independence and integrity of Persia were to be maintained.



(See the official statement to the Persian Government, Sept. 11, 1907, in Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 48, and 1912 (Cd. 6077), p. 1.)

The exact sense in which these assurances were intended to be understood has since been the subject of much controversy. On the one hand they have been interpreted, especially by critics of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy, as constituting a pledge that the free action of the Persian Government would suffer no material abridgment and that neither Russia nor Great Britain would seek to establish a permanent controlling power in any part of Persia. On the other hand it has been held that the article of the convention relating to the independence and integrity of Persia should not be interpreted in such a way as to destroy or materially restrict the operation of the articles which create the spheres of influence and that these articles clearly look forward to political control and possibly to annexation. Subsequent events indicate that the latter was the Russian, but perhaps not the British view. The debates in Parliament show that Russia was not willing to enter into the convention for less than the surprisingly large area conceded to her and that England was so eager to come to an agreement with Russia that she made a willing sacrifice.

Quite apart from the controversy over the correct interpretation there has been and probably will long continue to be much difference of opinion in regard to the fairness and wisdom of the convention of 1907. England, acting in her own interest and in the interest of the Persian people, doubtless hoped to restrain Russia from gaining control over Persia, and during four years succeeded to a considerable extent. But as will be seen, when the crisis of 1911 came (See article. The Morocco Crisis of 1911) England was driven by the exigencies of the international situation and the implication of the convention of 1907 into the support of Russia in a series of acts which materially infringed the integrity and independence of Persia and left among the Persian peoples a hatred of both empires. Seriously threatened by the growth of German ambitions and bound by the convention of 1907 liberal Britain was forced into a position of alliance with autocratic Russia in a course of action which amounted to a virtual dismemberment of the country and was largely, if not chiefly, responsible for the failure of the movement for the establishment of a constitutional government.

The Persians declined to take notice of this agreement about their country to which they had been in no sense a party, and only recognized it four years later under *force majeure*. Their reply of Nov. 7, 1907 (Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 73), contains the following words: "The above-mentioned agreement having been

concluded between the British and Russian Governments, therefore its provisions will concern the aforementioned Governments who have signed the agreement." March 20, 1912, the following statement was made: "The Persian Government will take care to conform their policy with the principles of the convention of 1907, and they take note of the assurances contained in the preamble of that convention." (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6103), p. 4.)

#### 4. THE STRUGGLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS WITH SHAH MOHAMMED ALI TO THE DATE OF HIS ABDICATION, JULY 16, 1909.

It was soon evident that a solemn oath meant nothing to Mohammed Ali. On December 15, 1907, he arrested and imprisoned the Prime Minister, and attempted a general coup d'état. He lacked sufficient organization and military force, however, and the Mejlis speedily obtained the upper hand. The country continued to be in disorder, and the Turks, wishing their share of Persia, violated the western frontier. In February, 1908, an attempt was made upon the Shah's life. The new nationalist press continued virulently to attack the Shah and his supporters. On June 1 he was compelled to dismiss from office a number of his friends. On the 12th of the month the Russian Government, which seemed at times to possess an uncanny foreknowledge of events, proposed to the British to support the Shah against the Nationalists. (Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 124.) Sir Edward Grey refused, but a new force of Russian troops was brought to Julfa. The Shah had already left Teheran for a palace outside and was gathering forces. On June 23 the Shah's troops, of whom the nucleus was the Persian Cossack regiment commanded by the Russian Col. Liakhoff, bombarded and destroyed the Parliament House and won the city. (E. G. Browne quotes letters to show that Col. Liakhoff was under Russian orders, and was complimented by the Tsar for his part in this coup d'état. *Op cit.*, 221-225; 432-436 (Russian text).) Patrols were placed, even about the British Legation. Col. Liakhoff became military governor of Teheran and rigidly enforced the Shah's will. The constitution was hustled out of sight. But the rest of Persia was not content with this subversion of popular participation in the Government. Tabriz, the most important city of western Persia and the second in size, raised a standard of resistance which probably saved Constitutionalism in Persia. This example was followed in many places, and when the spring of 1909 came, although the Russians occupied Tabriz in April on the pretext of protecting foreigners, forces gathered from many quarters and proceeded to march toward the capital. The Russian consulates and legations, supported by the British, vainly attempted to turn back the Constitutionalists. (*Ibid.*,



ch. x, gives an account of this revolution. See also Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4733), pp. 35 ad finem; 1910 (Cd. 5120), pp. 1-69.) They had also pressed the Shah on April 22 to restore constitutional government. On May 5, alarmed for his throne, and bearing in mind no doubt the recent deposition of Abdul Hamid II, he yielded, and promised to summon a second Mejlis. It was too late; the Constitutionalists had had enough of him. They continued their advance on the capital. Though additional Russian troops were brought to Resht, ready to come to Teheran, the Constitutionalists anticipated them, and on July 16 the Shah took sanctuary with his friends, the Russians, an act of abdication.

### 5. THE SECOND PARLIAMENT.

The ex-Shah was pensioned off (Parliamentary Papers, 1910 (Cd. 5120), p. 128. The negotiations give an interesting example of Oriental bargaining; see this and previous dispatches) and the Regency for the new Shah, his 13-year-old son, Ahmad Mirza, was given to the head of the royal Kajar tribe. The actual control for some weeks was in the hands of a self-appointed committee, called the National Council, which appointed a cabinet and arranged for the election of the new *Mejlis*. (Browne, E. G., op. cit., 322, 327.) The latter body met November 15, 1909, and was in session slightly over two years.

During most of this time progress in the direction of reform was slow. There were difficulties between the cabinets and the parliament. Internal disorder continued, so that in October, 1910, the British Government gave notice that if in three months the southern roads were not made secure, British troops would be sent in. (Parliamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 97 (Oct. 14)).

The problem of reorganization seems to have depended on finance. (See answer of Persian Government, Ibid., pp. 106-9; and elsewhere in dispatches.) The Government lived from hand to mouth, without money to organize police or military forces for restoring order. Taxes had fallen off, and the customs receipts were heavily pledged to the support of the foreign loans. The French financial adviser, M. Bizot, was regarded with suspicion from the first. (He arrived in April, 1908, and complained that no one would give him information. Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 118.) England and Russia were willing, almost anxious, to lend money, even a large loan, but the Nationalists steadily refused the suggested conditions, which involved control of the expenditure of the money loaned, and thereby foreign interference in the internal affairs of Persia. (Jan. 6, 1910, the Russian foreign minister suggested that a *large* loan be made so "that Russia and England will be in a posi-

tion to insist on the institution of an effective financial control.") Continual suspicion and irritation arose from the prolonged presence of Russian troops in Tabriz, Kazvin, and Ardebil. In May, 1910, it was resolved to employ foreign advisers. Russians, French, and Belgians were feared. Sweden was invited to lend officers to organize a gendarmerie, and in September it was suggested that the United States be asked to supply a treasurer-general. (This proposal was made in the assembly, Sept. 6, 1910. The cabinet objected for reasons that they could not state publicly. The majority in the assembly favored it at once, showing confidence in Americans. Parliamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 94.) This measure was approved, and in February, 1911, Mr. Morgan Shuster was appointed to the new position, with four American assistants. Negotiations were now completed for a loan, which would give the new foreign advisers the means wherewith to work. (See Loan contract, *ibid.*, pp. 60-62. The interest rate was 5 per cent.)

6. MR. SHUSTER IN PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION,  
TO JANUARY 7, 1912.

It is hard to pronounce upon the Shuster episode and sustain every interpretation with unimpeachable documentary evidence. The following account seeks to approach the truth. (It is based on a fairly wide reading *ad hoc*, in the British Blue Book, The Parliamentary Debates, Mr. Shuster's own writings, periodical and journalistic articles, etc. See the bibliography. It is not possible in the space available to give numerous references.)

Mr. Shuster was an honest and capable business man. He assumed that Persia was an independent nation whose finances were in a bad way, and planned to restore them in the shortest possible time by the best methods and the most suitable agents. The British Government would have been pleased to have him do exactly this, but the Russian Government felt differently. Mr. Shuster made a remarkable beginning in the eight months of his residence, and there can be little doubt that, had he been allowed to remain, Persian financial affairs would now be vastly transformed for the better.

He arrived May 12, 1911, and promptly won the complete confidence of the Persian Government and assembly. On May 30 and June 13 laws were passed giving the finances of Persia completely into his hands. An unpleasantness occurred with M. Mornard, Inspector of Customs, a Belgian supposed to be under Russian influence, who objected to being placed under Mr. Shuster. This difficulty was accommodated. Mr. Shuster decided that there was need of a treasury gendarmerie to police the collecting of taxes. He found Major Stokes, military attaché of the British legation at



Teheran, to be the man best fitted for the headship of this force. Major Stokes wished to accept the position, and the British Government was not at first adverse, provided he would resign his commission in the Indian army. (Sir Edward Grey's telegram of July 21 says: "Before Major Stokes accepts command he will have to resign his commission in the Indian army. You may tell Treasurer-general this." (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6104), p. 100.)

This gave Russia an entering wedge. She objected that Major Stokes would have authority in north Persia, and demanded either the appointment of a citizen of a small European country, or some compensation by the appointment of a Russian officer to a similar command. Mr. Shuster was firm in refusing to obey suggestions from outside, and Russian anger arose.

On July 18 the ex-Shah passed through Russian territory from his residence in Odessa and landed in Persia. Though denials were made, it is inconceivable that in a country as carefully policed as Russia he could have done this without official knowledge. Sir Edward Grey endeavored to have the Russian Government bring him back, but Russia refused, appealing to the principle of noninterference, with which she henceforth played fast and loose. (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6104), p. 98. Ibid. (Cd. 6105), p. 46.) The Agadir incident was up (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1911*) and probably in order to retain Russian support against Germany the British Government swung around to the Russian point of view, until in the final crises of 1911 Russia dictated her terms and England advised Persia to accept them. In the process the self-determination of Persia received grievous impairment.

Russia's intentions in Persia and the possibility of her shifting to the German side were illustrated by the "Potsdam Accord" of 1910-11. (See article, that title.) (Text in *American Journal of International Law*, vi, supplement 120-2, April, 1912. Russia's intervention in Persia (her ultimatum was given Nov. 11) came immediately after the conclusion of the Moroccan agreement, Nov. 4. In the St. Petersburg Agreement, which embodied the results of the Potsdam Accord, Russia declares that she "intends to obtain from the Persian Government a concession with a view to creating a network of railways in northern Persia." Russia also promised Germany that she would ask for a concession from Teheran to Khanikin, to join a branch of the Bagdad railway. Liberal terms were promised Germany, and Russia was not to oppose the Bagdad railway. In the light of this agreement it is evident that if England, by refusing to follow Russia in November, 1911, had broken the Anglo-Russian understanding, the Triple Entente might have been broken up by the transfer of Russia to the German side.

Mr. Shuster, feeling the growing opposition of the Russian Government, supported by the British, wrote in response to an attack of the *London Times* upon him a letter to the *Times* which was more truthful than diplomatic. (*London Times*, Nov. 9, 10, 1911.) This letter was later translated and circulated in Persia, with his knowledge, but not by his orders. (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1912-13 (Cd. 6105), p. 88, Dec. 2.) Sir Edward Grey said that this letter made the situation "impossible." (*Parliamentary Debate*, 1911, 5th Series, vol. 32, p. 156; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1912-13 (Cd. 6105), p. 82.) As a matter of fact, it was the Russian interpretation of the convention of 1907 which made Mr. Shuster's whole plan to restore Persia impossible. More tactful behavior on his part might have delayed, but could hardly have influenced the outcome.

In November Mr. Shuster appointed some British subjects to treasury positions in the Russian sphere of influence. This action, when added to the appointment of Maj. Stokes, which still hung fire, gave the Russians ground for charging the British Government with breaking the Anglo-Russian convention. Then came an episode which allowed the Russians an excuse for raging—a scuffle between Persian Cossacks under Russian orders and treasury gendarmes under Mr. Shuster's instructions, for the custody of confiscated real estate that was mortgaged to the Russian Bank. (As a matter of fact this episode took place on October 9 and 10. The Russian anger was deferred until November 11, after the general political situation became opportune. (See above; also *Parliamentary Papers*, 1912-13 (Cd. 6105), 32-3.) The Russians had no real case, but they set the machinery of war in action. Troops were sent to march on Teheran, and ultimatums were delivered, with increasing requirements. The British Government kept trying on the one hand to hold Russia back, and on the other to persuade Persia to accept the Russian demands. Two requests of Sir Edward Grey run like a refrain through his correspondence with Russia: That the Russians withdraw their troops from Persia, and that they tell the ex-Shah they will never recognize him. The first request was never granted, up to the Russian collapse of 1917-18. Indeed, Tabriz was cruelly punished in January, 1912, and most of the Nationalist leaders there were done away with, either by the Russians or the reactionary Persian governor whom the Russians set up. Ardebil and Resht suffered only less heavily. (There is reason to suspect that the Russians provoked the disturbances which they quelled in blood: Browne, E. G., in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 102, 633 (Nov., 1912).) The result of the second request was that the ex-Shah, defeated and expelled in the autumn of 1911, returned in the winter, and Russia did not dare restore him to the throne, on penalty of losing completely the



seriously-strained friendship of England. (Mohammed Ali was again pensioned off at the expense of Persia. His attempts had caused much confusion and loss, and the withdrawal of troops from the south in order to oppose him had made the situation there worse. Two of his brothers, moreover, had raised standards of revolt.)

When the situation cleared, Mr. Shuster had been dismissed and replaced by a Russian candidate, M. Mornard; Major Stokes and most of the American helpers of Mr. Shuster had gone; a Persian cabinet submissive to Russia and England had been set up; the second *Majlis* had been sent home, with no order for new elections; a large number of Russian troops were solidly established in several cities of north Persia; a few British troops were in the south; the Persian Government had recognized the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, had agreed to consult the two powers about the appointment of all foreign advisers, and had promised to pay Russia's expenses for the troops she had sent in. British liberal opinion had been greatly aroused against Russia. Quite a body of Liberals severely criticized the course taken by the British Government. While the American Government took no action beyond requesting the Persian Government on Dec. 1, 1911, to protect Mr. Shuster's person and property and fulfill their contract with him (which they did promptly and generously), American popular opinion was somewhat against both Russia and Britain. The German championing of the Persian side was naturally suspected of having a political basis.

#### 7. PERSIA UNDER RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH CONTROL, 1912-1914.

With the dismissal of Parliament and the expulsion of Mr. Shuster Persia practically passed under Anglo-Russian control. But the pressure of Britain and the general political situation (in which attention was turning to the Balkans, with an impending strain on the relations of Russia with Austria and Germany) led Russia to take no further aggressive action. Affairs settled down to dull and almost hopeless continuation of the old ways. Some small loans were made by the two powers and a larger one was talked of. Swedish officers, hampered by lack of money, organized a small force of gendarmerie. (This force was disbanded in September, 1915, for lack of money.) The Persian cabinets, however weak, were opposed to the extension of foreign control. Without such extension Russia was opposed to lending money, and obtained railway concessions in exchange for a small advance in May, 1913. (Parliamentary Papers, 1913 (C'd. 6807), p. 308 (concession of Julfa-Tabriz Railway); *Ibid.*, 1914 (C'd. 7280), p. 49 (navigation on Lake Urumiah). England at the same time obtained a concession for a line from Mohammerah to Khoremmabad.) The new regent, Nasr-ul-Mulk, who had taken

office in March, 1911, absented himself from the country from June, 1912, until September, 1913. In September, 1912, Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonoff met at Balmoral Castle. Though expected in some quarters, no revision of the convention of 1907, in the direction of dividing the unallotted zone, was made. Sir Edward contented himself with suggesting that recent changes in Persia had not been to Britain's advantage, and there was therefore more reason why "they should be sure of the south and of their commercial interests in the central zone." (Parliamentary Papers, 1913 (Cd. 6807), p. 173, Sept. 25, 1912.)

On December 30, 1913, a call for an election to a third *Mejlis* was issued. Elections were carried through but slowly. On July 21, 1914, the young Shah, now 16 years old, was solemnly recognized to be of age and the regency was terminated. As yet a majority of the new *Mejlis* had not reached Teheran, and he took the constitutional oath before as many as could be assembled of the members of the second *Mejlis*.

Persia thus arrived at the threshold of the World War with the constitutional régime nominally in force. Order in finances, road control, and city government had improved a little, but were still very imperfect. Russia was still in firm occupancy of the north, and was building a railway from Julfa to Tabriz (opened May 8, 1916). M. Mornard, who had succeeded to Mr. Shuster's office but not to his place in Persian confidence, resigned September 1, 1914, and another Belgian, M. Heynssens, was appointed. Britain had continued to press gently for the summoning of the new assembly, the policing of the roads, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Russia had been inactive since the crisis of 1911.

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## 121. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The Triple Entente was a somewhat loosely joined combination, consisting of Russia, France, and England, which existed from 1907 to 1914. Within the combination France and Russia were bound together by a close alliance (See article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1894). England had no

alliance with either country, but had understandings with France, through the Entente Cordiale (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale), and with Russia through the convention of August 31, 1907.

German historians and publicists assert that the creation of the Triple Entente was inspired by hostility toward the German Empire, and that the purpose of its organizers was to bring about the "Encirclement of Germany," i. e., to surround Germany with a circle of enemies who were united to thwart every effort for the extension of German influence in the world, and were only awaiting a favorable opportunity to destroy Germany by direct attack. The theory has never been supported by adequate documentary evidence or by any argument which will bear critical examination. The conception rests wholly upon distorted inferences.

In fact, the Triple Entente was organized for the purpose of preserving the peace of Europe by the creation of an effective balance of power. It was a strictly defensive combination intended to serve as a counterpoise to the tremendous and aggressive power exercised by Germany in virtue of its military strength and its domination over the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

## 2. CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE ENTENTE CORDIALE.

A growing uneasiness in regard to Germany's aggressive intentions in 1904 led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale (See article, that title). Other contributing factors were:

(a) A desire on the part of France to concentrate her colonial interests and to be rid of various causes of petty troubles with Great Britain, notably in the policy of M. Delcassé, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1898-1905.

(b) A reaction in Great Britain against her recent Germanophile policy and her bickerings with France and a wish to abandon her position of "splendid isolation." (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.)

## 3. TERMS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE.

The most important features of the convention which led directly to the Entente Cordiale were:

(1) *The public agreement.*—Relates chiefly to Egypt and Morocco, each Government giving the other free hand, but disavowing an intention to change the political status of these countries, and each agreeing to respect the rights of the other under existing treaties. The two Governments will give one another diplomatic support in order to carry out the agreement.



(2) *The secret articles.* If either Government is compelled by circumstances "to modify their policy in regard to Egypt or Morocco" the engagements in regard to freedom of trade, to the passage of the Suez Canal, and to the fortifications of the Straits of Gibraltar are to remain intact. If legislative reforms prove necessary in either country, neither Government will refuse to examine the proposals of the other. Compensation is to be made to Spain.

#### 4. NEGOTIATION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTIONS OF 1907.

The continued existence of the chief impelling motive which had led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale and especially the experience of Europe during the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 (See article, that title) induced Russia and Great Britain to seek to adjust their outstanding differences, with the further aim of bringing about a relation between them which, in conjunction with the Dual Alliance between France and Russia (See article, that title) and the Entente Cordiale between France and England, would virtually create a combination consisting of France, Russia, and England, representing sufficient power to counterbalance the Triple Alliance, dominated by Germany, and thereby to preserve the peace of Europe. The suggestion for such an agreement on the part of responsible public officials seems to have come up originally among the British and Russian diplomats assembled at the Algeiras Conference in 1906, but the idea of an Anglo-Russian accord had long been advocated by some British publicists (See especially the series of articles by Caltham in the *Fortnightly Review* for 1900-1901 and a discussion of the series by René Henry in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, vol. 17, pp. 147-168, March, 1904). Negotiation began soon afterwards. Agreement was reached and a convention signed on August 31, 1907.

#### 5. TERMS OF THE CONVENTION (APPENDIX I, SD).

The most important features of the convention were:

(1) *Persia.*—The British and Russian spheres in Persia are marked out. The revenues of Persia are to be devoted to the same purposes as in the past. If changes are necessary in the control of the revenue, the Governments agree to a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to an agreement. (See article, *The Persian Question*, 1906-1911.)

(2) *Afghanistan.*—Great Britain has no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan and will not encourage any measures there against Russia. Russia agrees that Afghanistan is outside her sphere of influence and will conduct all relations with Afghanistan through the British Government. Great Britain will not interfere in the internal government of Afghanistan nor annex any

portion of it, provided the Amir fulfils his engagements. The two Governments agree to equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan.

(3) *Tibet*.—The two Governments recognize the suzerainty of China and will respect the territorial integrity of Tibet. They will negotiate with Tibet only through the Chinese Government; they will send no representatives to Lhasa; they will seek no concessions, nor any pledges of the revenues of Tibet. (See article, *The Tibet Question, 1890-1911*.)

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## 122. THE SEPARATION OF NORWAY FROM SWEDEN.

### 1. UNION OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN.

The Rikssakt of 1815 provided for the voluntary union of the Crowns of Sweden and Norway and for the equality of the two countries. It contained no clear and specific provision, however, for the conduct of foreign affairs, and this omission was utilized by Sweden to secure control of that department of government and with it the consular service.

### 2. RIVALRY.

Norwegian commerce developed rapidly and finally far surpassed that of Sweden. Norway favored free trade; Sweden maintained a protective tariff and the two countries regarded themselves as commercial rivals. Norwegians began to feel that Sweden was managing the consular service in her own interest alone and to the detriment of Norwegian commerce. This feeling soon led to a demand for a separate consular system. In 1892 the Norwegian Storting passed a resolution for such a service, but Norway did not make much progress toward getting it until 1903. Announcement that an understanding for separate consular systems had been reached by representatives of the two kingdoms was then made in the communiqué of March 24.

### 3. COMMUNIQUÉ OF MARCH 24, 1903.

This agreement (Nordlund, 73-75) stipulated for the establishment of separate consular services, but provided that "The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same wording which can not be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authorities of both Kingdoms." In reality nothing was arranged, for the two countries found it impossible to agree on the terms of these identical laws. Sweden wished to keep the Norwegian consular service under control of the foreign office; Norway insisted upon an independent administration.

## 4. NORWAY ANNULS THE UNION.

King Oscar was firm in his opposition to the Norwegian consular legislation, but no Norwegian ministry would assume responsibility for his action by remaining in office. He finally admitted his inability to form a government and the Storting proclaimed that the King has ceased to act as King of Norway. This meant the dissolution of the union. Sweden, after some hesitation, agreed under conditions formulated in the protocol of Karlstad October 23, 1905, and definitely established by the conventions of Stockholm of October 26.

## 5. CONVENTIONS OF STOCKHOLM.

These were five in number and provided that (1) all differences between the two countries which could not be settled by diplomacy should be submitted to The Hague tribunal, except questions involving the "independence, integrity, or vital interests" of either country. (2) The common frontier was to be neutralized. (3) The Laplanders were to be allowed their ancient rights of pasturing their reindeer on both sides of the border. (4) Reciprocal rights for transit of goods through both countries was established for a period of thirty years. (5) For lakes and waterways common to both countries, each state might make regulations the benefits of which were open equally to citizens of both countries. (See Appendix I, 71.)

## 6. ADJUSTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The process of separating the two kingdoms required for completeness an adjustment of their relations with other countries, especially with a number of the great powers. On November 21, 1855, during the course of the Crimean war, Sweden and Norway, fearing encroachment on the part of Russia, had entered into a treaty with England and France (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 45, pp. 33-34) by which the northern kingdoms agreed not to permit Russia to obtain or occupy any part of their territories, while England and France agreed to furnish military and naval aid to resist any attempted encroachment by Russia. This treaty was still in force at the time of the separation in 1905. Its existence had been constantly regarded by Russia as an offensive imputation upon Russian good faith. To meet the changed situation a new arrangement was negotiated. On November 2, 1907, Norway, France, and England issued a declaration abrogating the treaty of November 21, 1855, so far as the three governments were concerned (*Ibid.*, vol. 101, p. 187). On the same day Norway entered into a treaty with France, England, Russia, and Germany, by which Norway agreed not to cede to any power nor to permit the occupation of any part of the Norwegian territory, while those governments agreed to respect the integrity of



Norway and to lend their aid if the integrity of Norwegian territory should be threatened. This treaty was for a period of ten years, with a provision for automatic renewal unless denounced at least two years before its expiration. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 107, pp. 179-180.) A somewhat similar arrangement was made by Sweden early in the following year. On April 23, 1908, Sweden signed with France and England a declaration identical with that which Norway had signed with those countries on November 2, 1907 (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, p. 188). On the same day Sweden entered into the Baltic and North Seas Conventions of 1908 (See article, that title). These conventions gave Sweden an arrangement which, though different in terms, was designed to be the equivalent in protection of that which Norway secured by the treaty of November 2, 1907.

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## 123. THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEA CONVENTIONS OF 1908.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The treaty of 1855 by which France and Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of Norway and Sweden against Russia was distinctly distasteful to Russia (See article, The Separation of Norway from Sweden). Russia was anxious to replace it by a more friendly arrangement. After the dissolution of the union of Norway and Sweden, Norway sought from the great powers a guaranty of her integrity. Sweden was more sensitive about her sovereignty and unwilling to admit dependence on the great powers. Under these circumstances were opened negotiations which led to the Baltic and North Sea Conventions.

### 2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR BALTIC CONVENTION.

The Baltic agreement was signed by Germany, Sweden, Russia, and Denmark, all States bordering on that sea. Its origin is not fully established. There were some who ascribed its inception to a German plan to alienate Russia from France and Great Britain. Others believed Germany was trying to exclude these latter powers from the Baltic to balance the Mediterranean accord. On the other hand, there were German statements that Russia initiated the negotiations with a view to escape her obligations not to fortify the Aland Islands. It was apparent that Sweden, however, would be the chief beneficiary of any arrangement to settle the status of the small northern States.

### 3. TERMS OF BALTIC CONVENTION, APRIL 23, 1908.

This agreement (See Appendix I, 84) declared the purpose of the four contracting powers to preserve the status quo in the lands encircling the Baltic. In case this were threatened they bound themselves to enter into communication with one another with a view to agreeing upon such measures as they might consider advisable in the interests of the maintenance of the status quo. A memorandum was added that the convention "could in no manner be invoked when there was a question of the free exercise of the rights of sovereignty of the high contracting parties in their respective possessions." This was done at the instance of Russia, who was unwilling to be a party to a pledge that the Aland Islands should not be fortified. Sweden was anxious for such a guarantee, but Russia firmly refused to repeat her humiliation of 1855.



## 4. NORTH SEA CONVENTION, APRIL 23, 1908.

The parties to the North Sea convention were Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It provided (See Appendix I, 83) for the status quo in the North Sea in terms similar to the Baltic arrangement. It was accompanied also by the memorandum regarding sovereignty.

## 5. SIGNIFICANCE.

These conventions together constituted a single arrangement for the small States of northern Europe. Norway and Belgium were not included, for their integrity had already been guaranteed, the former by the treaty of November, 1907 (See article, The Separation of Norway from Sweden), the latter by the treaty of 1839. Sweden was the greatest gainer by the conventions, for since the separation from Norway she had been left uncertain about any guarantee from the great powers. Denmark felt that her position was strengthened. The Dutch appeared indifferent, for as one of their writers expressed it: "Holland exists by the grace of England and France." They regarded the German promises as of "no value" but relied upon the strength of her two other great neighbors.

The agreements left unsettled the question as to whether or not the Baltic was a closed sea. The fact that any agreement was possible led many to hope that a more kindly feeling was developing in European politics. German papers pointed to the arrangement as an evidence that their country had no thought of aggression.

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## 124. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1907.

### 1. PURPOSE.

Acting upon the request of the Interparliamentary Union, President Roosevelt suggested on September 21, 1904, the meeting of a Second International Peace Conference, and recommended the following questions as proper subjects of consideration: (1) The questions for the consideration of which the First Hague Conference had expressed a wish that a future conference be held. (See article, *The First Hague Conference, 1899.*) (2) The negotiation of arbitration treaties between the nations represented at the conference to be convened. (3) The advisability of establishing an international congress to convene periodically for the discussion of international questions.

Owing, however, to the continuance of the Russo-Japanese War until September 5, 1905, to the outbreak of the Russian revolution which followed, and to the further delay caused by the meeting of the Third Pan American Conference, the Second Hague Conference did not meet until June 15, 1907.

President Roosevelt generously conceded the honor of calling the Second Hague Conference to Czar Nicholas II, who, for obvious reasons, omitted the subject of "limitation of armaments" from the Russian program. But Great Britain insisted upon raising this important question, and the United States was determined to ask for a consideration of the so-called Drago doctrine in a modified form, i. e., the question of forbidding the use of armed force for the recovery of contract debts unless arbitration were refused, or in case of failure to submit to an arbitral award.

Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Russia, the British Government failed in its attempt to secure a consideration of the question of a limitation of armaments or restriction of military expenditures. Germany even opposed the insertion of the words "more urgent than ever" in the resolution which was adopted confirming the resolution of 1899 relative to this matter.

### 2. RESULTS.

Though the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 failed in many respects to meet the expectations even of conservative states-



men and international jurists, it must be admitted that it was, on the whole, a considerable success. The fact that the principles laid down in its conventions were violated in a wholesale manner by the Central Powers during the World War increased the measure of condemnation which the world at large passed upon the atrocities committed by the armies of those powers.

The final act of the conferences included the following 13 conventions:

(I) Convention (of 97 articles) for the pacific settlement of international disputes—a revision of the convention of 1899 dealing with this subject. The codes of procedure bearing upon arbitration and international commissions of inquiry were considerably enlarged and elaborated, and a short code for arbitration of a more summary procedure added. The various projects for obligatory arbitration were defeated, owing mainly to the opposition of Germany. But in the final act the conference declared itself unanimously in favor of the “principle” of compulsory arbitration, and declared that “certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpretation of treaties and application of the provisions of international agreements may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without restriction.”

(II) Convention (of 7 articles) respecting the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts. This was a modification of the Drago doctrine known as the Porter resolution which practically prescribed obligatory arbitration in one class of cases, namely, contract debts. A majority of the powers represented at the Second Hague Conference (though many of those who signed subsequently failed to ratify) agreed “not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country as being due to its nationals,” unless the debtor State refused to arbitrate or failed to submit to the arbitral award after having accepted arbitration.

(III) Convention (of 8 articles) relative to the opening of hostilities. This convention declared, in effect, that hostilities are not to begin without prior warning in the form either of a declaration of war or an ultimatum, and it also provided for notice to neutral powers.

(IV) Convention (of 56 articles) regarding the laws and customs of land warfare. This was a revision of the Hague Code of 1899.

(V) Convention (of 25 articles) regarding the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land.

(VI) Convention (of 11 articles) relative to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities.

(VII) Convention (of 12 articles) relative to the conversion of merchant ships into warships.

(VIII) Convention (of 13 articles) relative to the laying of submarine mines. This convention was very imperfect, and was only concluded for a period of seven years.

(IX) Convention (of 13 articles) respecting bombardments by naval forces in time of war. This convention applies to naval warfare the rules governing bombardment on land.

(X) Convention (of 28 articles) for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1906 to maritime warfare. It relates to the treatment of the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked in naval warfare.

(XI) Convention (of 14 articles) relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of capture in maritime warfare. This convention includes provisions relating to the inviolability of postal correspondence; the exemption from capture of vessels engaged in coast fishing, etc.; and regulations regarding the disposition of the crews of enemy merchant ships captured by a belligerent.

(XII) Convention (of 57 articles, with an annex showing distribution of judges) relative to the establishment of an international prize court. This convention did not go into effect, owing to the failure of the contracting parties to ratify it. Opposition to the convention was very pronounced in England.

(XIII) Convention (of 33 articles) respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war.

In addition to the above conventions, the Second Hague Peace Conference renewed "for a period extending to the Third Peace Conference" the declaration of 1899 prohibiting the "discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature."

The conference made the notable recommendation that the signatory powers adopt a project or draft of a convention (consisting of 35 articles) for the organization of a court of arbitral justice as soon as they shall have reached an agreement upon the selection of judges and the constitution of the court. To remedy the defects of the Hague Tribunal, or so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration (which was not really a court, but a mere list or panel of judges), the Second Hague Conference attempted to create a so-called Court of Arbitral Justice. But its labors in this respect were unsuccessful. A draft convention providing for the organization of such a court was elaborated and readily adopted in plenary session, but the conference was unable to agree upon a mode of selection for the appointment of judges. The project was, therefore, merely recommended to the signatory powers for negotiation and agreement.

The following additional "wishes" and recommendations (*vœux*) were expressed: (1) That "in case of war the proper civil and mili-



tary authorities make it their very special duty to insure and protect the maintenance of peaceful intercourse, and notably the commercial and industrial relations, between the peoples of the belligerent States and of neutral States." (2) That "the powers settle, through special conventions, the situation, in respect to the support of military charges, of foreigners resident within their territories." (3) That "the elaboration of regulations relative to the laws and customs of maritime warfare may figure in the program of the next conference, and that in any case the powers apply, as far as possible, in maritime warfare the principles of the convention relative to the laws and customs of war on land." (4) That the powers hold a "third peace conference, which might take place within a period similar to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference, on a date to be set by joint agreement among the powers."

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## 125. THE REVAL INTERVIEW, 1908.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In June, 1908, Edward VII paid a visit to the Czar at Reval. As the Austro-Russian accord in regard to Macedonia, the *Mürsteg* program, had recently broken down (See article, *The Macedonian Question, 1878-1908*), and as the situation in Macedonia called imperatively for action, there was a widespread belief in Germany and Austria-Hungary that the purpose of the meeting was to arrange for a plan of joint English and Russian action in a form hostile to the interests and wishes of Austria-Hungary.

### 2. THE FACTS REGARDING THE REVAL MEETING.

The facts regarding the Reval interview, so far as known, seem to be as follows:

The King and Queen of England left Charing Cross on the evening of June 5, 1908, arriving at Reval escorted by warships on June 9. Here they were visited by the Czar and the Imperial family, a visit which they at once returned on the Imperial yacht. The speeches at the state banquet in the evening laid stress on the effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 in drawing the two countries together and in consolidating the peace of the world. The press announced that Sir Charles Hardinge and M. Isvolaky, who had accompanied their respective sovereigns, had come near to a complete agreement on the projected reforms of Macedonia.

The meeting at Reval appears to have been greeted with great satisfaction by the Russian press as a further step in the rapprochement between England and Russia and as strong guarantee of European peace. It was the belief of a good many competent observers that the Reval interviews probably, and quite without any intent on the part of the British and Russian Governments, hastened the outbreak of the Turkish Revolution. (See article, that title.)

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## 126. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908-9.

### 1. CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION.

The revolution was in essence the overthrow of the Sultan's autocratic power by the upper class Turks, and the substitution thereof of parliamentary government under their control. The earlier at-



tempt to secure constitutional government, connected with the name of Midhat Pasha and resulting in the constitution of December 23, 1876, was a failure, due to the lack at that time of any feeling for its necessity among the ruling caste. Thirty years of increasingly centralized government, the universal espionage which made all life miserable, the assassination or exile of all who opposed the régime in the slightest detail, the loss of territory and of prestige, the consciousness that the economic penetration of the foreign powers could end only in the dissolution of the Empire, forced the Turks of all classes to consider the constitution their only salvation. The leaders in Paris studied in detail successful revolutions of the past, arranged their differences as between radical and conservative, invited in the other nationalistic revolutionary parties, especially the Armenians, but retained control in their own hands.

## 2. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION.

The revolution seems to have been hastened by the announcement of Austria in February, 1908, that a railroad would be built through Novibazar, linking up the Bosnian and Salonika lines, which would bring all the western part of the Balkan peninsula under Austrian influence, and by the Reval interview (See article, that title).

The disturbance in Macedonia had brought together large numbers of Turkish troops. The common soldiers were unpaid and wasting their time, the officers were unable to preserve order and dissatisfied with the presence of the foreign officers, who were a constant reminder that the days of the Empire were numbered. Emissaries sent out from Paris found a good reception, and the revolution was proclaimed July 6, 1908. At first foreigners thought little of it, but adhesion was rapid. Troops sent against the rebels refused to fight. Freedom was proclaimed for the Christians, and safety for foreign interests. The Sultan suddenly surrendered by granting a constitution and calling for an election. The rule of Abdul Hamid had been supported by Germany, even through the Armenian massacres. Popular feeling naturally turned against it, while France, the home for many years of the leaders of the Young Turks, and England, the friend of liberty, were much favored. In their turn, they acclaimed the revolution as a marvel, which it was in many respects. During this period, the grand vizier, Kiamil Pasha, was Anglophile. English and French aid largely was used in reconstructing the government.

## 3. GROWTH OF GERMAN INFLUENCE.

The new régime was soon discredited by the declaration of independence by Bulgaria, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by

Austria, the declaration of annexation of Crete to Greece (See articles on those subjects). Whether all these were the result of the intrigues of the Central Powers they played the game of those powers. Long negotiations were needed to settle the railroad question in Bulgaria; the return of Novi Bazar did not prevent a boycott of Austrian goods by the Turks; the questions remained for long irritating. The new Parliament assembled December 17, not without frauds and the stirring up of racial hatreds, with the possibility of foreign troubles. Against the party supported by the Committee of Union and Progress, devoted to centralization, Ottomanization, and destruction of special privileges for national, religious, or foreign interests, was the liberal party, in touch with Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Arab, and Albanian nationalists, suspected of alliance with the Sultan and reaction. Kiamil Pasha found his support here and was forced to resign. Himil Pasha was less strongly English. The capital was temporarily secured by the troops of the Sultan (April 13), but troops loyal to the revolution were called up from Macedonia, the city was retaken on the 24th, and three days later Abdul Hamid was deposed and Mehmet V ascended the throne. The Young Turks had been greatly aided in their march on Constantinople by the expert advice of the Central Powers and especially of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna. The military party had been pro-German because of their German training, in Germany or under Von der Goltz. As the revolution became more military, those who remembered Paris played less part. The Adana massacres and the failure to adequately punish those responsible, caused a corresponding coolness of the English and French toward the Young Turk. The growing power of Enver Pasha, the "hero of the revolution," was also thrown toward Germany. In spite of all this, it is probable that at the beginning of the World War the majority of responsible officials and thinkers in Turkey were not pro-German.

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Georges Gaulis in *Le Journal des Débats* and by E. J. Dillon in the *Contemporary Review* and also the notes of the *Fortnightly Review*. A complete presentation of the documents of diplomatic character in the *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 107, 251ff; vol. 109, 219ff; the old constitution is given, vol. 107, 254ff. See also *Staatsarchiv*, vol. 78, pp. 215-311. An excellent presentation of the parliamentary questions is given by A. H. Lybyer, *The Turkish Parliament*, *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, vol. 7 (1910), 65ff. For the revolution in its historical background, le V<sup>te</sup> de la Jonquière, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, Hachette, 1914).

## 127. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1908.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin gave Austria-Hungary the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia-Herzegovina (See articles The Congress of Berlin and Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878). At the time there was a widespread expectation that within a few years the Provinces would be formally annexed to the Dual Monarchy. A variety of circumstances, connected with both the foreign and internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, prevented any serious effort to convert occupation and administration into annexation. As time passed objections of the domestic order ceased to be as pronounced as in the years soon after 1878. Under the leadership of Count Aehrenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government of the Dual Monarchy found in the Turkish revolution of 1908 (See article, that title), a convenient opportunity for annexation.

The Government of the Dual Monarchy alleged that the Turkish Revolution in 1908 made it necessary for Austria-Hungary to define her position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The constitutional reforms announced by the Young Turks required that Turkey grant a degree of autonomy to the provinces and representation in the Turkish Parliament. This made it necessary, in the interest of the welfare of the provinces, that Austria-Hungary should no longer leave their status ill defined.

### 2. PREPARATION FOR ANNEXATION.

Vienna was probably determined on an early annexation after the revolt broke out in Turkey in July. Though Isvolsky, Russian minister of foreign affairs, was told that the act would take place "au moment favorable" and with ample warning, Russia was not notified until October 3, and the other powers were uninformed until October 6. The diplomacy of Aehrenthal, minister of foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary, was perplexingly intricate. (Steed, 246-251.)

## 3. ANNEXATION PROCLAIMED.

On October 6 a circular note to the powers announced the evacuation of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and the grant of constitutional autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (See Appendix I, 86.) On October 7 the Emperor-King announced to the inhabitants of the provinces his reasons for annexation. (See Appendix I, 87.)

## 4. SETTLEMENT WITH TURKEY.

On October 8 the Porte protested to Vienna that the Treaty of Berlin and the convention of Constantinople could be altered only by the consent of the signatory parties. (See Appendix I, 88.) A Turkish boycott on Austrian goods caused such losses that on November 22 Pallavicini, ambassador of Austria-Hungary at Constantinople, promised concessions if the boycott was raised. Kiamil Pasha ordered it stopped on December 5. On January 11 Pallavicini offered the Porte £2,200,000 to compensate for Turkish property in the provinces, this payment, he asserted, having nothing to do with the annexation (Aktenstücke, nos. 93-95). This and other compensations were embodied in the protocol of February 26, by which Turkey recognized the annexation. (Appendix I, 90.)

## 5. CONFLICT WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

On October 7 Serbia demanded complete restoration of the Treaty of Berlin or compensation (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, pp. 291-292). Montenegro demanded that Antivari be freed from Austrian control. Milovanovitch, minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, was urged by the powers to avoid hostilities and await an international conference. He replied that Serbia wished a recognition of Serbian and Montenegrin integrity, and the strip between the Sandjak and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer between Austria and Turkey.

## 6. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS.

The attitude of the powers was as follows: The interests of England and France were not directly concerned. Russia was anxious to bring the matter before a congress of the powers (Dipl. Akt. no. 87 Beilage). Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance. Germany approved a fait accompli, but wished Austria to go no further. (Albin, 233-234; Annual Register, 1908, 322.) Aehrenthal would consent to a congress only with the proviso that the annexation should not be discussed, but should be simply ratified as a matter of legal form (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, p. 296). A plan for the congress was drawn up, but Austria-Hungary pronounced it unacceptable (Aktenstücke, no. 89 Beilage).



## 7. WHY NO CONGRESS WAS HELD.

The idea of a congress was abandoned for two reasons: The attitude of Germany and the retreat of Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The Berlin Government, supporting Austria-Hungary, insisted that annexation be excluded from discussion, and that no compensation be given Serbia and Montenegro without Austria's consent.

In the Reichstag, on December 7, Von Bülow said that Germany would stand by her ally. In March, 1909, he notified Russia that, if Russia intervened to aid Serbia, in case of war Germany would support Austria. Russia at once recognized the annexation.

## 8. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YIELD.

In February and March, 1909, Austria mobilized three army corps and the Danube flotilla, and demanded categorical renunciation of the Serbian claims. As Russia had withdrawn her support early in March (Aktenstücke, no. 117), Serbia on March 31 renounced her opposition to annexation and promised to restore her army to the status of the spring of 1908. (See Appendix I, 91.)

On April 6 Montenegro renounced her opposition in return for the suppression of article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, giving Austria control of Antivari (Aktenstücke, no. 178).

## 9. SETTLEMENT AMONG THE POWERS.

As the powers most nearly concerned agreed to the annexation, the remaining powers consented to the suppression of article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Italy consented April 11, Germany April 7, England April 17, Russia and France April 19 (Aktenstücke, nos. 179, 182, 185-187).

## 10. RESULTS.

The results of annexation for Austria were an indemnity of £2,200,000 to Turkey; trade losses by the Turkish boycott; £14,000,000 for the mobilization of the army; the alienation of most of the powers from Austrian policy; and a heavy obligation to Germany. The whole episode became the starting point and was in large measure the immediate cause for the series of events, all of them connected with the affairs of the Turkish Empire, which filled the years 1908 to 1914 and led directly to the World War.

See also article, The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909.

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## 128. THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF NOVIBAZAR, 1878-1909.

### I. ORIGIN OF THE OCCUPATION.

In planning the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Treaty of Berlin, it seemed desirable to Austria to have a foothold in the Sanjak of Novibazar. A double purpose would be served thereby, of keeping Montenegro and Serbia apart, and thus hindering the impulse of the Serbo-Croats toward political unity, and of holding the door open for an advance of Austria, if not by political control, at any rate by commercial penetration, toward Salonica. The proposal was brought forward at the session of the Congress of Berlin on June 28, and despite protests from the Turkish plenipo-

tentaries, on July 4 and July 10, was adopted on July 11, with no other change than a sentence appended concerning agreement as to details.

## 2. TREATY OF BERLIN.

Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin provided as follows:

The Government of Austria-Hungary, not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sanjak of Novibazar, which extends between Serbia and Montenegro in a southeasterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, the Ottoman Government will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient Vilayet of Bosnia. To this end the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come to an understanding on the details. (See Appendix I, 17.)

On the same day that the Treaty of Berlin was signed, for reasons which are still obscure, Russia entered into a secret convention with Austria-Hungary binding her not to raise any objections if, in consequence of inconvenience arising from the maintenance of Turkish administration, Austria-Hungary should be brought to occupy Novibazar definitively as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Steed, Hapsburg Monarchy, 213. Text in *Album Grands Traités*, 234.)

## 3. AUSTRO-TURKISH CONVENTION OF APRIL 21, 1879.

In the convention of April 21, 1879, between Austria-Hungary and Turkey (Hertslet, 2855-9; articles 7-10, and annex), the Emperor-King undertook to give notice beforehand of the time when his troops should enter the sanjak. Questions concerning their subsistence, quartering, etc., were to be arranged by the authorities and commanders of the two Governments, and all expenses were to be paid by Austria. The presence of the Austrian troops was not to interfere with the function of Ottoman administrative officers, judicial or financial. The Porte might also maintain regular troops, but not irregular, in the same places, "on a footing of perfect equality with regard to their number and military advantages, and the freedom of their movements." Austria would for the time being place troops only at three points on the Lim, namely, Pribol, Priepoliye, and Bielopoliye, to a total number of between 4,000 and 5,000 men.

## 4. OCCUPATION, 1879-1908.

This very limited occupation began on September 10, 1879. Bielopoliye was presently exchanged for Plevlye. The Austrians appointed only one civil official. Good relations were steadily maintained between the Austrian and Turkish officials, largely due on



the Turkish side to the friendliness of Ferik Suleiman, pasha for many years in Plevlye. The area garrisoned by the Austrians was after a time set off as a separate sanjak (that of Plevlye) by the Turks. (Miller, in *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, p. 401.) The inhabitants of the sanjak had no affection for the Austrians, but nothing occurred to disturb the situation for almost 30 years.

When the question of railways was taken up actively early in 1908, Baron Aehrenthal asked permission of the Porte to survey a railway through the sanjak from Uvats in Bosnia to Mitrovitza. The Serbians presented as a counter proposal, with the support of Italy and Russia, a line across from the Danube to San Giovanni di Medua. Action was prevented by the outbreak of the Turkish Revolution.

#### 5. TERMINATION, 1908-1909.

October 5, 1908, Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Porte protested, and Turkish popular opinion was expressed by a boycott on all Austrian goods. Austria withdrew her troops from Novibazar on October 28. After long negotiations the Young Turk Government was obliged to conform to the situation, and in the treaty of February 26, 1909, Austria obtained the cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but renounced all her rights in the Sanjak of Novibazar. In the course of the next few weeks, the powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin consented to the abolition of the 25th article.

The reasons which led the Austro-Hungarian Government to withdraw from Novibazar are not fully known. It is believed that Italy demanded withdrawal as the price for Italian recognition of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the Austrian general staff reported the true strategic line of advance toward Salonica to lie along the valley of the Morava in Serbia. (Seton-Watson, *Contemporary Review*, vol. 104, p. 326.)

See also the article, *The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909*.

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### 129. THE BULGARIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1908.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The treaties of San Stefano and Berlin (1878), to which the principality of Bulgaria owed its legal existence, though providing

for practically complete autonomy for the principality, recognized in favor of Turkey certain ill-defined rights of suzerainty over Bulgaria. (See articles, *The Congress of Berlin*, and *Bulgaria and The Balkan Settlement of 1878*.) Ordinarily these rights were of little value to Turkey and limited very slightly the independent action of Bulgaria. There was, however, in Bulgaria a strong desire for complete independence. Prince Ferdinand on several occasions sounded the courts of Russia and Austria in regard to the matter, but was advised to wait. The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908, furnished an opportunity.

## 2. THE DECLARATION OF TORNOVA.

On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand formally proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria at TornoVA. (See Appendix I, 85.) All the circumstances of the occasion indicate that the declaration was issued in consequence of an understanding previously arranged between the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian Governments. The decision not to defer the declaration until a later time was probably due to a fear lest the powers, coming into dispute over the action of the Dual Monarchy, would forbid Bulgaria to take any action as to independence. The decision was to confront Europe with a *fait accompli*.

## 3. NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER, 1908, TO APRIL, 1909.

The course taken by Bulgaria was an act of defiance toward Turkey, owing to its suzerain rights, and an infraction of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), to which all of the powers were parties. It therefore led to a period of acute tension, marked at times by considerable military preparation, between Bulgaria and Turkey and to a complicated negotiation. In the first phase of this negotiation Russia supported Turkey in a decided manner; Germany pursued a rather equivocal course; France and England used their influence at Constantinople to prevent war. In the second and final phase, Russia, changing its attitude, contributed in large measure to facilitate a financial transaction which paved the way for a settlement. The attitude of the powers throughout was that they would consent to modify the Treaty of Berlin as to this matter whenever Bulgaria and Turkey should compose their differences, but that the independence of Bulgaria could not be recognized until that had been done.

## 4. SETTLEMENT AND RECOGNITION.

The main obstacles to a pacific adjustment between Bulgaria and Turkey were sentimental and financial. Turkey at an early date indicated willingness to recognize the independence of Bulgaria upon the payment of a sum of money of an amount to be determined.



Turkey demanded that the sum to be paid include the arrears of tribute and a share of the Ottoman debt. The amount demanded was also placed at a high figure. Bulgaria replied that it would not buy its independence, but would conquer it. At a moment when the situation had become very threatening, with Turkey demanding a rectification of the frontier and both States again making extensive military preparations, Russia came forward with a plan which quickly paved the way to a solution. The plan allowed Turkey, as compensation for claims of all sorts, a sum amounting to 125,000,000 francs, which was substantially the final amount claimed by the Turks, while Bulgaria was willing to pay only 82,000,000 francs. Payment was to be made by way of reduction in the installments on the sums due to Russia from Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Russia, in turn, agreed to accept from Bulgaria the sum of only 82,000,000 francs. (The agreements are in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 102, pp. 384-387.) Turkey, therefore, signed a convention at Constantinople, April 9, 1909, recognizing the independence of Bulgaria (*British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 102, pp. 386-387). Recognition by the powers promptly followed.

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### 130. THE BOSNIAN CRISIS OF 1908-1909.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in October, 1908, led to a controversy between the Dual Monarchy and Turkey. (See article, *The Annexation of Bosnia-Herze-*

govina.) It also led to international complications which for several weeks early in 1909 threatened to end in a general European war. This was the Bosnian crisis.

## 2. OCCASION FOR THE CRISIS.

By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (See Appendix I, 17), Austria-Hungary was permitted to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. This arrangement was made in consequence of an understanding between Russia and the Dual Monarchy, entered into on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (See article, The Austro-Russian Accord of 1877) and of the support given to the Austro-Hungarian claims by England and Germany at the Congress of Berlin. As the provinces were inhabited chiefly by Serbs, and as a route across that region would afford Serbia the most convenient form of the long-desired access to the Adriatic, the Serbian agents at the Congress of Berlin tried to protest against the arrangement. (See article, Serbia and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) But the congress would not even hear the protest.

From the beginning of the occupation Austria-Hungary counted upon ultimately obtaining permanent possession. Serbia, however, continued to hope that the provinces, or at least such a portion of them as would give access to the Adriatic, would some day be secured to her. The crisis in 1908-1909 sprang from the fact that Serbia believed that she must prevent the consummation of annexation by Austria-Hungary or give up permanently her long-cherished hopes.

## 3. SERBIAN DEMANDS.

Soon after the proclamation of annexation Serbia called a part of the reserves to the colors and lodged a vigorous protest with the powers, demanding either a return to the status quo ante or compensations calculated to assure the independence and material progress of Serbia (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, pp. 291-292). Serbian newspapers demanded a strip of territory extending across Novi-Bazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Adriatic. The Government of the Dual Monarchy refused to receive the Serbian protest. It denied that Serbia had any right to raise a question as to the annexation.

## 4. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS.

For a time the attitude of the powers was uncertain. With the exception of Germany, whose attitude at first was extremely reserved, all of the powers objected to the action of Austria-Hungary, but apparently more to the form than to the fact of annexation.



As the controversy developed Germany came quickly and decidedly to the support of its Austro-Hungarian ally. In Russia public opinion expressed itself strongly in support of Serbia. The Russian Government, which at first had shown a disposition to do no more than record a formal protest against the infraction of the Treaty of Berlin, responded by supporting the demand first made by Turkey for an international conference to consider the matter. (Aktenstücke, No. 87 Beilage.) The British and Italian Governments then supported this demand with considerable vigor, while France sought to play a conciliatory rôle.

#### 5. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONFERENCE. ■

Austria-Hungary declared that it was not opposed on principle to a conference, but made its acceptance depend upon the program for the conference, which it insisted must be agreed upon in advance. It took the position that the conference ought not to discuss the validity of the annexation, but should confine itself to registering the measure as a *fait accompli*. Russia, after considerable exchange of opinion with the other powers, submitted a project for a program which included an item dealing with advantages to be accorded to Serbia and Montenegro. (Aktenstücke, No. 50.) Austria-Hungary, in reply, did not flatly reject the Russian proposal, but suggested that the advantages for Serbia and Montenegro should be economic only. While the discussion was in progress the Austro-Hungarian Government was endeavoring to prevent the calling of the proposed conference by settling its controversy with Turkey. Such a settlement was arranged in principle on January 12, 1909. (Ibid., No. 95.) After that Austria-Hungary claimed that there was no longer any occasion for the meeting of a conference.

#### 6. SERBIA FORCED TO YIELD.

Popular feeling in Serbia did not abate. There was a strong demand that opposition to the annexation should be pushed vigorously. To avert the danger of war, Russia proposed to the powers a collective *démarche* at Vienna and at Belgrade. Germany promptly refused to take part, while Austria-Hungary hastened to make known that it would refuse to receive any such proposition. Learning that France and England were not inclined to lend their support, Russia quickly dropped the proposal.

The crisis was brought to a close in a manner which involved a triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russia—a triumph which left behind it much bitterness of spirit in the states which were forced to yield. The humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was un-

doubtedly a very considerable factor in determining the whole course of events which from that date led directly to the World War. The precise manner in which Serbia was forced to yield was at the time veiled in a good deal of mystery, giving rise to numerous conflicting accounts of just what happened. Complete information is not yet available. It is clear, however, that Russia, under some form of strong pressure from Germany, was forced to abandon Serbia. The Kaiser subsequently asserted that he stood beside his ally, Austria-Hungary, "in shining armor" (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 115, p. 375), while Prince von Bülow declared that "the German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision" (Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, p. 51). Even then Serbia yielded only under constraint from all the powers. Her humiliation was recorded in the declaration she was forced to send to Vienna (March 31, 1909):

Serbia recognizes that the situation created in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not involve any injury to the rights of Serbia. In consequence, Serbia will conform to the decision which the powers are going to take in regard to article 25 of the treaty of Vienna. Serbia, conforming to the advice of the powers, agrees to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition which she has taken since the month of October of last year. She agrees to modify the line of her political conduct in regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in the future on good terms with it. In conformity with this declaration and confident of the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia will bring back her army, in the matter of organization, distribution, and of state of activity, to the situation existing in the spring of 1908. She will disband the volunteer bodies and will prevent the formation of irregular bands upon her territory. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 110, pp. 263-264.)

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### 131. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1878-1908.

#### 1. MACEDONIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

The region known as Macedonia may be roughly defined as the basins of the Vardar, Struma, and Mesta Zara Rivers, except the headwaters of the Struma. Nowhere in the Balkan peninsula or in



the Near East are races and nationalities so inextricably intermingled as in Macedonia. The population includes large numbers of Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, Roumanian Vlacks, Turks, and Jews. Much of the difficulty of the Macedonian problem lies in the common antagonisms of these peoples, and in the ambitions of the neighboring Balkan States, and in the sympathy of their inhabitants for the Macedonian members of their own nationality. The strategic position of Macedonia, especially Salonika, controlling one of the principal highways of trade between the Near East and central and western Europe and the *Drang nach Osten* ambitions of the Dual Monarchy added to the complexity and difficulty of the problem. That the Macedonian question developed into an almost constant source of anxiety to the diplomatists and statesmen of Europe for many years prior to 1914 and became in large measure the *causa causans* of the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, thereby contributing materially to the outbreak of the World War, must be imputed in large measure to the Balkan settlement arranged by the Congress of Berlin. (See article, The Congress of Berlin, and other articles dealing with the Balkan settlement of 1878.)

The Treaty of San Stefano (See article, that title) had included nearly all of Macedonia in the Great Bulgaria which Russia designed to establish. But the Congress of Berlin, influenced by a natural and not wholly unjustified suspicion of Russia, decided that Macedonia should remain under Turkish rule with only a few vague guarantees for improved government. Experiences soon showed that these guarantees were wholly ineffective. The decision to leave Macedonia under Turkish rule was the fatal error of the Congress of Berlin.

## 2. BALKAN RIVALRY IN MACEDONIA, 1885-1897.

Turkish administration, despite the projected law of vilayets of 1880 (a measure agreed upon between the Turkish Government and European commissioners, but never promulgated; La Jonequiere, II, 158; a brief abstract is given in Hertlet, 2990-2995), went on unchanged, embodying the customary evils of Turkish rule. Conditions were perhaps no worse than for generations past, but they were becoming more and more out of harmony with the advancing times. The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 altered the situation (See article, that title). The people of the strengthened principality began to aid their still subjugated brethren. At first they used only peaceful methods, by instituting and supporting schools and churches, and working to secure Bulgarian bishoprics according to the firman of 1870, which instituted the Bulgarian Exarchate. (A Bulgarian bishop could be appointed for a district in which two-thirds of the

inhabitants were shown to be Bulgarian. Two or three appointments were secured in 1890 and a like number in 1894. (Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, 443.) The Bulgarian educational work developed along propagandist lines, which were rivaled by similar efforts of Greeks, Serbians, and, after a time, Roumanians. Committees were organized, with more or less connivance of officials. An insurrection in Bulgarian interest was attempted in 1895, but failed.

### 3. MACÉDONIA AND THE TURKO-GREEK WAR OF 1897.

At the time of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (See article, that title) action on the part of Bulgaria and Serbia was prevented by an agreement reached between Austria and Russia to preserve the status quo in European Turkey. (Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, 444.) The remaining powers were glad to escape the responsibility and practically commissioned the two empires to act for all. Plans of uniting Macedonia with Bulgaria, or dividing it between the neighboring Christian States, or securing for it separate autonomy or independence, were laid aside, and for 10 years the futile method of attempting to reform the Turkish rule was the only one admitted by the Concert of Europe.

### 4. AGITATION IN MACEDONIA, 1899-1902.

Such was not the will of the Balkan peoples. In January, 1899, a Macedonian committee was organized at Sofia, to work for an autonomous régime in Macedonia, under a governor-general chosen for five years from the "predominant nationality." (Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, 444.) Greeks and Serbians could see in such a plan only a Bulgarian advantage. The committees in the different small states began to encourage brigand bands, on the theory that if Macedonia be made anarchial by robbery, rape and murder, fire and sword, Europe would be aroused to genuine and effective action. Europe took little notice, however, until 1902, when conditions had become exceedingly serious. The Sultan then sought to anticipate interference by himself instituting changes. In November he ordered the organization of a mixed gendarmerie, under an inspector general with the rank of vizier. (La Jonquiere, II, 164. *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 85, pp. 9-65. For Macedonian affairs in 1902, pp. 44-47: Instructions regarding vilayets.)

### 5. THE MÜRZSTEG PROGRAM, 1903.

It was felt that the Sultan's plan did not go far enough, and in February, 1903, Austria-Hungary and Russia transmitted a memorandum, which urged the use of foreign officers to command the new gendarmerie, that Mohammedans and Christians should compose it



in proportion to population, and better financial arrangements for the support of the scheme. (La Jonquiere, II, 164. Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 85, pp. 279-292. Austro-Russian project analyzed, pp. 288-291. Also vol. 88, pp. 106-112.) This plan met with the approval of the other powers. (London Times, Feb. 19, 1903; pp. 3, 5; and Feb. 25, 1903, p. 5). The Porte accepted the modifications, but matters became much worse in the summer of 1903, and it was evident that more must be done. The Emperors of Austria and Russia met at the end of September, and their chancellors, Counts Goluchowski and Lamsdorff, proceeded to draw up the new "Mürzsteg program," which was intended to strengthen and elaborate the plan of February (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 88, pp. 123-127). Austrian and Russian civil agents were to be attached to the inspector. A foreign general was to command the gendarmérie, and certain much-needed administrative and judicial improvements were to be made with the participation of the Christian population. (La Jonquiere, II, 164-166.) The Porte bent before the will of the great powers, the new generals were appointed, and the other changes taken in hand. In 1904 the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments agreed on measures for the prevention of the activities of irregular armed bands. The situation was improved somewhat, but brigandage did not cease. Nor did the Turkish officials, who resented the presence of foreign officers, mend their ways materially.

#### 6. BRITISH NOTE OF MAY 18, 1906.

In 1905 the British Government, feeling that further steps should be taken, took the initiative in proposing financial reforms. (Miller, Ottoman Empire, 447.) This resulted in a note of May 18, 1906, aimed mainly at securing more revenues to support the administration in Macedonia (the three vilayets of Saloniki, Monastir, and Uskub). The Porte, of course, accepted the recommendation, especially since it was accompanied by the consent of the powers to increase the duties on goods imported into Turkey. But anarchy continued, and threatened to make of Macedonia a shambles and a desert. It was evident that the attempt at settlement by Turkish reform could have no success.

#### 7. ANGLO-RUSSIAN PROJECT FOR REFORMS, 1908.

The difficulty was that the agreement of Austria and Russia, in suppressing their mutual rivalry, suppressed also nearly all action. A wholly new face was put upon affairs by the understanding arrived at between England and Russia on August 31, 1907. (See article, The Formation of the Triple Entente, and Appendix I, 81.) The opposition of 50 years' duration was changed into harmonious action,

the effect of which speedily became apparent in Turkish affairs. In March of 1908 the former arrangements for Macedonia were prolonged for six years. Sir Edward Grey set forth in the House of Commons (Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, vol. 184 pp. 1692-1708) a plan which would take the step, so long deferred, of virtually withdrawing the region from Turkish control. Macedonia was to have a governor general nominated by the powers, and the number of Turkish troops was to be reduced. Russia joined promptly in the recommendation, adding further details in the direction of strengthening European control. (Miller, *Ottoman Empire*, 418. La Jonquiere, II, 169.) The legal sovereignty of Turkey was to be insisted upon in order to check the ambitions of the neighboring small nations.

The project created great emotion in Turkey, and, in conjunction with the Reval Interview (See article that title), was one of the elements which led to the Revolution of July, 1908. The Young Turks expected to save Macedonia for Turkey by a complete change of government. The powers and the Balkan States willingly gave them a chance, and the whole structure and scheme of foreign interference was immediately withdrawn.

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## 132. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1908-1912.

### 1. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908.

Early in 1908 Russia and Austria-Hungary fell out over the execution of the Müzzsteg program (See article on The Macedonian Question, 1878-1908), by the terms of which a system of reform had been instituted in Macedonia. In January, 1908, Baron Aerenthal announced that Austria-Hungary had applied for permission to survey the ground for a railroad to connect the terminus of the Bosnian Railway with the line running from Metrovitza to Salonica. Russia was especially disturbed by this announcement, which she regarded as destructive of the joint action which she and Austria-Hungary had been commissioned by the powers to exercise over Macedonia. Baron Aerenthal promptly dispelled all doubts as to the correctness of Russia's inference by declaring that the special task of Russia and Austria in Macedonia was concluded. In June, 1908, King



Edward of England and Czar Nicholas met at Reval and drew up a further program for the pacification of Macedonia. The execution of this program was interrupted by the startling series of events which transpired during the latter half of 1908. (See article, *The Reval Interview.*)

On July 24, 1908, the bloodless revolution by which the rule of Abdul Hamid was overturned and the Young Turk régime established in the Ottoman Empire was effected; on October 5 Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria; on October 6 the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hapsburg dominions; and on October 12 the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island of Crete with the Kingdom of Greece.

## 2. THE YOUNG TURK PROGRAM AND MACEDONIA.

The belief of the Young Turks that a regeneration of the Empire was necessary to prevent the inevitable and irretrievable loss of European Turkey precipitated the revolution of 1908, and the paramount plank in the program of regeneration was the solution of the Macedonian problem. The policy which the Young Turk adopted to solve the Macedonian problem was to strengthen the Moslem element and to enroll Christians in the army.

## 3. MOSLEM MIGRATION TO MACEDONIA.

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (See article, that title) by Austria-Hungary the Young Turks sent agents into those countries to induce the Moslem population to emigrate to Macedonia. These immigrants, or *muhadjers*, as they were called, were settled by the Government in those districts where the Moslem population was weak. The experiment, which was not without precedent, proved disastrous. The element which could be induced to emigrate was ignorant, unruly, fanatical, and economically worthless. The presence of this lawless, malcontent element in Macedonia ended in irretrievable disaster for Turkey. They readily united with the Albanian Moslem immigrants to perpetrate the succession of massacres in 1912 which resulted ultimately in the formation of the Balkan Alliance. (See article, that title.)

## 4. MACEDONIA AND MILITARY SERVICE.

The second policy adopted by the Young Turks to secure the loyalty of their Christian subjects in European Turkey was the abolition of the *Karadj* or head tax, by which Christians were exempted from military service, and the enrolling of them in the army. This policy was attractive in theory but impracticable in application. The social, educational, temperamental, and religious incompati-

bility of Moslems and Christians, and the unspeakable and criminal conditions of the service rendered the plan of forming mixed regiments, officered exclusively by Moslems, a dismal failure. This system of obligatory military service was used from its inception as a means of extortion and terrorism; Jews and Christians who were financially able were forced to pay the £40 prescribed for exemption, and those who were unable to pay were practically reduced to military servitude. Under these conditions the Christian elements preferred exile, and between 1909 and 1914 Turkey lost hundreds of thousands of its best subjects by emigration.

#### 5. RESULTS OF YOUNG TURK RULE IN MACEDONIA.

The net result of the emigration and settlement of the muhadjers and the enrollment of the Christians for military service was that the people of Macedonia definitely abandoned the advocacy of autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan and sought to enlist the assistance of the Balkan States to emancipate them from Turkish rule.

#### 6. CONCLUSION.

The failure of the Young Turk policy in Macedonia and the series of outrages perpetrated there between 1909 and 1912 induced the Balkan States to compose their differences and to enter into the Balkan League. This league was perfected by a series of treaties, the first of which was signed on March 13, 1912, by Serbia and Bulgaria and the second by Greece and Bulgaria on May 10, 1912. On September 22, 1912, the defensive alliance of Greece and Bulgaria was followed by a detailed military convention. (See article 1 **The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912.**)

In the spring of 1912 occurred the successful Albanian uprising. The Albanian insurgents were joined by a part of the Turkish troops who had been operating against them and presently demanded the cession to them of the entire vilayets of Monastir and Uskub. This demand aroused Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria was stirred to action by the massacre of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana and Berana. On August 14 a popular demonstration was held at Sofia to demand immediate autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace or war against the Porte. On August 26 Bulgaria agreed that war should be declared in October. In September the members of the Balkan League appealed to the powers to join them in demanding immediate and radical reforms in Macedonia. On October 8 the powers presented an identical ultimatum at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinje. On the same day Montenegro declared war on Turkey. On the 14th Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece presented their ultimatum. On October 18 the Porte declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia, and on the same day Greece declared war on Turkey.



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See also bibliography for article, *The Macedonian Question, 1878-1908*.

### 133. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1897-1908.

#### 1. CRETE AND THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR OF 1897.

Insurrection in Crete early in 1897 led directly to the Greco-Turkish War of that year (See article, that title). The Greeks, beaten by German-trained Turkish troops, called on the powers, who, before mediating, demanded that Cretan autonomy under Turkish suzerainty, instead of the annexation of the island by Greece, be accepted by the Greek Government. Greece submitted.

The heads of the Cretan insurrection, although with great reluctance, also accepted the idea of the autonomy of Crete. While the powers found difficulty in settling peace terms and in securing a governor for Crete, the admirals, despite trouble caused by the presence of Turkish troops, restored order and introduced reforms.

#### 2. SETTLEMENT OF 1898-1899.

In April, 1898, Germany and Austria left the European concert on the Cretan question because of their growing interest in Turkey and withdrew their ships from the blockade. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon divided Crete into four departments which they severally administered, Canea being occupied by a joint force. The powers urged the departure of the Turkish troops, who were still troublesome. Turkey, having delayed with characteristic subterfuges, finally yielded, and on November 28, 1898, the last Turkish troops left Crete.

On November 26, 1898, largely at the suggestion of Russia, the powers having scoured Europe for a Cretan governor acceptable to all, invited Prince George of Greece to be high commissioner of the powers in Crete for three years. He accepted, the blockade was soon raised, and December 21, 1898, he landed on the island. The admirals having handed over the government to him, requested their own recall, and only a few foreign troops and the stationnaires remained. The Cretan flag was raised. Tranquillity followed, but

Moslems departed in great numbers, the 1900 census showing them only about one-ninth of the population, as against about one-third in 1881.

In April, 1899, a constitution drafted by Venizelos and presented by a constitutional assembly, was promulgated, according to which foreign affairs were to be determined by the representatives of the four protecting powers at Rome.

### 3. TRANQUILLITY UNDER PRINCE GEORGE, 1899-1904.

In 1899 things seemed to go well, but soon trouble developed. The Cretans were restless under Turkey; some wanted complete independence; some annexation to Greece (the stronger movement); many were at odds with the administration, which they charged with extravagance, inefficiency, and neglect.

Further annexationist appeals were made to the powers, who, though determined to maintain peace and the status quo (especially Germany and Austria, desirous of humoring Turkey, to advance their interests and hinder those of Russia), and fearing the opening of the Balkan question, still felt that that question must be solved.

The situation between prince and deputies became very strained in 1904. The unpopularity of Prince George was due to the fact (1) that his repeated attempts (1900-1904) failed to influence powers toward annexation, and (2) that he unwisely seemed to take measures toward perpetuation of the existing arrangement, regarded by Cretans as only temporary. Differences developed between his partisans and those of Venizelos, who, now a popular hero, became head of the insurgent movement. Naturally opposed to autonomy, he gradually yielded to it as a "further stage toward the realization of the national ideal."

### 4. ATTEMPTED UNION WITH GREECE, 1904-1906.

In July and August, 1904, at the request of the Cretans, Prince George again appealed to the powers for annexation to Greece. The powers refused (April, 1905), and the revolutionary movement gained full sway. Union with Greece was again proclaimed. On July 30, 1905, the powers put Crete under martial law and international troops occupied the chief cities.

In November, 1905, Venizelos conferred with the consuls of the powers who granted concessions, but refused to alter the status quo. Fighting stopped (July-September, 1906); Prince George resigned, claiming unwillingness to rule under new conditions, but really forced thereto by insurgents.



King George, asked by the powers to nominate a Greek subject, designated M. Zaimis as high commissioner. Order was restored. The powers failed to solve the Cretan question fast enough for the Cretans.

#### 5. CRETE AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908.

In May, 1908, the powers announced that soldiers would gradually be withdrawn when order should be assured, and began withdrawal on announcement from M. Zaimis that order was guaranteed.

The Young Turk revolution at Constantinople, July, 1908, was followed by stirring events in the Balkans (on October 5, the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, and on October 7, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). On October 7, also, Crete proclaimed union with Greece (ratified by Chamber October 12). M. Zaimis had left Crete October 3 "provisionally," and in his absence the Cretan Chamber appointed an executive commission (including Venizelos) to govern in the name of King George till Greece should take charge. Turkey protested. On October 28, 1908, the powers, declining either to recognize or repudiate the union, and anxious to allay the resentment of the Young Turks on the one hand and the ardor of Greek unionists on the other, promised that the matter would be made the subject of negotiations with Turkey, provided order was maintained and the rights of Moslems respected.

The close of 1908 left the matter in this anomalous situation.

See article, *The Cretan Question, 1908-1913.*

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## 134. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1908-1913.

## 1. INTRODUCTION.

The years of 1906 to 1912 witnessed a signal exhibition of the inability of the powers to decide upon an enforceable policy in regard to Crete.

During this period, at first, the affairs of Crete were controlled by a concert of six powers, but soon Germany and Austria withdrew, leaving England, France, Italy, and Russia in charge. Germany and Austria then began cultivating a closer connection with Turkey.

## 2. PROCLAMATION OF UNION WITH GREECE, OCTOBER, 1908.

From December 21, 1898, till 1906, Prince George of Greece ruled Crete under direction of Russia, Italy, France, and England. When he resigned the four nations asked him to appoint a high commissioner in his stead. He chose Zaimas, a Greek, who governed till October, 1908, when, upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria and the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the Cretans proclaimed a union with Greece. Turkey, of which Crete was a nominal possession, at once protested to the powers. Negotiations dragged along. (See article, *The Cretan Question, 1897-1908.*)

## 3. EFFORTS FOR RECOGNITION, 1908-1912.

During the period October, 1908, to October, 1912, the status in Crete was more than ever anomalous. The Cretan Assembly had proclaimed the union of the island with Greece. The Greek Government was anxious for annexation, but did not dare to proclaim it for fear of offending the powers. They, in turn, were unable to agree upon a settled line of policy as to the Cretan question. Meanwhile the Turkish Government, under the sway of the Young Turks, was pursuing a vigorously hostile policy toward all Greeks on account of the Cretan situation. In 1909 the powers announced that they would withdraw their garrison from the island, but would keep four warships in its waters, at the same time warning Greece not to annex Crete and Crete to maintain its autonomous government under a high commissioner. During the year there was considerable rioting at Canea, and it was necessary at one time for an allied force of marines to land and pull down a Cretan flag from over Canea. In 1910 the sentiment for union with Greece had become so earnest that four additional warships were sent to the island by the protecting powers. To the demand of the Cretans for union the powers answered that no negotiations would be taken up till the Cretans had established a stable government. Turkey, in the meantime, was requesting of the



powers that they settle the Cretan question. In 1910 the Cretan officers were required by their Government to take an oath of allegiance to Greece. This the Moslems refused to do, and the powers threatened to land troops and take possession. The Cretan Government lost control of the situation almost completely in 1911, but the powers still held that it was not a propitious time to settle the fate of the island and ordered the status quo maintained. Early in 1912 the Cretans elected delegates to the Greek Assembly, but these were prevented from sitting by the interposition of Great Britain acting for the powers.

#### 4. CRETE AND THE BALKAN WARS.

Finally, on the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Cretan delegates were seated, October 12, 1912, in the Greek Assembly. Cretan independence was formally acknowledged by the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, the island being ceded by Turkey to the Balkan allies. Neither the Treaty of Bucharest, at the end of the Second Balkan War, nor the Treaty of Athens, signed by Turkey and Greece on November 14, 1913, contained any express mention of Crete, but the signing of the treaties amounted to a virtual recognition on the part of Turkey and all the Balkan States that Crete had become an integral part of the Kingdom of Greece. Recognition of the *fait accompli* by the powers was finally obtained in December, 1913.

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### 135. THE CASABLANCA AFFAIR, 1908-9.

#### 1. ORIGIN.

On September 25, 1908, six deserters, three of German nationality and three non-Germans, from the French Foreign Legion, then in occupation at Casablanca, Morocco, under a safe conduct issued by

the German consul and under the personal protection of the chancellor of the consulate, aided by a Moroccan soldier attached to the consulate, attempted to take passage upon a German vessel. The deserters were seized by the French officials after considerable violence.

## 2. CLAIMS.

The arrest of the deserter gave rise to a controversy between the French and the German governments, in the course of which the following claims were advanced:

*For France.*—(1) Germany had no right to afford protection to persons in Morocco not of German nationality. (2) The territory within French military occupation in Morocco was subject to exclusive French jurisdiction, and therefore Germany had no authority to protect even the three deserters of German nationality.

*For Germany.*—(1) The deserters of German nationality were, by virtue of the extraterritorial jurisdiction which by treaty Germany exercised within Morocco, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the German consul at Casablanca. (2) The forcible arrest was a breach of the inviolability of consular agents. (3) The deserters of German nationality should be given up.

## 3. AGREEMENT FOR ARBITRATION.

On November 10, 1908, a protocol was signed at Berlin by which France and Germany agreed to submit all questions to arbitration and to express regrets following the decisions which the arbitrators should render. Each party was to choose two arbitrators from the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and these four should choose an umpire. Germany chose Guido Fusinato, of Italy, and Dr. Kriege, of Germany. France chose Sir Edward Fry, of England, and Louis Renault, of France. The four then selected H. L. Hammar skjöld, of Sweden, as the fifth member. By article 1 the tribunal was charged with the decision of all questions, both of law and fact, thus following the example set by Great Britain and Russia in the Dogger Bank case (See article, that title).

Meetings of the arbitrators were held from May 1 to May 19 and the award was given May 22.

## 4. ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL.

*For France.*—The French argued that the German consul acted contrary to both the principles of international law and the regulations of the German consular establishment, which recognize that Germans employed without authorization in civil or military services of foreign states are not entitled to protection. Precedents of similar



instances of desertion at Port Said in 1895 and Cairo in 1900, in which German consuls refused to grant protection to Germans, were cited. The consul also violated international rights belonging to a military occupant of foreign soil. Immunity from local jurisdiction attaching to the occupant implies not only that the troops are under military law, but that all offenses against the army come under the same jurisdiction.

*For Germany.*—Germany argued that German nationality was not lost by enlistment in the service of a foreign state; that Germany had by treaty complete jurisdiction over all Germans in Morocco; that the French troops were not in military occupation, but were acting merely as police, and that pacific occupation did not have the same juridical and legal effects as military occupation; consequently the powers of the occupant were no greater than those of the occupied state; therefore the consular jurisdiction obtained from Morocco by treaty was unchanged.

#### 5. THE AWARD.

The award showed evidence of an attempt at a political compromise rather than a clear-cut legal decision. Reasoning that there was a case of conflict between the two jurisdictions, and that "the jurisdiction of the occupying army ought, in case of conflict, to have the preference when the persons belonging to this army have not left the territory placed under the immediate, actual, and effective control of the armed force," it was held that "a grave and manifest fault" had been committed in attempting to have embarked on a German steamship deserters from the French Foreign Legion who were not of German nationality, and that the German consulate had not, "under circumstances of this kind, the right to grant its protection to deserters of German nationality." It was also held that the French military authorities ought to have respected as far as possible the actual protection exercised over these deserters by the German consulate, and that under the circumstances the force used by the French authorities was not warranted. The French military authorities, however, were not called upon to surrender the deserters.

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### 136. THE MOROCCO CONVENTION OF 1909.

#### 1. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1906-1909.

The Act of Algeciras conferred upon France and Spain the task of organizing an international police in the open ports of Morocco (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906). The natives protested against this by killing several Frenchmen, and as a result the French Government sent troops into several Provinces; this in turn provoked a rebellion against the reigning Sultan and ended in his deposition. The new ruler, Mulai Hafid, was now presented with a program of reforms and a bill of expenses for the French military operations. For the former the continued presence of French troops was necessary, for the latter a loan from the French Government, and it was with great reluctance that Mulai Hafid signed the convention of March 4, 1910. (See Appendix I, 95.) This agreement did not destroy the sovereignty of the Sultan, but many considered it scarcely in keeping with the Act of Algeciras, holding it must result in the establishment of a French protectorate.

#### 2. CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 8, 1909.

This development, even in its early stages, was not favorably regarded in Germany. The German Government thereupon devised a new policy. By a convention signed on February 8, 1909 (See Appendix I, 89), it frankly recognized "the special political interests" of France in Morocco and declared itself "resolved not to impede those interests." In return the French Government, "firmly attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Shereefian Empire," was "resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and consequently not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that country." Both Governments, "being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras," agreed not to "pursue or encourage any measure



of a nature to create in their favor or in that of any power an economic privilege, and to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession."

### 3. EFFECT OF THE CONVENTION.

Thus Germany had, apparently, conceded the fundamental point—the political interests of France—which she had refused to recognize in 1905. The Act of Algeciras was virtually superseded. But the German policy was not understood in French circles. To the Germans the important feature of the convention of 1909 was the pledge to associate Frenchmen and Germans in affairs for which they might obtain concessions. When, therefore, the German Government, on June 2, 1909, proposed to establish an economic condominium of French and German financiers in Morocco, the French Government was completely taken aback. Too late it perceived that it had pledged itself to a policy which, a clear violation of the open door, would place Morocco industrially and commercially at the mercy of Germany and might severely strain the entente with Great Britain. For the next two years the Quai d'Orsay vainly endeavored to find some escape from this agreement, but all the schemes proposed fell short of the minimum demanded by Berlin.

### 4. MOROCCO, 1909–1911.

Meanwhile conditions in Morocco went from bad to worse, culminating in rebellion in 1911 against Mulai Hafid, who appealed to the French for assistance. This was granted, a French column entering Fez on May 21. The German Government now gave warning that such a step meant the reopening of the entire Morocco question, and frankly told the French ambassador in Berlin that the French must retire from Fez or abide by the convention of 1909. But realizing that the French could not, under the circumstances, evacuate Fez, the German Government on July 1, 1911, notified the powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras that the gunboat *Panther* had been dispatched to the port of Agadir. (See article on Morocco Crisis of 1911.)

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See bibliography for article. The Morocco Crisis of 1911.

## 137. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911.

### 1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS.

The Morocco crisis of 1911 arose out of the dispatch of the German gunboat *Panther* to Agadir on July 1. (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909.) The ostensible ground for this

action was the request of German firms in Agadir for protection in the disordered state of the country. But inasmuch as there were no German subjects at Agadir and the port was not open to Europeans, it was clear that the real motive was a desire to reopen the whole question. The German Government resented the complete failure of the convention of 1909, and determined now, by a show of force, to prevent a further French penetration unless France would negotiate for a final settlement of the problem.

## 2. THE GERMAN PURPOSE.

It is highly probable that Germany hoped to break up the Triple Entente. It is also probable that at the beginning of the affair Germany expected to obtain part of Morocco for itself, counting upon the known military weakness of France and the confusion in England produced by the struggle over the House of Lords to prevent serious opposition.

## 3. FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

The absolute reserve of Sir Edward Grey and his insistence that Great Britain must be consulted in any arrangements concerning Morocco; the attitude of Mr. Balfour, who declared that the opposition would support the Government in its policy; the rally of all shades of French opinion; these circumstances, and perhaps also some pressure from Russia, apparently caused the German Government to reconsider. At any rate, as early as July 7, the German ambassador in Paris informed the French Government that Germany cherished no territorial aspirations in Morocco and would negotiate for a French protectorate on the basis of "compensation" for Germany in the French Congo region and the safeguarding of her economic interests in Morocco. Thus the first stage of the negotiations was safely passed. But stormy times were still ahead.

## 4. GERMAN DEMANDS.

The German terms, as presented on July 15, while containing an offer to cede the northern part of the Cameroons and Togoland, demanded from France the whole of the French Congo from the River Sangha to the sea (Documents diplomatiques, Maroc, 1912, pp. 414-415); to which was later added the transfer of France's right to the preemption of the Belgian Congo. The Germans also showed every disposition to limit the scope of the French protectorate and to seek for themselves special economic privileges, in the spirit of the convention of 1909 (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909). So great a price France was not prepared to pay, and she refused



the German demand. The danger lay in a continued French refusal and a continued German insistence. The dispute would then be thrown back on Morocco.

#### 5. ENGLISH ACTION: THE MANSION HOUSE SPEECH.

It was to obviate this danger that Great Britain now intervened; she was pledged to support the policy of France in Morocco and would do so to the very end; on the other hand, she would not interfere in, and would heartily support, any reasonable accommodation between France and Germany, that is, any settlement in Africa which France, acting as a free agent, was disposed to make. As the German Government had so far made no statement of its policy to the British Government, Mr. Lloyd George, at the request of Sir Edward Grey, delivered on July 21 his famous Mansion House speech, in which he declared that national honor was more precious than peace: a speech everywhere construed, especially in view of the orator's pacifist leanings, as a definite warning to Germany that she could not impose an unreasonable settlement on France. A difficult week followed, in which certain British naval preparations were made, while the foreign secretary and the German ambassadors were holding exceedingly stiff conversations. But the speech had done its work. The Wilhelmstrasse, impressed also, perhaps, by panicky conditions on the Berlin Bourse, became conciliatory, giving assurance that designs on Morocco formed no part of its program, and reaching an agreement with France, in principle, as to the future settlement.

#### 6. SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

In spite of all this, little progress was achieved. It was officially admitted that the situation was "grave," and on August 18 the negotiations were broken off, the German Government taking advantage of a railway strike in England to revive certain pretensions with respect to Morocco. After a long consultation with his Government, the French ambassador in Berlin on September 4 resumed his conversations with the German foreign office. On the 9th there was a great crash on the Berlin Bourse, also renewed rumors of military and naval preparations on both sides. But in the end good sense prevailed. On October 4 the two negotiators initialed a convention which gave France a protectorate *de facto* in Morocco, although the term was not used; in return she pledged herself most explicitly to observe the principle of the open door.

#### 7. CONVENTIONS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1911.

The French Government was now willing to discuss the compensation to be awarded Germany in the Congo. On November 2 it was

agreed that Germany should receive two prongs of French territory which would bring the Cameroons in touch with the Congo and Ubangi Rivers at Bonga and Mongumba, respectively, while Germany surrendered the Duck's Beak in the Lake Chad region. The only difficulty arose over the German demand that France transfer to Germany her right of preemption to the Belgian Congo; but with the assistance of the Russian Government a formula was found by which any change in the status of the Congo was reserved to the decision of the powers signatory of the Berlin African act of 1885. (See article, *The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885*.) On November 4, 1911, the Morocco and Congo conventions (See Appendix I, 100) were signed in Berlin, a letter from the German foreign secretary to the French ambassador being annexed, in which Herr von Kinderlen-Waechter recognized the right of France to erect her protectorate in Morocco.

#### 8. APPRAISEMENT.

The settlement was a great triumph for France, secured by the manifestations of national solidarity at home and the diplomatic assistance of Great Britain. Many Frenchmen regretted the cession of French territory, but Morocco was certainly far more valuable than the Congo, and above all the Republic had scored a distinct victory over the mighty Empire which had defeated it in 1870-1871. In Germany there was a corresponding discontent, which manifested itself in bitter criticisms of the Imperial Government's diplomacy and in violent outbursts of hatred for Great Britain, whose intervention was believed to have spoiled the German game. It is also to be observed that the land which Germany received was valuable chiefly as the entering wedge for further penetration of the Belgian Congo. Such designs had long been suspected, and they were proved by a conversation between the French ambassador in Berlin and the German foreign minister, Herr von Jagow, in the spring of 1914, in which the latter declared that Belgium was not in a position to develop the Congo adequately and ought "to give it up" (Belgian Grey Book, 11, 1915, no. 2, Baron Beyens to M. Davignon, April 2, 1914). If, as has been recently stated by so eminent a personage as Herr August Thyssen, the German Emperor and his general staff in the year 1912 decided upon a world war (*Current History Magazine of the New York Times*, March, 1918, p. 480), it is most probable that the reverse sustained in this diplomatic bout with France and Great Britain was a decisive factor, for it had been brought home to the war lords of Berlin that diplomatically the Triple Entente was stronger than the Triple Alliance. It must also have been clear to them that the sympathy of the world had been with France in the controversy of 1911.



NOTE.— Nothing has been said about the secret negotiations conducted between M. Caillaux, the French prime minister, and Baron von Jancken, of the German foreign office. As yet the facts are not fully known. There is much difference of opinion as to whether the final settlement was greatly affected by the tortuous diplomacy of Caillaux.

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## 138. THE POTSDAM ACCORD, 1910.

### I. REASONS FOR THE ACCORD.

Germany desired to counterbalance the effect of the Reval meeting. (See article, *The Reval Interview*.) The growth of German influence in Persia after the Persian Revolution threatened Russia's interests. After the expiration of the Russo-Persian Railway agreement in 1910, Russia faced the prospect of Germany's linking the Bagdad Railway with Teheran, before the Russian line, Baku-Teheran, was finished. (*London Times*, Aug. 21, 1911.) Germany faced the possibility of a competing line from the north, compromising the Bagdad Railway plan.

### 2. THE POTSDAM MEETING.

On November 4, 1910, the Tsar arrived at Potsdam for a 36-hour visit to the Kaiser. At Potsdam and Berlin Sazonoff had long conversations with Kiderlein-Waechter and Bethmann-Hollweg. The negotiations thus begun continued through the winter 1910-11.

### 3. INTERPRETATION.

On November 10 Sazonoff declared to the *Novoe Vremya* that the discussions had not involved in any way the stability of the Triple Entente. They had concerned Russian and German interests in Turkey and Persia. Complete consonance had been established. (See Appendix I, 97.)

On December 10 Bethmann-Hollweg said in the Reichstag that Germany gladly admitted Russia's special interests in Persia. The



former mutual confidence had been reestablished. (*Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, vol. 232, p. 3561.) A few months later the understanding reached at Potsdam was translated into a convention, signed at St. Petersburg, August 19, 1911. (See Appendix I, 99.)

#### 4. TERMS OF THE ACCORD.

The two powers agreed that Russia had special interests in Persia, while Germany had only commercial aims. Germany would seek no concessions in North Persia. Russia undertook to connect the spur from the Bagdad Railway with the railway system of North Persia, by a branch from Teheran, to be built within a specified term of years. Russia would not hinder foreign financial participation in the Bagdad Railway. Both nations would facilitate international traffic without differential treatment on the aforesaid connecting line.

#### 5. RESULTS OF THE ACCORD.

English policy hostile to the Bagdad Railway appeared to have been isolated and discredited. Germany obtained an open door for her trade in Persia. The Sadidjeh-Khanikin branch promised to be very profitable. Russia agreed not to hinder foreign investment in the Bagdad project. German accord with Russia furnished a lever against Austrian unruliness. (Garvin, J. L., in *Fortnightly*, vol. 95, 191-208.)

Russia obtained recognition of her sphere of influence in North Persia. The Triple Entente was still intact, though weakened so far as Persia and Arabia were concerned. German projects for branches north from Mosul, Nissibin, and Harran were abandoned. The Turkish project for a railway, Trebizond-Erzerum, thence across the Persian frontier to Tabriz, was abandoned. The Bagdad plan was safe from Russian competition. (*London Times*, Jan. 9, 1911.) If Germany failed to keep promises, Russia could retaliate by declining to build a connecting link from the future Persian Railway. (*Novoe Vremya*, Nov. 8, 1910.)

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### 139. THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, 1899-1914.

#### 1. THE BUILDING AND FINANCING OF THE LINE.

The Bagdad line, as foreshadowed in the concession of 1893 to the German Anatolian Railway Company (See article, Railway Concessions in Turkey), was to be a continuation of the Angora branch of the Anatolian railway, through Armenia, entering the Euphrates valley from the north and avoiding much expensive mountain tunnelling and grading.} Russia, for economic and strategic reasons, blocked this plan and eventually the concession was for a railroad running from the end of the Konia railway to Bagdad, then to Bas-sora, at the head of deep water navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab, to the mouth of the Tigris, and finally to a port, not specified, on the Persian Gulf. The concession was authorized in 1899, after the visit of the Kaiser to the Sultan in 1898. Great influence was exerted on the Sultan to secure this concession, which was looked upon by the Germans as assuring a great market for their goods and capital in the development of the district traversed, and even in some quarters as a means of colonization and of the acquisition of political power in Asia-Minor. The firman for the concession was finally issued in 1903. It was for ninety-nine years, assured high kilometric guarantees, gave mining rights in a twenty kilometer zone on each side of the line, important electric power and other privileges, and the right to build ports at Bagdad, Bas-sora, and at the Persian Gulf terminus.



It required the formation of a Turkish corporation to operate the concession.

Strong hostility to the project developed in Russia and France, and the British government, at first indifferent, took an unfriendly attitude. Russia feared the economic competition with her projected railways through Persia and opposed the road vigorously. The German syndicate intended to finance the project largely in France and England and also wanted the Indian mail contracts. It, therefore, proposed that French and English interests should be associated in the company. The Germans, however, refused to let control out of their hands, so these plans for obtaining foreign financial aid with government approval came to nothing. In spite, however, of official opposition, a large amount of French money was obtained for the enterprise through a strong French group of bankers, and with this and money provided through the Deutsche Bank the road was finished.

The building of the road was financed by the sale of Turkish bonds. The Government issued its bonds to the company, secured by the kilometric guarantees, which in turn was secured on the revenues of the provinces traversed for the first series, for the second and third on the surplus revenue turned over to the Government by the commission of the debt, and on revenues of provinces traversed for the balance. The bonds were sold by the Deutsche Bank, for the concessionaire company, with a small brokerage fee; the share capital was small.

## 2. THE KOWEIT INCIDENT, 1899-1903.

British main opposition to the execution of the Bagdad Railway project was based upon its political aspects, more particularly the menace to Britain's position in Egypt and India. British diplomacy succeeded in preventing the consummation of one cherished German design, namely the extension of the railway from Bassorah to the Persian Gulf.

In January, 1899, the Sheikh of Koweit, denying that he was a vassal of the Sultan, secretly accepted the protection of the British Government, in return for a promise not to cede any territory without the consent of Great Britain. Consequently he refused to lease or sell terminal facilities to the Germans in 1900, and was protected against German and Turkish intrigue by British cruisers. In 1901 Turkey was virtually forced to recognize his independence, and in May, 1903, Lord Lansdowne, then British foreign secretary, announced that Great Britain "would regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf as a very grave menace to British interests, and would certainly resist it by all means at her disposal."

## 3. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT, 1910.

Russia had also been opposed to some features of the Bagdad Railway enterprise; but, at the famous Potsdam interview (See article, *The Potsdam Accord, 1910*) between the German Emperor and the Czar in November, 1910, Russia accepted the project on condition that no branch lines were built into Armenia and Kurdistan. Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway schemes in northern Persia.

## 4. SITUATION AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

The settled opposition of Great Britain to the extension to the Gulf and to Bassorah, under German control, led to new arrangements. The Bagdad Company, in 1911, got a concession for the port of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean and for a railroad to connect the port with the Bagdad main line; the line to Bassorah was to be built by an Anglo-German group with at least two English directors; and the branch to the Persian Gulf was given up. By treaty of August 19, 1911, Russia withdrew opposition to the Bagdad Railway and France in 1914 came to an agreement with Germany in respect to French interests in the road.

## 5. CONCLUSION.

When the war broke out, Germany had in the main succeeded in her Bagdad design. The work was well advanced and when completed the road would run from Bagdad to Constantinople, with a branch line to the excellent port of Alexandretta on the Mediterranean. In addition to its great commercial value, so long as the alliance with Turkey lasted, the Bagdad Railway, connecting with Syrian roads and the Hedjaz running to Arabia, opened the way for an attack on Egypt and the Suez and on India by routes which British warships could not dominate. Said Rohrbach, the chief German authority on the subject: "The railroad is political life insurance for Germany."

For the subsequent rapprochement between England and Germany, in respect to the Bagdad Railway, see article, *The Projected Anglo-German Accord of 1914*.

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## 140. THE HALDANE MISSION TO BERLIN IN 1912.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Shortly after the close of the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, that title) an effort for the arrangement of an accord between Germany and England was undertaken and vigorously prosecuted on both sides for a period of three or four months. The episode is usually known as the Haldane Mission to Berlin from the fact that a visit of the British minister to the German capital in February, 1912, formed part of the negotiation and at the time little else was publicly known in regard to the matter. It appears, however, that the most important exchanges of views and propositions took place at London after the return of Haldane from Berlin.

### 2. DISCLOSURES.

At the time little information in regard to the matter was made public. Since the World War began both Governments have from time to time issued statements and published documents bearing upon the matter. A statement by Mr. Asquith in his Cardiff speech of October 2, 1914, after a long delay, elicited a reply from the German Government in the semiofficial *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of

September 7 or 8, 1915, and a statement by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in his Reichstag speech of August 19, 1915. To these the English Government made reply in a letter of Sir Edward Grey to the Times, August 25, and in an official statement issued by the Foreign office on August 31. In \_\_\_\_\_, 1917, the Manchester Guardian published an article on the subject in which it was evident that the writer had been furnished with information derived from Lord Haldane's report on his mission to Berlin. Finally in June, 1918, the British Government made public the report of Lord Haldane. From these disclosures, supplemented at a few points by unofficial data, the proposals which were made are now known and the course of the negotiation is clear in general, though some important details are still lacking.

### 3. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

The initiative in the proceedings seems to have been taken by the German Government. An English account, attested as correct by Lord Haldane, ascribes it to the personal act of the Kaiser: "He sent a private message to one of our ministers, not Lord Haldane, by a personal friend in England saying that he was concerned about the cloud which had gathered over our relations, and suggesting that the two cabinets should confer together" (Begbie, *Vindication of Great Britain*, p. 133). It seems to have been in consequence of this message, though perhaps after considerable preliminary negotiation, that Lord Haldane went to Berlin in February, 1912.

### 4. HALDANE'S VISIT TO BERLIN.

At Berlin Haldane had two interviews with the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and an interview with the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Admiral Tirpitz. In these interviews there was much discussion in an amicable mood of the general subject of Anglo-German relations and especially of the navy problem. Attention in the matter of definite agreements was directed toward the discovery of two formulas which both Governments would be willing to accept. One related to naval increase, the other to the course which England would follow if a war should occur in which Germany was involved. These negotiations disclosed the fact that no agreement on the subject of naval increase seemed possible. Haldane's report indicates that Bethmann-Hollweg showed some tendency to yield a little, but that Tirpitz "held out for the new German naval program." It does not show whether the Kaiser gave any indication of his personal attitude beyond the significant fact that no offer of concession came from the German side.



## 5. NEGOTIATIONS AT LONDON.

At Berlin the negotiations had dealt chiefly with the naval question. In the negotiations which were continued at London shortly afterwards attention appears to have been directed chiefly, perhaps exclusively, to the problem of finding a formula for the case of a war, in which Germany took part, that both Governments would accept.

## 6. PROPOSALS FOR A FORMULA.

The first formula considered appears to have been brought forward by Bethmann-Hollweg while Haldane was at Berlin. It was as follows:

"1. The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.

"2. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with any other power directed to such an end, and declare not to be bound by any such engagement.

"3. If either of the high contracting parties become entangled in a war with one or more powers in which it can not be said to be the aggressor, the other party will at least observe toward the power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavor for the localization of the conflict. If either of the high contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views concerning their attitude in such a conflict.

"4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the high contracting parties have already made.

"5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the provisions in article 2.

"6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising between either of them and other powers." (Current History Magazine, vol. 8, p. 169, July, 1918.)

This proposal was rejected by the British Government because the operation of articles four and five would have been to leave Germany free to support her allies in any war in which they might engage while England, not having an alliance with either France or Russia

would have been required to abstain from lending them any assistance. It is manifest that the German proposition virtually amounted to a proposal that England bind itself to an unconditional neutrality. The statement published by the German Government in September, 1915, admits that this was the character of the original German proposition.

England then proposed the following formula:

"England will not make an unprovoked attack on Germany and will refrain from an aggressive policy toward Germany. An attack on Germany is not included in any agreement, or combination to which England is a party. England will not join any agreement which aims at such an attack." (Bethmann-Hollweg's Reichstag speech of Aug. 19, 1915, printed in the London Times, Aug. 21, 1915.)

As the German Government rejected this formula the British Government proposed to modify it by prefixing the words: "As both powers mutually desire to secure between themselves peace and friendship." (Ibid.)

Bethmann-Hollweg thereupon offered to accept the modified British proposal, but upon condition that it be further modified by adding at the end the words: "England therefore will, of course, observe benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany." (Ibid.)

The second German proposal was, therefore, the following formula:

"As both powers mutually desire to secure themselves peace and friendship, England will not make an unprovoked attack on Germany and will refrain from an aggressive policy toward Germany. An attack on Germany is not included in any agreement or combination to which England is a party. England will not join any agreement which aims at such an attack. England will therefore, of course, observe benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany."

#### 7. END OF NEGOTIATIONS.

This proposal was rejected by England. According to Bethmann-Hollweg (Reichstag speech of July 19, 1915) Sir Edward Grey rejected it because "it would endanger the existing British friendship with other powers." It is, of course, manifest that the second German proposition differed from the first proposition for unconditional neutrality only in form. Had England accepted the German proposal she would have virtually agreed to remain neutral in any war at all likely to occur, since Germany would assert that any war in which she engaged had been forced upon her. Such an arrangement would have left Germany free to attack France and Russia and after they had been conquered or rendered powerless she could attack England, which under those conditions would be left without an ally.



## 8. APPRAISEMENT.

Although the Haldane mission to Berlin and the subsequent negotiations at London failed to produce the desired agreements the tension of the strained relations between England and Germany appears to have been somewhat relieved by the attempt. Sir Edward Grey at least did not lose hope that something might still be done by way of diplomacy to bring about better Anglo-German relations. Count Metternich reporting to the German Government on the final conference related that after the failure of the negotiations had become apparent Sir Edward Grey "emphatically declared that he did not intend or wish to drop the negotiations but on the contrary, he hoped that the intimate relations, for which a way had been prepared, would be further extended, and that an agreement on colonial territorial questions would be further striven for, and that after some time had elapsed negotiations for a political agreement similar to that which Great Britain had proposed would be resumed. After a lull had set in regarding the present naval questions a political agreement which proved the good will of both Governments, together with an agreement on colonial questions, would not fail to have a favorable effect on public opinion in both countries and he hoped, would also exert an indirect influence on the armament question." (Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Sept. 7 or 8, 1915, reprinted in the London Times, Sept. 9, 1915.) Negotiations along the line thus indicated by Sir Edward Grey began during the next year, resulting in the nearly successful projected Anglo-German accord of 1914. (See article, that title.)

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## 141. THE TRIPOLI QUESTION, 1902-1911.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

There seems to be good reason for the belief that among the diplomatists assembled at the Congress of Berlin there was some informal discussion of the Tripoli question. Lord Salisbury, according to De Launay, one of the Italian representatives, intimated that Italy might look forward to expansion in Tripoli or Tunis (Crispi, *Memoirs*, II, 114-118).

After the French acquisition of Tunis in 1881 Italian aspirations in regard to Tripoli were generally recognized and even encouraged by the powers. In an exchange of views between Lord Salisbury and Crispi in 1890, the former, according to the report of Catalini, Italian Chargé d'Affaires at London, declared himself convinced that on the day when the status quo in the Mediterranean should suffer any alteration the occupation of Tripoli by Italy would become an absolute necessity (*Ibid.*, II, 444-ff). At the same time he advised Italy to wait.

In 1890 Crispi endeavored to get from the great powers permission for Italy to take possession of Tripoli. France was rather non-committal. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and England thought that Italy had strong claims upon Tripoli and expressed their willingness to see Italy in control of it, but advised her to wait. (Crispi, *Memoirs*, II, 436-476.)

Differences of opinion among Italian statesmen, in conjunction with the high cost and small success of Italian colonial enterprises in the Red Sea area, account for the failure of Italy to take any definite steps for obtaining control over Tripoli until 1900.

### 2. FRANCO-ITALIAN CONVENTION OF 1902.

In 1900 Italy entered into a secret convention with France covering their respective interests in North Africa. This convention was not ratified until 1902. Though the text of the agreement was not published, the general nature of the arrangement was made public by M. Delcassé in an interview in an Italian newspaper. Italy agreed that France should have a free hand as regards Morocco, receiving for herself from France a similar assurance as regards Tripoli. (See article, *Italy and the Morocco Question*.)

### 3. PACIFIC PENETRATION.

From about the time of this agreement and doubtless largely in consequence of it, Italy began to push steadily the process of pacific penetration in Tripoli. The only steamships running regularly to Tripoli were Italian; the Banco di Roma maintained an agency in Tripoli and exerted a great influence. A considerable school system, subsidized by the Italian Government, was established. Railroads



were projected. Tripoli was enabled to enjoy the advantages of the Italian parcel post system. As a result of these Italian activities, "except for its political status, Tripoli was in 1908 practically an Italian province" (Seymour, p. 219).

#### 4. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION (1908) AND TRIPOLI.

The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908, by bringing the Young Turks into control at Constantinople, threatened to change this situation radically. Hitherto the process of taking over control of Tripoli on the part of the Italians had encountered little opposition from the Turkish officials. Now all that was changed. The officials sent out to Tripoli, evidently under instruction, vigorously resisted the efforts of Italians along the lines of pacific penetration. (Ibid.) A series of "incidents" occurred which led to decisive action by Italy in the fall of 1911.

#### 5. THE ITALIAN ULTIMATUM.

A lively agitation in the Italian press during the early days of September, 1911, heralded the action taken by the Italian Government on the 27th of that month. In a short incisive note the Italian Government asserted the absolute necessity for putting an end to the disorder prevailing in Tripoli and the right of that region to be admitted to the benefits of the same progress enjoyed by other parts of North Africa. The Turkish Government was charged with the constant manifestation of hostility toward the legitimate activity of Italy in Tripoli. Owing to the recent arrival there of military transports, the Italian Government announced that it had decided to prosecute the occupation of Tripoli. Twenty-four hours were allowed for a reply, but the Italian note clearly stated that no other solution than Italian occupation would be acceptable. The ultimatum was rejected by Turkey (September 28) and war began. The decision of Italy to delay no longer the long-foreshadowed taking of Tripoli appears to have been closely connected with the Morocco crisis of 1911. (J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, 388-389.)

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## 142. TREATY OF LAUSANNE, OCTOBER, 1912.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Italy declared war on Turkey September 29, 1911, because the latter had failed to accept the Italian 24-hour ultimatum to allow Italy to occupy Tripoli and Cyrenaica. (See article, *The Tripoli Question, 1902-1911*.) By formal royal decree, November 5, 1911, confirmed by an act of Parliament, February 25, 1912, these two provinces were declared to be under the full and entire sovereignty of the Italian Kingdom.

### 2. NEGOTIATION.

Russia suggested mediation, February, 1912, but the reply of the Marquis de San Giuliano, March 15, and the statement of the Porte, April 23, furnished the powers no opportunity for such action. Informal diplomatic conversations were opened at Caux, Switzerland, in July, and later these were continued at Ouchy. Agreement was impossible, since the Turkish representatives insisted that any action on the part of the delegates must be sanctioned by their respective parliaments. Italy saw in this demand the familiar Turkish play for delay. Finally an Italian ultimatum gave Turkey three days, October 12 to 15, in which to accept the Italian proposals. As Montenegro had declared war on Turkey, October 9, and the other States of the Balkan League were preparing to follow, the Turkish delegates were authorized to conclude a treaty. (See article, *The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912*.) Terms of the protocol were accepted on the 15th, but the final draft was signed on the 19th. In the interim, the Ottoman Government by a firman, October 16, granted autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica and the Sultan appointed a spiritual representative for the provinces. An irade of the Sultan guaranteed administrative and juridical reforms for the Aegean Islands. By royal proclamation the Italian Government granted amnesty and guaranteed religious freedom to the two provinces. A commission was appointed, consisting in part of natives, to make civil regulations respecting local customs.

### 3. TERMS OF THE TREATY.

The final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne (See Appendix I, 105) was signed October 18, 1912, by Pietro-Bertolini, Guido Fusinato, and Giuseppe Volpi, plenipotentiaries for Italy, and Mehemmed



Naby Bey and Roumboyoglon Fahreddin Bey, plenipotentiaries for Turkey. It provided for:

Article 1, immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities.

Article 2, Turkey's immediate recall of officers, troops, and civil functionaries from Tripoli and Cyrenaica, this to be followed immediately by Italy's withdrawal from the Aegean Islands (the Dodecanese). (It is to be noted that there is no formal recognition of any change in territorial sovereignty and that Italy has not withdrawn from the Islands.)

Article 3, immediate exchange of prisoners and hostages.

Article 4, mutual and full amnesty for all hostile acts, crimes at common law excepted.

Article 5, resumption of all treaties as before the war.

Article 6, an Italian engagement to conclude a treaty of commerce without the "capitulation" servitudes whenever the other powers do so.

Article 7, an Italian engagement to suppress Italian post offices in the Ottoman Empire whenever other powers do so.

Article 8, the signification of willingness on the part of Italy to lend support to the powers for the general suppression of the "capitulations" in the Ottoman Empire.

Article 9, a Turkish engagement to restore dismissed subjects of Italy to their administrative positions in the Empire without loss of retirement pension rights and a promise by Turkey to use her influence with nongovernmental institutions to act in a similar manner.

Article 10, an Italian pledge to pay into the Turkish treasury an annual sum equivalent to the average sums which for the three years previous to the war had been allocated for the use of the public debt to the two provinces; the amount to be determined by a commission of three—one Turkish, one Italian, and a third chosen by the two. In case of failure to agree each State was to choose a power as mediator and the two powers thus designated were to select a chief arbitrator. Italy was given the right to substitute for the annuity a sum corresponding to the amount capitalized at the rate of 4 per cent. (The commission fixed on 2,000,000 lire annually.)

#### 4. CONCLUSION.

The vagueness of the treaty as regards the questions at issue is taken to mean that the provisions of the ultimatum, the acts of annexation, the proclamation of amnesty and religious freedom, the firman and the irade had already accomplished the settlement of these matters.

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### 143. THE FORMATION OF THE BALKAN ALLIANCE OF 1912.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The negotiations through which the league between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro was formed were carried on in the latter part of 1911 and the earlier part of 1912. The negotiations were conducted in secret. The treaties likewise were kept secret by express stipulations of the treaties themselves. Rumors that such an alliance was being formed were first circulated several months after the conclusion of the more important treaties and definite knowledge that the league existed did not reach European capitals until the eve of the war between the league and Turkey in October, 1911. The Russian Government was promptly informed of the Bulgar-Serbian alliance, for reasons which will appear. The treaties and military conventions were published, in French translation, in *Le Matin*, Paris, November 24 and 26, 1913.

The question of combination or cooperation (with regard to relations with Turkey, particularly concerning Macedonian affairs) had been before the four countries almost constantly during the last four decades. The severity of the Ottomanizing policy of the Young-Turkish régime and the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War in September, 1911, clarified and energized, in all the countries simultaneously, the impulses toward joint action. It is not possible to ascribe to any one of the Governments concerned primary responsibility for taking leadership in the negotiations of 1911-12 now to be reviewed.



## 2. GREEK PROPOSALS TO BULGARIA IN 1911.

Venizelos became prime minister of Greece in October, 1910. His express policy at the outset was to avoid difficulty with Turkey. The Turkish Government by renewing with increased energy its boycott of Greek commerce in Salonica and its policy of repression and assassination in Macedonia forced him out of his pacific attitude. He thereupon made efforts to secure the cooperation of Bulgaria in a defensive agreement. In April, 1911, he transmitted to Sofia, through private channels, a proposal that the two countries enter into an understanding for joint defense of Christians in Macedonia and for an eventual defensive alliance against Turkey.

Gueshoff became prime minister of Bulgaria in the spring of 1911, supported by two parties which had always advocated a conciliatory policy toward Turkey; and Gueshoff announced that he would use every effort to avoid provocative movements of any sort. Moreover, his doubts as to the military strength of Greece and his suspicion that a Greco-Turkish War over the Cretan question was imminent, led him to make no response to the proposal of Venizelos.

## 3. NEGOTIATIONS OF THE BULGAR-SERBIAN TREATY.

Turkish abuses in Macedonia and the obstinate procrastination of the Turkish Government in the matter of the promised junction of the Turkish and Bulgarian railways, changed the conciliatory attitude of Gueshoff, and the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War in September, 1911, made more impatient and aggressive the disposition of Bulgarian public opinion.

Realizing that Serbian military assistance would be indispensable in an alliance against Turkey, the Bulgarian Government took steps to procure the cooperation of Serbia before negotiating with Greece. Serbia, which had for several years, under Russian auspices, sought an alliance whereby she might regain "Old Serbia," made known her readiness to receive proposals. King Ferdinand and Gueshoff were on holiday in Vichy at the time of the outbreak of the Italian War. Rizoff (Bulgarian minister to Italy, in Sofia on leave of absence) and Theodoroff (Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs) held conferences with Milovanovitch (Serbian prime minister) in Belgrade and Sofia, as a result of which arrangement was made for a secret interview between Gueshoff and Milovanovitch. This took place at night on the train from Belgrade to Nish. Through this three-hour conference an agreement was reached to enter into negotiations on the basis of Macedonian autonomy, with, however, a preliminary determination of spheres of influence of the two States.

Definite negotiations were taken up in December at Sofia, Dr. Spalaikovitch being appointed Serbian minister to Bulgaria for the

purpose in hand. Kings Ferdinand and Peter were consulted on more important questions, and Dr. Daneff, president of the Bulgarian National Assembly, and Paschich, Radical leader in the Serbian Parliament, were consulted on certain matters. Russian interests in the negotiations were represented through the Russian minister and military attaché at Sofia, who used their influence to secure accommodation of territorial claims and to press the parties to a conclusion. The treaty was signed February 29–March 13, 1912, by Gueshoff and Milovanovitch, and also by the Bulgarian and Serbian monarchs.

#### 4. TERMS OF THE BULGAR-SERBIAN TREATY.

There are two parts to the Bulgar-Serbian treaty. (See Appendix I, 101.) One part created a defensive alliance between the contracting parties, in which they pledged themselves to "succor one another with their entire forces in the event of one of them being attacked by one or more States." The other part is the "secret annex," in which they provided for possible war against Turkey, in the event of internal or external troubles of Turkey which might endanger the national interests of either of the contracting parties or threaten the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkan peninsula. The important feature of this part is the agreement as to territorial divisions in the event of a victorious outcome of such a war. All lands were to be held in common until after the signing of peace. Following peace, territory north of the Shar Range, including the Sandjak of Novi Bazar and "Old Serbia," were to go to Serbia, and the territory south and east of the Rhodope Range and the Struma River to Bulgaria. Autonomy was to be given to the intermediate region. If, however, both parties should agree that autonomy for this region was not feasible, it was to be divided between them according to lines defined in the treaty, with the exception of a further intermediate region left undivided and to be subsequently apportioned through arbitration by the Czar of Russia. The territorial arrangements represent an attempt to reconcile the Serbian desire for partitions and access to the Adriatic with the Bulgarian plan for Macedonian autonomy. Finally the treaty provided that the Czar should be arbitrator in other questions that might arise from the treaty.

#### 5. THE GRECO-BULGARIAN TREATY.

In the last week of February, 1912, negotiations between Bulgaria and Greece were begun. The negotiations between the prime ministers were carried on through Panas, Greek minister at Sofia. Venizelos proposed that the treaty should embrace territorial arrangements. But since the rigid claims of Greece would inevitably conflict with Bulgarian aspirations for Salonica, and since there was no time for



delay, it was decided to omit all territorial understandings. The treaty was signed by Gueshoff and Panas on May 29, 1912. By this treaty (See Appendix I, 103) the two States bound themselves to aid each other, if attacked by Turkey either by invasion or by systematic violation of rights derived from treaties or the fundamental principles of the law of nations, and to use their influence over their co-nationalists in Turkey, so as to assist in the peaceable existence of all the nationalities forming the population of the Turkish Empire, and to obtain for Bulgars and Greeks in Turkey the enjoyment of the rights assured to them by treaties or grants.

#### 6. AGREEMENTS WITH MONTENEGRO. ■

King Nicholas of Montenegro had always been eager for a combination against Turkey, and had made several proposals for an alliance with Russian aid. Immediately after the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War he suggested to the other States common military action. Serbia, at that time looking to possible negotiations with Turkey, declined. Bulgaria and Greece promptly signified their approval, though formal agreements were not entered into until after the conclusion of the treaties above described. Near the middle of April, 1912, Theodoroff, Rizoff, and Daneff held a conference with the Montenegrin prime minister in Vienna, where he had accompanied King Nicholas on an official visit to the Austrian Emperor, and an agreement was easily reached. No formal treaty was signed. The agreement on Bulgaria's part was to give financial assistance to Montenegro in case war should break out. A formal agreement with Greece was reached soon thereafter.

Agreement with Serbia was more difficult because of mutual suspicions of dynastic intrigues. However, the alliance was finally achieved, through the intermediation of Bulgarian officials, near the end of May, 1912. This completed the formation of the Balkan League.

#### 7. MILITARY CONVENTIONS.

It was necessary to supplement the Bulgar-Serbian and Greco-Bulgarian treaties by military conventions in order to determine the respective military obligations of the parties in the event of war with Turkey. A convention between Bulgaria and Serbia was concluded April 29-May 12. This was supplemented by agreements between the general staffs concluded June 19-July 1, August 23-September 5, and September 15-28. A military convention between Bulgaria and Greece was concluded September 22-October 5. (For these conventions see Appendix I, 102, 104.)

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#### 144. THE EFFORTS OF THE POWERS TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST BALKAN WAR.

##### 1. INTRODUCTION.

The efforts of the Powers to prevent the outbreak of the First Balkan War probably dates back to the latter part of 1911, when the situation in Albania and Macedonia attracted attention. In January, 1912, the Russian Government brought to the attention of the English and French Governments the dangers that might arise from this situation. The three Governments associated themselves in a joint demand on Turkey to put down the insurgent bands and to reform the Government. (Speech of M. Paul Doumer, *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 126, p. 124.) In the early spring of 1912 it was known that a rapprochement had been effected between Serbia and Bulgaria and that one between these two and Greece was under way.

##### 2. BALKAN ALLIANCE NOTIFIED TO THE POWERS.

In May, 1912, Danef, Bulgarian special ambassador, notified Sazonof, Russian foreign minister, of the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance and also called his attention to the bad situation in Macedonia which might necessitate vigorous action by the Balkan allies

against Turkey. Sazonof counselled moderation and caution. (Gueshoff, *Balkan League*, p. 45.)

### 3. AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 14, 1912.

Austria became alarmed, and on August 14 Count Berchtold, minister of foreign affairs, sent a note to the powers urging (1) "progressive decentralization" of the government in Macedonia, (2) the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, (3) the strengthening of Turkey. (Note unpublished, information from *Questions diplomatiques et coloniales*, vol. 34, p. 305, and speech of M. Doumier, *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 126, p. 125.) This step was welcomed by all the powers (*Ibid.*, vol. 126, p. 125), although they requested a definition of the phrase "progressive decentralization." (Dillon in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 102, p. 718.) Berchtold then visited Roumania personally in order to induce her to take steps to restrain the Balkan allies. Russia also continued her appeals for moderation. (Gueshoff, *Balkan League*, p. 51.)

### 4. TURKISH MILITARY MANŒUVERS.

In late September the Turks decided to hold army manœuvres at Adrianople. The powers of the Triple Entente felt that this would provoke the Balkan allies to mobilize also, and sent a note to Turkey protesting against these manœuvres. Turkey, in reply (Sept. 27), refused to give up the plan, but promised to limit the number of men taking part.

### 5. FRENCH PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 4, 1912.

On September 30 the Balkan States mobilized, and October 1 Turkey followed suit. Sazonof, who had been visiting in England, arrived in Paris October 2, and he and Poincaré at once started to devise a plan to ward off war. October 4 France opened negotiations with the various European chanceries with the view of either (1) joint action by all the powers or (2) joint action by Austria and Russia in the name of Europe. (Speech of M. Doumier, *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 126, p. 126; speech of M. Poincaré, *Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 125, p. 184.) After some delay (Dillon in *Contemporary Review*, vol. 102, p. 719), England accepted the proposal in the form that Russia and Austria should act jointly in the name of Europe in the Balkan capitals and that all the powers should act jointly in Constantinople. Austria accepted this plan October 6 with the proviso: (1) Maintenance of Ottoman integrity and sovereignty (Balkan status quo); (2) general lines of Berchtold note of August 14 to be followed in this new procedure; (3) the accord of the powers not to be communicated to Turkey.



These amendments were accepted by France, and the other powers rallied to the French proposition. (Speech of M. Doumier, Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 126.)

#### 6. AUSTRO-RUSSIAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 8, 1912.

On October 8, 1912, an Austro-Russian joint note was handed in at the Balkan capitals. It stated that (1) the powers would not permit a breach of the peace; (2) they would themselves take in hand the question of Macedonian reforms; (3) should war break out, the powers will not permit any change in the Balkan status quo; (4) collective action will be taken in Constantinople. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 126.) Some hours before its presentation in Cetinje, Montenegro declared war on Turkey. The remaining members of the alliance replied October 13 (Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, vol. 34, p. 554), thanking the powers for their action, but stating that they preferred to deal directly with Turkey.

#### 7. NOTE OF THE POWERS TO TURKEY, OCTOBER 10, 1912.

On October 10 the collective note of the powers was handed in at Constantinople. It demanded reforms in Macedonia in accordance with the law of 1880. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 127.) Turkey replied October 14 with a promise of reforms. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 129.) But before further action could be taken war broke out.

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## 145. THE TREATY OF LONDON, 1913.

### 1. FIRST MEETING OF THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 16, 1912.

The armistice for the cessation of the First Balkan War was signed on December 3, 1912, and the London Peace Conference, composed of delegates from the Balkan allies, including Greece, who had not signed the armistice, and Turkey, held its first meeting on December 16, 1912. At the same time a Conference of Ambassadors, consisting of Sir Edward Grey and the London representatives of all the powers, was also in session.

### 2. DEMANDS OF THE BALKAN ALLIES.

The Balkan allies demanded a war indemnity, as also the cession of all European Turkey (excepting Albania), Crete, and the islands in the Aegean Sea. Turkey was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, together with a strip of territory extending from Midia on the Black Sea to Rodosta on the Sea of Marmora, as also the peninsula of Gallipoli or the Thracian Chersonese.

Turkey was unwilling to give up Adrianople, a sacrifice insisted upon by Bulgaria. The "Divan," or Turkish National Assembly, decided, however, on January 22, 1913, that the demands of the allies must be conceded. Kiamil Pasha telegraphed the Turkish commissioners at London that same night, directing them to yield Adrianople and agree to the cession of all Turkey in Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the Aegean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to Midia on the Black Sea.

### 3. COUP D'ÉTAT OF JANUARY 23, 1913, AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

But on the following day, January 23, as a result of a successful coup d'état, Kiamil Pasha was driven from power and Nazim Pasha murdered by Enver Bey, who placed himself at the head of a new



government. When the news of the coup d'état reached London it was recognized that further negotiations were useless and that the London Peace Conference had failed.

#### 4. TERMS PROPOSED BY THE POWERS.

Adrianople having been captured by the Bulgarians, assisted by the Serbs, on March 28, 1913, the time was ripe for a resumption of peace negotiations. On March 22 the great powers had proposed the following terms as a basis for the renewal of negotiations: (1) A frontier line from Enos to Midia to follow the course of the Maritza, and the cession to the allies of all the territories west of that line, with the exception of Albania, whose status and frontiers were to be determined by the powers. (2) The question of the Aegean Islands to be decided by the powers. (3) Turkey to abandon all claims to Crete. (4) The powers would not entertain favorably the demand for an indemnity, but were willing to admit the allies to participation in the discussion of an international commission which should meet in Paris for the equitable settlement of their participation in the Ottoman debt and the financial obligations of the territories newly acquired. Turkey was to be asked to take part in the labors of this commission. (5) An end of hostilities immediately after the acceptance of this basis of negotiations.

Turkey agreed to these stipulations, but the allies insisted, among other things, that the Aegean Islands be ceded directly to them and were eager for an indemnity.

#### 5. SECOND MEETING OF THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, MAY, 1913.

It was not until April 20 that the Balkan States finally agreed to accept the mediation of the powers. When the Balkan delegates and the representatives of the great powers finally met for the second time at London on May 20 they found a treaty embodying the original terms of the powers all ready for them to sign. They demurred at first, but when, on May 27, Sir Edward Grey frankly told them that they must either sign or leave London they signed without much further delay on May 30, 1913.

#### 6. DISCUSSION AMONG THE BALKAN ALLIES.

The long delay in the negotiations was largely due to differences among the allies regarding the division of the spoils. Mutual hatred and suspicion and conflicting territorial ambitions made agreement almost impossible. The action of the Conference of Ambassadors in regard to Albania added greatly in the difficulty of the situation, since Serbia was thereby prevented from extending its territory westward to the Adriatic and would be left with only a relatively

small recompense for its sacrifices in the war, unless Bulgaria could be induced to consent to a modification of the Serbo-Bulgar treaty of March 13, 1912 (See article, *The Formation of the Balkan League of 1912*), a thing to which she was unwilling to agree. Even before the declaration of war Serbia had suggested a rectification of her frontier as outlined in the Serbo-Bulgar treaty of March, 1912. (See article, *The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912*.) Her demands grew with her victories, with the free hand in Macedonia allowed her and Greece by Bulgaria's preoccupation in Thrace, and with her exclusion from the sea by the creation of Albania. Bulgaria, on the other hand, cared intensely for expansion in Macedonia. Very bitter feeling was generated between Bulgaria and Serbia, culminating in warlike preparations, some actual hostilities, and a final demand on May 25 on the part of Serbia for revision of the treaty of 1912. Meanwhile Serbia had been approaching Greece suggesting conterminous bounds in Macedonia and alliance against Bulgaria, and a final agreement with her was reached on May 19-June 1 (*American Journal of International Law*, vol. 12, Supplement, pp. 89-92).

A second question was raised by Roumania, who hoped to gain Silistria and a more advantageous military frontier for her Dobrudja region. Bulgaria refused her suggestions as to compensation for neutrality (made at the London conference), and war almost resulted, but was averted by a Petrograd conference which gave Roumania Silistria without fortifications (May 7). On April 19 Serbia offered her a treaty against Bulgaria, and on May 2 the Greeks made a similar offer. She desired, however, to remain free until war was actually begun, fearing the effect of an alliance of all against Bulgaria.

#### 7. TERMS OF THE TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 30, 1913 (SEE APPENDIX I, 107).

The terms were practically those proposed by the powers on March 23. (1) Turkey ceded to the Balkan allies her territory in Europe beyond a line drawn from Enos near the mouth of the Maritza River on the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea. (2) The status and boundaries of Albania were to be fixed by the great powers. (3) The Sultan of Turkey ceded Crete to the Balkan allies in whose favor all rights of sovereignty were renounced. (4) To the great powers was left the decision upon the fate of the islands in the Aegean Sea (excepting Crete) and the status of Mount Athos.

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## 146. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION IN THE BALKAN CRISIS OF 1913.

### 1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS.

When the Balkan Alliance began war with Turkey in 1912 Austria-Hungary considered herself directly and vitally affected. Not only did she see danger to her ambition to reach the Aegean, but she considered that a powerful Serbian state might be dangerous if it reached the sea and developed a navy, since under the influence of Russia it might be able to close altogether Austria's only outlet, the Adriatic. Therefore some of the bolder statesmen of the Dual Monarchy desired to keep Serbia always dependent; but Count Berchtold, with the support of the Emperor, preferred the scheme of erecting between Serbia and the sea a buffer state, Albania, whose ports might be used by Serbia for commerce, but not for developing naval power. (*Annual Register*, 1913, p. 331.) It is possible also that Austria desired to postpone settlement for the present, until a later and more

favorable opportunity came for acquiring this country for herself. At the beginning of 1913 the situation was very threatening, since Russia, supporting Serbia, had large forces mobilized along the Galician frontier, while an Austrian army was watching them. (*Ibid.*, p. 332.)

## 2. THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1912-13.

In the last month of 1912, the matter had been brought to issue. December 16 a conference of delegates from the Balkan States assembled in London (*Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 124, p. 192), and at the same time a gathering of the ambassadors of the powers (See article, *The Treaty of London, 1913*). December 20 the powers had agreed, in order to avert a European war, that there should be an autonomous Albania. (*The Times*, December 21, 1912, published the official statement issued by the British Foreign Office.) The danger of such a conflict sprang chiefly from the fact that two of the great powers were determined that Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro should not be permitted to divide Albania between them, as they desired and as undoubtedly they would have done if not prevented. Austria-Hungary led the opposition. Its reasons for pursuing that course have already been indicated. Italy supported Austria-Hungary because of Italian ambitions in Albania and in order to prevent the coast opposite Italy from falling under the control of States which in the future might become dependencies of Russia, or possibly of Austria-Hungary.

A month earlier the factions of this mountain country had laid aside their differences and, assembling at Avlona, proclaimed their independence and neutrality (*Annual Register, 1912*, p. 356). Under strong pressure from the powers, on January 21 the Serbian delegates to the London Peace conference presented a memorandum declaring that they would conform their conduct to the interests and desires of the great powers, and that they would not object to an Albanian State. But they desired to have Skutari and other places. (*Archives Diplomatiques*, third series, vol. 125, pp. 119, 120.) Meanwhile Franz Josef had sent an emissary to the Czar to open negotiations on the subject, and in March an agreement was made by which Serbia was to have the Albanian towns of Ipek, Prizrend, Dibra, and Diakova, while Skutari, even if captured by the Montenegrins, was to be a part of the new State. (*Annual Register, 1913*, p. 332.)

During this time the forces of Montenegro were making heroic efforts to capture Skutari, and declared that they sought it to satisfy their political aspirations (*Ibid.*, p. 344). April 21 the other allied states accepted the mediation of the powers, on the basis that the pow-



ers were to delimit an autonomous Albania, among other things (Ibid., p. 346; Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 140), but the Montenegrins, refusing to accede, continued the siege until Skutari was yielded to them. (Annual Register, 1913, p. 345.) Peremptory demand was now made by the powers that Montenegro withdraw from the fortress. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 128, p. 80.) Yielding to this pressure, to the threats of Austria, and to the advice of Russia, King Nicholas finally placed Skutari in the hands of the powers May 5. (Annual Register, 1913, p. 346.) May 30 a treaty of peace was made at London between the Balkan allies and Turkey (See article, *The Treaty of London, 1913*). In the third article of this treaty the frontiers of Albania were marked off as the powers had decided. (Nouveau Recueil General de Traités, 3d series, VIII, pp. 16-19.)

### 3. THE SETTLEMENT.

The settlement, from the standpoint of the powers, was explained to the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey, who more than anyone else during this crisis assisted in preventing a war:

This agreement is that there should be an autonomous Albania. We willingly became a party to this, for the Albanians are separate in race, in language and, to a great extent, in religion. . . . It was decided that the littoral and Skutari should be Albanian, while Ipek, Prizrend Dibra, and (after much negotiation) Djakova should be excluded from Albania. (Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 51, p. 817.)

The arrangement was very unsatisfactory to the Albanians, for many of the mountaineers were in this manner cut off from the only market towns to which they had access. (Annual Register, 1913, p. 356.) There was much fighting between Serbians and Albanians, and several raids later in the year which finally brought stern summons to Serbia from Austria-Hungary (Ibid.).

The action of the powers in regard to Albania became a powerful factor in bringing about the Second Balkan War. By the creation of an independent Albania, Serbia was deprived of expected advantages to which she believed herself fairly entitled by her sacrifices and success in the First Balkan War. She, therefore, demanded that Bulgaria, whose gains by that war had been very large, should consent to a revision of the territorial arrangement contained in the Serbo-Bulgar treaty of March 13, 1912. Bulgaria refused to consent to any revision. Out of the resulting controversy came the Second Balkan War.

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Balkan peoples, and with sympathetic consideration of the desires of Austria-Hungary.

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## 147. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF ALBANIA, 1912-1913.

### 1. THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND ALBANIA.

The principality of Albania was established by act of the powers at the London Conference of Ambassadors at the special instigation of Austria and Italy. (See article, *The Albanian Question in the Balkan Crisis of 1913*.) Its boundaries were to be established on ethnographic lines by an international commission. The new situation inherited two problems from the one previous to 1912. (1) The hostile relations between Serbia and the Albanians owing to the incursions into Serbian territory of Albanian bands and the soreness in Serbia on account of the refusal of the Conference of Ambassadors to grant her access to the Adriatic through Albania. (2) The status of the Greeks in Epirus, provisionally included in Albania and constituting a source of difficulty between Greece, Albania, and the powers.

### 2. SERBIA AND ALBANIA.

Under pretext of defence against Albanian bands Serbia closed her frontier in June, 1913, shutting off Albanians from access to markets at Dibra and Djakoritza. The powers protested against this as hampering to the economic life of Albania and Serbia yielded on the question of these markets. (*Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, vol. 36, p. 501.) Incursions of Albanians continued and on September 20, 1913, Serbia warned the powers she would take defensive measures in case these raids continued. (*Ibid.*, vol. 36, p. 429.) On September 23 further attacks occurred and Serbia sent troops to the frontier and occupied positions within Albania. (*Ibid.*, vol. 36, p. 430.) Serbia explained this to the powers as a defensive measure. (*Ibid.*, vol. 36, p. 501.) Austria protested, at first "amicably," warning Serbia



against any violation of the Albanian frontier. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 502.) Serbia replied again that her measures were only defensive (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 502), but October 18 Austria sent an ultimatum ordering Serbia to evacuate Albania within eight days. (Ibid., vol. 36; p. 553.) Serbia yielded to this. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 554.)

### 3. GREECE AND ALBANIA.

October 30, 1913, Austria and Italy sent a collective note to Greece charging that Greek terrorization in Epirus prevented the delimitation work of the commission, that in such cases of terrorization the commission would consider the village ipso facto Albanian, and finally demanded that Greece evacuate Albanian territory by December 31, 1912. (Quoted, *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, vol. 36, p. 621.) The Greek reply (November 3) denied these charges and declared that the trouble arose from the inclusion of Greek population in Albania. (Quoted Ibid., vol. 36, p. 622.) December 13 Sir Edward Grey sent a note to all the powers urging postponement of date for Greek evacuation of Epirus, division of contested territory (without waiting for completion of the work of the commission) between Greece and Albania, and compensation for Greece in the acceptance of her claims in the Ægean Islands. (Ibid., vol. 37, p. 1. Note paraphrased. It has not been published.) This compromise, evidently aimed at saving the peace and ending a dangerous question, was accepted at once by France and Russia and finally (December 31) were agreed on in principle by the powers of the Triple Alliance, but securities were demanded that Greece would evacuate at the agreed time. (Ibid., vol. 37, p. 105, note quoted.) After another interchange of notes an agreement was reached between the powers on the general basis of Sir Edward Grey's first proposals. (Notes quoted or paraphrased, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 374.) Collective notes of the powers to Turkey and Greece were accepted by both with relation to Epirus boundary and settlement of Ægean Islands. But Greece, in her note of acceptance also demanded: (1) guarantees of religious equality for Greek Christians in Albania; (2) rectification of frontier; (3) permission for Greeks in Southern Albania to be enrolled in the Albanian gendarmerie as a protective measure. The first and last of these were accepted by the powers, the frontier rectification was refused. (Collective note of April 24, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 558.) On April 27, Greece finally evacuated Albanian Epirus and the question was closed.

See also the article, *The Albanian Question in the Balkan Crisis of 1913*.

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## 148. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND BALKAN WAR, 1913.

### 1. THE TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 30, 1913.

The Treaty of London (See article, *The Treaty of London, 1913*) signed on May 30, 1913, settled the frontier line between the Balkan States and Turkey, but left conflicting claims between themselves unsettled. On June 9 the London Peace Conference met for the last time, the attempt to reach an agreement on the points left unsettled by the Treaty of London having been abandoned and a protocol adopted leaving it to the Balkan States to supplement the treaty by direct conventions.

### 2. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND BULGARIA.

Of this there was, however, very little prospect. There was, in the first place, the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria respecting their respective shares of Macedonia. The Greeks had occupied Salonika, which Bulgaria greatly desired, and Bulgaria found herself in possession of Thrace, which she did not much care for.

### 3. DISPUTE BETWEEN SERBIA AND BULGARIA.

There was a similar dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia, the latter being in possession of that section of Macedonia of which Monastir is the center—a city and section that Bulgaria claimed as her portion. Bulgaria insisted that Serbia execute the arrangements agreed upon as to the future frontier between the two States in the treaty of March 13, 1912 (See article, *The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912*). But Serbia maintained that the creation of an independent Albania invalidated the provisions of the treaty. (For the Serbian point of view see the speech of Pashitch, the prime minister, in the Skupshtina on May 28. *The Times* (London), May 29, 1913.)

### 4. ALLIANCE BETWEEN SERBIA AND GREECE, 1913.

After their return from London, Premiers Venizelos and Pashitch, representing Greece and Serbia respectively, made an offensive and



defensive alliance for 10 years directed against Bulgaria, and military conventions were arranged. (See Appendix I, 108.)

#### 5. THE CZAR PROPOSES TO ACT AS ARBITRATOR.

On May 28, Serbia demanded that Bulgaria should renounce her rights under the treaty of March 13, 1912. (See article, *The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912*, section 4.) The Czar of All the Russias then stepped in as peacemaker, sending, on June 8, an identical telegram to the Kings of Bulgaria and Serbia, offering to act as arbitrator in this "fratricidal war," in accordance with the terms of their treaty of alliance.

Neither of the disputants appears to have desired the arbitrament by the Czar, but both agreed to submit to Russian arbitration (*The Times* (London), June 13, 1913), Serbia and Greece proposing that each of the three countries involved reduce its army one-fourth, in order to facilitate a pacific solution of the controversy.

#### 6. BULGARIA BEGINS THE SECOND BALKAN WAR.

But in the meantime a new cabinet had been formed in Bulgaria, where the warlike Dr. Daneff replaced the pacific M. Gueshoff as premier. On June 15, Bulgaria proposed simultaneous demobilization on condition that the contested districts should be occupied by mixed garrisons. Under circumstances which are still somewhat obscure, on June 29, Bulgaria began the Second Balkan War by an attack on the Serbian and Greek positions.

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## 149. THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST, AUGUST 10, 1913.

### 1. NEGOTIATION.

The Treaty of Bucharest was concluded on August 10, 1913, by the delegates of Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. As Bulgaria had been completely isolated in the Second Balkan War, and as she was closely invested on her northern boundary by the armies of Roumania on her western frontier by the allied armies of Greece and Serbia, and in the East by the Turkish Army, she was obliged, in her helplessness, to submit to such terms as her victorious enemies chose to impose upon her. All important arrangements and concessions involving the rectification of the controverted international boundary lines were perfected in a series of committee meetings, incorporated in separate protocols, and formally ratified by subsequent action of the general assembly of delegates.

### 2. TERMS.

By the terms of the treaty (See Appendix I, 109), Bulgaria ceded to Roumania all that portion of the Dobrudja lying north of a line extending from the Danube just above Turtukaia to the western shore of the Black Sea, south of Ekrene. This important territorial concession has an approximate area of 2,687 square miles, a population of 286,000, and includes the fortress of Silistria and the cities of Turtukaia on the Danube and Baltchik on the Black Sea. In addition, Bulgaria agreed to dismantle all existing fortresses and bound herself not to construct forts at Rustchuk or at Schumla or in any of the territory between these two cities, or within a radius of 20 kilometers around Baltchick.

### 3. SERBIA'S GAIN IN TERRITORY.

The eastern frontier of Serbia was drawn from the summit of Patarika, on the old frontier, and followed the watershed between the Vardar and the Struma Rivers to the Greek-Bulgarian boundary, except that the upper valley of the Strumnitza remained in the possession of Bulgaria. The territory thus obtained embraced central Macedonia, including Ochrida, Monastir, Kossovo, Istib, and Kõtchana, and the eastern half of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. By this arrangement Serbia increased her territory from 18,650 to 33,891 square miles and her population by more than 1,500,000.

### 4. GREECE'S GAIN IN TERRITORY.

The boundary line separating Greece from Bulgaria was drawn from the crest of Mount Belashitcha to the mouth of the Mesta River,



on the Ægean Sea. This important territorial concession, which Bulgaria resolutely contested, in compliance with the instructions embraced in the notes which Russia and Austria-Hungary presented to the conference, increased the area of Greece from 25,014 to 41,933 square miles and her population from 2,660,000 to 4,363,000. The territory thus annexed included Epirus, southern Macedonia, Saloniki, Kavala, and the Ægean littoral as far east as the Mesta River, and restricted the Ægean seaboard of Bulgaria to an inconsiderable extent of 70 miles, extending from the Mesta to the Maritza, and giving access to the Ægean at the inferior port of Dedeagatch. Greece also extended her northwestern frontier to include the great fortress of Janina. In addition, Crete was definitely assigned to Greece and was formally taken over on December 14, 1913.

#### 5. BULGARIA'S GAIN IN TERRITORY.

Bulgaria's share of the spoils, although greatly reduced, was not entirely negligible. Her net gains in territory, which embraced a portion of Macedonia, including the town of Strumnitza, western Thrace, and 70 miles of the Ægean littoral, were about 9,663 square miles, and her population was increased by 129,490 (Carnegie Report, p. 418).

#### 6. APPRAISEMENT OF THE TREATY.

By the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, Roumania profited most in proportion to her sacrifices. The unredeemed Roumanians live mostly in Transylvania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and therefore the Balkan wars afforded her no adequate opportunity to perfect the rectification of her boundaries on ethnographic lines.

The humiliating terms imposed on Bulgaria were due to her own impatience and intemperate folly. The territory she secured was relatively circumscribed; she had failed to emancipate Macedonia, which was her avowed purpose in entering the war; she lost the districts of Ochrida and Monastir, which she especially coveted; she was assigned only a small line on the Aegean, with the wretched port of Dedeagatch; and she was obliged to forfeit her ambition as the leader of the Balkan hegemony.

Greece, though gaining much, was greatly dissatisfied. The acquisition of Saloniki was a triumph; she was assigned the port of Kavala and the territory eastward at the insistence of the King and the army and contrary to the advice of Venizelos; in the northwest Greece encountered the opposition of Italy by urging her claims to southern Albania; in the assignment of the Aegean Islands she was profoundly dissatisfied; and she still claims 3,000,000 unredeemed conationals.

The fundamental defects of the Treaty of Bucharest were that (1) the boundaries which it drew bore little relation to the nationality of the inhabitants of the districts affected, and that (2) the punishment meted out to Bulgaria, while perhaps deserved in the light of her great offense in bringing on the Second Balkan War, was so severe that she could not accept the treaty as a permanent settlement. While Serbia, Greece, and Roumania can not escape a large share of the blame for the character of the treaty, it should not be forgotten that their action at Bucharest was in large measure due to the settlement forced upon the Balkan States by the great powers at the London conferences. (See articles on the Treaty of London, 1913, and the Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913.)

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## 150. THE GRECO-SERBIAN ALLIANCE, 1913.

### 1. CIRCUMSTANCES.

Even before the signing of the Treaty of London (See article, The Treaty of London) on May 30, 1913, during the interval between the First and Second Balkan Wars (See article, The Effort to Prevent the Outbreak of the Second Balkan War), Bulgaria showed signs of renewing the struggle.



As early as May of that year the Bulgarians had attacked Greek outposts, and it was in anticipation of more serious attacks that the Serbo-Greek alliance was formed, June 1, 1913.

## 2. TERMS.

By the terms of the treaty of alliance (See Appendix I, 108) the two states agreed upon a mutual guarantee of territory, promised not to come to any separate understanding with Bulgaria in regard to the division of the former Turkish territory in Europe, drew a common boundary line for the two states, defined a Serbo-Bulgarian boundary line which was to be claimed, and bound themselves "to afford assistance with all their armed forces," if Bulgaria "should attempt to impose her claims by force." The alliance was to last for at least ten years. The treaty included a stipulation that it "be kept strictly secret."

By this treaty Serbia secured, as she hoped, the possession of Monastir and the surrounding districts, and Greece secured Saloniki and Kavalla. The treaty was, of course, one of reciprocal obligation. If Bulgaria threatened Greece, Greece was entitled to call upon Serbia for aid. Should Serbia be attacked by Bulgaria, Greece was bound to go to the aid of Serbia.

The latter contingency actually arose in the autumn of 1915. Serbia was attacked in the rear by Bulgaria during the Austrian invasion at that time. Premier Venizelos who, almost since the beginning of the Great War, had favored the participation of Greece on the side of the allies, strongly advocated the fulfillment of the obligations which Greece had contracted toward Serbia, and this both on grounds of law and policy.

King Constantine and his adherents took a different view. They maintained that the obligations which Greece had incurred toward Serbia only applied to the case where Bulgaria, acting independently, attacked Serbia and did not apply to the situation created by a general European war. The view of the matter taken by the King and his friends prevailed, Venizelos was dismissed from power and office in the most unconstitutional fashion (i. e., after his triumphant vindication at the polls), and Serbia was left to her fate.

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## 151. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

During the Second Balkan War Turkey took advantage of the helpless plight of Bulgaria to recover Adrianople. The powers thereupon "most categorically" demanded the evacuation of Adrianople in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of London, but failed to enforce their demand.

Bulgaria having made terms with her other enemies—Greece, Serbia, and Roumania—by means of the Treaty of Bucharest (See article, *The Treaty of Bucharest*), decided to negotiate directly with the Porte.

### 2. TERMS OF THE TREATY.

Negotiations began on September 3, 1913, and the treaty was signed on September 29. The Enos-Midia line was preserved, but was made to curve northward from the Black Sea and westward across the Maritza in such a way that Turkey obtained not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilissé and Demotica. The Bulgarians were not even left masters of the one railway leading to Dedeagatch, their sole port on the Aegean Sea.

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For text of the treaty, see *American Journal of International Law*, VIII, Supplement, pp. 27–45.

## 152. THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION IN SERBIA IN 1913.

The ex-premier of Italy, Signor Giolitti, in a speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914, revealed the fact that in 1913 Austria-Hungary had planned to attack Serbia. He said that on August 9, 1913, he had received the following telegram from the Marquis di San Giuliano:

Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus foederis* of the Triple Alliance.



He replied:

If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a *casus foederis* can not be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her.

The fact that the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the day following Giolitti's receipt of the telegram reveals Austria's motive as a desire to prevent Serbia from profiting by the conclusion of a highly advantageous treaty.

The telegram indicates that the assassination of the Archduke was the occasion rather than the cause of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia; and it reveals the reason for Austria's action in July, 1914, in omitting to notify Italy in advance of her demands upon Serbia.

The authenticity of the telegram is established by the fact that the Austrian Government has not denied it. Its contents are brought into relief by the statements of M. Pichon, ex-minister of foreign affairs of France. The Paris correspondent of *Il Giornale d'Italia* reported (December 29, 1914) a conversation which he had with M. Pichon on the subject of Giolitti's disclosure. M. Pichon said that in June, 1913, when he was minister of foreign affairs, at the time of the affair of Scutari, the Italian Government had informed him that Austria had notified it of her intentions with regard to Serbia, and that the Italian Government had replied that the *casus foederis* was not applicable.

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### 153. NAVAL AND MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 1905-1912.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION.

In 1904 the Entente Cordiale was developed by the two countries. It was not an alliance, but the parallel policies pursued by the two States and the fact that each had reason to fear the hostility of Germany brought them to plan joint military and naval action in case of specified contingencies.

#### 2. MAY AND JUNE, 1905.

That some such arrangements had been already made as early as May or June, 1905, seems probable from the somewhat guarded language used by Delcassé in an interview in the "*Gaulois*." (July 12,

1905, quoted Morel, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*, p. 94.) In October, 1905, M. Lausanne in the "Matin" (Morel, p. 94) declared that in the final session of the cabinet before his resignation, Delcassé had asserted (See article, that title) that England was willing to mobilize her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. Jaurès declared that a member of the cabinet told him the same, soon after the meeting (Morel, p. 95). The "Matin" statement received a carefully worded denial in England, and was probably incorrect as to details.

### 3. IN 1906.

In the latter part of the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 France approached Sir Edward Grey with the request that he authorize naval and military conversations between England and France (Grey's speech, August 3, 1914.) Grey consulted a portion of the cabinet, later all of the cabinet, and it was agreed that the conversations should take place, provided that they did not bind either Government to specific action. These conversations occurred "from time to time" up to 1912. (Grey to Cambon, November 22, 1912.)

### 4. IN 1912.

November 22, 1912, Grey, after gaining the acceptance of the cabinet (speech of August 4, 1914), put in writing, in a letter to Cambon, the hitherto verbal arrangement as to these conversations. If either nation had grave reason to fear an unprovoked attack the two governments were to consult together as to cooperative measures to be taken. About the same time, almost certainly through agreement, the British Navy was, as far as possible, concentrated in the North Sea and that of France in the Mediterranean. It was this arrangement, which left the northern coast of France defenceless, and brought Grey to state to the German Ambassador that England would defend these coasts if they were attacked by Germany.

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## 154. MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND BELGIUM, 1906-1912.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

During the decade preceding the outbreak of the World War Germany was engaged in the construction of a number of railroads leading to the Belgian frontier. As there did not appear to be any considerable economic need for these roads their construction excited alarm. There was widespread belief in Belgium, France, and England that the real purpose of the roads was to facilitate an invasion of France across Belgian territory. The English military authorities, alarmed at the situation and fearing lest Belgium should be overrun by German troops before England and France could come to the aid of the Belgians, began the consideration of plans by which English assistance could best be given if there should be need.

### 2. NEGOTIATIONS OF 1906.

In order to secure effective cooperation in the working out of a defensive scheme, Lieut. Col. (later General) Barnardiston, the military attaché of the British Embassy at Brussels, opened negotiations with Gen. Ducarne, the Belgian Chief of Staff. These negotiations were confined to the formulation of a plan by which a British expeditionary force should cooperate with the Belgian Army in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. The negotiators agreed that British troops should enter Belgium only after Belgian neutrality had been violated by Germany. No convention or agreement of any kind was drawn up. The negotiations did not bind either party to any given course of action. Later in 1906 further conversations took place between Ducarne and Gen. Grierson, the British Chief of Staff during the French review at Compiègne.

### 3. NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912.

In 1912 further progress of the German plans for strategic railways brought about a second series of conversations between Lieut. Col. Bridges, British military attaché at Brussels, and Gen. Jungbluth, then Belgian Chief of Staff. In these conversations Col. Bridges argued that British troops ought to be landed even before the actual invasion of Belgian territory by German troops began, on the ground that Belgium alone could not defend herself against Germany and that British aid would arrive too late if England should wait for a Belgian invitation to assist. Against this view Gen. Jungbluth protested and insisted that no troops should be landed until asked for by the Belgian Government. This attitude of the English attaché appears to have caused some nervousness in Bel-

gium, and on April 7, 1913, Sir Edward Grey, who was probably informed of the general tenor of these negotiations, wrote to the English minister at Brussels a letter to be shown to Belgian Government. In it he disclaimed any intention on the part of the British Government to violate Belgian neutrality and promised that England would not be the first to send troops into Belgium (quoted, Scott, II, p. 1032).

#### 4. GERMAN PUBLICATION AND ANGLO-BELGIAN REPLIES.

After the German occupation of Belgium the reports of these conversations were found in Brussels and published, November 24, 1914 (a summary was given Oct. 13, 1914), by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. An attempt was made by the Germans to show that the reports proved that Belgium had forfeited its neutrality prior to 1914.

The British and Belgian Governments in reply pointed out (1) that all the military plans discussed during the course of the conversations in both 1906 and 1912 were for the contingency of a war in which Germany in attacking France would violate the neutrality of Belgium; (2) that no convention had been arranged, as the Germans alleged; (3) that in view of German threats against Belgian neutrality, especially in the matter of the German railroads leading to the Belgian frontier, England and Belgium had a right to enter into negotiations for appropriate action to meet the threatened danger.

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### 155. THE ATTEMPTED ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT, 1907-1914.

#### 1. OPENING OF DISCUSSION.

During the decade which preceded the outbreak of the World War there was much discussion in regard to projects for an Anglo-German agreement to limit naval armament. Consideration by statesmen charged with official responsibility for naval policy started with an article by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann, the English prime minister, in the first number of *The Nation* (London, March 2, 1907), inviting Germany to discuss the whole problem. Von Bulow refused to consider it. (Reichstag speech, April 30, 1907.)



## 2. SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE.

The British Government endeavored to have the matter taken up at the Second Hague Conference, but Germany refused to attend if this question was raised. (Cook, *How Britain Stroved for Peace*, p. 11.) At the conference a British delegate read a declaration that England was ready to exchange naval estimates with any power with a view to mutual reduction. (2nd Conference de la Paix, *Actes et Documents*, I, pp. 94-95.)

## 3. NEGOTIATIONS, 1908.

In the summer of 1908 the British Government again endeavored to come to an understanding with Germany. Edward VII explained to the German Emperor at Cronberg during his visit to Germany that naval rivalry aroused suspicions and embittered relations, then friendly and natural between the two countries. William II declared he would rather go to war than discuss this question, and the foreign office was equally decisive in refusal. (Cook, *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.) England tried to get the Austrian Emperor to use his influence, but with no result. (Hardin, *Monarchs and Men*, p. 33.) Edward VII is believed to have returned to the charge in his visit to Berlin in February, 1909. (Schmitt, p. 184.)

## 4. PROPOSAL TO RETARD CONSTRUCTION, 1909.

Both sides then began building warships at great speed until Germany reopened the conversations with a speech by Von Tirpitz in the Reichstag. (Reichstag speech, March 17, 1909.) England paid no attention to this, but in the summer of 1909 the new German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to secure British neutrality in case of a continental war, promising in return to "retard" her construction without abandoning the program mapped out up to 1918. (Cook, *Ibid.*, p. 20.) This offer was refused as inadequate.

## 5. FINAL EFFORT AT AGREEMENT, 1910-11.

After some informal exchange of views, the German chancellor proposed (Reichstag speech of Dec. 10, 1910) that England and Germany exchange views and form an understanding as to their economic and political interests, and in return for this understanding Germany would agree not to increase the German program. The British Government was considering this when the German Emperor intervened and declared he would not consent to any program binding Germany not to enlarge her naval program. (Cook, *Ibid.*, p. 25.) On March 30, 1911, the German chancellor in the Reichstag declared (Reichstag speech of that date) that any attempt

to limit naval armaments was impracticable. In late 1911, just before the Haldane mission (See article, *The Haldane Mission*, 1912), Sir Edward Grey indicated acceptance of a proposal that both sides should exchange views on naval matters. This was left unanswered. (Cook, *Ibid.*, p. 25.) From that time on conversations ceased, except as the matter was discussed in connection with the Haldane Mission to Berlin. (See article, that title.)

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### 156. THE PROJECTED ANGLO-GERMAN ACCORD, 1914.

#### 1. IMPROVED ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1913-14.

After the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, that title), the relations between England and Germany were somewhat improved by the cooperation of the two Governments during the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and their success in localizing those conflicts. A large section of English public opinion, including many influential Radicals, insistently urged such a policy and the English Government was manifestly anxious to bring about more amicable relations with Germany. Consequently there was some lessening of distrust on the part of both nations, and an Anglo-German rapprochement seemed possible, at least in respect to certain differences.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg repeatedly stated that "ever since he had been chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England," and Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to London, was sincerely desirous of bringing about an understanding between the two countries.



## 2. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND TURKEY, 1914.

Negotiations between England and Germany seem to have been initiated early in 1913. By June 29, 1914, the day after the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, various agreements relating to the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the Bagdad Railway, and other matters had been made on the part of England and Germany, in some of which Turkey also was included. Some of the agreements with Turkey had been signed, but those with Germany, though ready for signature, had not been signed, pending the completion of certain negotiations between Germany and Turkey. Differences of opinion over the question of publication seems also to have been a cause for delay. The British Government desired publicity, but the German Government objected to the publication of the projected agreement as to the Portuguese colonies in Africa. (Lichnowsky Memorandum, pp. 287-291.)

## 3. THE ANGLO-GERMAN-TURKISH AGREEMENTS OF 1914.

These agreements have never been published, but their general scope and purport is well known from the revelations made by Sir Edward Grey to the House of Commons on June 29, 1914, and from the Lichnowsky Memorandum. It appears that Great Britain withdrew her claim to participate in the construction of the Bagdad-Bussora section of the Bagdad Railway in return for the assurance that the section beyond Bussora or to the Persian Gulf would not be built without British consent. Great Britain thus obtained the assurance that the Bagdad Railway would not go beyond Bussora. British traffic was to enjoy equal rights and equal rates on the whole Bagdad line, as a guaranty of which two Englishmen were to be admitted to the board of directors.

The navigation of the Tigris was recognized as a distinct British interest. Great Britain admitted the suzerainty of Turkey over the Sheikh of Koweit, on condition that his autonomy be not interfered with, and that the status quo, or predominance of British interests in the Persian Gulf, be recognized. In return for these concessions the British Government agreed to the increase of the Turkish customs to 15 per cent.

The projected treaty in regard to the Portuguese colonies in Africa is described by Lichnowsky as a highly advantageous arrangement for Germany (Memorandum, pp. 281-287). It was to have been a revision of the secret Anglo-Germany treaty of 1898 (See article, *The Question of the Portuguese Colonies*).

## 4. CONCLUSION.

Though the projected accord of 1914 related exclusively to colonial matters, it is clear that on the part of Sir Edward Grey it was in-

tended to have a wider significance. It was manifestly intended to further the realization of a hope which he had expressed to Count Metternich in 1912 at the moment when it had become apparent that the accord with Germany then sought by the British Government could not be secured. (See article, *The Haldane Mission to Berlin, 1912.*) Count Metternich in a dispatch to the German Government on March 27, 1912, reported that in conversation with him Grey had "emphatically declared that he did not intend or wish to drop the negotiations, but, on the contrary, he hoped that the intimate relations, for which a way had been paved, would be further extended, and that an agreement on colonial territorial questions would be further striven for, and that after some time had elapsed negotiations for a political agreement similar to that which Great Britain had proposed would be resumed. After a lull had set in regarding the present naval questions a political agreement which proved the good will of both Governments, together with an agreement on colonial questions, would not fail to have a favorable effect on public opinion in both countries, and, he hoped, would also exert an indirect influence on the armament question." (*North German Gazette*, Sept. 7 or 8, 1915. Reprinted by the *London Times*, Sept. 9, 1915.)

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### 157. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1909.

#### 1. CALLING OF THE CONFERENCE.

The Second Hague Peace Conference (See article, that title) had agreed upon a project for the organization, with appropriate sphere of jurisdiction, of an international prize court, but failed to draw up a code of international maritime laws to govern its decisions. There was a general feeling that this state of affairs should be remedied.

The British Government took the initiative, and on February 27, 1908, sent a circular note to the other leading maritime powers proposing a naval conference to consider questions of contraband, blockade, continuous voyage, destruction of neutral prizes, unneutral serv-



ice, enemy character, conversion of merchantmen on the high seas, transfer to a neutral flag, and the question of domicile or nationality as determining enemy ownership of property.

The invitation was accepted, and the conference which met at London on December 4, 1908, was attended by delegates from the following 10 naval powers: Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Russia, Japan, Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, and the United States.

## 2. THE DECLARATION.

The results of the deliberations of the conference, which continued into February, 1909, was a declaration consisting of 9 chapters, 70 articles, and an official report to serve as an official commentary upon the various articles of the declaration. The most important features of the declaration were as follows (figures in parentheses refer to articles):

### PRELIMINARY PROVISION.

“The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.”

### CHAPTER I—BLOCKADE.

#### DEFINITION.

A blockade must really prevent access to the enemy coast line in order to be effective (2), but its effectiveness is a question of fact (3), and a blockade is not regarded as raised if the force is withdrawn by stress of weather (4). A blockade must be applied to ships of all nations, although the commander of the blockading force may give permission to a war ship to enter and leave a blockaded port (6), and in circumstances of distress to a neutral vessel provided she neither discharges or ships cargo (7).

These provisions are but the rules worked out by the courts in the application of the Declaration of Paris, 1856.

#### DECLARATION AND NOTIFICATION.

To be binding a blockade must be declared by the blockading power or its naval authorities (8) and notified to the neutral powers by the blockading power and to the local authorities by the commander of the blockading force (11). The declaration must indicate (a) the date on which it begins, (b) the geographical limits, (c) the period in which neutral vessels may depart (9). This notification is presumed to give knowledge to all vessels leaving a neutral port subsequent to the notification (15).

These rules for declaration and notification follow the American and English practice rather than the French, Italian, Spanish and

Swedish, which require notification to each individual vessel as it approaches the coast line, and the entry of such warning on the ship's papers.

#### LIMITATIONS.

A blockade must not extend beyond the ports or coast line belonging to, or occupied by, the enemy (1). The blockading force must not bar access to neutral ports or coast line (18). Neutral vessels may not be captured for violation of blockade, except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective (17).

#### PENALTY FOR BREACH OF BLOCKADE.

The penalty for the violation of a blockade is capture and condemnation—this liability continues as long as the pursuit continues (20). The cargo is also condemned, unless it be proved that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade (21). The liability for attempted breach thus depends upon knowledge, actual or presumptive (14, see Notification). If a vessel has not actual presumptive knowledge she is notified and the warning entered upon her papers (16). If through the negligence of the officer commanding the force no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local authorities, or no period has been mentioned within which vessels may come out, neutral vessels may come out and pass free (16). Whatever may be the ultimate destination of a vessel or her cargo she can not be captured for breach of blockade if at the moment she is on her way to a nonblockaded port (19).

### CHAPTER II—CONTRABAND.

#### DEFINITION.

The Declaration of London divided commodities into four classes: (*a*) Absolute contraband, which included articles generally used solely in war (22 contains the list); (*b*) conditional contraband, which included articles susceptible of use in war as well as peace (24 contains list); (*c*) articles which were not susceptible of use in war and which may not be declared contraband (28 and 29 contain the list); (*d*) articles susceptible of use in war which were to be provisionally excluded but might be added to the conditional contraband list by means of a declaration to that effect (25).

#### PENALTIES.

Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it be shown to be destined for the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or for the armed forces of the enemy. "It is immaterial whether the



carriage of the goods is direct or entails transshipment or a subsequent transportation by land" (30). This is but a statement of the doctrine of Great Britain and the United States regarding continuous voyages.

Proof of the destination is furnished by the ship's papers unless she is clearly out of her course (32) and is complete when (*a*) the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy, (*b*) when the vessel is to call at enemy ports only or is to touch at any enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching a neutral port for which the goods are documented (31).

Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of armed forces, or a government or department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods can not in fact be used for the purposes of war in progress (33). Enemy destination is presumed if goods are consigned to enemy authorities or a contractor in enemy country who supplies articles of this kind, a fortified place, or base of the enemy. Such presumption does not arise if it is sought to condemn a merchant vessel herself when so destined. If these presumptions do not arise the destination is supposed to be innocent (34).

Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when the vessel is bound for the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces, and when it is not discharged in an intervening port. The ship's papers are the proof unless the vessel is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers (35). Notwithstanding the foregoing, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard (36).

Thus the doctrine of continuous voyage which is allowed in the case of absolute contraband is rejected for conditional contraband except where the country has no seaboard. This was contrary to the desire of England, who believed that the destination of the goods, not the vessel, should determine the character of the goods.

Contraband goods are liable to condemnation (39). Goods belonging to the owner of the contraband and on the same vessel are also liable to condemnation (42).

Vessels carrying contraband, absolute or conditional, may be captured anywhere at any time throughout their voyages, but may not be captured if the carriage of the contraband is completed (37, 38). Vessels carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight forms more than one-half the cargo (40). If the vessel is released she may be compelled to pay cost and expenses (41). Contraband articles on board a vessel encountered on the high seas, but unaware of the out-

break of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband or without opportunity to discharge the contraband, can not be condemned except on payment, nor is the vessel condemned. Vessels are deemed to be aware of a state of war or of the declaration of contraband if they have left a neutral port subsequent to notification of contraband or an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities (43). A vessel not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board may, when circumstances permit, be allowed to turn over the contraband and proceed. This contraband the captor may destroy (44).

#### CHAPTER III.—UNNEUTRAL SERVICE.

The Declaration of London makes a distinction between unneutral services which are similar to the carriage of contraband and unneutral services which vest the neutral with enemy character. (Oppenheim, II, 524.)

(*a*) Unneutral services analogous to the carriage of contraband render the vessel liable for condemnation, and consist in (1) special voyages with the view of transporting individual passengers who are embodied in the armed forces of the enemy or with a view to the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy. (2) Knowledge of either owner, charterer, or the master that the vessel is transporting a military detachment of the enemy or one or more persons who, in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy (45).

(*b*) Unneutral service vesting the ship with enemy character consists in (*a*) taking a direct part in the hostilities, (*b*) being under the control of an agent of the enemy government on board the ship, (*c*) being in the exclusive employment of the enemy government. (*d*) being exclusively engaged in transmission of enemy troops or intelligence in the direct interest of the enemy.

In these cases the vessel will be condemned and in general receive the same treatment as an enemy merchantman (46).

Any individual who is embodied in the armed forces of the enemy and who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel may be made a prisoner of war, even though there be no ground for the capture of the vessel (47).

#### CHAPTER IV.—DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL PRIZES.

The destruction of neutral prizes is generally forbidden by article 48, but article 49 provides that "as an exception, a neutral vessel which has been captured by a belligerent warship, and which would be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of article 48 would involve danger to the safety of the warship or the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time."



The Declaration provides that before the destruction all persons, papers, and documents must be placed in safety (50). A captor who has destroyed a neutral prize must establish that he acted only in the face of exceptional necessity; if he fails to do this he must make compensation (51). If the capture is held subsequently to be invalid, although the destruction justifiable, compensation must be given (52). If neutral goods not liable to condemnation are destroyed compensation must be given to the owner. Finally the captor has the right to demand the handing over, or may proceed himself to the destruction, of any goods liable to condemnation found on board, provided the circumstances warranting the destruction are present (54). The same obligations rest upon the captor with regard to destruction of cargo as in the case of destruction of vessel.

#### CHAPTER V.—TRANSFER TO A NEUTRAL FLAG.

Transfer to a neutral flag is recognized as valid if effected before the outbreak of hostilities, unless it is proved that such a transfer was made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel would be exposed.

When the transfer is effected 30 days before the outbreak of war, the presumption is that it is valid if it is unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither the control of, nor profits arising from the employment of the vessel, remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If the transfer has taken place less than 60 days before the outbreak of hostilities and the bill of sale is not on board, the capture of the vessel gives no right to damages (55).

Transfer to a neutral flag after the outbreak is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is void: (*a*) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port, (*b*) if the right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor, (*c*) if the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing have not been fulfilled (56).

#### CHAPTER VI.—ENEMY CHARACTER.

The character of a vessel is determined by the flag which it is entitled to fly (57). The Declaration did not pronounce upon the vexed question of neutral vessels engaged in a trade closed to them by belligerents in time of peace. That question was expressly declared to remain outside of the scope of the rule just stated (57). The report which accompanied the Declaration stated that on this subject "an understanding could not be reached," and that the "ques-

tion remains absolutely open." (See Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 5 (1909), p. 370.)

Further than this the chapter gave few definite principles. It merely stated the generally accepted practice that the neutral or enemy character of the goods found on an enemy vessel was determined by the character of the owner (58). In absence of proof of the neutral character of goods on an enemy vessel they are presumed to be enemy goods (59).

Enemy goods retain their character until they reach their destination, notwithstanding any transfer except that prior to capture a former neutral owner, on the bankruptcy of the existing owner, exercises recognized legal rights, in which cases they regain their neutral character (60).

#### CHAPTER VII.—CONVOY.

Great Britain had consistently refused to admit that convoyed neutral ships were exempt from search, but by article 61 it was agreed that neutral vessels under the convoy of their own nation are exempt from search. By 61 and 62 investigations of allegations as to the presence of contraband are left to the officer commanding the convoy. If such an investigation reveals the presence of vessels not entitled to convoy they must be given up.

#### CHAPTER VIII.—RESISTANCE OF SEARCH.

Resistance to search has always been punished by condemnation. By British and American practice goods on board were also confiscated, but by the continental practice only the vessel was liable to confiscation.

By article 63 a vessel acquires enemy character through forcible resistance and is liable to condemnation. The cargo is liable to the same treatment as the cargo of an enemy vessel. Goods belonging to the master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods.

#### CHAPTER IX.—COMPENSATION.

If the capture of a vessel or of goods is not upheld by the prize court, or if the prize is released without judgment being given, the parties interested have the right to compensation, unless there were good reasons for capturing the vessel or goods (64).

#### 3. CONCLUSION.

The Declaration of London was never ratified. Consequently it never acquired the character of an accepted statement of what international law is nor of a convention accepted by certain powers and governing their conduct. Rather it is a statement of what, before the World War began, it was felt international law should be. It can in no sense be said to form a part of international law.



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## 158. THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1871-1914.

### 1. INTRODUCTORY.

The Italian Government, taking advantage of the defeat and deposition of Emperor Napoleon III, seized the city of Rome on September 20, 1870, and after a favorable plebiscite of the inhabitants, incorporated it in the Kingdom of Italy. The position of the Pope was defined by the Law of Guarantees enacted by the Italian Parliament on May 13, 1871. (See article, *The Roman Question, 1870-1871.*)

The earlier nineteenth-century plans for ending the temporal sovereignty of the Pope in Italy (e. g. the decree of 1809 uniting the Papal States to the French Empire, the Concordat of 1813, article 8 of the constitution of the Roman Republic (1849), Cavour's project communicated to Cardinal Santucci in 1861, and the memorandum of the Italian Government of Aug. 26, 1870) all contained stipulations designed to safeguard the spiritual independence of the Pope, which were analogous to those of the Law of Guarantees, but in addition stipulations that the arrangements in question (1) should result from an accord between the secular government and the Pope,

and (2) should be ratified by the Catholic powers. In 1871 by the Law of Guarantees the Italian Government attempted to accord the papacy a juridical international position by means of a unilateral act; the Pope refused the arrangement.

## 2. THE POSITION OF PIUS IX, 1870-1878.

From 1870 to his death in 1878, Pius IX maintained an attitude of protest pure and simple against the Italian Government. (For the most important protests see article, The Roman Question, 1870-71, sec. 5). He asserted that the temporal power was necessary to the freedom of the church, refused to accept the Law of Guarantees, and declared himself a "prisoner." He had already by the decree *Non expedit* (Feb. 29, 1868) forbidden the Italian Catholics to hold office or vote for representatives in the Parliament of the Kingdom of Italy.

The powers by their silence apparently acquiesced in the action of the Italian Government. But it should be remarked that, in as much as their attitude was a negative one, the course they pursued perhaps left a way open for them to raise the Roman question subsequently, especially if Italy should alter or violate the Law of Guarantees. No Catholic sovereign visited King Victor Emmanuel II at Rome after 1870. Outside of Italy there was much popular feeling, particularly in France, Spain, and Austria, in favor of the restoration of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. All the Catholic powers, and the Netherlands and Russia, too, continued as before to maintain diplomatic relations with the Vatican and to recognize the juridical position of the Pope in international affairs.

## 3. THE POSITION OF LEO XIII, 1878-1903.

Leo XIII pursued the general policy marked out by his predecessor. In the allocution pronounced on March 28, 1878, he affirmed that "this Apostolic See, violently stripped of its temporal sovereignty, is reduced to a condition in which it can in no wise enjoy the full, free, and unimpeded use of its powers." He reaffirmed (Dec. 30, 1886) the *Non expedit* of Pius IX, forbidding Catholics to vote in elections for the Italian Parliament, but permitting them to participate in communal and municipal elections. Again and again he stated that there can be no peace with Italy until his territorial independence is restored. He persistently refused to recognize Humbert as King of Italy, and in 1900 he protested against the accession of Victor Emmanuel III. Throughout his pontificate he successfully prevented the visit of any Catholic sovereign to Rome.

In the main the Italian Government honorably observed the Law of Guarantees and gave few pretexts to the Catholic powers to inter-



vene in behalf of the Pope. The most celebrated cases in which conflict developed over the operation of the Law of Guarantees between the papacy and the Italian Government were the Martinucci case and the case of the property of the Propaganda. In the former the Italian courts, by affirming (1882) their competency to try civil cases involving employees of the Vatican, denied the papal right of extra-territoriality. In the latter, the courts, by decreeing (1884) the conversion of the property of the Propaganda into State bonds, subjected an international agency of the Pope to Italian law. Notes of Cardinal Jacobini, papal secretary of state, on these matters elicited protests to the Italian Government from the Governments of France and Austria; and the Spanish Government, in answer to a question raised in the Cortes, declared in July, 1884, that it recognized the rights of the Pope to temporal sovereignty.

The protests of Leo XIII. however, were directed less against the alleged violations of the letter of the Law of Guarantees by the Italian Government than against a succession of anticlerical public demonstrations of hostility to the papacy. The most important of these demonstrations took place in connection with the translation of Pius IX's body in 1881, the Masonic celebration of the six-hundredth anniversary of the Sicilian Vespers (1882), the unveiling of the statue of Giordano Bruno at Rome in 1889, and the visit of the French pilgrims to the Vatican in 1892. On all such occasions the Pope renewed his protests.

#### 4. THE ROMAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

So long as France was governed by the Monarchists, the Pope relied upon the "eldest daughter of the church" to protect his interests, and the Italian Government was correspondingly apprehensive of France. What prevented forceful action on the part of France in the seventies was not only her weakness resulting from her military defeat in 1870-71, but the fact that in that period Austria had an anticlerical ministry and Germany was in the midst of a great *kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church. Even after the Republicans had gained the upper hand in France, French foreign policy was still much influenced by the traditions of popular loyalty to the Pope; by 1881 Austria was again more inclined to clericalism; and in Germany Bismarck was seeking to conciliate the Catholics. Without allies, Italy was hopelessly outmatched; the Roman question might range Germany and Austria as well as France against her. "Italy is no friend of ours," said Bismarck when the papal nuncio asked him in 1881 if he would oppose the restoration of the temporal power. It was the common belief in Italy that France intended sooner or later to restore the Pope, or at least to raise the question of the Pope's

position under the Law of Guarantees. French occupation of Tunis in 1881 seemed to confirm the suspicion of the Italians.

This menacing situation was a potent factor in forcing Italy into the Triple Alliance, thereby obliging her to bear a still heavier burden of armaments. Crispi, the Germanophile Italian statesman, asserted that "what has determined the attitude of Italy and her entry into the Triple Alliance, is France's perpetual intention of raising the Roman question." At any rate the Triple Alliance effectually prevented the formation of a league of Catholic powers.

French policy for some years after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance was directed toward obtaining the withdrawal of Italy from the Teutonic alliance by means of economic pressure through unfavorable tariff arrangements and likewise by continued threats of raising the Roman question. In 1887 a conciliatory utterance by Leo XIII was promptly followed by an intimation from Paris that it was inopportune for the Pope to make peace with Italy. Cardinal Rampolla, who became papal secretary of state in that year, was quite Francophile, and paid due attention to the French suggestion. Thenceforth, until near the end of Leo's pontificate and Rampolla's secretariate, the ties between the Vatican and the French Republic seemed to be growing closer.

Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Pope and of Catholics in Germany and Austria as well as in France, the Triple Alliance was renewed in 1891 and again in 1902. On the other hand, the Pope certainly welcomed the alliance between France and Russia, and his appeal to the French Catholics to rally in support of the Republic was probably not unconnected with the Roman question. In 1898 the Vatican was included among the powers which Nicholas II of Russia planned to invite to the first peace conference at The Hague; the Italian Government, however, refused to participate in the congress if the Pope were represented; and the Czar consequently withdrew his invitation to Leo XIII.

In the last years of the pontificate of Leo XIII the international aspects of the Roman question were gradually changed. The Dreyfus case, the advent of Delcassé to the French foreign office in 1898, and the formation of Waldeck-Rousseau's *bloc* ministry in 1899 led to an alteration in the ecclesiastical policy of the French Republican Government. The French law of associations (1901) created serious friction between France and the Vatican; and the rapprochement effected by Delcassé in 1902 between France and Italy boded no good to the temporal claims. At this juncture Leo XIII died (1903); and any hope of securing the continued support of France for the Vatican was dispelled in the ensuing conclave when Austria by the exercise of its veto compelled the abandonment of the candidacy of Cardinal Rampolla, the most Francophile of the cardinals. Out of



this conclave Cardinal Sarto, patriarch of Venice, finally emerged as Pope Pius X. He was not particularly Francophile and was rather a pious priest than an adroit statesman.

Shortly after the accession of Pius X, the President of the French Republic, despite the energetic protests of the pope, visited King Victor Emmanuel III at Rome (Apr. 24, 1904). It was the first time since 1870 that the head of a Catholic power had visited an Italian king in formerly papal territory. In July, 1904, France broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the French separation of church and state in 1905 formally removed France from the list of "Catholic powers."

##### 5. ATTITUDE OF PIUS X AND BENEDICT XV.

Pius X, during his pontificate (1903-1914), made few direct allusions to the Roman question. Formally he assumed the rôle of "prisoner of the Vatican" and repeated the condemnation of "the interference of the Italian Government with the liberty of the church and of the Holy See." But informally there were improved relations between Italy and the Vatican. In May, 1904, Cardinal Svampa met King Victor Emmanuel III at Bologna, with the pope's approval. And in the encyclical letter *Certum consilium*, addressed to the Italian episcopate on June 11, 1905, Pius X so far modified the *Non expedit* of Pius IX as to permit Italian Catholics in certain cases on the recommendation of the bishops to participate in parliamentary elections. In February, 1906, however, he publicly condemned a book by the bishop of Cremona which urged acceptance of the Law of Guarantees. In an allocution pronounced in 1913 on the occasion of the sixteenth centenary of Constantine's edict, the pope demanded "liberty" for the Church and especially for himself. Benedict XV, upon his election in 1914, declared his intention to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor. No new specific protest was directed by him against the Italian Government.

By 1914 it was generally considered by all writers on the subject, outside of a few *Zelanti* in the Roman Curia and a few ultraradicals in Italian Freemasonry, that the Roman question was no longer a question of the restoration to the pope of temporal sovereignty over the states of the church as they had existed in 1859, or even over the entire city of Rome. What seemed to concern Catholics most was the fear that the pope, were he to accept an Italian law of guarantees, would become an Italian subject and would thereby lose his international position and prestige. On the Roman question the great majority of Catholics and possibly Pope Benedict XV himself would seem to be willing to compromise with the Italian Government on the basis of Italy's recognition of the pope's

complete temporal sovereignty over a very limited district of Rome (perhaps the Leonine City) and on the basis of an international law of guarantees. Benedict XV clearly intimated that the Roman question was an international, rather than an Italian, question.

## 159. FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1871-1914.

### 1. INTRODUCTION.

Franco-German relations between 1871 and 1914 may be roughly divided into four periods, each with certain pronounced characteristics: (1) 1871-1878; (2) 1878-1893; (3) 1893-1904; (4) 1904-1914.

### 2. 1871-1878.

This period, which begins with the Treaty of Frankfort and ends with the Congress of Berlin, is marked in France by recovery from the wounds left by the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and in Germany by the consolidation of the new Empire. In general it was marked by no small degree of hostility between the two nations. Bismarck apparently hoped that the war would reduce France to a minor position in European affairs; her rapid recovery and, especially, the reconstitution of her army seemed to have been a severe disappointment to him. He was especially aroused by the emergence in France of a government inclined to royalism and clericalism, particularly at the time when, through the *Kulturkampf*, Bismarck had alienated the Roman Catholic Church from the German Empire. The fear that France might gain the support of the church and through her of Austria in order to gain "revenge for 1871" seemed to have been one of the factors in the "war scare of 1875" (See article, that title). Whether such a league was possible is very doubtful. The position at the head of foreign affairs in Austria of Andrassy, who had defeated the Austro-French alliance project of 1870, would argue against Austrian support for such a scheme. Nor was France, still exhausted from 1870-71, in a warlike state of mind, and the expression of the "revenge" idea given by the anti-German Gambetta—"think of it always, speak of it never"—shows no present intention of an attack on Germany.

The vexed question of the 1875 incident is dealt with elsewhere (See article, *The War Scare of 1875*). Whether or not Bismarck really intended to attack France—and the question is still doubtful—there can be little doubt that the intervention of England and Russia worked a sensible appeasement in the hostile relations between France and Germany. It also appears that there opened more clearly to the French diplomats the vista of a new move, an alliance with Russia. But this hope, for it was little more than that, troubled Bis-



marck little, as he felt sure of the support of Alexander II. Another cause that contributed to the betterment of Franco-German relations was the growth in France of a Colonial Party, which hoped to find in expansion abroad compensation for the losses of 1871. As Bismarck was not interested in spheres outside of Europe he gladly welcomed and even assisted a movement which would attract French interest from the "gap in the Vosges." At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck appears to have promised German support for the French occupation of Tunis—support which, in his rôle of honest broker, he appears to have previously promised Italy. The policy of Bismarck was clear: To bring about an Italo-French clash over Tunis, in the hope that Italy would be forced to rely on Germany for support. In this he was not mistaken, for after the Treaty of Bardo in 1881 Italy fell back on Germany and ultimately became a partner in the Triple Alliance. (See article, *The Formation of the Triple Alliance.*)

### 3. 1878–1894.

This period may be sharply divided into two parts: The first lasting until the fall of the Ferry Ministry in France in March, 1885; the second lasting to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894.

The first half of the period is marked by the ascendancy in French politics of the Colonial Party, with its expansionist aims and an apparent willingness to gloss over differences with Germany, in order to obtain a free hand for colonial expansion. With the exception of brief intervals this party held power in France during the entire first half of the period, and the result was a visible "detente" in the relations between France and Germany. Bismarck, who was absorbed in home politics, the formation of the Triple Alliance, and in the relations of Germany with Russia, had little reason to quarrel with the new French policy. He was, in general, not interested in extra-European matters, and no doubt hoped that the French policy would lead to complications with England, the great colonial power of the world, and thereby further isolate France in Europe. So he made not the slightest objection to the acquisition of Tunis by France in 1881—it gained him the adhesion of Italy to the Triple Alliance—and took pains to point out that Germany viewed with no hostility the new acquisitions of France in Asia and Africa.

This phase came to an end with the resignation of Ferry, the leader of the Colonial Party, in March, 1885. The new controlling forces in France were adverse to the policy of "distant adventures," much more inclined to devote attention to the European situation, and especially to the situation in Alsace-Lorraine, where the German Government had utterly failed to establish itself in the hearts of

the population. A continuation of strong anti-German feeling, increased interest in the army, and renewed agitation for a Russian alliance marked the change in French policy. France had no intention of making war on Germany, but it stood more stiffly on its rights and its dignity. The change of tone in Paris was soon reflected in Berlin, and for the remainder of the period the relations between the two countries were correct, but frigid. The stern and oppressive government of Germany in Alsace-Lorraine aroused much sympathy in France for the Alsatians, and a series of frontier incidents—of which the Schnaebelle affair was the most important (See article, *The Schnaebelle Affair*)—complicated relations yet more, but the statesmen of neither country had any desire that these incidents should lead to war and they were promptly settled. The anti-German sentiment in France between 1886 and 1889 centered in the leadership of Gen. Boulanger, for a time minister of war, but the movement met with the steady opposition of the leading French statesmen and came to nothing. After Bismarck was dismissed in 1890 the relations of France and Germany remained as before, cold but correct.

The growing rapprochement between France and Russia aroused the German Government to the possibility of a "war on two fronts." After 1890 William II tried to parry this danger by personal advances to France, which, though well received, changed but little the fundamental relations of the two countries. This period of detente came to an abrupt end as the result of an unfortunate incident at the time of the visit of the Empress Frederick to Paris in 1891, and there was talk of war in the German newspapers. All the blandishments and threats of Germany failed to stop the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance (See article, *The Formation of the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1893*), which was finally consolidated in 1893. In the meantime the situation in Alsace-Lorraine continued to arouse French sympathy and a growing hostility seemed evident between the two countries.

#### 4. 1894-1904.

This period again may be sharply divided into two divisions: The first between 1894 and 1898, the second between 1898 and 1904.

The first division may be styled after the man who, except for a brief interval, was in charge of French foreign affairs during the entire period, Gabriel Hanotaux. His policy was a revival of that of the French Colonial Party prior to 1885: Expansion in Asia and Africa, less attention to the affairs of Europe. This policy led France once more into hostility with England, the great colonial power of the world, then with Germany. The latter power had started on an expansionist policy also, whose origin dates back to



the early eighties, but this policy also clashed more with the interests of England than with those of France. Indeed, after a brief period of friendship with England in the years immediately following the fall of Bismarck, the policy of Germany abruptly changed to hostility toward England and friendship for France, England's rival in Africa. In 1894 and again in 1897-98 Germany made definite approaches toward France to secure the latter's cooperation in Africa against England; nor was Hanotaux, anxious to secure all possible aid for his expansionist aims, indisposed to accepting German support. How far Germany would have been willing actually to aid France against England is uncertain, but it appears probable that the main German aim was to embroil France and England in order that Germany might mediate at a price. (See article, *The Attempted Franco-German Accord of 1898*.) At least, it appears that this Anglo-French hostility left the Triple Alliance supreme on the Continent, especially as France's partner, Russia, was involved in the Far East, where she, too, was meeting an increasing measure of English hostility. But the immediate result of the two policies was a period of calm and almost of friendship in Franco-German relations, a situation which found its symbol in the participation of French warships in the review at Kiel in 1895.

The Hanotaux policy was ruined by the Fashoda affair. (See article, *that title*.) Just before the matter came to negotiation Hanotaux was succeeded at the Quai d'Orsay by Theophile Delcassé, whose views were very different from those of his predecessor. To his mind the great fact was the supremacy of Germany in Europe, a consideration which far outweighed the colonial gains which might result from the Hanotaux policy. A combination with England for defence against Germany was necessary, and to attain this it appears that Delcassé as early as 1898 was willing to liquidate the colonial difficulties between France and England. As an influential section of English public opinion was strongly inclined to favor an Anglo-German Entente, despite the bitter feeling between Germany and England growing out of the Boer War, it was necessary for Delcassé to feel his way, a fact which made French policy appear wavering for a few years. But when this Anglo-German rapprochement failed Delcassé again took up the policy of approach to England, and in 1904 successfully liquidated the points at issue between the two countries (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*). Outwardly the attitude of the German Government toward this new entente was calm, Von Buelow, the German chancellor, expressly stating in the Reichstag, April 12, 1904, that Germany could not object to it. But beneath the surface trouble was brewing and was sure sooner or later to cause an explosion.

During this period the main effort of German diplomacy appears to have been to weaken or even bring about the dissolution of the Entente Cordiale between England and France. During the first five years of the period the German Government hoped by threats of war to attain its ends. Morocco, guaranteed by England to France in 1904, was chosen as the weak spot in the combination, and every effort was made to drive a wedge between England and France on this issue. Delcassé seemed to have wished to defend vigorously French interests on this issue, even to the extent of going to war with Germany. But the French ministry, conscious of France's military weakness, refused to follow, and Delcassé resigned. The German hints that his dismissal would be acceptable to Germany do not appear to have been the major cause of his resignation, for he remained in office some time after these hints were given (See article, *The Resignation of Delcassé*). France agreed to submit the Moroccan question to an international conference at Algeciras, but the entente was maintained, and at the conference Germany suffered a severe check. (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906*.)

About 1909 Germany appears to have changed her method and to have directed her efforts toward bringing about a Franco-German detente and toward securing French cooperation in German schemes, especially in the Near East. It was an attempt to bring France back to the policy of 1894-1898. It secured support in France among certain international bankers, who saw great profits in such a scheme of cooperation, and among a section of the French socialists, who feared a European war. But the danger lest such a policy would weaken the entente and isolate France in Europe caused French statesmen to draw back, and an abrupt return to the policy of threatening on the part of Germany in 1911 had merely the result of stiffening the resistance of France against German aims and German policy. This took the form of the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir, a port on the west coast of Morocco, followed by a demand either to reopen the Moroccan question or to compensate Germany elsewhere. The real motive behind the act was probably to test the strength of the Anglo-French entente when confronted by the threat of war at a time when both nations were controlled by supposedly pacifist ministries. (See article, *The Morocco Crisis of 1911*.) In this hope the Germans were deceived, as both France and England refused to bow to the threat and drew closer together. In its immediate aim German policy was more successful, in that France bought German consent to the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco by yielding to Germany a large strip of the French Congo.



From 1911 to the outbreak of war in 1914 the relations of France and Germany grew steadily more hostile. Public opinion in Germany was won to the idea that German supremacy on the Continent required the elimination of France, and a flood of pamphlets and articles denounced French "chauvinism" and expounded French "decadency." The German general staff strengthened the army and perfected the plans which were acted on in 1914. In France the army was strengthened to meet the German threat, and the French people came to regard war as almost inevitable. The outbreak of war in 1914 was probably no surprise to the statesmen of either country.

## 160. THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN RELATION TO EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY, 1871-1914.

The years 1871-1914 in European history, if examined from the point of view of the growth of armaments, falls naturally into two periods, 1871-1901 and 1901-1914. During the first of these periods the growth of armaments, the natural result of the birth of new states and the growth of population, was due to more or less local causes and was not necessarily aggressive in its character. In the second period Europe took on the form of two vast hostile coalitions; armaments developed with extraordinary rapidity and assumed proportions hitherto undreamed of; Europe was clearly arming itself for a possible world war.

### I—1871-1904.

#### 1. GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ALSACE-LORRAINE.

In the foreground of the first period, as the chief cause of the increase of European armaments, stands the hostility between France and Germany, due to the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the most important causes of the World War. Only by means of the reorganization and enlargement of its army could France hope to recover and maintain a real independence in the face of victorious Germany. For many years, until 1899, in spite of the rapid growth of Germany's population and the automatic increase in the size of its army, the peace effectives of the two countries—about half a million men—remained substantially equal.

#### 2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

During the first 20 years that followed the Treaty of Frankfort, Germany did not trust solely to her own army for security against a French attack. The alliances with Austria (1879), Italy (1882), and the secret treaties with Russia (See article, Bismarck's Reinsur-

ance Treaty) kept France isolated and added many potential army corps to Germany's strength in case of a defensive war. As a result of the alliances, Germany secured a position on land as dominating as England's position on the seas; the impossibility of attacking Germany under such conditions was so self-evident that France gradually adjusted herself to the situation and the idea of a war of *revanche* was practically abandoned. The tension between the two States was further lessened by the colonial policy of France in the Mediterranean, that diverted her attention from the Rhine and led to a serious misunderstanding with Italy, a misunderstanding that was fully exploited by Germany, the Dual Alliance being expanded into the Triple Alliance (See articles, The Formation of the Dual Alliance 1879, and The Formation of the Triple Alliance, 1882). Italy at the same time entered upon an ambitious colonial policy in Africa, and for several years, under Crispi, large sums were spent on the army and navy. With the close of the century, the failure of Italy's colonial policy, and the renewal of friendly relations with France (See article, The Franco-Italian Rapprochement, 1896-1902) made it possible to pay less attention to military preparedness.

### 3. THE ARMIES OF THE BALKAN STATES.

The Balkan situation, with its rivalry between Russia and Austria, and the struggle of the Balkan States against Turkey led not unnaturally to a steady increase in the size of armies and an improvement in armaments, but it was not until the second period that the armies of the Balkan States played much more than a secondary rôle in the wars of the peninsula; compared with the armies of Germany, Austria, Russia, and France, they were small, poorly equipped, poorly disciplined, and inefficient. They were, however, under the tutelage of the great military powers; their officers studied in France, Germany, Austria, or Russia, and their military supplies, for the most part, were drawn from France and Germany.

### 4. THE EUROPEAN ARMIES IN 1871 AND 1904.

In 1871 the peace footing of the armies of the great powers was approximately: Germany, 402,733; France, 380,000; Austria-Hungary, 246,695; Russia, 700,147; and Italy, 333,555 (fit for immediate service). By 1904 there had been considerable increases; Germany had a peace footing of 605,975; France, 598,003; Austria-Hungary, 391,766; Russia, 1,100,000; Italy, 278,156. In the majority of cases the armies had increased 50 per cent in 33 years; Italy formed a solitary exception. But the increase, although considerable, was spread over a long period of time and, with the exception of France, was the natural result of an increase of population. The diplomatic revolution of 1904-1907 produced a marked increase of armaments.



## II.—1904–1914.

## 5. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1904–1907.

The diplomatic revolution that took place in the years 1904–1907 (See articles, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*, and *The Formation of the Triple Entente*) marked the beginning of the last period and led to unusual increases in the size of the armies of Germany and France and to striking improvements in armaments that rendered the armies more efficient. The vast economic development of Germany, her ambitions in the Balkans, in Asia Minor, in China, in Africa, in South America, and in Belgium; her demand for “a place in the sun”; the announcement by the Kaiser that “Germany’s future lies on the water”; Germany’s great naval program, clearly directed against England; her activities in Morocco and in Asia Minor; her support of Austria-Hungary against Serbia and Russia: all these facts forced the States threatened by the growing military domination of Germany to settle all questions tending to produce international misunderstandings, questions that were evidently of minor importance in the face of the German peril. In 1904 France and England came to an understanding concerning the position of England in Egypt and of France in Morocco; each was to be allowed freedom of action in its own sphere; England was no longer required to set a definite date for withdrawal from Egypt and France was practically permitted a free hand in Morocco (See article, *The Formation of the Entente Cordiale*). Three years later, in 1907, the long-standing feud between Russia and England in the east came to an end; in Thibet, in Afghanistan, and in Persia a settlement was reached satisfactory to both parties, and making possible cooperation of both States against Germany’s aggressive program (See article, *The Formation of the Triple Entente*). The alliances and ententes that thus came into existence, binding together Russia, England, France, and to some extent Japan, by common interests in opposition to Germany, constitute the most extraordinary diplomatic revolution in modern history. Germany claimed that the new alignment was an “encirclement” directed against herself. (See article, *The Formation of the Triple Entente*.) Her program expressed itself in the words “Weltmacht oder Untergang” (world power or downfall). She determined to break the circle before it became too strong for her. The diplomatic situation and Germany’s “will to power” naturally led to a tremendous increase in armaments and finally to the precipitation of a world war.

## 6. GERMANY’S INCREASED ARMAMENTS.

In 1905 Germany increased her peace strength by 10,000 men, and a similar increase was effected in 1911. The most important changes,

however—changes that seemed to indicate the expectation of war in the near future—took place in 1912–13. In 1912 the peace strength of the army (not including officers) was raised to 544,211 and the number of army corps was augmented by two. It was also decided to carry out at once the important provisions of the laws of 1911 and 1912 instead of spreading the execution over three years. This last law “increased enormously the readiness of the army for war and was the greatest effort made by Germany since 1870.” The peace strength was now about 723,000. The law of 1912 was hardly in force before a new bill was laid before the Reichstag raising the peace strength to 870,000 and providing for a large financial levy that would make possible the immediate execution of the plan. The law and the levy were passed in June, 1913. In this year it was estimated that Germany could put 3,100,000 trained men in the field, that it had a reserve of 900,000 men of active army and reserve age who had never served, and 3,000,000 more, mostly untrained, over 36 years of age.

#### 7. FRANCE MEETS GERMANY'S CHALLENGE.

In the face of such threatening preparations France clearly could not be idle. In August, 1913, a law was passed restoring the military service of three years that had been reduced to two in 1905. Only by keeping her citizens one year longer under arms could France increase the size of her active army. It was a defensive measure, one that was taken most unwillingly and taken so late that France was in the midst of reorganization when the war storm burst upon her. Under the new law her peace strength was estimated at about 673,000, or nearly 100,000 less than the peace strength of Germany. What efforts was Russia making to restore the balance?

#### 8. RUSSIA'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

Russia had suffered so severely from the Russian-Japanese war that the whole European situation was affected by it for nearly 10 years (1905–1914), and the belief that even in 1914 she had not sufficiently recovered to count as a decisive factor in a European war undoubtedly weighed heavily with the German Government in 1914 when it faced the great question of war or peace. The reorganization of the Russian Army had begun in 1909 and was practically complete in 1912. During that period the peace strength had varied little, being about 1,300,000; the new law of 1913 brought it up to 1,700,000. The war strength was estimated at 5,400,000. In spite of this Russia was not ready for war; several years more were needed to properly equip and train this army and to construct the necessary strategic railways along the German and Austrian frontiers. Germany understood the military situation in Russia as well as in France.



### 9. MILITARY PREPARATION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Germany looked to Austria-Hungary to restore the balance against France and Russia, and in the critical years 1912 and 1913 there were marked increases in the size of the Austro-Hungarian Army. In 1912 the annual contingent to the common army was raised from 103,000 to 159,500, increasing the peace strength from 295,000 to 350,000 and the war strength from 900,000 to 1,500,000. In 1913 it was proposed to bring the annual contingent up to 270,000, making the peace strength 560,000 and the war strength about 2,000,000. Naturally, this formidable force was not to be directed solely against Serbia; the chief obstacle to the realization of German-Austrian-Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans was Russia. Twice since 1908 Russia has attempted to protect Serbia against Austria-Hungary, and twice she has been cowed by the threat of German intervention. Would she resist in 1914?

### 10. INCREASE IN MILITARY EFFICIENCY.

The whole story of military armaments between 1904 and 1914 is not included in the statement of the increase in the size of the European armies; an army is something more than an aggregate of men. Noteworthy changes were made in armaments, methods of transportation, and in the introduction of new weapons of warfare; science, especially in Germany, was being applied to the preparation for war in a manner hitherto undreamed of. Great progress had been made both in the production of field artillery that in size, rapidity, and accuracy of fire made the old pieces obsolete. The machine gun made its appearance and was manufactured in large numbers in Germany. Germany, especially, recognized the importance of motor transportation and of aerial reconnaissance. The great gun factories in France, Germany, and Austria were being worked to the limit. The armies were not only to be larger but more destructive.

### 11. NAVAL RIVALRY BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

A summary review of the growth of military armaments in relation to European diplomacy would be incomplete without at least a mention of the naval rivalry between Germany and England between 1900 and 1914. Germany's plans of violent expansion overseas could not be carried out so long as the British Fleet dominated the seas. It is true that this British Navy had not interfered with Germany's peaceful economic expansion, but it certainly would not stand idly by if Germany attempted to improve the situation by the seizure of territory in Africa, Asia, or South America. Germany

must, then, for the realization of her plans, have a fleet in the North Sea strong enough, if need be, to take issue with England. Clearly, England's safety depended upon her ability to keep ahead of Germany in the building of warships. In the fact that her navy was to be created almost *de integro*, Germany had a distinct advantage; she had few old ships that must be scrapped. England, on the contrary, was obliged to rebuild her navy between 1904 and 1914 to keep pace with Germany. She was obliged to do more than that; in order to keep in the North Sea a fleet large enough to meet the full strength of Germany, she was forced to come to an understanding with Japan and France, allowing the one to defend the Pacific, the other the Mediterranean. This concentration of England's naval strength in the North Atlantic was the natural result of the policy with which the Triple Entente met Germany's threatening policy.

#### 12. GERMANY DECIDES TO STRIKE.

In 1914 the situation in Europe seemed to be favorable to an aggressive policy on the part of Germany. The situation appeared even to demand it, if she hoped to realize her ambitious plans. To Germany it appeared that delay would improve the military situation of Russia, would solidify the situation in the Balkans unfavorable to Austria-Hungary and Germany, and would bar the route to the East. An immediate war, Germany believed, would find France filled with political dissension and in the midst of her army reorganization; it could probably be undertaken without the interference of England, weakened by civil war in Ireland and by a widespread pacifist sentiment. Germany was ready, "the day" seemed to have dawned, and Germany plunged the world into war.

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## APPENDIX I.

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## APPENDIX II.

### COLLECTIONS OF TREATIES AND DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED.

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












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